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I 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
NINTH SITIING 
Monday, 1st December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Resumption of the session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second 
part of the session (Doe. 1068). 
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1083). 
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
7. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
8. Threat assessment (Presentation of the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 
1076). 
9. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of 
NATO. 
10. Threat assessment (Debate on the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1076). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the session 
The President declared the thirty-second 
ordinary session of the Assembly resumed. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
3. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
4. Examination of credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the 
Assembly that the credentials of the representa-
tives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 9 had 
been ratified by that Assembly with the 
exception of Mr. Collette, Mrs. Lalumiere and 
Mr. Portier as representatives and MM. Alloncle, 
Chenard and Lacour as substitutes in the French 
Delegation, and of Mr. Stegagnini as a substitute 
in the Italian Delegation. 
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In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the 
credentials of the above. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy. 
5. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
6. Observers 
The President welcomed as observers Mr. 
Arne Melchior and Mr. Lasse Budtz from 
Denmark, Mr. Panayotis Katsaros from Greece, 
Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five and Mr. Finn Knutsen 
from Norway, Mr. Antonio Garcia-Pagan and 
Mr. Juan Manuel Fabra from Spain and Mr. 
Kamran Inan from Turkey. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the second part of the session 
(Doe. 1068) 
On the proposal of the President, the 
Assembly deferred consideration of Mr. Stokes's 
report on threat assessment. In consequence, the 
President proposed that the Assembly should, if 
time permitted at the end of the sitting, consider 
MINUTES 
the report of Mr. Kittelmann on -European 
security and the Mediterranean. 
The President pointed out to the Assembly 
that several ministers had asked to speak during 
the session. The timetable of the session had 
therefore been modified. 
Not wishing to limit the duration of the parlia-
mentary debate and with the Assembly being 
unable, for budgetary reasons, to hold night sit-
tings, the President proposed that sittings begin 
at 9.30 a.m. and continue until 7.30 p.m. Votes 
would be held before 6 p.m. 
Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, De 
Decker, Freeson, Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. Reddemann. 
The President replied to the points of order. 
The draft order of business for the second part 
of the session was amended and adopted. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of and debate on tlte report 
of tlte Presidential Committee, Doe. 1083) 
The report of the Presidential Committee was 
presented by Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the 
Assembly. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker. Mr. Burger. 
The debate was closed. 
The Assembly ratified the action of the Presi-
dential Committee. 
9. Address by Mr. Mollemann, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Mollemann answered questions put by 
MM. Soell, Berger, Close, Jung, Tummers, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Fourre, Buchner, 
Cifarelli and Antretter. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy. 
10. Address by Lord Carrington, 
Secretary-General of NATO 
Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Lord Carrington answered questions put by 
Mr. De Decker, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. 
Wilkinson and V alleix. 
13 
NINTH SilTING 
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Hardy and Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
The President invited members of the 
Assembly who had been unable to put their ques-
tions to Lord Carrington to submit them to his 
office. He would ensure their communication to 
the Secretary-General of NATO. 
11. Address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
addressed the Assembly. 
12. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of committees pro-
posed by the Delegations of France and Italy: 
France: 
Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments 
- Mr. Jung as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Bourges; 
- Mr. Alloncle as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Wirth; 
- Mrs. Lalumiere as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Beregovoy; 
- Mr. Koehl as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Jung; 
- Mr. Fourre as an alternate meniber in place of 
Mr. Delebarre. 
General Affairs Committee 
France: 
- Mr. Chenard as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Delebarre; 
- Mr. Portier as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt. 
Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges · 
France: 
- Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Koehl; 
- Mr. Gremetz as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt; 
- Mr. Bassinet as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Fourre. 
MINUTES 
Italy: 
- Mr. Stegagnini as an alternate member in 
place of Mr. Bonalumi. 
France: 
Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations 
- Mr. de Chambrun as a titular member in place 
of Mr. Mercier; 
- Mr. Chenard as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. de Chambrun; 
- Mr. Collette as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Gremetz. 
13. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and thbate on the report of the 
Committu on Defem:e Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1073) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
K.ittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
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NINTH SITTING 
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Cifarelli, Mezzapesa, Muller, 
Giust, Rubbi, Berger and Inan (Observer from 
Turkey). 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
14. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd 
December, at 9.30 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 7.10 p.m. 
APPENDIX NINTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Declercq 
Dejardin 
Pecriaux 
France 
Close (Mrs. Staels-
Dompas) 
Steverlynck 
MM. Bassinet 
Fourre (Berrier) 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Hunault (Croze) 
Bordu (Gremetz) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Jung 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Prat (Oehler) 
Portier 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Antretter 
Berger 
Enders 
Haase 
Fischer (Mrs. Kelly) 
Kittelmann 
MM. Muller 
Buchner (Neumann) 
Reddemann 
Rumpf 
Schulte 
Lenzer (Schwarz) 
So ell 
Spies von Biillesheim 
Mrs. Pack (Unland) 
Mr. Zierer 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Bianco 
Cifarelli 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Stegagnini (Fiandrotti) 
Palumbo (Frasca) 
Giust 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Sinesio 
M asciadri (Vecchietti) 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Goerens 
Linster (Hengel) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Baumel Mr. Bohm 
Galley 
Koehl 
Mermaz Italy 
Seitlinger 
MM. Cavaliere 
Gianotti 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
van den Bergh 
Eisma (de 
K waadsteniet) 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
de Beer (van der 
Werfi) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Garrett 
Terlezki (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Hill 
Freeson (Lord Hughes) 
Jessel 
Lord Newall 
(Earl of Kinnoull) 
Mr. Murphy 
(Lady Jill Knight) 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Osborn 
Sir John Page 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
Netherlands 
Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Ross 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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TENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 2nd December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, Doe. 1069 and addendum). 
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, Doe. 1071 and addendum). 
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, Doe. 1072 and addendum). 
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 
1074). 
S. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 
1078). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 9.45 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendll~~ee register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the fina~~Cial year 1985 -
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
Revised draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the fina~~eial year 1987 
(Presentation of and joint thbate on the reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary A/fain and Administratio11, 
Does. 1069 and tuldelldum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1071 and tuldelldum) 
The reports of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration were presented by Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
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The joint debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Pollidoro and Ferrari 
Aggradi. 
Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Rees, Spies von Blillesheim, 
Linster and Sir John Page. 
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
The joint debate was adjourned. 
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
(Pruentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign A/fain of Luxembourg, 
Clulirmt~~~-in-01/i« of the Coum:il, Doe. 1074) 
The first part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly was pre-
sented by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
Mr. Poos answered questions put by MM. 
Bianco, V alleix, Bohl, Inan (Observer from 
Turkey), Wilkinson and Ferrari Aggradi. 
MINUTES 
5. Political activities ofthe Council- reply to the 
thirty-first annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of tuul debate on tlu report of tlu 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1078) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur. 
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Antoni, Masciadri, Rauti, 
Mezzapesa and Poos (Minister for Foreign 
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TENTH SITTING 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council). 
The debate was adjourned. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m. 
APPENDIX TENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Beysen (Declercq) 
Dejardin 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Fourre (Berrier) 
Jeambrun 
Jung 
Hunault (Koehl) 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Chenard (Mermaz) 
Oehler 
Bohl (Seitlinger) 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Antretter 
Berger 
Enders 
Scheer (Haase) 
Kittelmann 
Muller 
MM. Gerstl (Neumann) 
Schulte 
Lenzer (Schwarz) 
Soell 
Spies von Biillesheim 
Mrs. Pack (Unland) 
Mr. Zierer 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Bianco 
Stegagnini (Cavaliere) 
Fiandrotti (Cifarelli) 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Palumbo (Fiandrotti) 
Masciadri (Frasca) 
Rodota (Gianotti) 
Giust 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Sinesio 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Goerens 
Hengel 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Baumel Mr. Bohm 
de Chambrun Mrs. Kelly 
Collette MM. Reddemann 
Croze 
Galley 
Rumpf 
Gremetz 
Portier Italy 
Mr. Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Eisma 
(de Kwaadsteniet) 
Stoffelen 
van der Sanden 
(Mrs. van der Werf-
Terpstra) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Woodall (Garrett) 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Cox (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Newall 
(Earl of Kinnoull) 
Mr. Murphy 
(Lady Jill Knight} 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Rees (Sir John Osbom) 
Sir John Page 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
Netherlands 
MM. van den Bergh 
Tummers 
van der Werff 
United Kingdom 
MM. Jessel 
Ross 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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ELEVENTH SITIING 
Tuesday, 2nd December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1078 and 
amendment). 
2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Does. 
1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and 
addendum). 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on the revised 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, Doe. 1075 and amendments). 
5. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-fitst annual report of 
the Council; Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-first annual report of the Council; European 
security and the Mediterranean (Votes on the draft recom-
mendations, Does. 1075 and amendments, 1078 and 
amendments and 1073). 
6. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of 
the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987 (Votes on the draft ibudgets, Does. 1071 
and addendum and 1072 and addendum). 
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts (Vote on the 
motion to approve the final accounts, Doe. 1069 and 
addendum). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Political activities of the Council- reply to the 
thirty-first annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1078 and amendment) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Ahrens, Antretter and Giust. 
The debate was adjourned. 
4. Address by Mr. Chirac, 
Prime Minister of France 
Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, 
addressed the Assembly. 
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The President invited members of the 
Assembly who had been unable to put their ques-
tions to Mr. Chirac to submit them to his office. 
He would ensure their communication to the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. Chirac answered questions put by MM. 
Muller, Stoffelen, Bianco, Valleix, Goerens, 
Ahrens, Wilkinson, Close, Soell, Sarti and Sir 
Anthony Grant. 
The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.55 p.m. 
5. Political activities ofthe Council- reply to the 
thirty-first annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee and 
Jlote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1078 and amendment) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Linster, Bassinet, Fourre, 
Eisma, van der Sanden, Burger, Sir Paul 
Hawkins (point of order), MM. Burger and 
Cifarelli. 
The debate was closed. 
Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, 
Amadei and Cox. 
MINUTES 
The President replied to the points of order. 
Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
· The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Bianco: 
1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at 
the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, 
the joint views of the Council on the implica-
tions of the Reykjavik meeting; " 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation 
will be published as No. 438) 1• 
6. EuropetZn security and the Mediterranean 
(Vote on the revised draft recommemllltion, 
Doe. 1073) 
Speaker. Mr. Katsaros (Observer from 
Greece). 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
revised draft recommendation. 
The revised draft recommendation was agreed 
to unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 439) 2• 
7. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
(Revised report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1075 and amendments) 
Mr. Sinesio proposed that the report be 
referred back to committee. 
Speakers: MM. Freeson and Amadei (Rap-
porteur). 
1. See page 22. 
2. See page 24. 
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The Assembly agreed to refer the report back 
to committee. 
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985-
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
Revised draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary A./fain and A.dmini:rtratio11, 
Does. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1072 and addendum) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Sinesio, Masciadri, Bassinet, 
Burger and Goebbels (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council). 
The joint debate was closed. 
Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Cifarelli. 
9. Change in the membership of a committee 
In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
change in the membership of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by 
the Italian Delegation: Mr. Rodota as a titular 
member in place of Mr. Lapenta. 
10. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd 
December, at 9.30 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 7 p.m. 
APPENDIX ELEVENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Beysen (Declercq) 
Dejardin 
De Bondt (Pecriaux) 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Fourre (Berrier) 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Bohl (Croze) 
Andre (Galley) 
Bordu (Gremetz) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Jung 
Bichet (Koehl) 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Prat (Oehler) 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Antretter 
Berger 
Enders 
MM. Fischer (Mrs. Kelly) 
Kittelmann 
Muller 
Gerstl (Neumann) 
Schulte 
Lenzer (Schwarz) 
Soell 
Lemmrich (Spies von 
Biillesheim) 
Mrs. Pack (Unland) 
Mr. Zierer 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Stegagnini (Cavaliere) 
Cifarelli 
Mitterdorfer (Ferrari 
Aggradi) 
Palumbo (Frasca) 
Rodota (Gianotti) 
Giust 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pol/idoro (Pecchioli) 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Sinesio 
Masciadri (Vecchietti) 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Goerens 
Hengel 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
Mr. Mermaz 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bohm 
Haase 
Reddemann 
Rumpf 
Italy 
MM. Bianco 
Fiandrotti 
Rauti 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Worrell (van den 
Bergh) 
Eysink (de 
K waadsteniet) 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
van der Sanden 
(Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
de Beer (van der 
Werfl) 
United Kingdom 
MM. Corrie (Sit Frederic 
Bennett) 
Freeson (Coleman) 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Cox (Garrett) 
Sir Anthony Qrant 
Mr. Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Jessel 
Lord Newall (Earl of 
Kinnoull) 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
United Kingdom 
Sir John Osbom 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Ross 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 438 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
ELEVENTH SIITING 
(i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that 
cannot be separated from the recommendation; 
(ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reached the Assembly in 
time to allow a true dialogue with the Council; 
(iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on its activities twice a 
year; 
(iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European 
position towards the United States strategic defence initiative; 
(v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters; 
(vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament and the limitation of 
armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting; 
(vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of 
WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limi-
tation of armaments; 
(viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also 
exchanges between the Council and the Assembly; 
(ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU and public awareness; 
(x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communicate to the Assembly, 
insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it; 
(xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the role it assigns to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee or the activities of that body; 
(xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its interna-
tional secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985; 
(xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies " must also take 
account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has 
not followed up this recognition; 
(xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up 
the Rome declaration; 
(xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present 
and future of Western Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over the place the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU; 
(xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively pre-
venting the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration; 
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be 
held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the 
Reykjavik meeting; 
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3. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and 
indicate what steps it intends to take to this end; 
4. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previ-
ously been given in informal communications to some of its organs; 
5. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its 
meetings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained; 
6. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors; 
7. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, 
account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I; 
8. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the F'deral Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the participation of all member countries; 
9. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that 
the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned 
to the agencies; 
10. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates 
effectively; 
11. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on 
the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics; 
12. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the 
European armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the 
Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977; 
13. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armam.ents industries 
carried out by the SAC; 
14. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-
operation between existing European institutes for security studies "; 
15. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities; 
16. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU; 
17. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of 
its work. 
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RECOMMENDATION 439 
on European security and the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East 
region and the Mediterranean area has not changed; 
(ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has 
not increased since the committee's last report; 
(iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of 
atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population; 
(iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and 
southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and 
positions of allied countries; 
(v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region 
caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian involvement in world 
terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region; 
(vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO; 
(vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appro-
priate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, 
when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended: 
1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in 
the Mediterranean area: 
(i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating mari-
time surveillance under COMMARAIRMED; 
(ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered 
by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies; 
(iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the prin-
ciple of the freedom of the seas; 
(iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus 
helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent. 
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by pro-
viding military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed 
forces; 
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval 
on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a 
mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting 
defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members; 
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic 
position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-
eastern flank; 
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, 
inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to com-
pleting the NATO command structure in the area; 
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6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and 
causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region; 
7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus; 
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which 
will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General; 
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world 
and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security 
problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction; 
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples 
of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region. 
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Wednesday, 3rd December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 (Votes on the draft texts, Dqcs. 1069 and addendum, 
1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda). 
2. European helicopters for the 1990s (Presentation of the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, Doe. 1077 and amendments). 
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg. 
4. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence 
Procurement of the United Kingdom. 
5. European helicopters for the 1990s (Debate on the report of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, Doe. 1077 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 9.35 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Statement by the President of the Assembly 
Before introducing the first item on the orders 
of the day, the President made a statement. 
Because of the important matters on the 
agenda of the session, the work still to be done, 
the Assembly's difficulty so far in dealing with 
the various problems before it in view of the 
quite exceptional political situation of Western 
European Union vis-a-vis decisive world events 
described in particular in the important 
addresses and comments by Lord Carrington, 
Mr. Poos and Mr. Chirac, to mention only three 
addresses, he announced his decision to convene 
the Assembly, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure, in extraordinary session to complete 
its programme of work and thus strengthen 
WEU's contribution to the management of fast-
developing topical events. 
He would ask the Presidential Committee, 
which was to meet on Thursday morning, to take 
the necessary decisions on the date, duration and 
agenda for implementing this plan. 
.... ~ .... 
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On behalf of the Presidential Committee, he 
would inform members of the Assembly of these 
decisions as soon as possible so that each of 
them, and of course the Assembly committees, 
might make the necessary arrangements. This 
would be done with due regard to the commit-
ments of members of the Council and activities 
in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 -
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
Revised draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Votes on the draft texts, Does. 1069 and addendum, 
1071 and adlhndum and 1072 and addenda) 
Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration, moved a draft order on the draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1987. 
He asked the Assembly to agree to his pro-
posals on the problem of pensions, on the 
restructuring of the Office of the Oerk and on 
the adoption of a supplementary budget within 
three months. 
MINUTES 
On the last point, he asked the President of the 
Assembly and the Presidential Committee to 
negotiate with the Council to that end. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
motion to approve the final accounts of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985. 
The motion was agreed to. 
Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Hardy. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
revised draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1986. 
The revised draft budget was agreed to. 
The President proposed that the Assembly 
agree to the draft order, at addendum 11 to Doc-
ument 1072, on the draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987, taking particular account of 
the comments made by Sir Dudley Smith, 
Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The draft order and, in consequence, the draft 
budget of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 were agreed to. (This order will be pub-
lished as No. 65) 1• 
5. European helicopters for the 1990s 
(Presentation of and debllte on tM report of the 
Committee on Scientifrc, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 1077 and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and 
Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Sir John Osbom and Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
The debate was adjourned. 
6. Address by Mr. Fischbach, 
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg 
Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly. 
7. Address by Lord Trefgame, Minister of State 
for Defence Procurement 
of the United Kingdom 
Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence 
Procurement of the United Kingdom, addressed 
the Assembly. 
1. See page 30. 
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Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgame answered 
questions put by MM. Wilkinson, Ahrens, Sir 
Paul Hawkins, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Valleix, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir John Os born. 
8. European helicopters for the 1990s 
(Ruumed debllte on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Quutions 
and 11ote on tM draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1077 and amendme11ts) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: Mr. V alleix and Sir Paul Hawkins. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Sir John 
Os born. 
2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Bearing in mind the role of the EEC in co-
ordinating manufacturing capacity, including 
that of the aircraft industry and, in particular, 
the helicopter industry; " 
Speakers: Sir John Osbom, Mr. Wilkinson and 
Sir John Osbom. 
The amendment was withdrawn. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir John 
Os born. 
1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Aware that the role of the helicopter in 
modem warfare is influenced by the use of 
anti-helicopter missiles such as the 'Stinger' 
and by the use of 'anti-helicopter' heli-
copters," 
Speakers: Sir John Osbom and Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Sir John Osbom proposed the withdrawal of 
his amendment. 
Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg ; Dr. Miller 
(point of order). 
Mr. Hardy moved Amendment 1, previously 
in the name of Sir John Os born. 
Speakers: Lady Jill Knight, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
MINUTES 
The amendment was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 440) 1• 
Speaker (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller. 
l. See page 31. 
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9. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3.25 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m. 
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APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Declercq 
Dejardin 
De Bondt (Pecriaux) 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Chenard (Mermaz) 
Prat (Oehler) 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Antretter 
Bohm 
Enders 
K.ittlemann 
Muller 
Zierer 
Italy 
MM. Bianco 
Stegagnini (Cavaliere) 
Cifarelli 
Palumbo (Fiandrotti) 
Masciadri (Frasca) 
Giust 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Rauti 
Sarti 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Konen (Goerens) 
Hengel 
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MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Worrell (van den 
Bergh) 
Eisma (de 
Kwaadsteniet) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Berrier MM. Berger 
de Chambrun Haase 
Collette Mrs. Kelly 
Croze MM. Neumann 
Galley Reddemann 
Gremetz Rumpf 
Jeambrun Schulte 
Jung Schwarz 
Koehl Soell 
Mrs. Lalumiere Spies von Biillesheim 
MM. Portier Unland 
Seitlinger 
MM. Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
de Beer (van der 
Werft) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic B~nnett 
Mr. Freeson (Coleman) 
Sir Geoflfey Finsberg 
Mr. Edwards (Garrett) 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Corrie (Jessel) 
Ward (Earl of 
K.innoull) 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Osborn 
Sir John Page 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Gianotti 
Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
United Kingdom 
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1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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The Assembly, 
ORDER 65 
on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
TWELFTH SITTING 
Noting that the Council, in communicating its prior opinion, has explained that it was continuing 
to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and that it will 
study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible, 
1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of the present session its draft budget, as amended by 
the Council, on condition that within a maximum of three months a supplementary budget for 1987 be 
established taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the documents 
already submitted to the Council; 
2. Consequently INsTRucrs the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to this end. 
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RECOMMENDATION 440 
on European helicopters for the 1990s 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential of the heli-
copter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the 
United States and the Soviet Union; 
(ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of heli-
copters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter prepon-
derance of the Warsaw Pact forces; 
(iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters 
by NATO; 
(iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the 
negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States; 
(v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States heli-
copter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the 
United States; 
(vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states ofWEU based on 
transnational co-operation; 
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, 
surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter; 
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters 
and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry; 
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to 
harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint pro-
curement within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types; 
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the 
United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the 
governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in 
terms of orders; 
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to interna-
tional and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic 
pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic impor-
tance. 
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THIRTEENTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 3rd December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. 
2. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the 
draft order, Doe. 1081). 
3. Parliamentary and public relations (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 
1080). 
4. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West rela-
tions (Presentation of the report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 1079). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, 
Minister of Defence of Italy 
Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. 
Sarti, Cifarelli, Close, Stegagnini, Pollidoro, lnan 
(Observer from Turkey), Budtz (Observer from 
Denmark), Hill, Kittelmann, Palumbo, Ahrens 
and Bianco. 
The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and 
resumed at 5.20 p. m. 
Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
4. Outline of a new booklet 
on Western European Union 
(Presentation of and lhbtlte on tile report of the 
Committee for Parlilunentary and Public Rellltions 
and Pote on tile draft orthr, Doe. 1081) 
The report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was presented by 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur. 
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The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Tummers and Morris. 
The debate was closed. 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur, and 
Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, 
replied to the speakers. 
Speaker: Mr. Tummers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to unanimously. 
(This order will be published as No. 66) 1• 
5. Parliamentary and public relations 
(Presentation of and lhbtlte on tile report of tile 
Committee for Parlilunentary and Publk Rellltions 
and Pote on tile draft resolution, Doe. 1080) 
The report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was presented by 
Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Murphy, Hill and Enders. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
resolution. 
l. See page 35. 
MINUTES 
The draft resolution was agreed to unan-
imously. (This resolution will be published as 
No. 75) 1• 
6. Developments in the Soviet Union 
and East-West relations 
(Prue11tatio11 of the report of 
the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1079) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Close, Rapporteur. 
1. See page 36. 
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Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
7. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th 
December, at 10.15 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m. 
APPENDIX THIRTEENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Declercq 
Dejardin 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Collette 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Bohm 
Enders 
Kittelmann 
Schulte 
Italy 
MM. Bianco 
Stegagnini (Cavaliere) 
Cifarelli 
Palumbo (Fiandrotti) 
Masciadri (Frasca) 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Rauti 
Sarti 
Luxembourg 
Mrs. H ennicot-Schoepges 
(Burger) 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
W orrel/ (van den 
Bergh) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Berrier 
de Chambrun 
Croze 
Galley 
Gremetz 
Jeambrun 
Jung 
Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Mermaz 
Oehler 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Antretter 
Berger 
Haase 
Mrs. Kelly 
MM. Muller 
Neumann 
Reddemann 
Rumpf 
Schwarz 
Soell 
Spies von Bullesheim 
Unland 
Zierer 
MM. Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
de Beer (van der 
Werft) 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Morris (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Terlezki (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Lord Newall (Sir Paul 
Hawkins) 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Jessel 
Earl of Kinnoull 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Murphy (Sir John 
Os born) 
Lord Rodney (Sir John Page) 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Gianotti 
Giust 
Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Luxembourg 
MM. Goerens 
Hengel 
United Kingdom 
MM. Coleman 
Garrett 
Hardy 
Ross 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
ORDER 66 
on the outline of a new booklet on 
Western European Union 
THIRTEENTH SITTING 
{i) Noting the report on the outline of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations; 
(ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians 
and the public in member countries, 
INSTRUCTS its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
1. To ensure that a booklet based on the text submitted is published as soon as possible in the five 
languages of the WEU member countries; 
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is regularly brought up to date. 
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RESOLUTION 75 
on parliamentary and public relations 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the frequent mention of the reactivation ofWEU in debates in some member parlia-
ments; 
(ii) Convinced, however, that still more parliamentarians should take an active part in such debates 
in all member parliaments; 
(iii) Welcoming the United Kingdom Government's initiative in presenting a written report to par-
liament on the activities of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs, 
INVITES national delegations 
1. To seize every opportunity to discuss the role of Western European Union in parliamentary and 
public debates on security and defence matters; 
2. To urge the other governments of member countries to follow the example of those of Germany 
and the United Kingdom and produce regular written reports to parliament on the activities ofWEU; 
3. To approach their national parliaments and governments to ensure they acknowledge the due 
central and priority role of the Assembly, which is the most direct expression of the political and demo-
cratic will of member countries; 
4. To continue impressing upon the governments of member countries the need to allocate to the 
Assembly the financial and technical means essential for the effective pursuit of its public relations 
activities. 
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FOURTEENTH SITTING 
Thursday, 4th December 1986 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations 
(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. I 079). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10.30 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
Speaker: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
3. Developments in the Soviet Union 
and East-West relations 
(Debllte 011 the report of the Ge~~eral Affairs Committee 
arul rote 011 the draft m:ommerulatio11, Doe. 1079) 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Martino, Pecriaux and 
Tummers. 
Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Burger, 
Palumbo, Bogaerts, De Decker, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. Hill. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Close, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
Mr. Martino, Vice-Chairman of the com-
mittee, replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
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In accordance with Rule 33(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, Mr. Stoffelen asked for a vote by roll-
call. 
More than five members having concurred, 
the Assembly proceeded to a vote by roll-call. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to on a 
vote by roll-call (see Appendix 11) by 24 votes to 
14 with 1 abstention; 9 representatives who had 
signed the register of attendance did not take part 
in the vote. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 441) 1• 
4. Statement by the President 
The President informed the Assembly that the 
Presidential Committee had decided that the 
extraordinary session would take place in 
Luxembourg on 28th and 29th April 1987 with 
the following agenda: 
1. Reactivation of WEU 
2. Disarmament 
3. Budgetary and administrative questions. 
Speakers: MM. Cox, Dejardin, Dr. Miller, Mr. 
De Decker, the President, Mr. Goebbels (Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
representing the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council). 
5. Close of the session 
The President declared the thirty-second 
ordinary session of the Assembly closed. 
The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m. 
l. See page 40. 
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APPENDIX I 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Close (Declercq) 
Dejardin 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Caro 
Collette 
Alloncle (Galley) 
Chenard (Mermaz) 
Prat (Oehler) 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bohm 
Enders 
MM. Kittelmann 
Italy 
Spies von Biillesheim 
Zierer 
MM. Palumbo (Fiandrotti) 
Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Rauti 
Sarti 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Burger 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges 
(Goerens) 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
de K waadsteniet 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France MM. Muller 
Neumann 
MM. Berrier Reddemann 
de Chambrun Rumpf 
Croze Schulte 
Gremetz Schwarz 
Jeambrun Soell 
Jung Unland 
Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Portier Italy 
Seitlinger 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Federal Republic of Germany Bianco 
Cavaliere 
MM. Ahrens Cifarelli 
Antretter Ferrari Aggradi 
Berger Frasca 
Haase Gianotti 
Mrs. Kelly Giust 
MM. Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Cox (Coleman) 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Parry (Garrett) 
Terlezki (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Edwards (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Hill 
Woodall (Lord Hughes) 
Earl of Kinnoull 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Murphy (Sir John 
Osbom) 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Ward (Wilkinson) 
MM. Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Hengel 
Netherlands 
MM. van den Bergh 
van der Werff 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Jessel 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Ross 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations (Doe. 1079) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Abstentions ................................... . 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Baumel 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Bogaerts 
B6hm 
Burger 
Collette 
Close (Declercq) 
Palumbo (Fiandrotti) 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bassinet 
Cox (Coleman) 
Dejardin 
Enders 
Ayes: 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mrs. H ennicot-Schoepges 
(Goerens) 
Mr. Ter/ezki (Sir Anthony 
Grant) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Mr. Hill 
Earl of Kinnoull 
Lady Jill Knight 
Noes: 
MM. Mezzapesa 
Martino (Milani) 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Spies von Bullesheim 
Steverlynck 
Valleix 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
Zierer 
MM. Woodal/ (Lord Hughes) 
Chenard (Mermaz) 
Dr. Miller 
Parry (Garrett) 
Edwards (Hardy) 
MM. Prat (Oehler) 
Pecriaux 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Abstentions: 
Mr. de Kwaadsteniet 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 441 
011 developme11ts ;, the Soviet U11io11 a11d East- West relatio11s 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military 
deployment not justified by the requirements of its security; 
(ii) Considering that, in spite of the Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the name of detente have 
led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situ-
ation in the peoples' democracies; 
(iii) Noting that the size of the amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the funda-
mental reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the 
Soviet Union requires a reduction in its military effort; 
(iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction; 
(v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and 
foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that 
country's external relations; 
(vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of 
living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure; 
(vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many 
proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments; 
(viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of 
confidence-building measures; 
(ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective con-
cessions in international negotiations; 
(x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, 
but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near 
future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal of true negotiations which 
would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level; 
(xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces - which should be 
brought to the lowest possible level - in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been 
achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the 
Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe; 
(xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise their views on ques-
tions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners; 
(xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive role to play in this matter and gratified that it 
has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals; 
(xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide relations of all kinds 
between the West and the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European posi-
tions on armaments and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative; 
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
are started; 
3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the 
third world the struggle it calls " anti-imperialist " ; 
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4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to 
allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military 
effort; 
S. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in 
Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeo-
pardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, 
including SS-2ls, SS-23s and SS-24s; 
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an 
agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons. 
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 

NINTH SITTING 
Monday, 1st December 1986 
SUMMARY 
1. Resumption of the session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Adoption of the minutes. 
4. Examination of credentials. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hardy (point of order). 
S. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
6. Observers. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second 
part of the session (Doe. 1068). 
Speakers: The President; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, 
Mr. De Decker, Mr. Freeson, Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Mr. Reddemann. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1083). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Goerens (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Burger. 
9. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Replies by Mr. Mollemann to questions put by: Mr. Soell, 
Mr. Berger, Mr. Close, Mr. Jung, Mr. Tummers, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fourre, Mr. Buchner, Mr. 
Cifarelli, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Hardy (point of order). 
10. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of 
NATO. 
Replies by Lord Carrington to questions put by: Mr. De 
Decker, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Valleix. 
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
12. Changes in the membership of committees. 
13. European security and the Mediterranean (Presentation 
of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Doe. 1073). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kitte1mann (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Muller, 
Mr. Giust, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Berger, Mr. Inan (Observer 
from Turkey), Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman and 
Rapporteur). 
14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
Appendix: 
Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
I declare resumed the thirty-second ordinary 
session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union which was adjourned on 5th June 1986 at 
the end of the eighth sitting. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub.:. 
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
l. See page 15. 
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3. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the eighth sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes al'e agreed to. 
4. Examination of credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the examination of the creden-
tials of the new representatives and substitutes 
nominated since our Assembly's last part-session 
whose names have been published in Notice No. 9. 
In accordance with Rule 6( 1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, these credentials have been attested 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
by a statement of ratification from the President 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, with the exception of those of Mr. 
Collette, Mrs. Lalumiere and Mr. Portier as rep-
resentatives and Mr. Alloncle, Mr. Chenard and 
Mr. Lacour as substitutes in the French Dele-
gation, and that of Mr. Stegagnini as a substitute 
in the Italian Delegation. Those members were 
nominated after the adjournment of the session 
of the Assembly. 
It is now for the Assembly to ratify those cre-
dentials under Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
These nominations are in the form prescribed 
by the rules and no objection has been raised. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, we may 
proceed to ratification without prior referral to a 
credentials committee. 
Is there any objection? ... 
The credentials are ratified subject to subse-
quent ratification by the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe. 
I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues. 
I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. This is a serious point of 
order. It is not party political and I believe that I 
am speaking for many members of the Assembly 
regardless of political persuasion. I am sure that 
they will endorse the comments that I feel to be 
essential. 
I had originally thought of raising the issue 
under item 4 but since the point of order con-
cerns much more extensive considerations than 
merely this session, it is appropriate that I raise 
the matter now. You will be aware that, over a 
substantial period, many members of the 
Assembly have become increasingly restive 
about the proliferation of visiting speakers. In 
my recollection it was clearly urged that there be 
no more than two visiting speakers in any 
session of the Assembly. 
When I arrived in Paris today and looked at 
the order paper I saw forecast five or six 
speakers. We do not travel in winter across 
Europe merely to be a mobile audience. We are 
supposed to be a parliamentary assembly. There 
are grave matters that we have to consider. We 
do not come here - I do not want to be offensive 
about our visitors - to listen to rather trite pre-
sentations from ministers who may wish to be on 
the ministerial bandwagon. We are here to con-
sider serious reports. We shall not have time to 
do so because of this appalling proliferation of 
visitors. I do not wish to be rude about the vis-
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itors but we are prevented from fulfilling the 
prime task of this Assembly, which is to consider 
our reports and so on. 
You will understand, Mr. President, that the 
point I make could be made by someone on the 
right of European politics and I know that con-
servatives as well as socialists, liberals and 
christian democrats share this view. I have no 
means of telling whether it is the majority view 
of the Assembly but I suspect that it is. It is cer-
tainly the majority view of those of us who have 
been involved in the Assembly for a long 
time. 
I ask you, Mr. President, to rule on my point 
of order and to confirm that a maximum of two 
speakers was the decision reached by the 
Assembly. I ask you, further, to make whatever 
alterations are necessary to give this Assembly 
time to do justice to the subjects that we should 
be considering this week. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I think you 
will find that your comments are to some extent 
answered by what I shall have to say in a few 
moments. The chair is faced here with a problem 
of a political character which is not entirely pre-
judicial to the work of our Assembly, as the 
presence of members of government is part of a 
policy which we shall be examining carefully 
during the present session. 
I wish to take issue only with your use of the 
word "visitors". They are, in fact, members of 
the governments of member countries who, 
according to the Charter, have a right to address 
the Assembly whenever they wish. I do not want 
to start a debate, and I assure you that your point 
has been noted. We have already put the 
problems you mention to the Presidential Com-
mittee, and appropriate action will be taken. 
With your permission, we shall now proceed 
with our business. · 
I shall shortly be calling those who wish to 
raise points of order when we come to discuss 
the order of business. 
First, as President of the Assembly, I wish to 
welcome the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
of Ministers. I thank him for coming here and for 
having made the necessary arrangements ena-
bling the Council presidency to take a full part in 
all our work. This initiative is particularly 
welcome to the Assembly, as it fulfils a wish 
which has been expressed on a number of occa-
sions. 
5. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Minister, 
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, all 
observers who have drawn a parallel between the 
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work of the various European parliamentary 
assemblies have stressed the extraordinary 
cohesion always found in the WEU Assembly 
from the moment there was question of matters 
relating to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and the organisation which 
brings us together here. 
This cohesion is all the more credible since we 
are perfectly familiar with the clash of various 
opinions and political sensibilities inherent in all 
parliamentary assemblies. The session now 
starting is not expected to be any more irenic 
than others from this point of view. As always, 
each and every one of us will fight for the ideas 
to which he is attached. 
Strengthened by your confidence, allow me to 
tell you that the very widespread support the 
Assembly has always given me on matters 
relating to WEU will, as in the past, continue to 
be a source of inestimable encouragement and 
assistance, particularly for everything concerning 
relations between the Assembly and the Council. 
The Assembly's firmness and the unanimity 
always shown by the Presidential Committee 
were essential for defending a cause which, 
although not yet finally won, has nevertheless 
had some success about which I will say a few 
words. 
The Assembly's cohesion has produced and is 
still producing tangible results for the future of 
Europe as long as it is expressed with sufficient 
strength to find a response among public opinion 
and consequently to be taken into consideration 
by the governments which are members of the 
Council. 
This is true for the most important and more 
minor matters alike. In the thirty-two years of its 
existence the WEU Assembly has worked out, if 
not a doctrine, which cannot be the task of a par-
liamentary assembly, at least what may be called 
a message. 
This message is a simple one but clear enough 
to anyone looking back on all the texts it has 
adopted, often unanimously. It may be summed 
up as an affirmation of the de facto solidarity 
that unites the whole of Western Europe, 
whether it likes it or not, from the moment the 
security of one of our countries is threatened. 
The modified Brussels Treaty merely translated 
into a positive act a reality greater than us and 
which obliged our countries to face it together. 
A second observation stems from this one, i.e. 
that no true European union can acquire the sta-
bility necessary for any political achievement if it 
fails to assume the consequences of this soli-
darity, in other words if, at political level, it does 
not face up to all the requirements implied by 
European security. 
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Our colleagues in the European Parliament 
understand this full well and often claim the 
right to debate matters relating to security. So 
far, they have not been successful because our 
governments recognise only the WEU Assembly 
as having defence responsibilities. 
If some obscurity surrounded the way Europe 
considered security matters should be handled, 
the signing of the single European act by the 
twelve member governments of the European 
Community and the ratification of this text by 
our national parliaments makes the situation 
clearer since this act, while leaving aside the 
question of European security, recognises that 
the implementation of WEU's responsibilities is 
part of an overall process from which a European 
union should progressively emerge. 
Thus, the Rome declaration, which remains 
the charter for the reactivation of WEU, is no 
longer an isolated act but, in accordance with 
what we have always asked for, fits into a process 
covering every area of European activity. That is 
what I wished to say when referring, in the mem-
orandum of the Presidential Committee issued 
last September, to the idea of a European 
political area. 
This can but fortify us in our approach to the 
Council calling for full application of the prin-
ciples to which it subscribed in October 1984 and 
which we recalled in this memorandum. Those 
of us who took part in the joint meeting between 
the Presidential Committee and the Council on 
14th November at the close of the ministerial 
meeting in Luxembourg were able to note that, 
on this point at least, the Assembly's message 
had been received. 
Admittedly, the so-called informal nature of 
the Luxembourg meeting did not in principle 
allow any decisions to be taken. However, it does 
seem to have started off a process which should, 
if pursued, give substance to that European 
defence policy which we have for so long 
deplored as being faltering. 
Confirmation of this assertion is to be found in 
the particularly large number of ministers and 
others who have asked to speak or who accepted 
invitations to do so. What several of them rep-
resent is certainly not without significance. Their 
remarks should confirm and explain this new 
course being followed by the Council. The 
coming of the French Prime Minister is an event 
of particular importance and no one can doubt 
that his address will be listened to most atten-
tively. 
It is obviously not to the weight of our deliber-
ations alone that we owe what is undeniably a 
success for our Assembly but, above all, to 
events and circumstances which have showed 
public opinion, sometimes not very aware of the 
facts of international life, and reticent govern-
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
ments that the point of view we uphold meets 
the challenge now facing Europe. 
The reports we are to debate, particularly those 
by Mr. Close and Mr. Amadei, show there is 
little doubt that the facts revealed to the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance by 
the Reykjavik summit meeting, in spite of its 
failure, will be the hub of our debates. Similarly, 
it is clear that this event has exercised and will 
continue to exercise a decisive role in the 
direction followed by our governments. 
In any event, the ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg has already shown that this summit 
meeting has definitely changed the way Euro-
peans view the future of their security. Reykjavik 
probably did more for what the Assembly has 
been asking the Council for thirty-one years than 
all our recommendations if it has finally con-
vinced our governments that they should use 
WEU to hold effective political consultations on 
security and defence matters and to translate 
these consultations into political action, particu-
larly in NATO. The Assembly has often said that 
WEU should be the start of the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance. Circumstances seem at 
last to have inscribed this in the Council's inten-
tions. 
The reactivation of WEU is not an adminis-
trative option or an institutional restructuring, 
even if it involves operational changes. It is 
above all the decision, set out in the Rome decla-
ration but hardly carried into practice before the 
Luxembourg meeting, to give political content to 
European defence. 
It is evident that the new direction followed by 
the Council will have considerable and varied 
repercussions on relations between the govern-
mental and parliamentary organs of WEU. 
First, since the question of reactivating WEU 
was raised, the rigid framework in which the 
Council worked and set its relations with the 
Assembly has weakened considerably and some 
aspects seem doomed to disappear, or almost, in 
the fairly near future. It is enough here to recall 
the place occupied by the protocols organising 
the control of armaments in WEU's activities for 
thirty years to illustrate how cumbersome and 
rigid the framework was. 
If reactivation becomes a fact, as what we 
know of the Luxembourg meeting allows us to 
hope, it would henceforth be political initiatives 
ill-fitting the old structures that would govern 
most of what was done in WEU. Quite new 
forms of relations between the governmental 
organs of the organisation and the Assembly 
would then have to be worked out and imple-
mented. We started this task two years ago in 
agreement with successive Chairmen-in-Office of 
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the Council, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and 
now Mr. Poos, who will be addressing us 
tomorrow, and experience so far has given some 
satisfaction, as Mr. Goerens emphasises in the 
report on the activities of the Presidential Com-
mittee which he is to submit to you for your 
approval. 
However, these relations fall well short of our 
rightful expectations. Much remains to be done, 
particularly to ensure that the Assembly is kept 
adequately and as strictly informed as possible 
about the content and form of the multiple but 
not very well organised activities which the 
Council seems to have chosen. so that we may 
debate them properly. The increase in the 
number of informal meetings and messages can 
in no way be taken as material for what must be 
a public, clear dialogue between a parliamentary 
assembly and an executive body. 
The European security committee associating 
the political directors from ministries for foreign 
affairs and representatives of ministries of 
defence, decided upon at the Luxembourg 
meeting, would provide the Council with a per-
manent instrument for its political activities. We 
have received an assurance from the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council that this committee 
would be set up in the framework ofWEU which 
obviously implies that the Council must report 
to the Assembly on its work. This is a point on 
which we shall have to be demanding and vigi-
lant since there is little doubt that this executive 
body, which will elude statutory commitments, 
will soon be tempted to veil in nebulous, 
informal and vague terms all the difficulties it 
encounters in trying to express joint seven-power 
opinions. 
We consider this a vital matter and experience 
shows there is ample scope for concern. 
Recently, the repeated refusal of the Council, in 
spite of its earlier promises, to report on the 
activities of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group has made us wonder what kind 
of exchanges it is prepared to have with the 
Assembly. In his report on the political activities 
of the Council, Mr. Bianco makes a pertinent 
analysis of many shortcomings in this dialogue 
and shows clearly that they stem from the weak-
nesses, not to say the shirking of duty, of a 
Council which, in the absence of adequate 
impetus from the governments, seems to be 
spending more time paring Assembly budgets 
than taking political action. 
It will be for us to ensure that the ministers 
keep to their decisions. For this purpose, we shall 
have to insist that they lead to specific commit-
ments and permanent structures. European 
security cannot be ensured by speeches or by 
short-lived actions, more or less in response to 
the emotions which may be aroused by the 
hazards of international life. 
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The disarray caused by the NATO twofold 
decision of 1979, the announcement of the SDI 
in 1983, renewed outbreaks of international ter-
rorism and the Reykjavik meeting in 1986 
showed, if proof were needed, that Europe could 
not face up to such events if it did not prepare 
itself well beforehand by continuous reflection 
on the evolution of the international situation, 
its interests and the aims it intends to pursue. 
The Assembly for its part must be able to 
make a better contribution to this reflection than 
in the past because the new direction of the 
Council's work is more propitious for holding 
political discussions. 
For this purpose, the Assembly should pay 
closer attention to the agenda of Council 
meetings than it has done so far. Admittedly, its 
agenda was known to us - if at all - only just 
before Council meetings. But in Luxembourg the 
ministers announced a number of questions they 
intended to place in the centre of their discus-
sions in the next few years. It is for us to draw 
the necessary indications in order to guide our 
own work in a direction which will allow a 
fruitful, in-depth dialogue to be established with 
the Council. 
However, the Council must make no mistake. 
There is no question of our being - as one of its 
members recently suggested - the Council's 
megaphone. If the Assembly can help, as it has 
done so far, to make European public opinion 
understand the importance of security problems, 
if it has helped to outline a spirit of European 
defence, it is because it has never backed away 
from a public debate and has been able to bring 
its debates to a conclusion by adopting, with 
absolute freedom, recommendations on topical 
international matters at a time when the Council 
was showing very little interest in them. It is not 
the Council's new interest that must make it 
avoid detailed debates, votes or total freedom of 
expression. The Assembly will be able to play the 
role proposed by the Council of making Euro-
peans aware of the dimensions of their security 
problem only if it continues to be a difficult 
counterpart for the Council itsel£ 
If we set aside matters relating to security in 
the Mediterranean, many aspects of which the 
Assembly studied well before the Council itself 
followed suit, it seems evident that relations 
between Europe and the United States, particu-
larly in regard to everything relating to disar-
mament and the limitation of armaments, 
should dominate our debates in the next few 
months. 
These are in fact matters which must now be 
considered by Europe which would probably 
have preferred not to have had to tackle them. 
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For many years, our contribution to our own 
defence has been merely a small addition, in 
the systems guaranteed by NATO, to the 
deployment of nuclear and conventional forces 
of all kinds by the United States throughout the 
world. It was thus quite normal that we relied, to 
varying degrees, on the United States for deter-
mining alliance policy, particularly in regard to 
strategy and, necessarily, disarmament too. We 
were not well enough armed to be able to find a 
place for ourselves. 
More or less well-founded impressions from 
the Reykjavik meeting must not make Europe 
abandon the prospect of reducing armaments 
and in this connection embark upon a conflict 
with the United States which would be both 
pointless and dangerous for us. Europe can no 
more achieve cohesion against the United States 
than it can ensure its security without the United 
States. Defence Europe is first of all a Europe of 
co-operation and agreement with the Americans. 
Defence against nuclear missiles, alliance 
strategy, security outside the NATO area, disar-
mament and the fight against terrorism are all 
areas in which Europe cannot envisage its own 
defence without close, continuing contact with 
its American ally. 
But there too the transatlantic dialogue must 
remain frank and balanced. We should welcome 
the fact that our Secretary-General has just 
visited the United States to explain the contri-
bution a reactivated WEU could make to the 
alliance. The presence of Lord Carrington at our 
session and his words later this afternoon will 
remind us that it is in NATO that these matters 
are handled between allies. 
I do not wish to conclude my remarks about 
what we have learned of the latest Council deci-
sions without referring to another Assembly pro-
posal which, for the first time, seems to have 
been followed up positively in Luxembourg, i.e. 
the Council has undertaken to arrange European 
training courses in the defence institutes of 
member countries. This is a first step towards 
implementing what had been the principal 
intention of the Seven when they decided to 
reactivate WEU: to promote the emergence of a 
European spirit of defence to ward off the threat 
of a serious moral crisis such as the one following 
NATO's twofold decision in December 1979. A 
European defence policy that neglected this 
essential aspect of joint security would most 
probably be built only on sand. 
Finally, the governments will have to draw the 
full consequences of their proclaimed intentions 
regarding reactivation. The Assembly does not 
have the means which are essential for adapting 
itself to the new situation and the Council's 
budgetary policy for several years has been a 
serious threat to the Assembly's independence 
and possibilities of working effectively. 
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Thus, nine persons representing the executives 
of member countries or intergovernmental 
organisations are to address us during this 
session, some because we invited them and 
others because they invoked the right ofthe gov-
ernments of all WEU member countries to 
address the Assembly. This is in itself an 
important, heartening event. 
This encouraging demonstration by the govern-
ments should have resulted in a much longer 
session to avoid the truly parliamentary debates 
being reduced because of governmental 
addresses. However, our budget, which is a very 
tight one, prevents us from adding a single day or 
even a single sitting to what was planned. Such a 
situation is unacceptable because it is a challenge 
to parliamentary freedom and to our right and 
duty to express ourselves on the matters on the 
agenda of our session. 
We are of course not complaining about the 
number of ministers who are coming. What we 
are complaining about is that the governments 
do not give us the wherewithal to pursue our 
session normally when they claim to show their 
interest in it. 
The whole Assembly will be gratified to learn 
that, at its last meeting, the Council refused to 
follow the proposals submitted by the budget 
experts. It has made noteworthy concessions for 
our 1986 budget and has said that it is prepared 
to re-examine the Assembly's requests for 1987. 
This news arrived too late for us to be able to 
take advantage of it for organising this session, 
but we note the political gesture thus made. 
Tomorrow morning, we shall have to decide 
on the proposals Sir Dudley Smith will submit to 
us on the measures we shall have to take to 
pursue useful negotiations with the Council on 
this subject. 
The constraints of the order of business of this 
session prevent me from prolonging my remarks 
in spite of my wish to speak to you about other 
matters, particularly armaments co-operation. 
Recent events have again shown how inadequate 
this still is and how much it still needs the 
political impetus which was to be the Council's 
task but which is still awaited. 
I wish to conclude, however, by noting that 
European defence, which not so long ago still 
seemed a highly academic question, has in the 
last few weeks become a major preoccupation for 
Europeans. This should make our session of very 
special importance in the history of WEU and 
perhaps also of Europe. 
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6. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
calling you, Mr. Hardy, I have two matters to 
mention to the Assembly. If you agree, I will call 
you during the debate following what I have to 
say about the Assembly's orders of the day. 
I have to inform you first of the presence of 
the following parliamentary observers: from 
Denmark, Mr. Ame Melchior and Mr. Lasse 
Budtz; from Spain, Mr. Antonio Garcia-Pagan 
and Mr. Juan Manuel Fabra; from Greece, Mr. 
Panayotis Katsaros; from Norway, Mrs. Kaci 
Kullmann Five and Mr. Finn Knutsen, and from 
Turkey, Mr. Kamran Inan. 
I am happy to welcome both , them and the 
members of the Permanent Council present at 
this part-session. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- We are not. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the second part of the session 
(Doe. 1068) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now call for the adoption of the draft 
order of business for the second part of the 
session, Document 1068. 
I have to inform the Assembly that I have 
been advised by the Chairman ofthe Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments of a 
request to postpone for the time being consider-
ation of the preliminary report on threat 
assessment, Document 1076, presented by Mr. 
Stokes, because the Rapporteur is at present ill in 
bed. 
As this involves internal reorganisation of the 
order of business for this session, I ask the 
Assembly to agree that consideration of this 
question be postponed. 
I also ask that the Assembly agree to the 
inclusion at the end of today's orders of the day, 
provided there is enough time, of Mr. 
Kittelmann's revised report on European 
security and the Mediterranean, Document 
1073, which was to have been considered at the 
end of the session on Thursday, 4th 
December. 
The Assembly will also note that a number of 
late changes have been made to the order of 
business. The fact is that several' ministers have 
claimed the right to speak at this session under 
Article VI of the Assembly's Charter. These initi-
atives are indicative ofthe interest taken by gov-
ernments in our work, and can therefore only be 
a source of satisfaction to us. 
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I was, however, determined that these inter-
ventions should not adversely affect the parlia-
mentary debate proper. I mean by this that the 
time allocated to them should leave me in a 
position to allow a reasonable time to everyone 
wishing to take part in the debate. I had therefore 
decided that we should have an evening sitting 
on Wednesday, 3rd December. 
In the event, this decision could not be imple-
mented because the budgetary constraints we 
have had to apply to our sessions in recent years 
leave no room for contingencies of this kind. Our 
staff, both permanent and temporary, are 
working to the limits of their capacity, and there 
are no spare staff to call on in an emergency. 
Consequently, I had to give up the idea of sug-
gesting what would have been a desirable change 
to the order of business. The only way we can 
ensure that we have enough time for the parlia-
mentary debate is to begin our sittings at 9.30 in 
the morning and to continue until 7.30 p.m. To 
minimise the problems posed by this 
arrangement, I shall see that the votes are taken 
before 6 p.m. 
That the participation of a large number of 
ministers should have this effect demonstrates, I 
believe, both to ourselves and to the Council the 
state of paralysis to which we have been reduced 
by the budgetary policy pursued for some years 
past with regard to the Assembly. 
That, ladies and gentlemen, is what I wanted 
to say on the subject of an important item of 
important orders of the day of an important 
session. I put the matter to you for your consid-
eration. 
I now call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I am most 
grateful, Mr. President, and I am sure that 
everyone shares your regret about the change in 
the agenda necessitated by Mr. Stokes's illness. 
But, whilst I am grateful for your courtesy and 
obvious consideration in response to my point of 
order, I must say, with respect, that it was no 
answer. I say that because, Mr. President, the 
rules which you quoted say that you " may " 
allow. The point I am making is that you have 
allowed, when you need not have allowed, half a 
dozen ministers to be present during this 
Assembly to take a great deal of the time. They 
are bound to take a great deal of the time if they 
are to be afforded the respect that is their due, 
but by affording the ministers the respect that is 
their due, you are preventing the Assembly from 
pursuing its responsibilities. That is the first part 
of my point of order. 
The second part relates to the heartfelt plea 
that you have already offered, in that the 
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Assembly is being deprived of adequate 
resources and it would have been far more 
potent to say to the ministers: " You cannot 
come because we cannot afford you. " Perhaps 
that would have driven the point home even 
more forcefully than your wise and pertinent 
comments earlier. 
Thirdly, since you have allowed the ministers 
to come, I must ask you two questions. Is it pos-
sible to suggest that some of them do not turn 
up? If that is not possible, is it also possible for 
me to suggest - I would not wish to be accused of 
discourtesy but reality requires me to say this 
and I ask for your comments - and would it be 
absolutely unreasonable if some of us said to the 
third, fourth, fifth, or sixth minister to come this 
week that since it is not reasonable for our debate 
to be so circumscribed, we have no alternative 
but to express our protest with our feet by 
walking out of the Assembly so that ministers are 
deprived of the mobile audience that they seem 
to think we are? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have been 
notified of several points of order. You are aware 
of the liberal attitude of the chair, and I will 
gladly give the floor to all those wishing to raise 
such points. I shall be equally glad to reply, but I 
would ask you not to abuse the facility allowed 
under the Rules of Procedure in order that our 
discussions may not be unduly delayed. 
I call Mr. De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I fully share the views expressed 
by Mr. Hardy. 
The Liberal Group is very gratified to note the 
growing interest being taken by governments in 
our Assembly. We cannot, however, hide the 
perplexity we feel when we observe that the 
interest they take in their presence here varies in 
inverse ratio to their willingness to increase the 
Assembly's budget. 
Be that as it may, Mr. President, I wish to state 
that we approve the changes made to our orders 
ofthe day and that we welcome the presence of a 
large number of ministers. This does, indeed, 
bear witness to our Assembly's new-found 
vitality, although we do feel that this attitude 
should find further expression in budgetary 
measures and that, in view of the large share of 
its time devoted by our Assembly to the 
attending ministers, they should perhaps con-
template increasing our budget so that we could 
have three sessions a year instead of two. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Freeson. 
Mr. FREESON (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. Although I would 
certainly support the remarks about the budget, I 
do not think that this is the occasion to indulge 
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in a debate upon that. We shall have an oppor-
tunity later to do so. I shall confine my remarks 
to the order of business. 
As I understand it, the order of business is pre-
sented to us so that we may agree about it or dis-
agree. It is on the order paper in that form. I 
object to the order of business and I am prepared 
to vote against it. I know that that cannot affect 
today's proceedings. However, if we must have 
six ministers in four or fewer days, they should 
all be confined to the latter part of our pro-
ceedings, so far as that is possible. 
It is now ten minutes to four o'clock. Look at 
the order of business that we have ahead of us 
today. There are a number of addresses, 
including your own, Mr. President, and one from 
the Secretary-General. We have ministers who 
are to address us and we are supposed to be 
dealing with a number of reports, although there 
is some doubt about one item because of the 
illness, which we regret, of Mr. Stokes. Never-
theless, it is suggested that another report should 
be placed on the agenda in the stead of that from 
Mr. Stokes. 
I must protest. It was not necessary for us to 
have ordered our business in this way. I and 
others would be less annoyed, less angered - and 
it is anger that some of us feel about the way that 
this has been handled - if we were confident that 
when ministers come to this Assembly they did 
so for reasons other than simply that of making 
speeches on matters about which they want us to 
hear. We should be better pleased if they came 
before us or our committees to debate security 
matters at a time when, above all other periods 
over the past forty years, we need genuinely to be 
debating such matters. I do not think that we can 
be confident that that will happen. Six ministers 
have been asked to come here. They want to 
address us, not necessarily to debate matters with 
us. That is what we should be doing in the wake 
of the Iceland semi-summit. I wish to vote 
against the order of business and protest most 
strongly about the way in which this Assembly is 
being used, perhaps I should say abused, by 
political leaders. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. 
Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - It is 
obvious that the point of order raised by Mr. 
Hardy is not spurious. One ought not to imagine 
that the view expressed by him was in any way 
isolated. I support Mr. Hardy, speaking as 
someone who feels that he is not here primarily 
to listen to speeches. I have no objection to lis-
tening to speeches, but it is not what I am here 
for. Nor is it what most of us are here for. We are 
here to debate the issues about which reports 
have been tabled. If we believe that these reports 
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are important, and I think they are, it cannot be 
said that they can be adequately discussed when 
we have so many ministers scheduled to 
speak. 
I earnestly ask you, Mr. President, when the 
agenda is being drawn up, not to say: " The most 
important thing is to have a number of ministers 
here and then we shall try to fit in as many 
reports as we can. The important thing is to 
listen to ministers. " That is not how it should be 
done. The important thing is that the reports 
should be discussed. If we have time for one or at 
the most two ministers, that should be thought 
about afterwards. It should not be a subject that 
receives priority. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
The important thing is that, whether we like it or 
not - and we can argue about it at another date -
six ministers are to address us. I hope that when 
we put questions to them the first that we shall 
put to each minister will be:" Why are your gov-
ernment not prepared to meet, along with the 
other governments, the genuine requests of this 
Assembly for proper funding?" If we can restrain 
our own ego trips and put these questions to each 
minister, we shall at least have done some good. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, even 
though Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has anticipated my 
proposal, I should like to say briefly that, as a 
result of a decision of the Bureau, the ministers 
are now here, and I feel it would be churlish of us 
not to agree to their staying. But we would 
probably be failing as parliamentarians if we did 
not make it absolutely clear to each of these gov-
ernment representatives that the treatment 
meted out to the Assembly by the Council of 
Ministers is quite unacceptable to us as parlia-
mentarians. I should therefore like our message 
to the representative of the Federal German 
Government in today's debate to be extended to 
the other five ministers we have invited and 
then, if necessary, if they fail to draw the logical 
conclusions, to refrain from talking to any of the 
ministers at the next part-session. 
In Rome, the ministers proposed to us, 
wrongly I believe, that this Assembly should be 
solely responsible for public relations matters. 
But even if we agreed to this, it would be a far cry 
from our adopting a passive approach to public 
relations by listening to ministerial speeches 
which are generally publicised. 
Mr. President, my specific proposal is this: let 
us leave the order of business as it is, but at the 
same time make it clear to the Council of Min-
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isters that this is the last time they are going to 
come here like this and that on any future 
occasion we shall ask what response the gov-
ernment representatives expect from the 
Assembly and, at the same time, make it clear 
what response we hope to have from the Council 
of Ministers. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The views 
which we have just heard expressed provide 
irrefutable proof of the existence in this forum of 
a consensus which has nothing to do with 
political opinions but is an opinion proper to the 
Assembly itself as expressed by all of us. This is 
an extremely important point which has a 
bearing simultaneously on the performance, 
organisation and credibility of our work. 
I accept entire responsibility for the situation 
we find ourselves in, as it was I who agreed to the 
attendance of various ministers who wished to 
address our Assembly, except of course for the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council by virtue of 
his office and whose presence throughout the 
session is a source of both honour and pleasure 
to us. As you are aware, if he is unable to take 
part in our work, his place will be taken by the 
Luxembourg Minister of Public Security or, in 
his absence, by the Luxembourg Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. We invited Lord 
Carrington, the Secretary-General of NATO, to 
address us, and the other invitations followed 
on, quite officially, though of course leaving your 
President no time to consult either the Bureau or 
the Presidential Committee. I therefore took the 
decision on my own responsibility and I appeal 
to you to judge me in your wisdom. 
Furthermore, I could hardly say that we 
refused to be addressed by the representative of a 
member government, since, under the terms of 
the Charter, such representatives are fully 
entitled to attend and address the Assembly by 
invitation. That is one of the traditions of our 
Assembly, although we did for a very long time 
complain that we were never honoured by gov-
ernment ministers in office but only by their rep-
resentatives. I must add that this is a political 
issue of a technical character within the rules. It 
is no mere chance that so many eminent people 
have expressed the wish to address the 
Assembly, and we should see that we take 
advantage of the situation. 
I have made the necessary arrangements to 
extend the duration of the sittings for the first 
three days of the session: by one and a half hours 
in the evening and by half an hour in the 
morning, making together one hour for Tuesday 
and Wednesday morning and three hours for the 
two afternoons, or a total of four hours, plus one 
and a half hours this evening. This means that 
we shall have, in aggregate, a possible five and a 
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half extra hours or more than half a day's public 
sitting. As I just pointed out another solution 
would have been preferable, but nobody can do 
the impossible. 
Addressing myself to Mr. Hardy in particular, 
I must say that I totally reject any attitude which 
might be interpreted as discourtesy. There is no 
question of this, but only of safeguarding parlia-
mentary rights and asking governments to align 
their political positions as regards the attention 
which they give to the parliamentary debates 
conducted by our Assembly. 
We shall have to submit to the Council pro-
posals concerning participation by representa-
tives of the governments of the member coun-
tries. It will then be up to the Council to tell the 
Assembly what action it can take to ensure that 
such participation in the debates of our 
Assembly does not affect them adversely. 
Two problems arise, and these concern the 
organisation and the budget. Let us hope that our 
discussions, the level-headedness of our 
approach and our sense of responsibility in 
relation to a matter which has now been engaging 
our attention for an hour may have favourable 
repercussions for the Assembly's future. Thank 
you for raising the matter in thoroughly respon-
sible terms. 
In view of the commitment I have entered 
into, I can now only ask you to approve the order 
ofbusiness, as I have proposed it, with the altera-
tions to the times of the sittings. 
My statement will appear tomorrow in the 
report of the debates for all to see. 
May I urge you, ladies and gentlemen, that we 
trust each other and try to extricate ourselves as 
best we can from the present situation. 
We will now vote on the draft order of 
business of this session. 
Are there any objections to this amended order 
of business? ... 
The draft order of business, as amended, is 
adopted. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Presidential Committee, Doe. 1083) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order ofthe day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Presidential Committee on 
action by the Presidential Committee and ratifi-
cation of the committee's action, Document 
1083. 
I call Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the 
Assembly and Rapporteur. 
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- Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report 
on action by the Presidential Committee which I 
have the honour to present concerns firstly the 
Assembly's relations with the Council and sec-
ondly the administrative action of the Assembly 
of Western European Union. 
Constituted as it is to represent the various ele-
ments of the Assembly as well as to reflect its 
political trends, the Presidential Committee is 
competent to approve basic lines of conduct 
aimed at ensuring the Assembly's cohesion. It-
should be pointed out that the political dialogue 
which the committee is able to ensure between 
the Council and the Assembly has of recent 
months acquired special importance as a conse-
quence of the thaw in arms control negotiations 
and the meeting between the leaders of the two 
superpowers. As it also has budgetary and 
administrative responsibilities, the Presidential 
Committee has endeavoured to bring home to 
the Council the arguments for the financial 
measures needed to enable the Assembly to fulfil 
its functions. It follows that the Presidential 
Committee's task is to ensure the continuity of 
the Assembly's action between sessions. 
The section dealing with the Assembly's rela-
tions with the Council does not call for detailed 
comment from me, as our schedule already 
includes many interventions and reports on the 
same subject. I shall therefore limit my remarks 
to the essentials. 
My first comment concerns the nature of the 
relations between the governmental and parlia-
mentary elements of the organisation. The 
Luxembourg ministers for foreign affairs and 
defence, who have received in turn the President 
of the Assembly, the enlarged Bureau, i.e. the 
Committee for Relations with the Council, and 
the Presidential Committee, have shown great 
readiness to co-operate. The members of our 
Assembly who attended these various meetings 
made a point of stressing the importance we 
attach to ensuring that the voice of Europe is 
heard in the East-West negotiations in the 
aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting. 
In the same constructive spirit, our President, 
Mr. Caro, drew the Council's attention before the 
ministerial meeting in November to the 
Assembly's position on the topics to be dis-
cussed. According to information received, the 
memorandum prepared for this purpose by the 
President of the Assembly met with a favourable 
reaction at the ministerial meeting held on 3rd· 
and 4th November. 
Without wishing to analyse in detail what the 
Council intends to do to implement its Rome 
commitment to reactivate WEU, I must express 
my satisfaction that the Seven have defined prin-
ciples and formulated projects which should 
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enable it to discuss security problems and 
establish, in parallel with the political co-oper-
ation of the Twelve, co-operation between the 
Seven on security matters. 
The decision of principle recently taken by the 
Council in Luxembourg to entrust to a political 
committee for European security the task of 
making Europe's voice heard in security matters 
is a favourable response to the proposal by the 
President of the Assembly for the creation of a 
European political area for the co-ordination of 
political co-operation. 
The Chairman of the Council and the Pres-
ident of the Assembly are also in agreement on 
the need for WEU to establish a dialogue with 
the United States in order to demonstrate to the 
Americans that the work done by WEU serves 
the global interests of the alliance. And now we 
come to a worrying point. 
Should we, as the Council wishes, complete 
the reactivation of Western European Union 
before deciding on the application for mem-
bership from some countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance? The Presidential Committee does not 
take this view and hopes that the solution to this 
problem will not be deferred indefinitely. 
The second subject is administrative action. 
The wish to reactivate Western European Union 
while at the same time depriving the Assembly of 
the financial resources essential for that purpose 
amounts to cutting off the water supply from an 
irrigation system. The Presidential Committee 
took the view that the conclusions arrived at in 
London by the meeting of experts of the WEU 
Budget and Organisation Committee were unac-
ceptable. The President of the Assembly 
therefore wrote to the Chairman of the Council 
suggesting that the negative points in the recom-
mendations made by the ' Budget and 
Organisation Committee should not be taken up. 
The Presidential Committee hopes that, with 
the support of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, the modest budget which it has pre-
pared will receive final approval by the Council. 
The fact is that, if we take account of the 
increasing burden of pensions due on the 
retirement of staff recruited when the Office of 
the Clerk was established, the reductions asked 
for amount not to zero growth but in real terms 
represent a cut in the Assembly's resources. 
I would like to conclude my remarks on bud-
getary questions on an optimistic note. Mr. Pres-
ident, the fresh spirit which now prevails in rela-
tions between the governmental and parlia-
mentary elements of our organisation as a 
consequence of the Rome meeting leads me to 
the conclusion that there is everything to hope 
for. 
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Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as the 
orders of the day are particularly demanding I 
shall limit myself to these few reflections and will 
not now go into details of the new methods of 
voting, which interested delegates will find 
appended to my written report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Goerens. I also take this opportunity, 
through you, of thanking the Presidential Com-
mittee for its extremely important work between 
sessions. 
In the debate I now call Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Minister, ladies and gentlemen, I 
congratulate Mr. Goerens on his excellent report, 
not forgetting the support of the Presidential 
Committee as representative of the Assembly 
and, in particular, the personal commitment of 
our President, Mr. Caro, to the reactivation, or 
rather the revival, of WEU. There is still a long 
way to go. I think that, during its chairmanship, 
Luxembourg will do its best to induce its six 
partners to attach greater importance to the 
problem of WEU. 
As far as the vital point, the budget, is con-
cerned, our minister for foreign affairs has 
vetoed any increase in Luxembourg's contri-
bution to WEU. I will say only that we must 
stress the fact that the Chairman of the Council 
has been represented here from the beginning 
and will continue to be so by an appointed 
Council member throughout the session. The 
improved dialogue between the Council and the 
parliamentary Assembly gives rise to the hope 
that we shall at last hear Europe speaking with 
one voice on East-West relations. The mooted 
creation of a political committee for European 
security made up of the political directors at the 
ministries for foreign affairs and, possibly, 
defence should result in a united Europe as far as 
its security strategy is concerned. One conse-
quence would be an improved dialogue between 
Europe and America in the global interest of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
The Council must understand that, under the 
terms of the Brussels Treaty, it is the only body 
empowered to define Europe's security interests. 
Our Assembly is certainly ready to collaborate in 
serving the interests of our security. 
Opinions differ with regard to the enlargement 
of the organisation. Tomorrow afternoon it will 
be interesting to hear the President's arguments 
on this matter. 
To conclude, I would like to thank once again 
everyone who has collaborated in the prepa-
ration of this report. I take the view that this 
forum should welcome all ministers who wish to 
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show their support for WEU on condition, as has 
been said, that such support is reflected in their 
national budgets. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Burger. I have no other speakers on the list. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again? ... 
The debate is closed. 
I think that the Assembly is ready to ratify the 
action of the committee. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The action by the Presidential Committee is 
ratified. 
I congratulate Mr. Goerens on his report. 
A minor alteration has just been made to the 
orders of the day and, with the consent of the 
Secretary-General ofWEU, it is now my pleasure 
to give the floor to Mr. Mollemann, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. I thank him in advance for his 
answers to any questions which will be put. 
9. Address by Mr. Mollemann, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, when I was last here a year ago, many of 
you were unhappy that so few ministers 
addressed you. Now many of you are unhappy 
that so many ministers come here. I congratulate 
you upon this qualitative improvement in your 
unhappiness. But to be quite serious about the 
requests members have made here, I should like 
to say the following: the statement I intended to 
make to you is just being distributed, and I do 
not therefore need to read it out. If you like, you 
can read it for yourselves. 1 
So that we can do precisely what the Assembly 
wants, namely discuss questions, I will restrict 
myself to four comments, which are covered in 
rather more detail in the statement that has been 
distributed. 
First, in East-West relations after Reykjavik, 
we should not miss the opportunity of finding 
out whether the objectives proclaimed by 
General Secretary Gorbachev, and which he 
refers to as new thinking, will actually provide an 
opportunity for a more co-operative relationship 
between East and West in all areas. We must take 
1. See appendix, page 79. 
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the utmost care to ascertain this. We should not 
have to reproach ourselves afterwards for 
missing an opportunity. 
Second, this means that we should make a cau-
tious but positive appraisal of the results 
achieved and initial approaches made in 
Reykjavik as an opportunity for more ambitious 
and more practical results in the future - in other 
words, results set out in agreements. Where the 
Federal Government is concerned - and I am 
glad that this appears to apply to most of us, or at 
least to the governments that met in 
Luxembourg - this is particularly true of our 
concern to implement the zero option in respect 
of intermediate-range missiles, which came 
within reach in Reykjavik. We would see that as 
a distinctly positive development, as an 
improvement, not a deterioration, in the security 
situation. 
Third, I believe Reykjavik has underlined the 
importance of the declaration made by the then 
Soviet foreign minister and his American coun-
terpart on 8th January 1985 on the relationship 
between offensive and defensive systems. They 
said that a co-operative solution must be found 
for offensive systems, strategic offensive systems 
and for any defensive systems, including space 
systems, with the aim of avoiding an arms race 
in space and ending the arms race on earth. This 
means, of course, that space systems, like all 
other levels - conventional, tactical-nuclear, 
strategic, intermediate-range - must be the 
subject of negotiations and that the nature and 
scale of the planning of space systems depend 
directly on any results achieved in the negotia-
tions on strategic offensive systems. In other 
words, the fewer defensive systems we have in 
space, the fewer we need - ideally speaking, none 
at all. 
My fourth and last comment - you will find all 
this, as I said, in greater detail in the speech dis-
tributed - concerns chemical weapons. Ladies 
and gentlemen, we are aware, of course, that the 
conventional imbalance and the situation as 
regards chemical weapons will become more 
important if agreements are reached on 
intermediate-range systems and offensive 
nuclear systems. But I should not like to leave 
anyone in any doubt that, as the negotiations on 
chemical weapons now stand, we have a good 
chance of completely eliminating this scourge of 
humanity. The British draft should enable all the 
negotiating partners to reach agreement. We 
would very much welcome that. 
Those were the main points I wanted to make, 
without taxing your patience, and at the same 
time finding a compromise between the request 
of the British member who is now recovering 
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over a· cup of coffee and what I originally 
intended. 
I now await your questions on security policy 
or other aspects. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister, for your kindness and courtesy. The 
Assembly is sitting quite normally and, as I have 
already said, you have every right to be here. 
Your address was most interesting, and, as 
agreed, I shall now call members of the Assembly 
who wish to ask questions. 
I call Mr. Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Minister, you have implied that 
progress in one area of arms control should not 
be achieved at the expense of progress in other, 
unrelated areas. 
I want to ask you what you think of attempts 
to hamper negotiations, possibly $uccessful nego-
tiations, on the reduction of intermediate-range 
missiles, with the argument that at the same time 
short-range weapons should be eliminated and 
the conventional balance in Central Europe 
redressed. What do you think of this? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Mr. 
Soell, in this I abide strictly by the 1979 twofold 
decision, which explicitly provides for the elimi-
nation of any imbalance in intermediate-range 
weapons, ideally through negotiation, but if this 
is unsuccessful - as was in fact the case - by 
means of a western build-up with Pershings and 
cruise missiles. 
This decision refers to the need to introduce 
upper limits not only on long-range systems but 
also on the shorter-range systems. But it does not 
refer to the conventional disparity. That is what I 
mean when I say that progress which can be 
made in one sphere must not be inappropriately 
linked to results previously achieved in other 
spheres. We would lose the confidence of the 
public - in my country at least - if we tried to 
back out of the twofold decision in this way. The 
public are relying on us to take the wording of 
this decision seriously. The Federal Government 
will not abandon it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Berger. 
Mr. BERGER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Minister, following on from 
what you have just said, I should like to make 
absolutely sure that I understand. We agree, I 
believe, that if the importance of nuclear 
weapons wanes, if we adopt the zero option for 
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intermediate-range weapons as a category and 
very substantial reductions are made in strategic 
systems, the conventional force imbalance will, 
of course, gain in importance; also that we must 
gear our policy to redressing the balance in con-
ventional forces to safeguard Western Europe 
and the alliance. 
But I should like to raise another question. 
Does the Federal Government also think- par-
ticularly in the light of what happened at 
Reykjavik- that we in Western European Union 
must do everything we can to establish a joint 
disarmament policy, so that it too can be jointly 
defended and carried through within the 
alliance? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I can answer the 
second question, Mr. President, with a simple 
"yes". We Europeans must, of course, agree not 
only on defence policy but also on arms control 
and disarmament policy. Only then will our pro-
posals be able to bring due influence to bear on 
opinion-forming in the alliance and thus on the 
other side as well. That is surely the point of dis-
cussions of the kind we are now having. 
As for the first question, in the present situ-
ation the function of nuclear weapons must be 
assessed not only against the main purpose of 
preventing war through deterrence, but also, as 
regards their necessity, against the current dis-
parity in conventional forces. But I feel we would 
be going too far in our reasoning if, in the hope 
that 50% of strategic systems might be dis-
mantled within five years - and it is no more 
than a hope - and with the thought that there 
might then be a further drastic reduction ten 
years later, we were to act as if we already had a 
world without nuclear weapons within reach, as 
if the conventional potential was all we had left. 
No, I think it is right to seize the opportunity to 
start reducing the nuclear stockpiles now and at 
the same time to negotiate on the other aspects, 
as planned. 
At the moment, we are at a rather difficult 
stage in the formulation of objectives: within 
what framework, with what geographical limits 
and what co-operation or in what relationship 
with the neutral and non-allied countries should 
the negotiations on a reduction of conventional 
armaments in Europe be conducted? I do not 
think it is going too far to say that there can 
surely be no conflict between a further ten years 
of MBFR and, at the same time, a new con-
ference, which would possibly receive a mandate 
from the CSCE, on disarmament in Europe. The 
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two alliances would both attend - France would 
have to attend if it was to have any point- and a 
mechanism for intervention or consultation with 
the neutral and non-allied countries would 
somehow come into being. 
These matters have not yet been settled. But as 
in the past, parallel efforts will also have to be 
made in this area. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Fol-
lowing what the minister has just told us, I have 
three points to make concerning the zero 
option. 
First, the zero option on offer following the 
twofold decision was in no way the same as the 
present one, as the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 mis-
siles had not then been deployed. 
Second, it was decided at Reykjavik that one 
hundred SS-20s would continue to be based in 
Soviet Asia against one hundred equivalent 
weapons based on American territory. Can you, 
Minister, put any trust in an operation of this 
kind, when the mobility of these one hundred 
SS-20s means that in a few days they can be 
brought back to the Urals, without even having 
to leave the Asian part of the USSR, so as to 
cover virtually the whole of Europe with their 
4 000 kilometre range? The same is not true of 
the cruise missiles based in the United States, 
which would have to be brought back to Europe 
to achieve comparable effectiveness. 
Third, Minister, do you not think that the 
credibility of all the parliamentarians who, in 
their national parliaments, have argued for 
deployment based on co-ordination between the 
United States and Europe and the restoration of 
deterrence at European level thanks to our 
ability to reach Soviet territory with cruise and 
Pershing 11 missiles, has not been shaken in the 
same way as when President Carter stopped pro-
duction of the neutron bomb? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MCLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). -First, it is true to say 
that the modernisation programmes have not 
stood still anywhere since the twofold decision 
taken by the alliance in 1979. Structures have 
changed in several areas, but on both sides. 
Second, although I do not want to go into this 
in any depth, I would ask you not to forget that it 
is extremely important for us - as regards the 
specific area of intermediate-range systems this 
was perhaps a particularly gratifying aspect of 
Reykjavik - that the French and British systems 
were not included, but are still present. That 
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must be borne in mind when the outcome of 
Reykjavik is assessed. 
Third, I pointed out just now - perhaps I did 
not make myself sufficiently clear - that it was 
very much the intention of the twofold decision 
- and of the agreement reached in Reykjavik too 
- not only to reduce the long-range systems to 
one hundred on each side- in the Asian part of 
the Soviet Union and in the United States - but 
also to try to agree on upper limits for the 
shorter-range systems. This means that the side 
which does not currently reach this upper limit 
has the " right to match " if the other side does 
not reduce the number of its systems. That was 
also a part of the Reykjavik agreement. 
Against this background, I believe the credi-
bility crisis I have referred to would be more 
likely to occur if what Mr. Soell mentioned was 
to happen, if we were now suddenly to link this 
area to areas that were not mentioned in the 
twofold decision, although the same disparity in 
conventional armaments existed even at that 
time. 
Let us not beat about the bush. Among our-
selves we may say that the statement by General 
Rogers, who forged this very link with conven-
tional armaments, naturally does not make 
things any easier. Well, that is a military view. 
But here policy must remain the primary 
concern if we want to avoid a difficult 
• argument. 
The question of geographical disparity, which 
you have also raised, is, of course, a general 
problem at all arms control and disarmament 
negotiations. The Soviet Union is linked to its 
partners by terra firma, while the United States is 
separated from us by many thousands of kilo-
metres. It seems to me, however, that where the 
one hundred systems are concerned, this is not a 
very pressing problem. The one hundred 
Pershings and cruise missiles would in them-
selves give a mix of weapons. They could be 
brought back to Europe fairly quickly if it was 
felt they were needed here. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Jung. 
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). - I was 
deeply impressed by your address, Minister, and 
am perhaps even more by the text which was dis-
tributed, as this contains a number of contradic-
tions. 
Everyone here is anxious to work for peace in 
Europe, yourself included, but while on the one 
hand you call for co-operation with the United 
States and declare that co-operation with France 
in defence matters is essential, you speak on the 
other hand of the solution called in German the 
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"Null-LOsung" or zero option, which could lead 
to the adoption of a kind of neutrality. 
Given that we are all responsible politicians, I 
would like to put to you a very simple question 
to clarify the situation. Do you not think that the 
experience of the last forty years demonstrates 
that all of us here should support, within the 
context of European co-operation, the strongest 
possible European defence? And is this not the 
only way we can avoid being beggars, in relation 
to either side, while retaining our ability to 
defend ourselves? 
Futhermore, I am surprised by your attitude 
towards space defence. The most advanced tech-
nological developments are everywhere directed 
towards defence in space, and I hope we can be 
clear on this point here. 
We take the view that co-operation between 
French and British nuclear armaments, together 
with a movement in the direction of European 
defence, is the only way to guarantee peace. Do 
you agree with this analysis, or do you believe it 
is possible to conceive of other methods of 
ensuring the peace of Europe? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Jung, the zero 
option is not a German position and it is cer-
tainly not a neutral position, but the position of 
the alliance, and the one I represent here. 
On the question of space systems I have again 
described the position formulated by Foreign 
Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz 
in Geneva on 8th January 1985, according to 
which the attempt must be made to find a co-
operative solution for strategic offensive systems 
and for the defensive systems developed as pro-
tection against them, including defensive 
systems that could be deployed in space. 
A definition was then given of what this 
means: " co-operative " should always mean that 
the nature and scale of defensive systems - natu-
rally, I would say - depend on the nature and 
scale of existing and continuing offensive 
systems. Thought through to its logical con-
clusion, this means that if the strategic offensive 
systems can be reduced by means of arms control 
agreements, no one can say at the end of the day: 
Ah yes, but we still need a defensive system. 
I believe if we accept that at arms control 
negotiations and in defensive policy concepts we 
must always put ourselves in the other side's 
shoes, the exclusion of space-based defence 
systems - by either side - is bound to cause the 
other side to be suspicious and to pose questions 
that are difficult to answer. 
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We therefore advocate for the current phase of 
research - and both sides are, of course, con-
ducting research - that we do what came within 
reach in Reykjavik, that is to say seek to reach 
agreements which eventually make it possible for 
a co-operative solution of this kind to be found 
for the defensive systems as well. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- I should like to say something in connection 
with the last sentence of the minister's statement. 
He said that the British member was drinking 
coffee and that he could not therefore give him 
an answer. I do not think that it comes within 
this minister's terms of reference to check when a 
parliamentarian has coffee, quite apart from the 
fact that we knew what Mr. Hardy knows. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - You are right. That 
was, of course, an inappropriate irony, but it was 
prompted by the fact that I myself had just gone 
for a cup of coffee and was told there that 
because of the Secretary-General's generosity 
and courtesy I should come back sooner. So I did 
not get my cup of coffee and was envious of the 
British member, who did. I did not mean to 
offend anybody. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Mr. Mollemann clearly has thoughts that it was 
worth his while coming to this meeting to 
address us and we are grateful to him. At least he 
has shown us the courtesy of realising that there 
was a timetable problem and has circulated his 
speech. He has made four important points. In 
the interest of brevity I shall ask him a question 
that will require a one-word answer, "ja " or 
"nein ". Do his government propose to support 
the request of this Assembly for sensible budget 
arrangements? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I hope I am not 
making the same mistake as I did over the coffee, 
but as you know very well there are questions 
that cannot be answered with either " yes " or 
"no". Let us take the question: Did you stop 
beating your wife yesterday? You would not be 
able to answer that with "yes" or "no". The 
same goes for this question. 
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Secondly, I am quite prepared to introduce 
this Assembly's request into the the deliberations 
of our cabinet, but I would not be honest if I told 
you today that the cabinet's deliberations would 
produce this or that result. 
I should therefore like to say, thirdly, that we-
I too am a member of parliament, of course -
should try to use our most powerful right, the 
right to establish a budget: through you, in your 
national parliaments. You should enable your 
governments to obtain approval from parliament 
for additional funds for this purpose, and to 
make larger contributions. Not only shall I not 
oppose this but, if parliament gives us more 
money, I shall willingly make the funds 
available. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - The 
question I wanted to ask has just been raised by 
my fellow representative, but I would like to take 
advantage of the opportunity provided by the 
minister to revert to the suggestion which he put 
to us. While it is admittedly of interest, it has in 
recent years already been considered several 
times in our parliaments. 
I will therefore limit myself to one further 
thought, which should lend added stimulus to 
the request to all member states to provide our 
Assembly with the means needed to enable it to 
exist, assume its full role and discharge its func-
tions. 
There is at least one issue which is currently 
posing a budgetary problem for our Assembly; it 
is the fact that, for accounting purposes, pensions 
are included in the Assembly's operational 
budget - a very poor arrangement in our view. 
This additional comment should perhaps be 
added to everything that has already been said 
on the subject in support of firm, specific and 
practical action by our various countries. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, I told Mr. Reddemann quite 
spontaneously just now that it would probably be 
advisable for us to sit down with the parlia-
mentary groups after 25th January 1987, when 
elections to the Bundestag will be taking place, to 
consider especially with the members on the 
Budget Committee and those who are here, what 
can be done to overcome the obvious material 
difficulties prevailing here, which you have just 
described very impressively. I am ready to 
support moves to this end. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Buchner. 
Mr. BUCHNER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). -Minister, as you have 
recommended that we should not beat about the 
bush but have referred to a disparity both in the 
case of medium-range weapons in the past and·of 
conventianal weapons now, I should like quickly 
to ask you another question before you go off for 
coffee: if, contrary to what you obviously expect, 
the negotiations on the elimination of medium-
range weapons should actually produce a result, 
if, that is, they should be dismantled in East and 
West, would the Federal Government consider 
the conventional imbalance so serious that it 
would think about rearmament initiatives? Can 
we look forward to fresh rearmament? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - In our national par-
liament we discuss the armed forces and arma-
ments plans, which are submitted to the appro-
priate committee and regularly updated. These 
plans, with which knowledgeable members are 
familiar, are implemented in accordance with the 
decisions taken by parliament. They already 
refer to the need to improve our conventional 
fighting strength and to redress the current 
imbalance. 
Similar efforts are being made at WEU level. 
For some considerable time now you have been 
discussing here what can be done through 
increased co-operation among the Europeans in 
arms production and planning and in 
standardisation to redress the conventional 
imbalance and that needs to be done. 
In the text distributed to you, you will find the 
idea which I will now reiterate in one sentence: 
we would naturally prefer to eliminate the 
imbalance in the conventional sphere by 
achieving practical results in disarmament nego-
tiations, but we say just as clearly: the effect of 
each and every step taken under arms control 
agreements must be geared to our security 
interest and, if such agreements are not reached, 
we shall do what is necessary to guarantee our 
security. But this will not require any new rearma-
ment decisions, simply the implementation of 
the military and armament plans approved by 
parliament. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cifarelli. 
Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
should like to put a question to the German min-
ister because the failure to reach agreement in 
Reykjavik has undoubtedly aroused serious 
concern, particularly in view of the Federal 
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Republic's position in the centre of Europe and 
of the conventional threat to Europe as well. 
We must remember that the Euromissiles were 
adopted because of the vital need to correct the 
enormous imbalance in Europe as regards the 
Warsaw Pact's conventional armaments. My 
question is as follows. 
No agreement to reduce armaments was 
reached in Reykjavik. Does the minister think 
that in present circumstances the Atlantic guar-
antees and commitments are being overtaken by 
the strange spread of individual illusions con-
cerning European armaments or does he believe 
that European security should be ensured by 
modernising the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance and making it more effective? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, as I 
have said before, the twofold decision was not 
taken because of the current conventional 
imbalance - that is not correct - although we 
always take account of the overall security situ-
ation at all arms control negotiations and in each 
defence plan. 
I will also say once again that, in view of the 
existing disparities, we must co-operate as closely 
as possible, and it is undoubtedly common 
knowledge here too that we must strengthen the 
European pillar within the alliance, as I tried to 
explain just now. 
As I believe this is a crucial point, I should like 
to repeat that I do not agree with the view that 
Reykjavik was a failure, and why I do not agree. 
All of you, ladies and gentlemen, have been con-
cerned with defence and arms control policy 
issues for many years. You have observed the 
long process of negotiations on MBFR, SALT, 
START, INF and chemical weapons. Did 
anyone really believe that in the space of a day 
and a half two men would be able to slice 
through at a stroke all the knots that have been 
tied in ten years? Against this background I feel 
that what was almost achieved and is now the 
subject of further negotiations in Geneva and 
Vienna was a great deal, not a failure. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Antretter. 
Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Minister, in view of 
what you have just said - and I agree with you 
there - I should like to comment on something 
you say in the written statement you have dis-
tributed. You say that the Federal Government 
is interested in observance of the SALT 
agreement. What, then, do you think of the 
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recent breach of the agreement by the United 
States, when it put the 131st B-52 bomber into 
service with cruise missiles? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I believe that in the 
current situation - and that includes this 
decision by the American Government - it is all 
the more essential for us to reach agreements on 
reductions to replace the existing agreement, 
which has not, of course, been ratified, and that 
this time, instead of stipulating ceilings up to 
which weapons may be accumulated, the agree-
ments should, as proposed in Reykjavik, set 
upper limits that will necessitate scaling down 
armament levels. I feel that is more important 
than for me to continue to discuss an individual 
decision. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That con-
cludes the questions from members. Thank you, 
Minister, for your co-operation and for your par-
liamentary approach and the courtesy and skill 
with which you have dealt with the Assembly's 
problems. Once more, thank you, and a safe 
journey home. 
I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. I am extremely sorry to 
have to raise this matter, but I understood that I 
would be called to ask a question. I was grateful 
for the minister's contrite comment about his 
reference to my colleague and myself being 
absent, but it is only reasonable that I should be 
allowed to ask my question, if only to explain 
that my colleagues and I did not wish to act 
ungraciously, but the proliferation of ministers, 
the change in business and the delay in our pro-
ceedings required some discussion. 
The question that I wanted to ask the minister 
-and it should be asked- is a follow-up to the 
important question asked by Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg. As a highly skilled and capable former 
minister, Sir Geoffrey will have recognised the 
highly skilful ministerial reply that he received. I 
do not suppose that Sir Geoffrey expected the 
minister to offer a simple "ja " or " nein " in his 
response, but clearly we were entitled to ask the 
minister whether the Federal Republic would be 
prepared not merely to engage in discussions 
about an adequate supply of resources for the 
Assembly but positively to support moves to 
provide those extra resources. That aspect was 
not given an adequate response. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I am very 
sorry. I had not noted that you wanted to put a 
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question to the minister of state. Please forgive 
me. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - The Clerk 
advised me that I would be called to ask my 
question. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I tender the 
apologies of the chair. Your question will be con-
veyed to the minister of state in writing, and I 
hope we shall have a quick reply. I ask the Clerk 
of the Assembly to take the necessary action. 
10. Address by Lord Carrington, 
Secretary-General of NATO 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now give 
the floor to Lord Carrington and thank him for 
accepting the Assembly's invitation. You have 
just taken part, Secretary-General, in a parlia-
mentary debate, and you will have noted that an 
assembly is a living institution which gets to the 
heart of the subject at what is an extremely 
important juncture in the history of WEU. I 
thank you for coming, and also thank your 
organisation for the manner in which it performs 
its functions. 
Lord CARRINGTON (Secretary-Genera/ of 
NATO}. - Let me first thank you, ladies and gen-
tlemen, for the honour that you have done me in 
inviting me here. I must start with an apology, 
because you asked me to be here from 4.30 p.m. 
to 5.30 p.m. and I made another appointment 
which I have to attend after 5.30 p.m., so we 
shall not have long for questions. However, I 
shall get through as much as I can as quickly as I 
can. 
I sometimes think that those of us who regu-
larly attend occasions such as this are rather like 
dedicated fishermen who are to be seen sitting 
under green umbrellas beside rivers, canals and 
lakes in all weathers. Like you, they have to sit 
through long periods in which nothing much 
happens in the hope of an occasional moment of 
excitement. Like you, they seem sometimes to 
enjoy it. I shall do my best to produce if not 
enjoyment, at least food for thought. 
I suppose that if a public opinion poll were 
held within the seven countries that make up 
Western European Union, asking what the man 
in the street knew about the great organisations 
formed in Europe over the past forty years, 
linking one country with another, most people 
would immediately think of the European Eco-
nomic Community. It has always been the case, 
at least in times of peace, that men and women 
are concerned above all with how well off they 
are compared with their neighbours and how 
their present standard of living compares with 
that of a few years ago. Mountains of butter and 
lakes of wine are the ingredients that make head-
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lines for the tabloids arid headaches for the trea-
surers. 
I dare to guess that NATO would probably be 
the second most widely familiar body, if only 
because at fairly regular intervals vocal minor-
ities protest or complain about something that 
NATO has done, is supposed to have done, or 
has not done. However unfair it may seem, I am 
pretty sure that WEU would be much less 
recognised and less well known to the public. No 
doubt that is a pity, although it is not necessarily 
a catastrophe because for those who concern 
themselves with politics, particularly the politics 
of defence, WEU is well known and much 
respected. Over the past couple of years, under 
the active and vigorous stewardship of Alfred 
Cahen, a major effort has been made to establish, 
through its reactivation, something that has 
come to be called a European defence identity. 
After all, we are Europeans, and it is the 
defence of Europe with which, naturally, we are 
primarily concerned. If that is what a European 
defence identity means, I am very much in 
favour of it. It would be a source of weakness not 
only to Western Europe but to the alliance as a 
whole if our defence effort came to be regarded 
by the general public not as an essential element 
in our own security but as a tribute to some long-
established totem. An effort that can be seen as 
national defence has an immediacy that simply 
making a contribution to NATO does not have. 
We Europeans, having pinned so many of our 
hopes for the future on a Community that has no 
responsibility for defence, need to be particularly 
attentive to the danger that the requirements of 
defence may be relegated to a secondary impor-
tance in the minds of the twelve members of that 
Community. 
I hope, having said that, that my credentials as 
an advocate of the usefulness ofWEU have been 
established. In my view, the primary importance 
of this organisation is in the commitment that 
underlies it. That commitment, embodied in the 
Brussels Treaty, provides that the parties should 
" afford the party attacked all the military and 
other aid... in their power ". 
It is a more binding commitment than that of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Because of that, it 
joins the seven countries together very closely. 
Therefore, I believe that you can make a great 
contribution to defence collaboration within 
Europe and across the Atlantic. 
Some people spend much time calling for new 
institutional structures to improve our efforts. It 
would be hard to deny that we are not ideally 
served by those we have at present. Of the 
European members ofNATO, the French are not 
members of the Eurogroup. The process of 
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political co-operation within the Community, for 
reasons that are well known and fully under-
standable, although not necessarily admirable, 
does not address defence issues, and WEU leaves 
out seven of the fourteen European members of 
NATO, including the two that happen to share 
frontiers with the Soviet Union. 
There is no way in which we shall reform or 
recast those institutions to remedy their defi-
ciencies. It is much more constructive to try to 
make them work more effectively together 
towards what is, after all, our common objective 
- to strengthen the contribution of the European 
allies to the transatlantic relationship that is the 
cornerstone of our security. So let me - I hope 
that you will not think me presumptuous -
suggest that there are at least two areas in which 
European partners in the alliance, particularly 
you in WEU, could do a great deal to promote a 
more effective European defence identity - first, 
armament co-operation and, secondly, a greater 
conventional defence effort. 
I have to admit that I have developed, deliber-
ately but perhaps not attractively, the habit of 
giving my audiences a regular and constant 
stream of advice about the need for more and 
better arms co-operation. There is no way that I 
can know how much impact my pleas have, but I 
believe in the value of the constant dripping of 
water on stone, even on the granite of some of 
my industrial and political colleagues who nod 
politely in agreement and do nothing. 
We delude ourselves if we believe that we can 
continue in Europe to produce military 
equipment in the same old way that we have 
done in the past, each country going its own way, 
trying to do too much on its own, with inade-
quate resources and paying too much attention 
to its own national interests at the expense of 
alliance priorities and interests. We are getting 
better but there is still far too much of the 
project-by-project, deal-by-deal, shorter pro-
duction lines style of armaments production. In 
my judgment, we simply cannot afford it. In vir-
tually all areas of our civil economy we in the 
West have a pretty good story to tell when com-
parisons are made with eastern bloc nations ; but 
in the area of defence production, it is, for fairly 
obvious reasons, the Warsaw Pact that is doing 
better than we in the West, and it is we in the 
West who have to get our act together. 
Describing the problems is easy. Everyone 
here will be familiar with the rubbish of different 
allied tanks that cannot fire the same shells, and 
of different communications equipment that 
requires expensive black boxes before soldiers 
can even speak to each other. We have heard the 
old joke about the only common thing in 
NATO's jeeps or personnel carriers being the air 
in the tyres. Tough decisions have to be taken 
before things are to improve. They will require 
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high-level political action. There is no shortage 
of good intentions. Some of the recent initiatives 
on both sides of the Atlantic are bearing some 
fruit, but we have not yet begun to grapple with 
the fundamental issues. In Europe we can no 
longer afford to dissipate resources through 
duplication of efforts. We have to pool our 
efforts. 
For example - I hope that this is not too revo-
lutionary - why not set up European research 
and development establishments, multi-
nationally paid for and multinationally manned, 
in the key equipment sectors ? What about the 
establishment of a defence industrial policy 
worthy of the name, supported by common 
acquisition and procurements regulations and 
practices? We cannot any longer afford to miss 
opportunities for co-operation because indi-
vidual nations pursue national, commercial, 
parochial and technological interests. 
As for burden-sharing and conventional 
defence improvements, you will know as well as 
I do of the need for the European alliance to do 
more and to be seen to do more, but the result of 
the mid-term elections in the United States and 
the assumption by Senator Nunn of the chair-
manship of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee will bring this subject to the fore once 
more. 
Senator Nunn is a staunch supporter of 
NATO, but equally firm in his belief that greater 
European effort is required. This is not a subject 
that will go away. Arms co-operation and greater 
European efforts in defence are to my mind two 
issues, among others, in which you can be of 
great benefit to your members and to the 
alliance. 
I do not suppose that I can come here as Secre-
tary-General without saying something about the 
current state of East-West relations in the 
aftermath of the Reykjavik summit. Reykjavik, 
like most other noteworthy events in East-West 
relations, has been analysed almost to death and 
I do not wish to add to the " what might 
otherwise have been .. commentaries. 
Few, if any of us, expected anything very sub-
stantial to emerge. It was, after all, billed as a 
summit to discuss a summit, not as a potential 
breakthrough to a major new arms control 
agreement, but things turned out rather differ-
ently. There was a negotiation and serious pro-
posals were made, proposals which went much 
further than anything hitherto envisaged. 
The first reaction of many people on learning 
of the breakdown of the talks was deep disap-
pointment, but closer examination later showed 
how far the two sides had progressed and the 
areas of agreement between them. Discussions 
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on matters which even a few months ago would 
have been regarded as hopelessly visionary were 
reported. It seemed that the log-jam which had 
blocked progress for so long might be about to 
break up. 
After the lapse of a few weeks, the conse-
quences of Reykjavik can be seen in a rather 
calmer atmosphere. We have all had time to 
reflect on those two momentous days. Reactions 
have differed. Some Americans have been sur-
prised that Europeans who have, it seems to 
them, been hesitant in their support for 
American nuclear weapons in Europe, should 
now feel that the proposal to withdraw them puts 
them at risk. Some Europeans on the other hand 
have been surprised that the Americans went, as 
they see it, so far and so fast, and implicitly 
criticise the lack of consultation. This last point 
is, in my judgment, unfair. The day before the 
Reykjavik meeting, Ambassadors Nitze and 
Ridgway came to brief the NATO Council. It 
was clear that there was no expectation of a nego-
tiation of the kind that in the event took place. It 
must be equally evident that in the light of the 
proposals put forward at the beginning of the 
talks at Reykjavik it would have been impossible 
for the Americans not to have entered into 
serious discussion. As soon as the meeting ended 
Secretary Shultz came to Brussels to debrief and 
consult. There really can be no complaint of the 
Americans trying to keep their European allies in 
the dark. 
Most of us were astonished at what did emerge 
in the form of agreed elements in a possible 
future negotiating package or, for the more cau-
tious spirits, at least the shape of such package. 
The realisation grew that the leaders of the two 
superpowers had come fairly close to, or had at 
least discussed seriously, the abolition ofballistic 
missiles and INF nuclear weapons. And West 
European politicians and diplomats began to 
debate the consequences of such an eventu-
ality. 
One more thing: even if outline agreements 
had been signed, there would have been many 
months of patient negotiation. Verification - the 
key to confidence-building - had been barely 
touched on in the talks and problems of satis-
factory verification in a closed society such as the 
Soviet Union are fraught with difficulty. We had 
a long way to go before the conditions under 
which the Americans had made their proposals 
could be fulfilled. 
Some of the proposals made in Reykjavik may 
indeed come about. I hope so. If the Soviets 
abandon the linkage with the SDI there is no 
reason why a satisfactory INF agreement cannot 
be reached. Nor if compliance difficulties are 
solved should it be beyond the wit of man to 
agree on a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear 
weapons, but that is in the future. 
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Irrespective of whether we succeeded in those 
two directions, three major things have hap-
pened as a result of Reykjavik. First, President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev have now had for 
the second time experience of direct across-the-
table negotiations with each other. They will 
have learned lessons about how to· do business 
with each other, and that must be to the good. 
Second, public perception has been changed by 
the glimpse that radical nuclear disarmament 
was a real possibility. That will have a major 
impact on the shaping of the debate from now 
on. Consider, for example, the way in which 
those who advocate nuclear disarmament have 
been able to claim the near agreements in 
Reykjavik as evidence that they had been right 
all along. The very fact that such radical pro-
posals have been made will mean that allied 
strategy will in future be viewed in a totally dif-
ferent light. 
One of the most important consequences of 
Reykjavik has been to remind the alliance of the 
relationship between the nuclear and conven-
tional components of our defences. In particular, 
it has drawn attention to what is perhaps 
NATO's most vulnerable point- the imbalance 
in conventional forces between the alliance and 
the Warsaw Pact. And if the aftermath of 
Reykjavik leads to progress in reducing nuclear 
arsenals, the need to make parallel progress in 
eliminating conventional disparities becomes 
even greater. 
When I was addressing the Atlantic Institute a 
week or so ago, I made the point that the conven-
tional disarmament process was likely to be 
much more complex and more difficult than 
nuclear disarmament. The MBFR talks, which 
one could say were comparatively straight-
forward, have made little progress in thirteen 
years. That is not to suggest that we should not 
put every effort into solving the problem and do 
a lot more work than we have done in the past. 
The alliance cannot complain of conventional 
imbalance and do nothing to reduce it. 
It may be that Mr. Gorbachev is really inter-
ested in freeing resources for a revitalisation of 
the Soviet economy. Conventional forces, with 
their need for manpower and equipment which 
account for the great bulk of military expendi-
tures on both sides, provide an excellent oppor-
tunity. For our part, we are already preparing 
through the work being done in the high-level 
task force under the chairmanship of Ambas-
sador Guidi. I do not know what that body will 
produce. It is reporting to the NATO Ministerial 
Council on 11th December and working hard on 
the substance of a problem which has become 
increasingly important and urgent. 
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For the present, the alliance must continue to 
require a range of nuclear systems as well as con-
ventional arms to provide deterrence. There is 
little alternative as we note the continuing 
improvements and additions to the already over-
whelming Soviet conventional strength. In such 
circumstances, our strategy of forward defence 
and flexible response is the only one available to 
us. 
At the same time, allied governments must 
live up to their undertakings to improve their 
conventional forces. Conventional forces cost a 
lot of money. At a time when governments have 
more than enough demands on their resources, 
spending on the armed services does not, alas, 
always have the high priority which those of us 
who are most concerned with defence would like 
to see. Nor, paradoxically, are those who are 
most anxious about nuclear weapons prepared to 
draw the logical conclusion that more must be 
spent on conventional arms. Nuclear defence is 
defence on the cheap, particularly if the nuclear 
weapons are American nuclear weapons; but we 
must recognise that we are not going to get all the 
money we need. We have therefore taken the 
practical course of trying to concentrate our 
efforts on areas that matter most - areas where 
there are critical deficiencies and where a special 
effort will provide the greatest returns for col-
lective defence. I hope that what we are doing on 
the conventional defence improvements (CDI) 
will encourage ministries of defence to make 
greater efforts at long-term planning and the 
exploitation of new technologies. None of this 
will produce dramatic change. But it is helping to 
shape our collective efforts. 
So I would be deceiving you if I ever said I 
thought that conventional or nuclear deterrence 
can be had on the cheap. The cost of armaments 
grows steadily: that is why NATO ministers 
accepted the target of 3% annual growth in real 
terms. Whatever we do by way of armaments 
co-operation and efficiency improvement, the 
capabilities we shall need in the nineties will still 
be expensive. Of the WEU member countries 
only two have declared plans for growth of 
around 3%. The remainder, some after notable 
efforts which have improved the equipment, 
readiness and sustainability of their forces, no 
longer intend to do so. I must warn you that, just 
as we are now benefiting from the efforts of the 
past, if we go on as we are we shall be leaving a 
dangerous legacy of neglect to our successors and 
to the people of Western Europe. 
Of course, it is expensive. Of course, it places 
burdens on the taxpayer. But the cost of failing is 
not just financial; it affects the very foundations 
of our society and the world in which for forty 
years we have lived in peace and unparalleled 
prosperity. It is up to us parliamentarians, legis-
lators, leaders of public opinion to make our 
fellow countrymen and women understand. 
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One final word about arms control: the con-
clusion of the Stockholm conference marked the 
first multilateral security agreement since 1975. 
It was not all we wanted but it was a considerable 
improvement on the measures set out in the 
Helsinki final act of 1975, particularly in low-
ering thresholds for the notification and obser-
vation of military activities, and in providing -
although to some degree inadequately - for 
on-site inspection. And the inclusion of the 
whole European part of the Soviet Union estab-
lishes another important principle. On the whole 
that was a step forward. If properly imple-
mented, the Stockholm results will lead to more 
openness and pave the way for further steps. 
We have also seen some progress on chemical 
weapons. I hope that that will take place as a 
result of Mr. Shevardnadze's encouraging speech 
in Vienna. 
Of course, progress in the conventional field 
has been much less impressive and indeed, alas, 
has taken a step backwards in terms of verifi-
cation at the MBFR talks. But despite that, if we 
look back on 1986 and enter 1987, we can cer-
tainly say we have had an eventful twelve 
months. It is a very long time since there has 
been so much movement in relations between 
the two blocs. For example, Reykjavik is bound 
to throw up new ideas which must be dealt with 
- for example, the Soviet willingness to discuss 
the previously undiscussable - and, most 
important of all perhaps in this last twelve 
months, the alliance remains strong and united, 
not as strong as we would like, but strong enough 
to deter an aggressor, and united despite the 
many attempts to drive wedges between us. It is 
our strength and cohesion which bring the Soviet 
leaders to the point of serious negotiation. They 
are realistic. They have no need to take account 
of parliamentary or public opinion; and they will 
consider concessions only when they see that 
they cannot win their prize by simply waiting for 
it to drop into their lap. 
It is the duty of the alliance- and ofWEU- to 
remain firm, united and resolute but at the same 
time ready to seize opportunities not only for 
arms control agreements and reductions but also 
for the relaxation of political tension between 
East and West and the creation of a more stable 
relationship in a world with far too many arms 
and far too little trust. We in the West are ready. 
We must hope the Soviet bloc will respond to 
our efforts. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your address, and espe-
cially for those parts of it which have a direct 
bearing on the issues to be debated by the 
Assembly. What you have said reflects perfectly 
the reality which we have to confront. Thank you 
again for your contribution to our debate. 
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I shall now call five members who wish to put 
questions. 
I call Mr. De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Thank you, Secretary-General, for your 
remarkable address and for having underlined 
the important part which WEU could play with 
regard to European co-operation on armaments 
and their standardisation. However, you could 
perhaps explain to us why it is that the minis-
terial organs of WEU, including especially the 
technical agencies of WEU, which meet every 
requirement in the matter of confidentiality, 
appear to be sometimes unable to obtain either 
from the NATO secretariat-general or from 
NATO and SHAPE headquarters the infor-
mation they need to discharge the functions 
entrusted to them by the Council of Ministers of 
WEU? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General of NATO. 
Lord CARRINGTON (Secretary-General of 
NATO). - I do not think so. I do not know of 
anything which the Secretary-General of WEU 
has asked me for which has been refused him. I 
do not know that anything that has ever been 
asked for has been refused. It will be recognised, 
of course, that we have the difficulty in the 
alliance of working on the basis of consensus and 
therefore if one of the sixteen countries objected 
to a piece of information being passed to WEU it 
would be impossible to pass it. The Secretary-
General of NATO, probably unlike the Secretary-
General of WEU, does not have the power to 
override sovereign governments. Sometimes it 
would be marvellous if he had. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
Since, at Reykjavik, if it had not been for the 
blockage of the SDI question, we could have 
found ourselves with a provisional agreement 
about long-distance missiles and INF, and since 
such an agreement would not have covered tac-
tical nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or veri-
fication, is it not the case that, for the foreseeable 
future, we shall have to go on relying, with gra-
titude, upon the American nuclear umbrella? 
What do you think about a future Europe in 
which some countries accept that umbrella and 
others refuse it? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General of NATO. 
Lord CARRINGTON (Secretary-General of 
NATO).- There was never any suggestion, even 
in the very unlikely event of an outright 
agreement having been signed at Reykjavik, that 
there would be anything other than a nuclear 
deterrent to rely on, because the Americans were 
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talking only about ballistic missiles, which meant 
that cruise missiles and manned bombers and so 
on were not included. The suggestion that you 
can get rid of nuclear weapons in the world in ten 
years does not seem very practical. Think of the 
verification problems there would be. I believe 
that we- shall have to rely upon the nuclear 
deterrent for a long time indeed. Those who feel 
that they can dispense with the nuclear umbrella 
have to face the fact that if there is to be a suffi-
cient deterrent we do not need to match the 
Warsaw Pact man for man, tank for tank, gun for 
gun because we are a defensive alliance but great 
expense would be involved. This also assumes 
that the Soviet Union does not have nuclear 
weapons either. 
Conventional defence improvements are very 
expensive. The more sophisticated the weapons 
become, the more expensive they are. Let me 
give an illustration. During the second world war 
rich people in England could, if they contributed 
£5 000, buy a Spitfire. You would be very lucky 
today to get a Tornado for £14 million. That has 
outpaced the level of inflation and depreciation 
of the pound. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - We 
were heartened when you said at the outset of 
your remarks that the defence of Europe is what 
we are primarily concerned about. Looking at 
INF and prospects for arms control in that area 
do you not feel, since we have, after much 
political travail, secured the deployment of 
modernised INF within five European countries 
of NATO, that to move to a zero-zero option 
now would be extremely dangerous unless we 
were to secure good collateral from our Soviet 
counterparts? That would involve agreement 
that it would be acceptable on our part to employ 
anti-tactical ballistic missile systems and, on 
their part, that they reduce the SS-21s, SS-22s 
and SS-23s that they have deployed, particularly 
in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, since we 
began deploying our Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles from the end of 1979. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General of NATO. 
Lord CARRINGTON (Secretary-General of 
NATO). - I do not think that the European coun-
tries have much justification for feeling surprised 
about the zero-zero option. After all, the twin-
track decision in December 1979 visualised pre-
cisely that. I was a party to it and I remember. 
What we visualised was no deployment of cruise 
and Pershing missiles if the Soviet Union 
withdrew all of their SS-20s. We were, in effect, 
visualising a zero-zero option then. 
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Circumstances have now changed. One of the 
altered circumstances is that, as a result of the 
deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, the 
Soviet Union deployed in Eastern Europe a 
number of shorter-range nuclear missiles, saying 
that you could not equate cruise and Pershings 
with SS-20s. Consequently, we have more of 
these weapons facing us than ever before. We 
should insist upon the withdrawal of those 
weapons as well as the SS-20s that were brought 
up as a result of the twin-track decision - the 
deployment of cruise and Pershing. 
I also think that it is essential that there be a 
commitment to a proper SRINF agreement and 
not just a freezing - although that is no doubt 
essential - of negotiations. I also think that there 
has to be a proper commitment to conventional 
arms reduction talks on a much wider basis than 
· MBFR. Although one does not want to link all of 
these, because I can see as well as anyone else the 
problems of doing so, it is essential that we take 
account of what one agreement in one sector 
does to the balance in another sector. 
ATBM is a little in the future. We are studying 
the threat but it has not really got to the stage in 
the alliance where we are sufficiently sure that 
A TBM is the way to deal with it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Secre-
tary-General, I greatly appreciate the force and 
realism of what you have had to say, and I wish 
only to draw your attention to Spain's position in 
the defence of our continent. 
We share your undoubted satisfaction at the 
favourable outcome of the referendum which has 
confirmed Spain's allegiance to the Atlantic 
Alliance and consequently its firm adherence to 
the western camp. We extend a cordial greeting 
to the Spanish observers whom we are pleased to 
see in our midst. 
Could you, Secretary-General, enlighten us on 
two points? 
First, following the favourable referendum, 
what is the precise nature of the links which have 
been established or reinforced between our 
Spanish allies and the various organs of the 
alliance? 
Second, we note that Spain's application to 
become a member of our organisation has still 
not been submitted formally. Do you have any 
more precise information, and can you tell us 
how NATO would view Spain's entry into 
WEU? It is, of course, a matter between Spain 
and ourselves, but you may well have an 
opinion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General of NATO. 
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NATO).- I am sufficiently old a parliamentarian 
to answer that second question by saying: " That 
is a matter for you, not for me ". I am not going 
to get into trouble. 
The Spanish people voted to come into NATO 
on the basis that they would become full 
members but would not integrate their military 
forces. There are at present discussions going on 
between officials on the international staff and 
the Spanish Government about what precisely 
that means. The impression I get is that it is a 
firm commitment on the part of the Spanish 
Government that they will ·not integrate their 
forces, because that is the basis on which they 
came in. However, I think there are discussions 
going on to see what kind of military contri-
bution - and I mean " contribution " in its 
widest sense - it would be appropriate and pos-
sible for Spain to make. 
I must apologise. I must ask you to excuse me. 
I have another engagement and I have to tell 
you, Mr. President, that it is with the French 
Minister of Defence. Therefore I do not think 
that I ought to be late. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your replies to the ques-
tions put by members. 
I must inform the Assembly that I have noted 
in writing for the attention of the Secretary-
General, who is obliged to leave because of other 
commitments, the questions put by Mr. Hardy, 
Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Palumbo, Sir John 
Osborn, Mr. Inan and Mr. Haase. 
You know that the chair gives the floor to 
everyone wishing to speak. Among all the other 
matters to be placed on record, the chair has 
therefore also noted the problem of the time to 
be allowed to speakers bearing in mind the time 
available to the Assembly. The fact is that we 
cannot work to hard and fast timetables. Such an 
arrangement has never worked in any par-
liament, and is not likely to do so here. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. Once again, this is a 
most serious point. Lord Carrington's address 
was a fascinating and important part of a signi-
ficant debate. You read out a list of members 
who had questions to ask him. I understand that 
it is necessary for Lord Carrington to leave, but 
his contribution was such that I believe it rea-
sonable to ask you to convey to him a request 
that he should consider the questions that we 
were not able to ask. I certainly want him to con-
sider my question and I believe that members 
who had serious questions to ask should be 
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enabled to present them officially through the 
Assembly within a reasonable time. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
for your intervention, Mr. Hardy, which is 
entirely acceptable to the chair. I fully agree with 
what you have just said, and I would ask 
members who were unable to put their questions 
to Lord Carrington to let me have them in 
writing, if they so desire. I will pass them on at 
once to Lord Carrington for answers. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I 
endorse what Mr. Hardy has said, but it should 
be made clear to Lord Carrington that the criti-
cisms made earlier about too many ministers 
attending our debates did not apply to him. It is 
sad that he has become a victim of those earlier 
complaints. He was booked to speak for one 
hour and to answer all our questions and I hope 
that he understands that the critical remarks 
made by Mr. Hardy earlier today - to which I lis-
tened with sympathy - did not extend to him. 
We should love to see Lord Carrington here on 
another occasion. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Yes, abso-
lutely correct. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That was 
clearly understood, Sir Frederic. The procedure 
will be applied by the chair to ensure that 
members wishing to put a question get an 
answer. 
We shall now proceed to the next order of the 
day. 
11. Address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
giving you the floor, Secretary-General, I would 
like to thank you for your courtesy, which will 
have come as no surprise to those who know 
you, in allowing Mr. Mollemann, the Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and Lord Carrington, Secretary-
General of NATO, to speak before you. 
I now invite you to the rostrum. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, members of the 
parliamentary Assembly of Western European 
Union, I know very well that you have extremely 
full orders of the day and I shall therefore do my 
utmost, since your time is precious, to be as brief 
as possible. 
However, I would like to start by expressing to 
you my deep gratitude for the invitation to 
address you today for the third time. In my 
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judgment, the importance of this lies in the fact 
that you are the representatives of the peoples of 
the states which make up our organisation and in 
the fact, of which your President has reminded 
us, that you are the only parliamentary body 
competent to discuss European security 
problems in the Atlantic context, to which this 
security is indissolubly linked. 
The gratitude I feel today is all the greater as I 
believe that this session, opening on 1st 
December, is one of special importance and is 
being held at a particularly significant time. I say 
this for three reasons. 
The first is the quality of the reports to be pre-
sented at this session. These are extremely 
important, and have been carefully considered 
by your Council. I know that the members of 
governments who are to speak here - in par-
ticular Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, and Mr. Fischbach - will answer some 
of the concerns reflected in your reports. 
The second reason why this session of your 
Assembly is specially significant lies in the 
strength and brilliance of the ministerial repre-
sentation. I am of course well aware, as Mr. 
Hardy recently reminded us, that the extent of 
this representation makes some inroads into the 
time you have to devote to your strictly parlia-
mentary work, and I appreciate that you may 
find that troublesome. All the same, as your 
President has pointed out, the quantity and 
quality of the ministerial representation here do 
constitute a political event. 
An event because ministers or secretaries of 
state with responsibilities for the armed forces or 
national defence will be present at virtually all 
your sittings. 
Again, the presence here tomorrow of the 
Prime Minister of the French Republic is also a 
political event. 
Similarly, the honour of being addressed by 
Mr. Mollemann, as was amply proved by the 
number of questions put to him. 
Further events will be the contributions by Mr. 
Spadolini and the United Kingdom Minister of 
State for Defence. 
Finally, the presence on this rostrum of Lord 
Carrington was a very major event. As you have 
all stressed, his presence here bears witness to the 
fact that WEU is indeed being reactivated, 
without going outside the alliance. This is evi-
dence that the process is taking place at the very 
heart of that Atlantic solidarity without which 
there can be no credible defence of NATO or 
therefore of Western Europe. 
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The third reason why the timing of this session 
is particularly significant is that it is taking place 
immediately after the ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg. Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach will 
address you tomorrow on the subject of the con-
clusions reached at that meeting. 
I have no intention of anticipating what they 
will have to say to you. Moreover, they briefed 
your President and members of the Presidential 
Committee on the ministerial meeting when it 
ended in Luxembourg. I can however tell you, 
here and now, that the results of the ministerial 
meeting did respond in a most positive way to 
some of your concerns about the vigour, not to 
say the reality, of the reactivation of Western 
European Union - concerns which emerge in 
some of the reports before the present session of 
the Assembly. 
But I really do wonder, and I put the question 
to you, whether these reports would have been 
framed in the same terms and would have 
expressed the same concerns had they been 
written after rather than before the Luxembourg 
meeting. I tell you now that I think not. I appeal 
here to the evidence supplied by your President, 
who has just emphasised the exhilaration of 
Luxembourg, and by Mr. Goerens who, having 
written his report after the meeting in the Grand 
Duchy, has expressed his appreciation of its 
outcome. The fact is that the recent evolution in 
East-West relations has suddenly highlighted the 
imperative need for our states - more than ever 
now - to act in concert about joint security 
problems. As you know better than anybody, this 
essential reflection can only take place in 
WEU. 
The Reykjavik talks and their aftermath have 
clearly shown that WEU is well and truly reacti-
vated and perfectly equipped to take on the 
responsibilities assigned to it. Mr. Genscher at 
the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg was 
uttering no empty words when he said: " If 
WEU did not exist, it would now need to be 
invented." 
Naturally, there is still a great deal to do- that 
much is clear from a reading of your reports -
and I ask you to believe that no one is more 
aware of this than your Council and its Secretary-
General who have determinedly moved things 
forward since your last session. Allow me to give 
you one or two examples. 
The Council has sought to improve further the 
procedure for replying to the Assembly's recom-
mendations and written questions which give 
useful indications to the Council as to its future 
tasks. 
Again with the aim of conveying information 
to the Assembly more speedily and more com-
pletely, it was agreed that the annual report 
would henceforth be circulated half-yearly. The 
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speeding-up of the transmission of texts repre-
sents marked progress and clearly shows the 
Council's real determination to give due impor-
tance to the public democratic dialogue between 
the Council and the Assembly. 
Since I last had the honour of addressing you 
in June, the Council's special working group on 
SDI has continued to meet regularly. Not only 
has it exchanged information between member 
countries on questions related to participation in 
SDI research but it has also begun to analyse, on 
a long-term basis, the politico-strategic implica-
tions of possible developments in ballistic 
missile defence. 
In its recent progress report to ministers in 
Luxembourg, the group, whilst considering that 
it was impractical to draw conclusions at this 
early stage of BMD research, nevertheless 
recognised - very significantly - that common 
perceptions of European security interests linked 
to possible developments in this area were 
emerging within the member countries of 
WEU. 
Indeed, as Chairman of the special working 
group, I am gratified to note that Mr. Bianco in 
his report, when referring to the information 
given by the Council on SDI in its thirty-first 
annual report, states that the consensus reached 
among the Seven on SDI " went quite a long 
way". 
As to the future, the Council's special working 
group will, of course, continue to examine the 
problems arising from SDI. But following the 
decision taken at the Luxembourg ministerial 
meeting, this will not be its only task - the 
group's mandate will now be extended to include 
the whole range of problems concerning 
European security. 
In the same vein, the m1msters decided in 
Luxembourg that there should be more active 
participation by the political directors and the 
representatives of the defence ministries and I 
am sure that in their addresses Mr. Poos and Mr. 
Fischbach will be giving you more details about 
this new and important aspect of reactivation. 
The desire expressed in one of your recom-
mendations that there should be uniform partici-
pation by all the member states in joint reflection 
on security has become a reality as from 13th 
and 14th November. Indeed, Western European 
Union emerged from the ministerial discussions 
as the forum where all its members should 
determine the security of Europe together. 
Moreover, this situation is now in the public 
domain as Ministers Andreotti and Genscher 
have made clear in speaking to the press. 
There is not the slightest ambiguity in this 
matter, and rumours circulating in early 
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November about a possible directorate are 
totally without foundation. 
The same recommendation asks the Council 
to " explain to the Assembly how it intends to 
keep the press informed of each ofits activities". 
A new member of the political division of the 
secretariat-general has been charged with this 
essential task of informing public opinion 
through the media. I was pleased to introduce 
him in London to your Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations. You are also 
aware - and I thank you for your recognition of 
this fact - how concerned I am personally about 
keeping the press and public opinion well 
informed. 
The agencies, for their part, have now received 
their new mandates from the Council. They have 
already provided many extremely useful contri-
butions to the Council's work. These studies are 
an essential tool for the Council whose activities 
have to cover all aspects of European security. 
It is in this context that I was charged in 
Luxembourg with the task of submitting to the 
presidency at the beginning of 1987 proposals to 
obtain the maximum benefit from the 
agencies. 
This attempt to achieve increased effectiveness 
has led the Council to strive to ensure that the 
agencies have greater access to the sources of 
confidential information which are essential for 
the proper execution of their mandates. In this 
connection, you have heard the question put by 
Mr. De Decker to Lord Carrington and Lord 
Carrington's reply. 
I would also add for good measure a point 
which has already been alluded to. At the insti-
gation of France, European seminars on security 
and defence matters are to be organised under 
the auspices of Western European Union. This 
project was approved by the ministers in 
Luxembourg. It will be a simple formula, based 
on the methods of the French Institut des Hautes 
Etudes de Defense Nationale and will aim to 
arouse public awareness of defence and security 
problems in Europe. I am grateful to France for 
suggesting that the first session of a seminar initi-
ating this educative effort should be opened in 
Paris. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you may 
rest assured that all these steps forward will not 
prevent your Council from remaining very much 
aware of the progress still to be achieved, to 
which quite rightly you call its attention. But this 
progress should be seen in the perspective of 
what Western European Union is in process of 
becoming in accordance with the wishes of those 
who instigated its reactivation - the govern-
ments of our member states and yourselves. 
What should it become? An instrument of 
European political co-operation on security, 
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through which the public can be better informed 
in this sphere, particularly in the context of the 
Assembly-Council dialogue. 
The debate on the conditions for European 
security is certain to develop and it will be your 
role, ladies and gentlemen, to expand and 
explain this to the public. Your role will by no 
means be that of a mere megaphone, Mr. Pres-
ident, but rather that of a catalyst stimulating 
democratic debate between the Assembly and the 
Council in public view. 
I am of course aware of the budget problem. 
This has been mentioned several times this 
afternoon, and will no doubt be raised again 
tomorrow. I am just as conscious ofthis problem 
as you are since the Secretariat-General is faced 
with the same difficulty, but I do know that Mr. 
Poos will not evade discussion of the matter, and 
that he will handle it in the same positive way in 
which he has assumed the Luxembourg presi-
dency of our organisation. 
The French writer, philosopher and political 
scientist, Hippolyte Taine, said that a nation 
died through the sapping of its courage and a 
drying-up of its ideas. This is true of every major 
national or international project and, of course, 
of a project such as the reactivation of our 
organisation. 
However, I very sincerely believe that our 
courage has not been sapped and that we are not 
lacking in ideas. Your Assembly has indeed 
much to do with this through its positive criti-
cism and its vigorous encouragement to the gov-
ernments of the Seven to go forward. These gov-
ernments have, for their part, shown lately in 
Luxembourg what contribution they bring in this 
respect. 
To conclude, let me stress that I am not so pre-
sumptuous - and indeed that would go beyond 
my role - as to wave an announcement of 
victory before you. But I am delighted to have 
been able to give you this very encouraging 
report on progress made with reactivating 
Western European Union. This is vital in itself, 
as well as being essential to the cause of 
European construction to which we are all 
devoted. By nurturing WEU we have in a sense 
promoted the growth of that recalcitrant but 
tenacious tree which calls to mind the one cele-
brated by the Belgian poet Emile V erhaeren 
when he wrote: A tree which suffered all the 
rigours of winter and the languors of summer 
" without for a single instant weakening in its 
determination that, with each new spring, its life 
should be enhanced and more radiant still". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your outstanding contri-
bution to the Assembly's debates and for 
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showing yourself to be such a friend of this 
Assembly, for a friend you have always been 
since the auspicious day of your appointment, 
which has served the interests of us all. I thank 
you also for the active part which you are playing 
in the reactivation of WEU. 
Perhaps I may summarise the impression of us 
all at the start of this session by saying that the 
reactivation of WEU would serve no purpose in 
itself if it were not based on a renewed will 
towards political union within Europe. This is 
what is actually taking place and I am duly 
grateful to you. 
12. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The French 
and the Italian Delegations have proposed the 
following changes in the membership of com-
mittees: 
The French Delegation proposes the following 
changes in the membership of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Jung as 
a titular member in place of Mr. Bourges; Mr. 
Alloncle as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Wirth; Mrs. Lalumiere as a titular member in 
place of Mr. Beregovoy; Mr. Koehl as an 
alternate member in place of Mr. Jung and Mr. 
Fourre as an alternate member in place of Mr. 
Delebarre; in the membership of the General 
Affairs Committee: Mr. Chenard as an alternate 
member in place of Mr. Delebarre and Mr. 
Portier as an alternate member in place of Mr. 
Dreyfus-Schmidt; in the membership of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges: Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in 
place of Mr. Koehl; Mr. Gremetz as an alternate 
member in place of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and 
Mr. Bassinet as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Fourre; in the membership of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: 
Mr. de Chambrun as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Mercier; Mr. Chenard as an alternate 
member in place of Mr. de Chambrun and Mr. 
Collette as an alternate member in place of Mr. 
Gremetz. 
The Italian Delegation proposes the following 
change in the membership of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. 
Stegagnini as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Bonalumi. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
These changes are agreed to. 
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13. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1073) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on European security 
and the Mediterranean, Document 1073. 
Before calling Mr. Kittelmann I should point 
out that, in accordance with the alteration just 
made to the orders of the day, I shall give the 
floor to members wishing to speak after the 
statement by the Rapporteur, but that the vote 
will not take place this evening. It will probably 
be taken tomorrow together with the scheduled 
votes on the budgetary reports and on those of 
Mr. Bianco and Mr. Amadei. 
I call Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, I had the honour to introduce 
this report on 4th June of this year. The Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments is 
today presenting a revised version. At the 
request of a single delegate the Assembly agreed 
that the report should also consider the 
important role played by various western 
industrialised countries as suppliers of arms to 
the Near East. This report has been drawn up in 
compliance with this request, Tables A and B 
having been added in Appendix VI. 
At my request the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments has also promised to 
draw up a separate and more detailed report on 
this problem. 
Three amendments were submitted to the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. One of them, the one in which Syria as 
well as Libya is mentioned as a participant in 
international terrorism, has been approved. I 
hope, therefore, that you will not take it amiss if 
I refer you in general to my comments in June, 
principally because the description and 
assessment of the situation remain unchanged 
since that time. 
We considered three problems in depth: the 
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, the NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean and the non-
aligned countries of the Mediterranean. 
The fact that in a letter to United Nations Sec-
retary-General Perez de Cuellar in early July 
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed 
a simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and United 
States naval forces from the Mediterranean -
presumably envisaged as a new version of the 
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Geneva Near East conference - cannot in any 
way change the basic evaluation of the Soviet 
Union's policy on the Near and Middle East. In 
fact, it essentially confirms our view that the 
Soviet Union is making still more determined 
efforts to acquire influence in the Mediterranean. 
The geographical aspects alone of the proposed 
withdrawal are enough to cast doubt on it. 
With your permission, therefore, I will now 
briefly recall the two most important areas 
covered by this report. The USSR resolutely 
exploits for its own ends any trouble spots 
emerging in the international arena and particu-
larly in the third world. This also applies to the 
Near East conflict and the associated energy 
problems confronting the western industrialised 
countries and equally to the offensive policy of 
Islam, which is spreading far beyond the actual 
Iran-Iraq trouble centre to all the countries of the 
Near East and North Africa, where the USSR is 
endeavouring to expand its spheres of influence 
and to weaken the West's position wherever this 
appears possible without any risk to itself. We 
must realise that, given the Soviet Union's per-
ception of the world, this is a legitimate means to 
an end. For our part, we must never lose sight of 
that fact. We simply have to remember at all 
times that the West is far more dependent than 
the USSR on third world countries for raw mate-
rials and energy. 
Consequently, the strategic importance of 
NA TO's southern flank has not decreased in 
recent years. In any assessment of the security 
situation it is more than ever essential to con-
sider not only Central Europe but also the 
southern region of the allied command in 
Europe. 
The West's primary aim throughout the 
AFSOUTH sector is still the prevention of war 
by deterrence. In view of the latent challenges on 
its southern flank it would seem appropriate to 
pay due attention to this region. A particular 
problem is posed by the fact that crises and con-
flicts outside the NATO area are increasingly 
affecting the AFSOUTH sector. In the southern 
region the West not only finds itself confronted 
with the Warsaw Pact: some member countries 
in the southern region not only have a common 
frontier with Warsaw Pact countries but also 
adjoin an area of regional conflict such as Iran-
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Near East. 
In these circumstances Turkey's strategic 
importance has grown. Regardless of events 
outside the NATO area, it is still our main task 
to respond adequately to the communist 
threat. 
The Warsaw Pact forces are superior to those 
of the AFSOUTH sector. The fighting strength of 
the western units is not yet quite enough. 
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It is becoming increasingly important to 
strengthen cohesion by extending co-operation to 
other spheres and by achieving closer political 
and military integration into the alliance. Above 
all, the Central European countries must be con-
stantly reminded that vital interests of the West 
are at stake in this region. The southern region is 
of great importance to the whole of the alliance. 
To ensure peace or maintain a credible deterrent 
capacity, it is clearly essential that the NATO 
forces in the southern region should also be 
modernised and maintained at an adequate 
level. 
The security of the countries on the southern 
flank and control over the Mediterranean con-
tinue to be NATO's principal tasks in this area. 
We have endeavoured to set this out in detail in 
the report. In this connection we welcome the 
fact that the United States Sixth Fleet is 
improving the position of the alliance in the 
Mediterranean. 
We welcome the participation of French forces 
in manreuvres in the Mediterranean. Special 
mention should also be made of the considerable 
Greek and Turkish defence efforts and the 
various Italian programmes, including the estab-
lishment of a rapid strike force. We also welcome 
Spain's accession to the alliance, which has simi-
larly improved the West's position in this 
region. 
The political, military and above all economic 
action that needs to be taken now and in the 
future is set out in the draft recommendation. 
To conclude, I should like to take up two 
points. We have noted with interest that the 
Council discussed security in the Mediterranean 
at its meeting in Venice. In the report we are to 
deal with during this sitting it has devoted a 
short section to this subject which bears no 
relation to the importance of the region. Then, at 
its meeting in Luxembourg, the Council did not 
have enough time to consider this problem. We 
can only call on the Council to see this subject as 
an on-going task and to take appropriate account 
of it in its negotiations. 
The second point is this; we increasingly have 
the feeling that too much is said and too much 
time elapses between the realisation that the eco-
nomic situation in the southern region needs to 
be improved and action to this end. In our report 
we appeal for the stabilisation of the situation in 
the southern region chiefly through the provision 
of economic aid - to a greater extent than in the 
past. 
(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Cifarelli. 
Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
should first like to congratulate Mr. Kittelmann 
on his essential, important and very full report 
about which a great deal needs to be said. May I 
begin by recalling that my party and I myself 
have always resisted and are still resisting the 
temptation to shift the axis of Italian foreign 
policy and of Italian defence towards the Medi-
terranean or at least exclusively to the Mediter-
ranean. We have always maintained that it is 
Italy's first duty and interest to stay within the 
Atlantic family looking towards Western Europe 
and regard this as the essential prerequisite for 
the better implementation of a responsible and 
constructive peace policy in the Mediterranean; 
Italy must not give way to temptations of the 
kind which in the past have written some very 
sad pages in our country's political history. 
But precisely because we are calling for the 
constructive involvement of the original ele-
ments of the Atlantic Alliance and because of our 
position and duties in relation to the problems 
arising, we should like to add a few reservations 
to our approval of certain major points in the 
report. 
Our first reservation concerns the words used 
concerning the serious crisis in the Middle East, 
the crisis of what used to be Palestine and con-
cerning the great quarrel between Israel and the 
Arab states regarding the grave problem of the 
fate of the Palestinian people. I cannot accept a 
wording which puts the Israelis and the Pales-
tinians on the same footing as though there were 
faults on both sides. On the one hand there is a 
state recognised by the United Nations and, on 
the other, surrounding states which have not 
been prepared to make peace with it; in the 
middle there are people deserving of respect for 
whom the agreement will certainly not be repu-
diated by Italian republicans who have always 
recognised the rights of nations. But in order to 
solve this problem the greed and manreuvrings 
of other states must be set aside. 
Another major point is the attention which 
Mr. Kittelmann said he wished to give in another 
report to the subject of reactions to Libya's spon-
soring of terrorist activities. We republicans can 
approve what the report says about Turkey. In 
our view the presence of Turkey both on the 
southern flank of NATO and in the Council of 
Europe is very important. Since Turkey restored 
conditions for full participation in the Council of 
Europe we have kept the question under con-
stant review and consider that every effort to 
promote agreements and co-operation with that 
country and especially to improve relations 
between Turkey and Greece, which are a real 
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thorn in the flesh and an open wound affecting 
NATO's potential in this extremely delicate 
sector, should be supported with commitment in 
every possible way. 
Regarding the situation in Cyprus we have 
made many efforts in the Council of Europe and 
we must continue because there has to be some 
serious counterpart to the Turkish Republic; 
what we want is an expression of European sym-
pathy and support with full recognition of 
Turkey's co-operation in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Furthermore, Turkish co-operation is needed to 
reduce tension and to achieve a solution, federal 
or otherwise, for Cyprus. 
Of particular and fundamental importance for 
all the problems involved is the maintenance of 
freedom of navigation and of a military and 
political presence throughout the Mediterranean, 
particularly as regards Egypt, which is unques-
tionably a key element for peace as it may be 
endangered by Islamic fundamentalism or a 
serious economic crisis. Consequently, while 
stating that Egypt must be given every encour-
agement and support, I would recall that the 
Camp David agreements were a step towards 
peace. It is my opinion, therefore, that we are 
right to stress this point because we are not then 
simply reading a critical lecture about the present 
but are looking at all the problems we are dis-
cussing here. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Mezzapesa. 
Mr. MEZZAPESA (Italy) (Translation). - The 
steadily deteriorating situation in the Mediter-
ranean is a matter of serious concern to all Euro-
peans. This point was made by, among others, 
the Italian foreign and defence ministers during 
the recent meeting in Luxembourg: 
" Instability in the Mediterranean has shown 
no sign of improvement. All the unknowns 
remain regarding Libyan policy. At this very 
moment Colonel Kadhafi is waging war in 
Chad. Serious threats of terrorist activity have 
spread to other countries. The Mediterranean 
region is split up into thirty states where 
regimes and policies change rapidly and 
thereby affect international conduct. " 
This statement made in Luxembourg seems 
virtually to summarise the report we are consid-
ering. I must say to the Rapporteur that this 
report gives a very pertinent analysis of the 
Mediterranean situation and in particular shows 
a highly intelligent political understanding of the 
facts combined with a measure of reasonable 
realism which have enabled him to put ten recom-
mendations to us. The last of these reads: 
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"To encourage appropriate measures to 
improve the economic and social situation of 
the peoples of the less-developed countries in 
order to create more stability in the region. " 
May I observe that this document comes from 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and not from a committee on economic, 
social and political questions. 
Let us be clear that there is no intention of 
denying the importance of the military aspects of 
the problem. Quite the opposite. The recommen-
dation before us stresses among other things that 
every effort must be made to secure the opera-
tional freedom of forces of NATO countries in 
the Mediterranean area - naturally with due 
regard for international law; the need is also 
stressed for the continued presence of United 
States forces in the area and of adequate aid for 
modernisation of the equipment of the armed 
forces of a number of countries which are still 
lagging behind technologically. 
The vital point is political, however. This is 
the need to identify and combat the possible 
causes of war within the various countries. There 
is no point in vilifying the opposing political and 
military blocs which we must accept as an una-
voidable fact. But both those blocs may be 
induced to intervene, in particular by conflicts 
and crises within the various countries and espe-
cially in relations between the various Mediter-
ranean countries; this applies in particular to the 
non-aligned countries and also to countries in 
the eastern and southern Mediterranean; they 
may be led to intervene by a very unstable 
political situation, by frequent and sudden 
changes of political regime and by open or latent 
local conflicts. Mr. President, I am horrified and 
bitterly concerned by the diplomatic conflict 
between Greece and Turkey, two countries with 
an ancient civilisation and noble traditions, 
which are unable to resolve their disputes in the 
Aegean and so, without wishing to do so, weaken 
the defensive role which NATO should have in 
the area. 
These are the internal causes which may per-
suade and induce one great power to intervene, 
to the great danger of political and military equi-
librium and consequently to the maintenance of 
peace in the Mediterranean and throughout the 
world. 
The Rapporteur is therefore perfectly correct 
in stating that security in the Mediterranean is 
closely linked with good relations between the 
countries and that: 
" The success of such an undertaking will 
depend much more on diplomatic and eco-
nomic relations than on traditional military 
power." 
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In these circumstances, vital factors are firstly 
the cohesion of NATO and secondly co-ordi-
nation of the policies of the members of the 
European Community whose actions can help to 
preserve peace and stability more than purely 
military measures. 
In this way we shall fulfil the hope recently 
expressed here that we shall have a Mediter-
ranean and a world with fewer arms and greater 
security. Otherwise, we run the risk of having a 
Mediterranean with less arms and also less 
security but that is not what we want. 
For these reasons, Mr. President, we shall give 
our convinced support to the report and the 
recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking 
Mr. Kittelmann most sincerely for drawing up 
such an extensive report on the problems in the 
Mediterranean area and above all for explaining 
the military side in such detail. I do not think 
there can be any doubt that the Mediterranean is 
today one of the areas of considerable tension in 
the world, where war, warlike acts, death and 
injury are daily occurrences, and this, as we all 
know, in various parts of the Mediterranean 
region. 
In this assessment of the situation we must 
always bear in mind a sentence in the draft rec-
ommendation, the first sentence proposed by the 
Rapporteur, which says that the long-term 
political objective of the Soviet Union towards 
the Middle East region and the Mediterranean 
area has not changed. All I can say about that is: 
how true. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that what we are 
concerned with here might be called Russian and 
not just Soviet policy, for it was always the clas-
sical Russian policy in this region to advance 
towards the " warm seas ", as they were known. 
Since the squadron of the brothers Orlov cruised 
in the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, 
Russian policy has been obsessed with this area. 
It may also be of interest that it is mentioned in 
the secret supplementary agreements to the 
accords between Hitler and Stalin. In these agree-
ments Hitler granted the Soviet Union a sphere 
of influence oriented towards the Arab region, 
that is to say today's major trouble spot, the 
Persian Gulf. However, these 1939 agreements 
did not refer to the Balkans or Turkey. The secret 
talks which the then new Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov, who died a few days ago, held with 
Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berlin in 1940, did not 
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in the end lead to an agreement on the division 
of spheres ofinfluence between the two great dic-
tators of the 1940s, Hitler and Stalin, because 
Hitler was not prepared to meet Molotov's 
demands that Turkey and the Straits should 
form part of the Soviet Union's sphere of 
influence. 
That this was the Soviet Union's objective, 
ladies and gentlemen, became clear after the end 
of the war, in 1945. Turkey entered the war in 
1945 and so became, as it were, one ofthe victo-
rious powers on 8th May 1945, and yet, on the 
termination of the non-aggression and friendship 
treaty that had been negotiated with Kemal 
Ataturk, the Soviet Union demanded military 
bases on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, 
making these demands - with others - the focal 
point of the conference of foreign .ministers held 
in Paris in 1946. 
Russia - the Soviet Union - has pursued a 
consistent policy elsewhere as well, for instance 
with regard to the former Italian colonies, Libya 
and Eritrea, which the Soviet Union would very 
much have liked to bring under its adminis-
trative sovereignty at the time. It was always 
keen to obtain bases in Libya and Eritrea in this 
way. Then, in 1947, the picture in the Mediter-
ranean changed radically, as the Truman doc-
trine brought the Sixth Fleet into the Mediter-
ranean to avert a threat to the freedom of 
countries in the region. As you know, the civil 
war was raging in Greece, exacting great sacri-
fices. But for the presence of the United States 
Sixth Fleet, peace could probably not have been 
maintained in the Mediterranean, the break 
between Tito and Stalin though of course made 
things easier. 
Ladies and gentlemen, in this situation and in 
view of the Soviet Union's interest in this region, 
it is quite clear that the West, NATO, WEU, 
must do everything possible to ensure that the 
balance of forces in this area is maintained so 
that any unilateral threat can be counteracted. 
Turkey's role has already been mentioned. I 
should like to underline this without adding any-
thing to what the previous speaker said. But I 
do believe that Turkey plays a particularly 
important role as a cornerstone of NATO in the 
Mediterranean region. It is, however, regrettable 
that the tensions between Greece and Turkey do 
not exactly help to strengthen this cornerstone. 
Libya was also mentioned. Libya is a serious 
problem in the Mediterranean, not only, as we 
know, because of its links with terrorism but also 
because Libya is a country which pursues an 
aggressive policy and has occupied part of Chad. 
In the last few weeks in particular it has become 
clear that it can no longer rely on supporters, if I 
may call them that, in Chad itself, since 
Goukouni Oueddei, the leader of the Gunt 
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movement, which rose against Chad's President 
Habre - and this revolt is still going on - has 
been wounded in Libya, where he is under house 
arrest, and some of his bodyguards have been 
shot dead. This shows how Mr. Kadhafi treats 
his friends. And the occupation of Northern 
Chad by Libyan troops, with the logistical help of 
military personnel from the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, has become an open act of aggression, since 
the Gunt forces have recently begun to seek 
reconciliation with President Habre again. This 
example alone - other danger spots have already 
been mentioned: Iraq-Iran, the conflict in 
Lebanon, the relationship between Israel and its 
Arab neighbours, and mention should also be 
made of Cyprus in this context - shows that 
there are tensions throughout the Mediterranean 
area. We for our part in NATO and WEU must 
th~refore be a stabilising factor and do every-
thmg we can to guarantee lasting stability and to 
maintain peace through our active presence in 
this area and by supporting our friends there. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Giust. 
Mr. GIUST (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, I think that previous 
speakers have said everything there is to be said 
about the present exceptional situation in the 
Mediterranean and I consider that the essential 
merit of Mr. Kittelmann's report on this point is 
first that it focuses on a problem which is taking 
a dramatic turn and secondly that it draws our 
~tte~tion and that of all the various organ-
IsatiOns to the need to recognise the new unde-
sirable situation existing in the Mediterranean. 
This being so, Mr. Kittelmann's report on 
European security and the Mediterranean is of 
great importance not only as an Assembly doc-
ument but also as a text requiring the attention 
of everyone with military, political and eco-
nomic responsibilities in the Mediterranean and 
within our western political structure. It is 
merely necessary to enumerate the sources of 
con?ern and tension mentioned in the report to 
reahse how many matters of concern there are in 
the region - Iran-Iraq problem. A really serious 
development has been the recent delivery by the 
United States of weapons to a country at war 
which is not a western country and I trust that 
the Americans will be able to clarify their 
position; any failure to do so would be of the 
greatest concern for the whole political structure 
maintained by the western countries and the 
members of NATO. It is sufficient to recall the 
various problems listed from Lebanon to Israel 
and Palestine as Mr. Cifarelli mentioned from 
the major question of the third countries: from 
the Balkans, from Yugoslavia, from the emerging 
African countries, from the new war referred to 
as international terrorism, with the most worry-
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ing and dramatic elements in the pursuit of that 
war located in the Mediterranean, in Syria and in 
Libya. 
On this point, Mr. President, I hope that the 
recent ~talian proposal for more intelligent, more 
determmed or at least less equivocal Middle 
Eastern involvement in a united effort to combat 
international terrorism will be accepted, carried 
through and better understood. 
In conclusion, Mr. President, this brief per-
sonal summary which is more fully developed in 
Mr. Kittelmann's report reveals matters of 
internal concern for the members of NATO and 
the countries of the western world. I am referring 
to the disturbing position of Greece and to rela-
tions between Greece and Turkey over the issue 
of Cyprus which make the general picture of the 
Mediterranean even worse. 
These are our reasons, Mr. President, 
regarding which I will not insult your intelligence 
by wasting time on further comment, for voting 
wholeheartedly in favour of Mr. Kittelmann's 
intelligent and very full report with its political 
and cultural insight stressing the economic 
aspects and the need for united action to prevent 
further possible upheavals in the Mediterranean. 
But the main and ultimate merit of this report 
for us, for our Assembly and for everyone in 
general is that it has aroused historically essential 
attention in WEU and I would imagine in other 
organisations responsible for general military 
and economic policy and has emphasised a par-
ticularly delicate and worrying element in an 
area of extreme delicacy involving all our coun-
tries, our whole system and European security. 
If calmer, more credible and more certain 
future prospects are not restored over the Medi-
terranea_n as a whole within the next few years, 
peace will undoubtedly be threatened not only in 
that area and in Europe as was demonstrated by 
the recent crisis in the Gulf of Sirte, but unfortu-
nately over much wider areas which could even 
involve the whole of our planet. 
For these reasons I wish to thank Mr. 
Kittelmann for his report to which we will give 
the full support it undoubtedly deserves. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rubbi. 
Mr. RUBBI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, European security 
and the position in the Mediterranean are 
unquestionably closely linked and the many 
sources of instability and unresolved problems in 
the Mediterranean all affect Europe and the pres-
ervation of European security, which we all need. 
What is to be done then? What is to be done to 
remove these causes and eliminate the unre-
solved problems of which there are many? On 
this point Mr. Cifarelli will perhaps allow me to 
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say that, on the one hand, there is Israel with all 
its need for guarantees for its security and its 
existence, which we also wish to be assured, but 
on the other hand, there are not a number of 
peoples but one particular people, the Pales-
tinians, who alone in the world have no land or 
state. This is a legitimate right to which they are 
absolutely entitled and they cannot be treated as 
a nomadic people because otherwise we also 
would be responsible for a tragedy like that 
which unfortunately struck the Jews in the past 
and during the second world war. Action must 
therefore be taken to deal with all the causes, but 
how? 
I must say with the greatest sincerity that Mr. 
Kittelmann's report is completely wide of the 
mark in dealing with the political geography of 
the situation we are considering. I was particu-
larly struck by one sentence in the report which 
defines the Mediterranean as exclusively western 
territory. What does this mean, Mr. Kittelmann? 
I must ask the question because I should like an 
explanation on this point. On the one hand there 
is a threat of Soviet hegemony which, it is said, 
has to be resisted at all costs and on the other, 
there is United States and NATO dominance 
which it is sought to impose. 
Mr. Kittelmann, I am opposed to both; I am 
opposed to the risk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
dominance and I am also opposed to the possi-
bility of American or NATO dominance in the 
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is geographi-
cally, politically, historically and culturally the 
area where European, African, Asian, Arab, 
Israel, neutral and non-aligned states and peoples 
live together and have to live together; some of 
these are neutral and non-aligned countries 
towards whom we must behave correctly because 
when we speak of Cyprus, as quite rightly we 
have, we must not forget that a NATO country 
and a member of the Atlantic Alliance like 
Turkey is occupying 40% of its territory and has 
set up a so-called republic on that territory; nor 
must we make mock of the guarantees of Maltese 
neutrality because they are given not only by 
Libya but also by a treaty with Italy supported by 
more than 180 billion from Mr. Craxi and the 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Andreotti. 
We must see things as they are! The Mediter-
ranean is these countries with which we must 
work to resolve the problems as the Community 
foreign ministers tried in 1980 and has several 
times been attempted in Europe's dialogue with 
the Arabs. But why has this line been aban-
doned? It has been abandoned because these 
vital special interests of Europeans, Africans, 
Arabs and Asians have been sacrificed to the 
global interests of the United States of America. 
We believe that the two superpowers should 
have a role in the Mediterranean but not a stra-
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tegic role or a sphere of influence but a role 
through which they can help to solve the 
problems by their authority. 
That is why we are in favour of an interna-
tional conference under the auspices of the 
United Nations and with the backing of the two 
great powers, as happened in Geneva some time 
ago. Otherwise we may have a repeat of what 
happened with Sigonella first and later with 
Libya. What did the American bombing achieve? 
Did it perhaps put an end to terrorism? The ter-
rorism which we all wish to fight with determi-
nation. None of us thinks that this problem can 
be resolved by military action, particularly as we 
have all learnt that these countries - not only 
Iran but also Syria and Iraq - are dealing in arms 
under the counter with contemptible swindlers. 
No; if we go on in this way tensions will 
re-emerge in the area and it is not by chance that 
three NATO governments which have signed the 
Atlantic treaty, namely Spain, Greece and Italy, 
condemned the American action and that the 
Italian Government stated formally through its 
Prime Minister that it will not allow the United 
States to use Italian bases for other such actions. 
All of this increases tension. First and foremost 
the security of the Mediterranean is a problem 
for the European countries and we are therefore 
the people to call for a resumption of inde-
pendent action by European governments and 
institutions. WEU should also make its contri-
bution in this direction; as Mr. Kittelmann's 
report does not take that line, I am sorry to say 
we shall have to vote against. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Berger. 
Mr. BERGER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I have asked to speak on this report 
because it might otherwise have looked as if our 
Italian colleagues were virtually the only people 
really interested in the problems of the Mediter-
ranean area. I think the German Rapporteur, 
Mr. Kittelmann, is to be congratulated on once 
again pointing out that the North Atlantic 
Alliance, and Western European Union as part 
of this alliance, are, in the final analysis, mar-
itime organisations. The security of the member 
countries is probably under less of a threat on the 
central front, although it is there that the 
opposing ranks are at their densest, which many 
people see as a threat. The maritime problems on 
the periphery are, however, more likely to 
jeopardise our security. 
If I were a Soviet planner trying to test the 
cohesion ofthe NATO alliance, I would not look 
to Central Europe, where the whole alliance 
would immediately and unquestionably be under 
attack, but to the northern flank, Spitsbergen, the 
Norwegian Sea, or the Mediterranean. 
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Mr. Berger (continued) 
Consequently, the Soviet Union is acting con-
sistently in every respect in trying to strengthen 
its position in the Mediterranean. It has scored 
successes, but it has also suffered setbacks, both 
of which we should note in order to draw conclu-
sions for the future. 
The Soviet Union has been successful to the 
extent that it now has a far larger fleet in the 
Mediterranean than twenty years ago, as the 
report makes very clear. We must not under-
estimate this. 
The Soviet Union has suffered setbacks in that 
despite its efforts it has not managed, for 
example, to gain a really firm foothold on the 
Mediterranean coast facing Europe, to establish 
bases from which its fleet could operate far more 
effectively. As I have said, it has been successful 
in some respects and unsuccessful in others, but 
there is no guarantee that it might not succeed in 
all respects one day. I believe that as members of 
Western European Union and the North Atlantic 
Alliance we must be very wary of this. 
What is more, the Mediterranean is also a very 
important area in the context of what we are now 
saying, after Reykjavik. If we want to maintain 
NATO as a whole as a maritime alliance, we 
must ensure a continued American commitment 
in Europe and European waters, an area in which 
the Americans have, in fact, to make a great 
effort in the interests of our security. If we 
stopped for a moment to imagine what would 
happen to Europe if the only fleet in the Mediter-
ranean was the Soviet Union's, we would see 
what we have to accomplish here together for the 
future. 
I should therefore like to endorse two recom-
mendations made by the Rapporteur, designed 
to prevent the West from losing positions in the 
Mediterranean and, if I may, to add a third. 
The first is that conflicts between NATO 
partners, which weaken our position, should, if 
possible, be resolved so as to strengthen the 
alliance as a whole. I am referring to Greece and 
Turkey. This problem must be solved because 
the present situation detracts from the security of 
the whole alliance. These two NATO partners 
must sit down together and try to solve their 
problems. 
Second, as the previous speaker made clear, 
the problems in this region cannot be solved nor 
the situation stabilised unless we also make a 
joint effort to overcome its social shortcomings 
and economic weaknesses. Only this kind of 
stabilisation will lead to political stability as well. 
The third recommendation I would add is that 
NATO and the Mediterranean countries that 
belong to NATO should co-operate as closely as 
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possible in the region. This includes France and 
Spain, Spain's continued membership of NATO 
being particularly important for the West. I feel 
this recommendation is necessary and should 
also be supported by this Assembly. 
All this makes it easy for us, of course, to 
approve this excellent report, for which my 
thanks once again. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Inan. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - I congratulate the Rapporteur on his 
excellent report, which makes several references 
to Turkey, the Cyprus question and the problems 
between Greece and Turkey already referred to 
by several of the previous speakers. 
As far as Cyprus is concerned, it is pointless to 
approach the present situation by invoking the 
historical past. The Turks have twice agreed to 
sign the document produced by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, 
and our President has stated in writing his will-
ingness to sign this document forthwith. The 
refusal, invariably categorical if not actually 
obstinate, has come from Greece. 
Nobody wishes more than us to help the 
Turkish community by a fair political solution 
safeguarding the interest of both communities 
while maintaining the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The problem 
is to persuade the other party to negotiate and 
accept the good offices of the United Nations. 
Therein lies the Cyprus problem. 
As far as the Greek-Turkish conflict is con-
cerned, Mr. President, a number of problems 
have been created by our neighbours. The 
Aegean, which should, in theory, be an area of 
co-operation and peace between two nations who 
have known and been in contact with each other 
for nine centuries, should in the view of our 
Greek friends be a closed sea with 78% of its ter-
ritorial waters in Greek hands. They lay claim to 
95% of the continental shelf and to 80% of the 
airspace - claims which would suffocate the 
Anatolian peninsula over its sea and air routes. 
That is unacceptable. 
In January 1985, Greece decided to direct all 
its forces not against the Warsaw Pact but against 
Turkey, to create an anti-Turkish militia 600 000 
strong and to set up an anti-Turkish ministry of 
the Aegean. In the three years he has been in 
power, the Prime Minister of my country has 
called on his Greek counterpart at least ten times 
to arrange a meeting in Athens, Ankara or else-
where in Europe, so that they might talk and 
enter into a dialogue. Our two countries are part 
of the western world, of the democratic system 
and of the defence of the West, but still we 
always meet with a categorical refusal. 
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Mr. lnan (continued) 
Having myself been the recipient of several 
appeals, I now in turn appeal to you and your 
organisation to exert pressure on Athens, on 
Greece, to ask them to enter into a dialogue and 
discussions with Turkey. On behalf of the 
Turkish Government, I can give an undertaking 
that, ifyou are able to elicit from Prime Minister 
Papandreou a willingness to talk to Turkey any-
where, we for our part will be ready to go there. 
We are in favour of peace and co-operation. It is 
we who defend 37% of the frontiers which we 
share with the Warsaw Pact. 
We have forces about 800 000 strong and an 
economy which leaves much to be desired, but it 
is a fact that the Mediterranean is the weakest 
link in western defence. For too long the West 
has concentrated its attention on Central Europe. 
Our Greek friends are playing a negative role in 
the Atlantic Alliance. What is left? Italy, Turkey 
and the Sixth Fleet not yet committed to the 
Atlantic. NATO is a de facto American fleet, 
which from time to time merely puts on the hat 
of the Atlantic Alliance. That is the real truth of 
what is happening in the Mediterranean. We also 
look for cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. 
We have no wish for family discards, weaknesses 
or divisions within the alliance, but our Greek 
friends remain to be convinced. They are nice 
neighbours, and we care for them greatly, but 
they are not always easy to get on with. An effort 
should really be made to establish a dialogue 
with them. 
Mr. President, as you are from a Mediter-
ranean country - and contributions have already 
been made to this debate by the representatives 
of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany in 
the absence of any other country interested in the 
Mediterranean - I now take the liberty of asking 
you to intervene with the Greek Government to 
ask it to put an end to its destructive role within 
the EEC and the Atlantic Alliance and become 
truly Western European by accepting the need 
for dialogue. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. 
Kittelmann. 
Mr. KlTTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, I will 
begin by thanking all the speakers, some friendly, 
some critical, for the fairness with which they 
have considered the report. 
To be brief, I have nothing to add to many of 
the comments made because they fully accord 
with what appears in my report and the conclu-
sions approved by a very large majority of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. But I should like to comment on two or 
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three remarks, beginning with a personal 
admission in response to what Mr. Cifarelli said: 
the equation of Israel and the Palestinians is not 
a qualitative equation, it represents an appeal to 
two groups, and is not intended to mean any 
more than it says. As a very committed friend of 
the state of Israel I should like to make that abso-
lutely clear. 
Many of the statements that have been made 
here have shown how important the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU considers the 
southern flank to be. 
For me personally, as a Central European, it 
was a pleasure and an experience to act as 
Rapporteur under the critical eyes of members 
who are far more directly affected by the 
problems in their area than we are in Central 
Europe. I have taken all the more trouble to 
ensure that you can see from the report how 
important it is for Central and Northern Europe 
to pay more attention to these problems as well. 
Mr. Rubbi, I listened very carefully to what 
you had to say. I think I would have done some-
thing wrong if you had been able to approve this 
report without reservation. Nonetheless, the 
NATO countries in the Meditertanean area -
including your own country - are entitled to be 
treated in the same way as the other NATO 
countries. NATO has committed itself to equal 
treatment. 
Perhaps even a communist delegate can see his 
way to agree with the sentiment that not only is 
economic aid needed in this area but that it must 
actually be provided. That at least will meet with 
even your unqualified approval. 
I should like to thank you, Mr. lnan, for what 
you said, as a guest speaker from Turkey. You 
referred once again to relative strengths. Please 
do not take it amiss if I do not discuss the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey, which you 
described. We have discussed it in great detail in 
the report, which shows that this imbalance in 
particular is a challenge to us. 
As regards Turkey, which faces major eco-
nomic difficulties and is of fundamental strategic 
importance to NATO in the southern region, I 
would say that we cannot leave this country 
alone with its problems. WEU should encourage 
those who bear the responsibility to give Turkey 
more support. 
I should like to thank you, Mr. President, once 
again and also the members of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments for their 
support. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Kittelmann. 
The vote on the draft recommendation will be 
held late tomorrow afternoon. 
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14. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd December, at 
9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
l. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
- the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
Document 1069 and addendum). 
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1986 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
Document 1071 and addendum). 
3. Draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
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1987 (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, Document 
1072 and addendum). 
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxem-
bourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
Document 1074). 
5. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee, Document 
1078). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 7.10 p. m.) 
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APPENDIX 
Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, I am grateful for the opportunity 
of speaking to this Assembly once again. My 
address will reflect the great commitment with 
which the Federal Chancellor, the Federal 
Foreign Minister and the Federal Defence Min-
ister are seeking a definition of Europe's security 
policy interests together with their Western 
European partners. 
The Federal Government knows full well that 
the efforts of the executives can succeed only if 
they have the support of the parliaments and the 
public in Europe. The aim must be to give the 
policy of European integration the security 
policy dimension without which any policy for 
Europe committed to the goal of European union 
will lack credibility. 
The debates of this Assembly and the growing 
participation of governments in them are a sign 
that we have made some progress towards the 
reactivation of WEU since the decisions taken in 
Rome. Franco-German friendship has played a 
crucial role in this, as in all aspects of the policy 
for Europe. The speech Prime Minister Chirac 
will be making tomorrow will, I am sure, 
underline this once again. The Federal Gov-
ernment is confident that the need to harmonise 
the security policies of the Western European 
countries is being increasingly acknowledged. 
What is at stake? The Federal Government has 
always justified its commitment to the 
reactivation of WEU by referring to the need to 
consolidate the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. As you all know, the image of the two 
pillars supporting the Atlantic Alliance was first 
used by President Kennedy during a speech in 
Philadelphia in 1962. This image is part of the 
tradition of American post-war policy, which has 
remained fundamentally unchanged until the 
present day. The United States has always sup-
ported and encouraged the unification of Europe 
because it knows that this unification is the best 
way of combining and strengthening Europe's 
forces. In his memorable speech in May 1985 
before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 
President Reagan reaffirmed the United States' 
continuing loyalty to the cause of European uni-
fication when he said: 
" I am here to tell you America remains, as she 
was forty years ago, dedicated to the unity of 
Europe. We continue to see a strong and 
unified Europe not as a rival but as an even 
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stronger partner. ... That policy saw the new 
world and the old as twin pillars of a larger 
democratic community." 
Integration is the best way for Western Europe 
to hold its own in a world that c<J>ntinues to be 
dominated by the antithesis between East and 
West. It is the only way for Europe to be sure of 
its place in tomorrow's world. Europe must 
accept its responsibility for its own future and for 
peace in the world. 
Europe's security cannot be guaranteed 
without the Atlantic Alliance. The proven part-
nership in this alliance must retain its vitality. 
To this end, it must become still more evident in 
the future that the alliance partners formulate 
their policy on the basis of the mutuality oftheir 
fundamental security interests. 
The process of consultation, in which the day-
to-day business of partnership in the alliance 
finds expression, must be balanced and become 
even more visible. The American and European 
public must be able to see that North Americans 
and Europeans in the alliance together determine 
the West's position on the operational aspects of 
security policy. 
The Atlantic partnership must be visible so 
that the Europeans' efforts are appreciated in 
America and Europe continues to be aware of 
North America's basic interest ih its security. 
The reactivation of WEU will give the policy of 
European integration the security policy 
dimension it requires. Harmonisation of the 
WEU member states' positions on security 
policy is also the way to strengthen Europe's con-
tribution to the Atlantic partnership. It 
strengthens Europe's capacity for genuine part-
nership and thus the alliance itself. 
This was made very clear by the deliberations 
of the foreign and defence ministers in 
Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November of this 
year. As the report of the Chairman-in-Office 
rightly emphasises, the meeting in Luxembourg 
gave rise to a searching and fruitful exchange of 
views on the current state of East-West relations. 
But above all a very broad consensus was 
reached on important basic aspects of security 
policy and strategy and of disarmament and 
arms control policy. This consensus will inspire 
the discussions of the alliance partners at the 
forthcoming meetings ofthe NATO defence and 
foreign ministers. 
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The main principles to emerge from the min-
isters' deliberations in Luxembourg were as 
follows: 
- the essential aim of western security policy 
must be to prevent any kind of war, whether 
nuclear or conventional; 
- the strategy of deterrence will continue to be 
important for Europe's security in the 
future; this strategy guarantees the essential 
link between Europe's and the United 
States' security; 
- in view of the balance of forces between 
East and West, the credibility of this 
strategy can be assured only by a continuum 
of deterrence which embraces the conven-
tional and nuclear forces of all the alliance 
partners; 
- the efforts to achieve arms control and dis-
armament at a lower and more balanced 
level of forces form an integral part of 
western security policy. Arms control agree-
ments must increase security, and they must 
be verifiable; 
- progress in one area of arms control must 
not be achieved at the expense of progress in 
other, unrelated areas. The member states of 
WEU are of one mind in rejecting the link 
created by the Soviet Union between the 
INF negotiations and SDI; 
- with the prospect of progress in nuclear dis-
armament, the achievement of stability in 
the conventional sphere becomes even more 
important and urgent The complete elimi-
nation of chemical weapons throughout the 
world also becomes more urgent; 
- the dismantling of longer-range weapons in 
Europe will make it even more necessary to 
engage in follow-up negotiations on the 
elimination of the imbalance in shorter-
range weapons, the target being the same 
upper limits for both sides at a lower 
level. 
Ladies and gentlemen, in Luxembourg the 
WEU partners defined the task to be performed 
after Reykjavik. The Federal Chancellor 
described this task to the German Bundestag on 
6th November 1986: the Europeans could be in 
no doubt that such drastic reductions in nuclear 
weapons over a comparatively short period as 
those discussed in Reykjavik would result in a 
major change in the strategic balance between 
East and West. 
Reykjavik has created a basis for the Geneva 
negotiations on which progress can be achieved 
in all three areas of negotiation. In the 
meantime, both sides have come forward with 
fresh proposals on intermediate-range weapons, 
strategic weapons and the space problem, based 
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on the convergence achieved in Reykjavik. What 
matters now is that the promise held out by 
Reykjavik should be translated into practical 
agreements at the Geneva negotiating table. 
The talks in Reykjavik indicated a fresh 
approach in the efforts of the two superpowers to 
make their relations in one - in the central -
area of security policy more constructive. As we 
see it, this is the crucial aspect of the Reykjavik 
meeting. The Federal Government is convinced 
that there can be no return to the time before 
Reykjavik. The implications of the new 
approaches must be carefully thought through. 
We must be grateful that Reykjavik triggered off 
this process and we Europeans must together 
make the necessary effort to ensure that it 
develops in the right direction. From the Federal 
Government's viewpoint the following state-
ments can already be made: 
We have an overriding interest in an 
agreement on intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons. The Federal Government welcomes 
the zero option proposed for longer-range mis-
siles in Europe, with a simultaneous reduction to 
one hundred warheads outside Europe. Both 
Europe and the alliance have an interest in 
avoiding the emergence of a new grey area. 
Shorter-range weapons cannot therefore be 
ignored during the arms control negotiations. It 
follows from the need for stability in the area of 
security policy that shorter-range systems should 
be subject to restrictions under an INF 
agreement and that missiles with a range of 150 
to 1 000 km should be included in follow-up 
negotiations. What we want to see is an INF 
agreement containing a specific commitment to 
the early resumption of negotiations aimed at 
also reducing these weapons to the same upper 
limits on both sides at a lower level. If an 
agreement of this nature is to be reached in the 
near future, it is important that the Soviet Union 
should abandon the irrelevant package it has 
created with SDI. A policy of all or nothing will 
prevent any progress. It would be a major step 
forward for the whole of mankind if the planned 
agreement required the Soviet Union to scrap 
1 335 of its current 1 435 warheads. 
As was also pointed out in Luxembourg, we 
consider it important to concentrate on the 
immediate and the feasible, that is to say the 
agreement on a drastic reduction in 
intermediate-range missiles and the halving of 
the strategic potential of both sides. 
It is particularly important in this context that 
in Geneva the Soviet Union has confirmed the 
willingness it showed in Reykjavik to halve the 
number of its heavy intercontinental missiles -
SS-18s. You all know what a serious problem the 
treatment of these heavy intercontinental mis-
siles has long been in negotiations between the 
two superpowers. 
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Against the background of these negotiations 
in Geneva I should like to point out that the 
Federal Government considers it very important 
for both sides to abide by the upper limits 
imposed by SALT II, because they form a 
framework for the strategic balance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Like our 
partners in the alliance, we see drastic reductions 
in the offensive nuclear potential of both super-
powers as the most important goal. Agreements 
on a substantial reduction in nuclear potential, 
like the 50% cut in strategic weapons mooted by 
both sides in Reykjavik, will make the question 
of continued observance of the upper SALT 
limits redundant. 
In Luxembourg the ministers also discussed in 
great depth the interactions which exist in the 
overall complex of deterrence and which will 
become more apparent when reductions in indi-
vidual categories of nuclear weapons are con-
sidered. The deterrence that prevents war is 
based on the "triad", whose elements are not 
readily interchangeable. On the other hand, since 
the post-war years, the nub of the European 
security problem has been the permanent con-
ventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, with 
the particularly destabilising effect of the 
invasion capability of its front line forces. For us 
Europeans the essential point is that any kind of 
war - whether waged with conventional or 
nuclear weapons - must be prevented in the 
future. Even a war waged with conventional 
weapons in Europe today would be many times 
more horrific than the second world war. 
For us the dividing line does not run between 
nuclear and conventional war but between war 
and peace. That is why we attach so much 
importance to the Luxembourg consensus, in 
which the linking of conventional and nuclear 
forces of all the alliance partners is regarded as 
essential for the future. At the same time, 
however, we attach paramount importance to 
the efforts to reduce existing instabilities in con-
ventional forces: according to the decisions taken 
by the foreign ministers in Halifax, the aim is to 
increase stability and security throughout Europe 
by achieving greater openness and striking a veri-
fiable and stable balance in conventional forces 
at a lower level. 
With its Budapest declaration, the Warsaw 
Pact has in principle reacted favourably to 
NATO's signal from Halifax. Favourable results 
were achieved at the CSCE in Stockholm, pro-
viding a sound basis for further progress in the 
control of conventional armaments. The group 
of high-ranking experts set up by the foreign 
ministers in Halifax will be submitting its reports 
at the forthcoming meeting of the NATO foreign 
ministers. The alliance will thus be given a basis 
for drawing up proposals for further steps in con-
ventional arms control. On several occasions the 
Federal Government has stated its belief that all 
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the alliance partners must participate in such 
negotiations. 
Progress towards the control of nuclear arms, 
however, lends still greater importance to the 
negotiations on a complete, worldwide ban on 
chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament 
conference. The Federal Government is con-
vinced that success in these negotiations is 
within reach. What is needed now is an early 
agreement on the central issue of verification. 
The Soviet Union should now translate its 
announcements into practical proposals. We are 
prepared to work together on solutions that take 
account both of the need for stringent verifi-
cation of the agreement and of the legitimate 
interest of the participating countries in pro-
tection. 
Since the Reykjavik talks there has also been 
an improvement in the prospects for progress 
towards the gradual solution of the nuclear test 
ban problem. What must not, of course, be over-
looked in this context is that a test ban cannot be 
a substitute for a substantial reduction in existing 
arsenals of nuclear weapons. The progressive 
introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
that could be reliably verified would, however, 
help to increase strategic stability. The reliable 
verification of a test ban is still the essential pre-
condition for any agreement. Although such veri-
fication poses considerable scientific and tech-
nical problems, solutions to these apparently 
now exist. A major contribution here could be 
made by a worldwide seismological monitoring 
system, the gradual expansion of which the 
Federal Government proposed at the Geneva 
disarmament conference in 1985. 
The prospect of substantial progress towards a 
peaceful and safe world with fewer weapons 
comes at a time when the thirty-five partici-
pating nations have gathered in Vienna for the 
CSCE follow-up meeting. Vienna has provided 
further evidence that the CSCE offers a 
framework and a timetable for a process of 
dynamic development geared to lasting peace in 
Europe. 
In Vienna we face the task of conducting a 
frank and objective debate on the state of the 
implementation of the Helsinki final act and the 
concluding document of Madrid, and of dis-
cussing and, if possible, approving further pro-
posals. 
The process that has taken place since Helsinki 
confirms that the security problems cannot be 
solved in isolation. They are closely related to 
the promotion of political, humanitarian, eco-
nomic and cultural co-operation and confidence-
building. The CSCE process is part of the vital 
purpose of eventually overcoming the division of 
Europe and with it the division of Germany. 
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This process should enable us to phase out the 
polarisation of Europe by power politics. 
WEU's contribution here is essential. Its 
reactivation, while strengthening the Atlantic 
partnership, also demonstrates that attempts to 
separate the Europeans from the United States 
and to drive wedges between the European coun-
tries have no prospect of success. 
The policy of combining the forces of Western 
Europe, which is what we have wanted for 
decades, must be vigorously continued. This will 
improve the conditions necessary not only for 
the form of Soviet policy to adapt to present-day 
circumstances, but also for its substance to be so 
structured that a balance of interests in the out-
standing security policy issues can actually be 
achieved between East and West. 
The deliberations in Luxembourg on the 
Reykjavik talks showed that the WEU countries 
are linked to the United States in the funda-
mental solidarity of their security interests. This 
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will also greatly improve the conditions for pro-
gress in our efforts to create a stable state of 
peace in Europe. 
Mr. President, we have made considerable 
progress since the Rome decisions two years ago. 
If WEU had not existed, we would have had to 
invent it in the present situation. We must not 
underestimate the work still to be done, but the 
direction is clear: from our joint analysis we 
know what steps are necessary to ensure the 
security of Western Europe and the vitality of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Particular importance attaches 
to WEU in the light of the efforts to improve sta-
bility in the conventional sector throughout 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The 
Federal Government wishes to thank the parlia-
mentary Assembly for its active - and occa-
sionally critical - monitoring of the govern-
ments' efforts. It is true: our peoples want more 
rapid progress. I am convinced that the lively 
exchanges between the Council and Assembly 
will carry us forward in our common task. 
TENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 2nd December 1986 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
Does. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 
and addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman 
and Rapporteur), Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. 
Rees, Mr. Spies von Bullesheim, Mr. Linster, Sir John 
Page. 
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 
1074). 
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Bianco, Mr. 
Valleix, Mr. Bohl, Mr. Inan (Observer from Turkey), Mr. 
Wilkinson, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi. 
5. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 
1078). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bianco (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Antoni, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. 
Poos (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council). 
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 9.45 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
1. See page 18. 
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3. Accounts of the administrative ~penditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final 
accounts 
Revised draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
Does. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1072 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order ofthe day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the accounts of 
the adminstrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts, Doc-
ument 1069 and addendum. 
Here I have to tell you that, with the 
agreement of the Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration, we shall 
be simplifying our discussions this morning by 
having the Chairman of the committee speak to 
all three financial reports followed by a joint 
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debate. A separate vote, of course, will be taken 
on each this afternoon as is specified in the order 
of business. 
That being so, we shall also take, now, the 
presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admini-
stration on the revised draft budget of the admin-
istrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1986, Document 1071 and 
addendum, and the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1987 and the 
opinion of the Council, Document 1072 and 
addendum. 
I take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Poos, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg 
and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and sin-
cerely thank him for being here. 
I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rap-
porteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - I 
agree with your suggestion, Mr. President, that I 
should move formally the budget for 1986 and 
the draft budget for 1987 for consideration by the 
Assembly, and that we should have a general dis-
cussion to give us the opportunity to express our 
opinion, which has already been mentioned 
during yesterday's debate and undoubtedly will 
be mentioned again this morning. 
The situation has changed slightly for the 
better, but the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, which I have just left, is still 
deeply anxious about the overall situation and 
wishes to place certain facts on record. Secre-
tarial difficulties have been caused by our having 
a meeting so early this morning, at 8.30 a.m., fin-
ishing only a minute or two before this session. It 
has not been possible to put the text on paper. 
Therefore, I propose to move that addition 
towards the end of my speech, and I hope that it 
will be available by then. 
I should like to make some general comments 
on how many members of the Assembly see our 
budget, including the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, of which I have the 
honour to be Chairman. It is no secret that there 
has been a great deal of dissatisfaction and 
anxiety among members about the zero growth 
policy of the Council of Ministers representing 
our member governments. It has been felt for a 
long time that if we as an organisation are to play 
our part in the reactivation of Western European 
Union, we must have the wherewithal to achieve 
that. It has not escaped the notice of many 
members that, apparently, the other agencies of 
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WEU seem to have benefited more than our-
selves in those difficulties. 
I have raised the matter with my government 
and ministers present, and I have been told that 
their policy is zero growth for all foreign institu-
tions of which my country is a member. That 
may be so. I should like to place on record, on 
behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, our deep appreciation of the 
Italian Government's attitude and the fact that 
the Italian ministers have been most supportive 
of us in our efforts to get a better deal for the 
Assembly. 
Although I welcome the noises that have been 
made by various ministers, I was a little worried 
yesterday by what the Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers said. Ministers believe that the 
Assembly has a valid role to play but the 
Chairman said that it was up to members to 
lobby their governments to extract a better 
response from them. I have done that with the 
leader of the British Delegation, but we did not 
get very far because back bench members of par-
liament do not have the power to raise money. 
Governments are omnipotent in that regard and 
it is a matter for ministerial decision. It should 
not be up to members of the Assembly to lobby 
their administrations. The Assembly should be 
regarded as an important body that operates in 
the interests of defence in Europe. The Assembly 
should be regarded as an amalgam of the seven 
countries, and if there is lobbying to be done, it 
should be done by the Presidential Committee, 
the President and senior members of the 
Assembly. 
I do not want to harp on the present situation 
because I see a ray of light after what appeared to 
be a very unhappy meeting of officials on the 
budget. The Council of Ministers has made a half 
gesture towards us. Any gesture is to be wel-
comed. I hope that that will lead to our claims 
being fully recognised and understood and that 
the Council of Ministers will encourage our 
efforts in the year ahead. 
Members will know that the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration of WEU 
decided at its meeting on 23rd October to rec-
ommend to the Council that the reduction in the 
draft budget be 893 800 francs. At its meeting on 
26th November, the Council decided to reinsert 
under three separate sub-heads of the draft 
budget some 79 875 francs. The reduction has 
therefore been brought down to 813 925 francs. 
The most important implication of the Council's 
decision for our budget is that no new posts have 
been agreed. The Council reserves the right to 
return to that proposal when it considers the 
study of the structure of the Office of the Clerk. 
There is a reduction in the estimates for the 
recruitment of interpreters and temporary staff 
and for the requirements of the Office of the 
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Clerk. No offset machines or typewriters are to 
be purchased, and the teletext machine, which 
the Assembly so urgently needs, has been 
refused. 
I find it a great indignity that you, Mr. Pres-
ident, and the Presidential Committee should 
not be given leeway as experienced, grown 
people to decide whether a typewriter, a new 
chair or a telex machine should be installed, all 
within the framework of the money allowed. The 
inability to do that is, I believe, very undignified 
in a democratically elected assembly. As one of 
my colleagues said somewhat sarcastically yes-
terday, I wonder whether the Council of Min-
isters would grant us the corn to feed carrier 
pigeons to take messages back and forth to 
London as we are not to have a telex 
machine. 
There are reductions under the many sub-
heads of Head V of the budget, including mission 
expenses of the Office of the Clerk and fees for 
experts. Taking account of the Council's 
decision, the 1986 budget grew by 1. 72% and the 
1987 budget shows an increase of 2.22%. Pen-
sions, however, grew by 1.84% and 4.68% respec-
tively. 
The Secretary-General wrote an important 
letter to the Clerk, Mr. Moulias, as late as last 
Thursday night. I believe that it has been circu-
lated. I do not wish to weary the Assembly by 
reading it out, but I hope that members will 
study it. The Secretary-General explained that 
the Council has not yet taken a decision to apply 
the zero rate criterion to the operational budget 
without pensions. It is clear that to continue in 
that vein will be highly detrimental to the work 
of the Assembly. 
We are a small institution and we are saddled 
with continuous growth of the pensions com-
mitment. Figures have been circulated and given 
to the Council of Ministers. In 1984, the pen-
sions commitment represented 4.59% of our 
budget whereas at the moment it represents 
5.69% of the budget. By 1993, it will represent 
16.36% ofthe budget. On 1st January 1988, two 
senior members of staff retire, causing consid-
erable inflation in the pension element of the 
Assembly's budget. One does not need to be a 
mathematical genius to realise that a growing 
percentage of the Assembly's budget will go on 
pensions. If our paymasters always operate the 
zero growth criterion, our successors, if the 
Assembly continues, will find that the whole 
WEU budget is spent on the pensions of past ser-
vants. That is a ridiculous idea. 
I am advised that if something is done about 
pensions here, that will oblige our member coun-
tries to do the same for other organisations such 
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as NATO, the United Nations and the OECD. I 
do not entirely accept that argument because 
many of those organisations are more powerful 
than us and often have strong contributory 
pension schemes. I urge the Council of Ministers 
to consider this problem seriously. Although 
members of the Assembly realise that, at a time 
of economic stringency, there is not a great deal 
of spare cash to lavish on WEU, fairness must 
come into consideration when one is dealing 
with small organisations, such as this, that have a 
heavy commitment to pensions. 
We shall be inhibited until member govern-
ments realise and agree that pensions should be 
taken out of our budget and that they should no 
longer be a continuous issue. We have to pay 
them. We wish long life to our retired members-
I am glad to say that so far they are hale and 
hearty and living well. 
But we may well have a commitment to many 
of them for many years to come and a burden 
that the Assembly cannot possibly carry for very 
much longer. 
In those circumstances, therefore, we are 
extremely anxious to be able to negotiate with 
the Council of Ministers that, while we need a 
better deal than we have had to date - and we 
have had this debate continuing for several years 
- we should like to be able to impress upon them 
the need to do something about the payment of 
pensions. 
In those circumstances we intend to be even 
more active in pressing our case as an orga-
nisation through you, Sir, as President, and 
through the Presidential Committee, and as an 
Assembly as a whole. When I say that at a very 
full meeting of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration this morning, with 
probably one of the largest attendances we have 
had for a very long time, one resolution was 
carried almost unanimously - there was merely 
one abstention - on the subject of negotiation 
with the Council, it will be realised just how 
strong is the feeling. 
As an Assembly we should begin now effec-
tively to negotiate over the restructuring of the 
Office of the Clerk, to make ourselves more effi-
cient, to show the Council of Ministers that we 
can effect economies, that we are making the best 
use of the funds put towards us, and persuade 
them in the restructuring now going on in other 
areas of Western European Union that we, too, 
should benefit and that we can become a more 
effective organ, playing our part in the defence of 
Western Europe and in making our essential con-
tribution to world peace. 
I have not yet had the text put before me, but I 
believe that I can convey its essence. While we 
are still very unhappy about the budget situation, 
we do not want to rock the boat and we do not 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir Dudley Smith (continued) 
want to have open hostility with the Council of 
Ministers, which I believe would be counter-
productive. Therefore we would, and I would so 
recommend to the Assembly, accept the changes 
made in the budget of 1986 and the amendments 
to our proposals for 1987, but still go on negoti-
ating about the future. I should like to move, 
therefore, that we accept the budget for 1986 and 
the draft budget with its amendments for 1987, 
and also that in accepting those budgets we 
should welcome the suggestion from the Council 
of Ministers and from the Secretary-General that 
we as an organisation will have the structure of 
the Office of the Clerk looked at, and that we say 
in the same resolution that we urge the Council 
of Ministers further to examine the pensions 
position and to give us the latest thinking on 
these issues within three months, so that there is 
a time-limit and year does not just merge into 
year. 
If within three months we as a budgetary com-
mittee and you, Sir, as the President of the Presi-
dential Committee could have an answer from 
the Council of Ministers we should be able to 
carry on with our suggestions for reform and 
further contact with the Council of Ministers, 
having a meaningful dialogue leading to a more 
satisfactory situation. 
I recommend to the Assembly that we adopt 
the two budgets and the motion that I have just 
outlined. I am sure that there will be members 
who will wish to contribute - we heard them yes-
terday - on this subject. 
I thank you, Mr. President, for your sterling 
efforts in always fighting in the Assembly's 
corner. I am also grateful for the very hard work 
put in by our officials in endeavouring to get us a 
much better deal, a deal to which we believe we 
are entitled. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - May I join 
my colleagues, Sir Dudley, in congratulating and 
thanking you - and through you, of course, 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration - for your considerable efforts in 
defending the legitimate rights of the Assembly. 
The joint debate is open. 
I call Mr. Pollidoro. 
Mr. POLLIDORO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, as long ago as 
the Rome meeting in 1984 we agreed on the need 
to reactivate WEU, being genuinely convinced of 
Europe's role not only in East-West relations but 
also in making a positive contribution to 
reducing tension and increasing confidence 
through practical action aimed at European 
security. 
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This reactivation and independence have, 
however, been impeded in a thousand ways, 
including the obstruction of any action by the 
blocking of the budget. But the WEU budget, 
based on the changes made, does not conflict 
with the need for strict and economic man-
agement as the President himself showed a short 
time ago. In addition, we have also repeated the 
need to rationalise expenditure as fully as pos-
sible in order to avoid all waste. 
We are all aware of the history of relations 
between the Council, the committee and the 
Assembly regarding the budget; but the practical 
reasons for requesting increases in the budget are 
those which everyone has recognised as being 
objectively sound, covering as they do reor-
ganisation of the secretariat, the modernisation 
and adaptation of equipment, the proper 
adjustment of funds for staff and particularly for 
pensions; this is required because discrimination 
is not possible. I repeat that it is impossible to 
avoid such adjustments which the Assembly 
recognised as essential until last year without 
changing the actual wishes of the Assembly. Fur-
thermore, the increase originally requested 
would not have added substantially to expen-
diture or to member countries' contributions; 
this is a very insignificant matter. That is why I 
think we should reflect on this point and that a 
number of members made a sound proposal in 
committee when they requested meetings 
between the committee and the governments to 
discuss this question and ask delegations for an 
undertaking to discuss with their governments 
the reactivation of WEU and therefore the pro-
vision of an adequate budget. 
If there is no change of direction, political 
activity will progressively decline, because 
current expenditure on maintaining the existing 
structure will take priority, until the role of the 
Assembly and then of WEU loses all meaning 
through lack of funds. While the solution for 
1986 did not meet the Assembly's requests of 
which I have spoken it did ultimately allow the 
position to be held by recognition of the addi-
tional expenditure allowed. As regards the 1987 
budget there is still a ray of hope because it was 
decided at a subsequent meeting between the 
Council and the committee that requirements 
and expenditure should be reviewed. 
Like other members we were thinking of 
voting against the budget but this ray of hope 
suggests that attitudes may change in the future. 
We shall watch how the situation develops 
regarding the new assessment and will decide 
accordingly. 
I would, however, like to draw members' 
attention to the dispute between the Council and 
the Assembly in recent years. If no account is 
taken of the wishes of the majority of representa-
tives, the outcome will be to damage the role of 
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the Assembly which is the only democratic body 
made up of WEU elected representatives. As we 
are in favour of reactivation- as we have already 
said - no unilateral action must be taken and 
fruitful collaboration must be established, recog-
nising the Assembly as the democratic insti-
tution of an organisation concerned with 
security. 
For these reasons, and with these reservations, 
we shall therefore approve the budgets on con-
dition that a new situation is created including 
the elements of which I have spoken. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Ferrari Aggradi. 
Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (Italy) (Trans-
lation). - I feel that I should make a brief 
statement as I have worked very closely with Sir 
Dudley Smith who acted as Rapporteur and who 
in my opinion is entitled to special thanks as you 
yourself quite rightly said. This is also my great 
pleasure. I fully agree with his proposals as 
regards both substance and method : an open 
procedure expressing mutual confidence but also 
a practical determination to discuss a solution 
for unresolved problems. We must move in the 
right direction taking account of the comments 
made by the Council of Ministers and working to 
resolve the problems as best may be while at the 
same time recognising the absolute need to bring 
persuasion to bear both on the Council as a 
whole and on individual ministers to whom we 
must respectfully but clearly explain our requests 
and the reasons for them. 
I am confident that we shall be able to move 
forward as we have done in the past; I am con-
fident that the budget will be recognised as the 
essential instrument for carrying out our activ-
ities to the full and making our contribution. 
I should like to stress two fundamental points. 
The first is our independence or in other words 
our responsibility. We can receive recommenda-
tions from the Council of Ministers or any indi-
vidual minister for stringency or understanding 
in accordance with certain criteria which are 
applied in their countries and should be applied 
over their whole area of commitment. But 
certain principles must be stated in the strongest 
terms; the first of these is autonomy. I know that 
the President is committed to this; I know that 
we must all respect this commitment to great 
stringency, possibly involving some reductions 
in non-essentials; but it is for us to make the 
choices and to decide how the best contribution 
can most usefully be made. It is unthinkable that 
when the choices have been made they should be 
changed for economic and financial reasons. The 
total sum is cut; we shall try to show the reasons 
why we think this should not happen. But within 
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the sum allocated to us it is our right and duty to 
make our own choices so that the funds can be 
used for the purposes we propose. 
The second principle which I consider vital is 
as follows. The Council of Ministers can adopt 
very stringent measures. For example, it has 
applied the highly contestable criterion of zero 
growth. We decided to accept this but zero 
growth basically means a reduction because in 
real terms it means calculating planned inflation 
which is usually lower than real inflation. It 
means therefore taking no account of certain 
increases in equipment which we purchase and 
are above this average price. However, when this 
principle is adopted it must be applied logically. 
In real terms the budget means the sound 
running of our Assembly. If, over the years, 
expenditure on pensions increases it cannot be 
claimed that this contributes to the running of 
the Assembly. The Assembly's expenditure 
should be considered net of this extraneous 
expenditure; hence pensions cannot be included 
in the calculation of zero growth but must be 
counted separately. The criterion can be fixed by 
the Council of Ministers but its application must 
not be left to the discretion of no matter who, 
even someone with the greatest authority, 
ignoring the fact that our members include par-
liamentarians who have held major government 
posts and therefore have experience; but the cri-
terion must be applied clearly and consistently. 
In the contacts we shall have over the next few 
months on these two points we must be very 
firm and clear because they are the expression of 
our sacred rights and duty to the Assembly. 
As I said to begin with, I wish to thank the 
Rapporteur and agree with his proposal that we 
should be very polite and use the correct proce-
dures when we discuss this important subject; 
and I offer my best hopes for his activities over 
the next few months. 
(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rees. 
Mr. REES (United Kingdom). - I wish to 
revert briefly to the general plight that Sir 
Dudley highlighted so ably in his opening 
speech. It is a point of fundamental and critical 
importance. The point is simply that if the pen-
sions that we pay as a matter of contract and 
honour to our former officials are index-linked 
and if the number of pensioners increases over 
the years, as is likely, it must follow that the pro-
portion of our budget available for general 
administrative expenses will inexorably 
diminish. 
I do not underestimate the need for a con-
tinuing and rigorous economy in the affairs of 
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any administrative organisation. I do not under-
estimate the need for a rigorous and continuing 
search for efficiency in the affairs of any orga-
nisation. I do not underestimate the fact that it is 
our ministerial colleagues primarily and not our-
selves who have to fund our activities and justify 
to our domestic parliaments the moneys that 
they find for us. 
However, a drastic and progressive reduction 
over time in our general administrative budget 
must reduce our effectiveness. I believe, 
therefore, that the time has come - and this was 
the tenor of Sir Dudley's contribution and may 
be the point underlying an amendment that I 
hope the chair will accept, to be moved by Mr. 
Freeson - for there to be a general review of our 
functions. 
It would be helpful if our officials, when 
making assumptions about future rates of 
inflation - they can only be assumptions - pre-
pared a paper for us and our ministerial col-
leagues on the economies that will have to be 
made if zero growth is to underlie the whole 
budgetary exercise. That paper could show where 
the economies would fall and, particularly, what 
posts would have to be abolished. We and our 
ministerial colleagues could then consider the 
consequences of the abolition of those posts and 
what reduction in our functions might be nec-
essary. 
We might even be brought to the point where 
we and our ministerial colleagues would logically 
have to contemplate the extinction of the role of 
the Assembly. I am sure that none of us would 
contemplate that lightly and that we should resist 
it rigorously, but even a reduction in our func-
tions would sit ill with the powerful speech made 
to us yesterday by Lord Carrington and with the 
overwhelming and warm attentions that are 
being paid to our debates by a number of minis-
terial colleagues, including no less a person than 
the Prime Minister of France. 
The time has come for a fundamental review 
of the role ofWED and this Assembly. It will be 
a salutary exercise and will help us - not that I 
think we need assistance - to face the conse-
quences of the insistence of our ministerial col-
leagues on zero growth. More particularly, it may 
help them in their debates to contemplate clearly 
and unflinchingly the consequences of what they 
press on us. 
Our debate is critical for the future and the 
functions of the Assembly. Not for the first time 
in this Assembly, as in many other democratic 
organisations, a budgetary committee is per-
forming a critical constitutional role. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Spies von Biillesheim. 
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Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, discussing budg-
etary matters is always difficult and explosive. 
The same is true of our national budgets. But in 
this Assembly the discussion of budgetary ques-
tions is particularly explosive because it is con-
fined to the Assembly's budget, just one part of 
the WED budget. It is also limited by the fact 
that we do not have any budgetary rights of our 
own. It is very unusual for parliamentarians to 
have their budget fixed by ministers and 
bureaucracies. 
During the preliminary talks on our budget we 
are constantly pressed by our governments to 
save money. The governments have every right 
to expect this. On the other hand, the amounts 
involved are often very small and the activities 
of other parts of WED, in other words of the 
same organisation, are very expensive - I am 
referring to the agencies - although there is 
nothing more for them to do. We know this, but 
we have no means of exerting any influence. 
It is therefore particularly annoying that the 
Assembly's budget, small as it is, should be 
restricted, whereas money drains away elsewhere 
without any justification and we parliamen-
tarians are unable to stop the flow. 
We may complain about having no budgetary 
rights, not even the right to exercise control over 
WED's other budgets, but that just happens to be 
what the treaty provides. For the moment at 
least, there is nothing we can do to change this, 
but we should never stop pointing it out. Par-
ticular attention should be paid to budgetary 
rights if the WED treaty ever has to be revised 
and ratified again by the parliaments owing to 
the enlargement of WED or on other grounds. 
This is by no means out of the question and, in 
the medium term at least, even probable. 
I do not think we can go so far as to call for 
this parliamentary Assembly to be given budg-
etary rights relating to the whole of WED. But 
this Assembly should at least have the right to 
inspect all WED's various budgets to ensure that 
the same principles are applied in each case. 
At this part-session the differences between 
WED and the Council of Ministers have 
emerged quite distinctly. I would remind you 
only of the discussion yesterday about the 
numerous ministerial statements. Someone 
asked how much time we would really have left 
for our own debates. But the differences are, of 
course, also evident from this budget debate. 
Complaints are constantly made about the 
lack of co-operation between the Council and the 
Assembly. We all know there are several reasons 
for this. One is that these two bodies unfortu-
nately occupy separate premises. The question is 
whether anything can be done to change this. 
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Then there are organisational and staff reasons 
arising from insufficient dovetailing. Finally, 
there is the actual work, which tends to proceed 
in parallel. With difficulties like this, we should 
not be waiting for a new treaty but trying to 
make a new start. 
That is why I wanted to reintroduce the pro-
posal that has already been discussed by the 
christian-democrat and conservative group. 
Would it not be possible and appropriate to set 
up a working group - a small working group at 
not too high a level - consisting of members of 
the Assembly and Council, to discuss questions 
of common concern? The budgets of other areas 
of WEU should not be a closed book to us. They 
must not be kept secret from us. There must at 
least be joint discussion on them. I believe that, 
if a working group of this kind were set up and 
started work, it could also help to reduce distrust 
and annoyance on both sides. I feel the budget is 
a particularly good area for a small working 
group to make a start on improving mutual 
understanding. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Linster. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too, like 
President Caro a moment ago and other 
speakers, wish to congratulate Sir Dudley Smith 
for his written reports and his statement. These 
reports, whose clarity and conciseness, prudence 
and sureness in their assessment of the political 
factors form the basis of all the budgetary pro-
posals, are admirable. 
Above all, although there are often sharp and 
important political differences between Sir 
Dudley Smith and myself, I would like to voice 
publicly my admiration for the tenacity and 
fighting spirit with which, despite being turned 
down every time by the experts of the Budget 
Committee in London, he goes on trying to per-
suade the ministerial organs of WEU at long last 
to give the Assembly the financial and staff 
resources it needs to maintain its position. 
I must emphasise the role that an assembly of 
elected parliamentarians should play, ipso facto, 
in a combination of democratic institutions and 
also - and above all - the role that the ministers, 
in their public statements at least, have always 
assigned to it since Rome, namely to be the 
political mainspring, inspiration and conscience 
ofWEU. 
Are we to suppose that it is because the parlia-
mentary Assembly has, however, finally become 
WEU's bad conscience over the Council's 
political semi-inertia, that the experts of the 
Budget Committee want to clip our wings and 
curtail the resources we need to do our job 
properly? 
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Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I do not 
propose to waste the Assembly's time in 
explaining the arithmetic of our budgetary 
problems and showing, once again, where the 
yoke hurts most. The Rapporteur and other 
speakers have already done so and if I had 
wanted to do the same I could simply have 
repeated my last year's statement with different 
figures. 
The reason I wanted to speak at this juncture 
is to underline a point which merits stressing 
because the good marks that can be awarded 
need repeating at least as much as the criticisms, 
particularly since certain criticisms like that just 
made by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim may have 
been fair in the past but are no longer quite so 
fair today. 
In his excellent written report, Mr. Goerens, 
whose verbal report was unfortunately somewhat 
fogged by the smoke left by the unfair accusa-
tions about the statements of several ministers, 
explained that, on analysing them, the Presi-
dential Committee had declared the positions 
taken by the experts to be unacceptable - I am 
talking about the experts' position on the budg-
etary questions, of course - and that negotiating 
with the Council on that basis was out of the 
question. Following their decision, the President 
of the Assembly wrote to the Council urging it 
not to endorse the negative aspects of the Budget 
Committee's recommendations. 
So far, Mr. President, there iS nothing very 
new. How many times have the Presidential 
Committee and the President of the Assembly 
protested against the experts' unacceptable posi-
tions? - and one cannot help wondering, inci-
dentally, why the experts, and then the ministers, 
always support the most minimal positions even 
when proposed by a minority. 
But what is new and, unless I am mistaken, 
unheard of in the annals of WEU is the fact that, 
whereas for the previous financial year the 
Council did not even deign to respond to the 
budget proposals in time for the Assembly to 
clear the budget by the deadline allowed, for the 
first time - and this is new, I repeat, and posi-
tively unheard of - the Council has ignored the 
minimalist recommendations of the Budget 
Committee and substantially improved them 
along the lines of the views expressed many 
times here by the Assembly and its President. 
There is no doubt that this is not just a com-
promise, on which we have to congratulate Mr. 
Poos who negotiated it, but a positive sign and a 
real encouragement; in my eyes and those of 
most of the other members of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration, it is a 
very clear political message. It is the first time 
that the Council has rewarded us not with words 
but with additional funds. As I say, we think we 
are right to interpret this gesture not only as a 
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token of good will but as a positive political 
signal. 
This is all the truer because our Luxembourg 
Chairman-in-Office has also made it known that 
he intends to look not only at the thorny 
problem of the place of the steeply rising 
financial item of pensions in our budget, but also 
at that of the urgently necessary restructuring of 
the Office of the Clerk. 
This having been said, Mr. President, there is a 
further word I would like to add. If we demand a 
measure of budgetary autonomy for the 
Assembly, autonomy in matters of detail without 
the lectures on petty economies from civil ser-
vants, however highly placed, that are quite out 
of place when addressed to an assembly of 
elected representatives, we have to recognise that 
the rights we claim have their counterpart in the 
form of duties. We have to make choices for our 
priorities and savings where we judge them to be 
possible and useful. That is the price we have to 
pay for demanding and securing direct dialogue 
with political decision-makers. 
With my eye on possible future developments 
and realising that the Council perhaps has other 
fish to fry than the Assembly budget, I shall vote 
in favour of the various budgetary proposals we 
have discussed today. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Page. 
Sir John PAGE (United Kingdom). - We 
should all be worried about the bad-tempered 
atmosphere that seems to have entered into our 
dealings over budgetary matters with the Council 
of Ministers and wonder why. 
In the absence of the President himself from 
the chair, I can say that we have a charming, per-
suasive and approachable President, an able, 
dynamic and positive Secretary-General, a wise, 
experienced and, if I may say so, handsome 
Chairman of the Budgetary Affairs Committee, 
an encouraging mandate from our governments, 
which is shown by the number of ministers who 
are here during this session, which we should 
welcome, and a united Assembly. How shall we 
get over the ill temper that seems to be souring 
our relationship? 
I should like to offer my solution, based on the 
fact that many years ago, about the time when 
Noah was launching the ark, I was Chairman of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration here. My thesis is this. It seems that the 
fruit on the trees of Mr. Spies von Biillesheim 
and myself have ripened at the same moment. 
We in the Assembly do not discuss enough the 
work of WEU as a whole, including the other 
organs and agencies about which we know far 
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too little. I believe that the Assembly accounts 
for only about one-quarter of the budget ofWEU 
as a whole. We know extremely little about how 
the other three-quarters is spent. I have always 
felt that the dance of the seven veils is more 
interesting than full frontal presentation, but the 
activities of the other organs and agencies are 
about as open to public view as the harem of a 
reactionary Middle East monarch. 
I do not know whose fault it is, but we suffer 
from some withdrawal symptoms and frustration 
because we cannot control or even influence the 
activities of WEU as a whole. That makes us 
more introspective than we should be. We 
wonder whether the pension rights of people who 
are employed in the agencies are better than 
those of those who work for the Assembly. I 
believe, on the basis of the little that I have 
gleaned, that the terms of reference of the 
agencies have been changed and that they are 
doing a useful job, but I long to know more. 
If the Chairman of the Committtee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration and the Pres-
ident were able to make their presentations to 
governments and to cover the work of WEU as a 
whole, not just the work of the Assembly, we 
might not appear to be concentrating selfishly on 
our own interests and our representations might 
be more sympathetically received. 
I know that many members of the Assembly 
suspect that other organs and agencies are treated 
more generously than the Assembly and that the 
biblical text which runs " To him who hath shall 
be given and from him who hath not shall be 
taken away, even that which he thought that he 
hath" might apply. I recommend that the 
Council of Ministers looks to the text of the 
Good Samaritan, picks up the Assembly from 
the ditch and takes us along, if not necessarily to 
the George V, at least to a decent three-star hotel 
where we can make a full recovery. 
(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I still have 
a few members down to speak including Mr. 
Sinesio and Sir Paul Hawkins but, in order to be 
able to have the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council speak to us, I would ask the Assembly to 
kindly agree to adjourn the debate for the 
moment. We shall return to it later. 
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Offrce of the Council, Doe. 1074) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the first 
part of the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council, Document 1074. 
Before you begin, Mr. Chairman, allow me to 
express to you the satisfaction of the Assembly 
and above all of its President and to thank you 
for everything you have done with your col-
leagues in the Luxembourg Government to 
conduct this presidency in a manner that claims 
everyone's admiration and which has enabled us, 
thanks to your help and that of your colleagues 
Mr. Fischbach and Mr. Goebbels, whom I also 
have pleasure in welcoming, to give this 
Luxembourg presidency and Luxembourg itself 
practical support in the reactivation we wish to 
bring about. I invite you to take the rostrum and 
I hope that, afterwards, you will be kind enough 
to answer questions from the Assembly. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I would like to say straight away that I 
am honoured at being able to address your 
Assembly today as the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council of Western European Union. This is a 
great honour bearing in mind the well-known 
fighting spirit of the members of this Assembly, 
to say nothing of the tenacity of its President. 
Never having had the privilege of sitting on 
your benches but knowing well your legitimate 
expectations, my only ambition since Luxem-
bourg's accession to the chairmanship of our 
organisation has been to ensure that the commit-
ments entered into are met. Although our task 
today is particularly delicate and difficult, we 
shall endeavour to prove worthy of the confi-
dence placed in us. Needless to say the number 
of staff we are in a position to muster for the 
Luxembourg chairmanship and this large inter-
national organisation are extremely limited. 
It is against this background and in a particu-
larly fast-changing context that Luxembourg 
finds itself responsible for imparting new vigour 
to the process of renewal decided upon some two 
years ago. 
Eager to provide a swift response to the expec-
tations so often expressed by all of you gathered 
here, the Council Chairman first lent an attentive 
ear to some of the heads of this organisation 
before consulting member countries. In the 
second half of this year, for example, he had a 
meeting in Luxembourg with Mr. Cahen, the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Caro, the President, and 
the enlarged Bureau of your Assembly. 
Immediately after these meetings and in the 
light of the impressions exchanged, further 
impetus was given in London, at the level of the 
Permanent Council, by the presence of political 
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directors and senior officials from the defence 
ministries in turn. What we asked for in fact was 
that everyone should give immediate thought to 
the future of WEU. There is no 1 need to tell you 
how surprised we were that no one failed to 
respond including your President himself and 
the governments of the member states. 
On the contrary, in the light of all these contri-
butions, the Chairman was able to produce a 
consolidated memorandum which is now the 
basis for the practical implementation of the 
reactivation process. 
This methodical and systematic approach, 
without any publicity, enabled the recent 
informal ministerial meeting ~eld in Luxem-
bourg to take a few first important decisions: 
First, the WEU member countries agreed to 
hold two ministerial sessions in the year, one 
informal and one formal. 
Second, the political directors and, on their 
initiative, the senior defence officials should 
meet in principle at least four times a year. 
Third, the terms of reference of the working 
group so far responsible for the SDI issue on its 
own are now extended to all the politico-military 
questions that I shall refer to a little later. 
Fourth, France and Italy offered to produce a 
memorandum as quickly as possible on security 
in the Mediterranean region. The aim is to have 
this debated early next year in a special group set 
up for the purpose. 
Fifth, aware of the need for co-ordination 
between the work of the foreign affairs and 
defence ministries, the ministers responsible for 
defence, at a separate meeting on the occasion of 
the last informal meeting, displayed their keen 
interest in maintaining active co-operation from 
now on within WEU. 
Sixth, the question of a high-speed communi-
cations system on the pattern of the Coreu 
system now being used by the Twelve is being 
studied by the Netherlands. 
Seventh, Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of 
WEU, who spoke to you from this rostrum yes-
terday, has been asked to produce a study for 
spring next year on the future of the organ-
isation's administrative structures that are split 
at the moment between two locations. 
In the light of all this, the Luxembourg chair-
manship would like to see the organisation take 
further concrete decisions at its session next 
spring, its aim being that ministers should 
express their definitive views on all matters 
affecting the operation of WEU and its infra-
structure. 
There is no escaping the fact that, through the 
interaction of the various levels of responsibility 
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centred around the Permanent Council con-
sisting of our permanent representatives, WEU is 
in the process of changing its appearance com-
pletely. 
However, as I have already said, I do not want 
to disappoint you by saying nothing about two 
questions which I also know to be central to your 
concerns: the enlargement of the organisation 
and the budget. Whilst it is true that these two 
items were not on the agenda of the informal 
ministerial meeting that has just ended, the fact 
remains that they were broached by the 
Chairman and all the ministers present who did 
not at any time seek to avoid discussing them or 
even to minimise their importance. 
As regards the enlargement of the organisation 
to include new members, which the Council 
Chairman would have liked to proceed in step 
with reactivation, it is clear that the majority of 
member states feel it would be better at the 
moment to delay any decision on this subject 
while the reactivation process is still under way. I 
am able to tell you, however, that no one said he 
was against the accession of any particular 
would-be member. On the contrary the points 
made concerning eligibility for membership and 
the effects of an enlarged Assembly were argued 
very calmly throughout. In the end, the wish to 
see reactivation concluded first won the day. 
I therefore ask your Assembly to accept the 
Council's position of principle in this matter but 
I also assure you that the Chairman's office, for 
its part, will not remain inactive. From now on it 
will act with extreme discretion, with the aim of 
preparing the ground so that, when the time 
comes, a decision on enlargement can be taken 
in full knowledge of every factor to be taken into 
account. 
As to the budget, all of my colleagues accepted 
that a reactivated WEU needed to have adequate 
material resources particularly at a time when 
the budget of the organisation was burdened by 
certain compulsory expenditure. Here I refer to 
the rising cost of the pensions of retired members 
of staff. 
As previously, the Council Chairman has tried 
to be imaginative and has proposed that, once 
the reactivation process is concluded, the annual 
growth rate in WEU's administrative expen-
diture should be no different from that which our 
budgetary experts allow each year for all the esti-
mates of the Community institutions. In pro-
posing this, the object is twofold: to assimilate 
WEU with all the Community institutions in 
accordance with the express provisions of the 
single European act and to relieve our Per-
manent Council of the fruitless budgetary discus-
sions we know too well. 
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Those are the broad lines of what has been 
done at the level of the structures or, I should 
say, the infrastructure. It is better than nothing as 
everyone will admit but it certainly is not 
enough. 
The fact is, as stated in the Chairman's memo-
randum, there is " a very close and even organic 
link between the future activities of the organ-
isation and in particular their objectives and the 
means to be employed in the way of organs and 
mechanisms". That being so it was urgent and 
vital that the future tasks of the organisation be 
better defined. This is an essential aspect of 
reactivation and the degree of satisfaction felt by 
member states on that score will largely con-
dition the success of the process begun in Rome 
in 1984. 
Following the consultations that took place 
between member states it became clear that 
where European security is involved no subject, 
in principle, should be taboo. The only obvious 
limitation is where the responsibilities of other 
bodies like European political co-operation and 
the Atlantic Alliance are involved. 
This is also the approach that governed the 
choice and title of the subject that the Seven 
wished to discuss and highlight at their last 
informal meeting in Luxembourg. By making 
" after Reykjavik " the only major item on the 
agenda, the representatives of the seven member 
governments were given a chance to go beyond 
the individual reactions that this important 
event had prompted and, as far as possible, to 
make a joint assessment of the success or failure 
of that meeting between the two highest policy-
makers on earth. 
The Luxembourg meeting was unquestionably 
marked by the desire for an in-depth discussion 
of security questions. The specific contribution 
of ministers of defence, now more closely asso-
ciated with the organisation and, therefore, more 
involved in the debate, needs stressing in this 
connection. The ministerial discussions on this 
question showed how vitally necessary it is to 
have a forum in Europe for joint discussion of 
the security of our continent. 
At the same time all the members of WEU 
insisted that they did not intend in any way to 
"rock the boat". On the contrary, they all 
recognise that the Atlantic Alliance had been and 
still is the guarantee of more than forty years of 
peace in Europe and that the need for solidarity 
with NATO is self-evident. It is precisely to the 
Atlantic Alliance and its strategy that Europe 
owes these forty years of peace. So the meeting 
made it possible to underline the fact that 
Atlantic solidarity continues to be a vital need, a 
reflection of the indivisible nature of the security 
of the member states of the alliance on the two 
sides ofthe ocean. It is also the reason why main-
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taining that peace in Europe has to be the 
primary objective of any security policy in the 
future. 
The security of European states is to be seen in 
terms of the planned and effective balanced 
reduction of arms to the lowest possible level. In 
following this principle European policy-makers 
in WEU have no doubt that they are interpreting 
the deepest wishes of their peoples. Disar-
mament targets, on which the discussion was 
focused, have to include reductions of forces and 
arms of all kinds and first and foremost in the 
strategic nuclear arsenals of the two great 
powers. 
Lord Carrington who spoke to you yesterday 
stressed that the great breakthrough after 
Reykjavik is that the public now perceives 
radical nuclear disarmament to be possible. The 
second objective has to be stability in the field of 
conventional armaments but with no imbalance 
and thirdly, the Seven urge the acceptance of 
ceilings, agreed by both sides, for very short-
range missiles in the event that the zero target for 
intermediate-range missiles were to become 
effective. The idea in my mind is that there 
should be a declaration affirming the possibility 
of solving the problem of short-range missiles at 
the same time as that of intermediate-range mis-
siles and I have the feeling that the countries of 
the East should be invited to do away with this 
type of armaments as soon as an agreement has 
ratified the zero objective. 
Lastly, the Council is in favour of the elimi-
nation of all chemical weapons throughout the 
world. 
A concern voiced several times during this 
extremely vigorous debate is that any future 
negotiations on the control and reduction of 
armaments must increase European security, not 
reduce it. With that in mind it is vital that if 
negotiations on one type of weapon are likely to 
affect an essential factor of European security in 
a given sector then the emergence, at the same 
time, of other factors likely to imperil strategic 
stability without which there can be no security 
in Europe, has to be avoided. 
Indeed, the Seven consider that the need to 
maintain a capacity to deter not only all 
aggression but all forms of military intimidation 
remains essential in present circumstances in 
Europe. 
Agreements on armaments control and pro-
gress with disarmament are only conceivable if 
there is provision for credible verification. 
Lastly, the ministers meeting in Luxembourg 
unanimously rejected the Soviet proposal of a 
package covering all the measures envisaged for 
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the various types of weapons but tying their 
implementation to the United States giving up 
the SDI system. 
As you can see, the role of the institution is 
now outlined very clearly in all its component 
parts: to be a forum for consultation and joint 
action on the conditions of European security 
which are likely to undergo decisive changes 
during the next few months. This consultation 
should enable the voice of Europe to be more 
clearly heard in future negotiations on the 
control of nuclear, conventional and chemical 
weapons. 
Regardless of whether one takes a pessimistic 
or optimistic view of the content of the 
Reykjavik talks and the contradictory interpreta-
tions to which they have given rise, it is clear 
that Europe cannot remain outside discussions 
in which the future of its safety at the end of this 
century is at stake. 
That is why WEU would now have to be 
invented if it did not already exist. It was in these 
terms, as Mr. Cahen recalled yesterday, that the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany spoke - and was not con-
tradicted. I say WEU will go on existing 
tomorrow, offering its seven member states a 
unique instrument for the kind of consultation 
that is not, to our regret, allowed at the level of 
European co-operation. 
It is now up to the European nations not to 
allow any doubts to remain about the energy 
they are capable of mobilising and to persuade 
their allies of their resolve with regard to their 
joint defence. 
In this connection, I have to point out, 
however, that implicit in our approach is a duty 
of mutual frankness vis-a-vis our partners in the 
alliance. It would be wrong for WEU to be a 
forum for the open criticism of any ally with 
whom governments co-operate within the 
alliance. The reason for our organisation's exis-
tence is, precisely, to strengthen that alliance by 
enabling Europeans to increase and improve 
their efforts through greater co--operation which, 
after our meeting in Luxembourg, may be 
defined as European political co-operation in 
security. 
As for the future, let me say finally that the 
prospects opened up by the Reykjavik summit 
have set us thinking about the future of deter-
rence as we know it and the flexible response 
strategy. This by no means implies that they are 
now being challenged but the purpose would be 
to make realistic preparations for gradual nuclear 
disarmament in readiness for the time when 
negotiations make this possible. For us, the 
ultimate goal for any agreement must be fewer 
weapons and more security for our continent as a 
whole. 
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Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this brief 
statement has enabled me to outline in broad 
terms what we have been doing over the last few 
months and to give you some indication of the 
approach taken by the seven member govern-
ments of our organisation. 
It is now up to you to judge, criticise and 
propose. That is the role of any assembly and I 
have not a moment's doubt that every con-
structive contribution from the Assembly will 
further stimulate not only the presidency but also 
all the governments of the seven member 
states. 
It is therefore essential that we should be able 
to pursue this constructive dialogue we have 
begun with you today in the weeks and months 
to come. In his opening address Mr. Caro made 
the point that this presidency will spare no effort 
in fulfilling its difficult task. 
In our turn, we do not think that the Assembly 
and Council are in competition in this matter. 
On the contrary, it is together and - to use, for 
once, a military expression - by closing ranks 
that we shall succeed. 
The confidence that I hope you will express on 
the occasion of this session will be particularly 
valuable to us. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr. 
Chairman-in-Office, I would like to thank you 
for your major contribution to the presentation 
of the first part of the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council. 
As we said, the role of the Luxembourg presi-
dency is particularly important at the moment 
and the attitude of the Council, whose 
spokesman you are today, is proof that the 
reactivation of Western European Union has 
embarked on a road where concrete proposals 
will be confirming - as we all hope - the declara-
tions made in Rome in 1984. 
May I remind you, Mr. Minister, that you 
agreed, after the question time we are now to 
have, that we should take Mr. Bianco's report on 
the thirty-first report of the Council. In that way 
it will be possible to include the Assembly's pre-
paratory work and your own contribution in the 
same debate. I would also remind you that you 
are, of course, entitled to intervene whenever 
you so desire during the debate. 
I call Mr. Bianco. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). - I should 
like to ask the minister a question concerning the 
Council's views on the application of Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; that is, I 
should like to know whether or not the govern-
ments of the seven WEU countries consider that 
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the proven involvement of some countries in ter-
rorist activities in Western Europe calls for appli-
cation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, if I have rightly understood, the question 
put to me is this: could the involvement of a par-
ticular country in an act of international ter-
rorism lead us into war? I do not think we have 
reached that point. If we find that a country, any 
country, is implicated in an act of terrorism -
and that was the case in recent weeks - it is up to 
the European states to consult together with the 
object of taking sanctions against it. 
The intensity and level of those sanctions must 
depend on the offence committed. You know 
about the sanctions taken against Libya and 
Syria during the last six months. These were dis-
cussed at length and decided upon unanimously 
by the member states of the European Commu-
nities which, for this purpose, also consulted 
with the other members of the alliance and in 
particular with the United States. 
To sum up, our response to a terrorist act in 
which the involvement of a particular state can 
be clearly demonstrated has to be scaled to the 
particular case and differentiated in accordance 
with the proven facts. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
Chairman, we were greatly interested by your 
very precise statement and its general tone of res-
olution and determination. You concluded your 
remarks with the idea of closing ranks - which 
may be a military term but is also used in sport -
in particular between the Council and this parlia-
mentary Assembly. As to closing ranks, in terms 
not of competition but of emulation about which 
you spoke at length, the vital attitude is that we 
should be constantly tightening the unity of our 
western world and also strengthening our will so 
that this unity is a real one. 
That is the objective of the ambitious 1984 
reactivation project signed and sealed in Rome 
but, in this context, is the Reykjavik meeting a 
giant step forward or does it present a danger of 
division or, in any case difficulty? 
You said the Council made the position clear 
at the Luxembourg meeting. Our Assembly itself 
will be including a study of the various items 
concerning East-West relations in its future 
work. In spite of the clear-cut position in your 
statement, can you again confirm to us that, at 
the level of the Council, Reykjavik may be 
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regarded as both a failure and a positive element 
and, above all, that our seven partners are 
resolved at government level to speak with the 
same voice in pursuing their disarmament 
action? It is vital to this Assembly that we should 
be able to rely on you as a partner without the 
slightest ambiguity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - It is particularly easy for me to 
answer this question because most of the reply is 
already contained in my statement. 
I confirm once again that it is indeed the 
intention of the Seven to pool their thinking and 
to consult together about what comes after 
Reykjavik. Together, we have to analyse all the 
military and political implications arising out of 
this essential phase in negotiations between the 
representatives of the biggest and most powerful 
states in the world. 
We are faced with a real challenge and we have 
to face it together as Europeans. That is why, in 
Luxembourg, we gave the instructions we did to 
our political directors and it is also why we 
enlarged the terms of reference of the special 
committee responsible for studying the SDI. The 
SDI is of itself a new factor dictating radical 
changes in our strategic and political thinking. I 
hope, in the near future, to be able to present you 
with the conclusions we reach at all these levels 
and not least the political level. The question will 
be on the agenda for the next ministerial 
session. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bohl. 
Mr. BOHL (France) (Translation). - Mr. Min-
ister, I am from the Moselle and therefore close 
to Luxembourg which I know to be gifted with 
common sense and logic. Now, we have budg-
etary problems and relations are difficult 
between the Assembly and the Council. What do 
you think you can do to put an end to all these 
difficulties which, in my opinion, are so small 
that they could easily be solved with a little logic 
and common sense? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I am very much aware of the 
importance of these budgetary difficulties but I 
am happy to tell you that the Assembly and the 
Council are now more or less agreed on the 1986 
budget. 
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Major disagreement, however, remains with 
regard to the 1987 budget. The Council has pro-
posed a growth rate of 2. 79% but if we deduct the 
cost of pensions the rate comes down to a pitiful 
0.49%. If allowance is then made for expected 
inflation in France we have what is, in fact, neg-
ative growth. In my position as Chairman I must 
say that this increase is not enough and that was 
also, incidentally, the feeling of my six colleagues 
when we had our informal discussion in 
Luxembourg. 
Your plea has therefore been heard and the 
Council will have to think again. I make no 
secret of the fact that I plan to propose that a 
growth rate be set in advance for the WEU 
budget equivalent to that which we have agreed 
to apply to the other European institutions. 
Everybody knows that the budget of the other 
European institutions is gone through with a 
fine-tooth comb by the national financial 
experts. Once a growth rate has been set, it 
should be possible to adapt it to the international 
organisations to which the states belong. I hope 
that this proposal will be agreed by all my col-
leagues on the Council of Ministers. There is 
nothing more I can tell you today. Your message, 
Mr. Bohl, has been received. I shall pass it on to 
all my colleagues and we will take a fresh look at 
the 1987 budget. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
In an. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. Minister, I am a highly interested 
observer but, with regard to enlargement, I 
wonder what I am supposed to tell my gov-
ernment and my parliament. Nobody is particu-
larly opposed to any country and the Seven are 
going through a process of reactivation. What 
does this mean? 
Two years ago in Rome, the Seven created 
some interest and aroused hopes with regard to 
enlargement and the organisation of European 
defence. The impression now is that they went 
too far in their enthusiasm and that they are 
trying to pull back. Is there a firm intention on 
the part of the Seven in this respect? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I do not think there has been 
any pulling back at all by the Council of Min-
isters on the enlargement issue. 
The ministers of the Seven have discussed this 
several times, firstly in Bonn and most recently 
in Venice. Unfortunately, as Chairman-in-Office, 
I have to say that opinions differ, not on the 
principle, but on the date of application of the 
Luxembourg decision. It is a question of corn-
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pleting reactivation before going ahead with the 
important task of enlargement. 
That means delaying the decision. The 
decision on reactivation means there has to be a 
deadline for it: 31st December 1987. In all logic, 
the governments who have insisted on com-
pleting the first stage - reactivation - must 
surely agree to discuss enlargement about the 
middle of next year. They will have to take a pos-
itive decision. I have heard no objections in prin-
ciple from any country. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Fol-
lowing Mr. Inan's intervention, may I press the 
Chairman-in-Office about enlargement? I believe 
that to the outside observer it appears that the 
Council is making a profession of pusillanimity 
in this matter. Is it not the case that in forging an 
effective European identity on security it is 
imperative to mobilise our parliamentary and 
public opinions, and is not this organisation the 
one, by treaty, and, de facto, the one best able to 
do it? 
When the Soviet Union is sending highly expe-
rienced envoys to the West- Mr. Agentov and 
Mr. Karpov - to try to suggest to our govern-
ments that the United States should abandon 
SDI if progress is to be made on arms control, is 
not this just the time when we need to enlarge 
our organisation? How much longer can we real-
istically keep democratic applicants such as Por-
tugal, my country's oldest ally, in the wings? 
How much sense will it continue to make for 
friendly parliaments such as those of Turkey, 
Norway and Spain, to send observers to play a 
part in our deliberations? 
May I remind the Chairman-in-Office that the 
Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, 
suggested that it was imperative that our govern-
ments continue to spend adequately for defence? 
If we do not spend adequately for this organ-
isation and if we do not think that its mutual 
defence commitments are worth extending to 
other friendly democratic countries, surely we 
are giving a bad example to the public, whose 
opinions about security need to be reinforced 
rather than assuaged by what appear to be bad 
excuses. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. Wilkinson is preaching to 
the converted. I think, like he does, that there are 
arguments for this and that the text of the treaty 
itself reads in favour of enlargement but, in this 
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question like any other, the chairman can only 
convey what the member countries unanimously 
decide. Enlargement is a decision that has to be 
taken unanimously and you well know that some 
governments believe you have to build a house 
before you extend it. So today I cannot say any 
more about this important subject but you may 
be sure that I am ready to go on with my efforts 
to persuade all member countries so that we may 
take the necessary decisions as quickly as pos-
sible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Ferrari Aggradi. 
Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (Italy) (Trans-
lation). - I should like to repeat the appreciation 
which I expressed previously to the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council in Luxembourg particu-
larly as regards the recognition since Reykjavik 
of the need to extend the role of our 
organisation. It would be a serious mistake to 
underestimate this historic fact at least as a ten-
dency towards a fundamental change and not to 
recognise that this substantially adds to our role. 
It is not a matter of any will to reactivate but an 
objective recognition of the need to implement 
an essential role. 
I should like to ask a number of questions and 
then summarise them as a single question. It is 
true that we should support any agreement for 
disarmament; this is a matter of moral as well as 
political principle. When there is any sign that an 
agreement on disarmament may be possible, we 
can only be in favour. 
We must be responsible protagonists - and I 
stress the word responsible - and not people who 
take part but hold back; responsible on the one 
hand for our contacts with the public and on the 
other for a responsible and attentive study of the 
problems which may also require a special com-
mitment from the European countries. If we look 
at our relative contribution in this matter at the 
moment we cannot fail to recognise that we are 
doing much less than the great powers. We want 
progressive disarmament and a reduction of 
expenditure. We must assess all this in a most 
responsible manner. Nuclear disarmament must 
be gradual whereas our aim for conventional 
forces must be a balance leading ultimately to a 
reduction. So if these are the correct policies and 
the basic points of reference and if we recognise 
that the road will be a long one, my final 
question must be as follows. And I agree, Mr. 
President, that the reply must be collective and 
consistent and that we must make an effort 
above all in this Assembly to further a collective 
and consistent reply, involving - I would 
emphasise - a truly responsible commitment 
because it is only by way of responsible commit-
ments and not by standing aside or turning our 
backs that we shall achieve the great objectives of 
peace. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - My thanks to Mr. Ferrari 
Aggradi for his statement in which he asked an 
important question and at the same time gave 
part of the answer himself. In the main I support 
what he said: it is not our function to accept just 
any disarmament agreement. On the contrary, at 
all stages of the discussion, we have to try to 
work towards balanced agreements that will 
increase European security. We also have to 
strive to keep effective negotiations going on all 
types of weapon whether nuclear, conventional 
or chemical. Like Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, I believe 
our response has to be a joint one and this 
requires collective consultation. That is the 
reason why we meet in WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have no 
one else down to speak and that leaves me 
therefore to thank you, Minister, for your very 
valuable participation in our debates. 
5. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of and tkbate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1078) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on the political activities of the Council - reply 
to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, 
Document 1078. 
The debate on the budgets will be resumed 
after this report has been discussed. 
I call Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). -Mr. Pres-
ident, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the 
report we are presenting later than usual, at the 
end of the year, was not written without diffi-
culty; we can say that some points were continu-
ously revised to take account of new facts as they 
emerged from time to time. Now it comes before 
us at a particularly important moment in the 
political life of the western countries and in par-
ticular of the seven WEU countries. 
The report in fact comes between the 
Reykjavik meeting and the Luxembourg 
meeting. It was approved on lOth November. It 
was discussed in Copenhagen immediately after 
the important Reykjavik meeting and was 
approved in Paris just before the Luxembourg 
97 
TENTH SITTING 
meeting. These are two dates which I believe are 
of great political significance because of the deci-
sions we have to take. As the Secretary-General 
said yesterday and the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council has reiterated today, I think that the 
constructive dialogue established between the 
Assembly and the Council of Ministers has been 
useful and in some ways productive. 
We are all parliamentarians with a positive 
and constructive determination as convinced 
Europeans to emphasise the need to make more 
of international political events and to work out 
a view common to European countries. In 
putting a question a short time ago Mr. Ferrari 
Aggradi made a point which I fully endorse. The 
international relations established between the 
two great powers to some extent demand a 
European view. It is not by accident that 
Luxembourg revived the hopes of a reactivation 
of WEU, which had been in some measure 
dimmed in Venice. I do not think this came 
about by accident but rather because the 
Reykjavik talks clearly revealed that Europe 
could not stand aside and must express its own 
views on its own problems, particularly on the 
subject of defence. 
I believe that in this Assembly we must stress 
the need to cease being an institution which as it 
were follows events as happened previously, 
after the signature of the treaties between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America. 
After the signature of those treaties Europe raised 
the question of the imbalances in the European 
theatre and to some extent - and this is the 
important point - we became involved in the 
actual international negotiations aimed at 
detente and establishing the conditions for world 
peace. 
This, Mr. President and Mr. Chairman, is a 
state of affairs which we must not repeat. We 
should anticipate events and speak with a single 
voice. We should not confine ourselves to 
general statements but should be involved in 
actual policies in order to maintain the whole 
principle of European security as you quite 
rightly said in your speech. 
I should therefore like to extend an invitation 
to you which will become an amendment that I 
hope the Assembly will approve with the same 
unanimity as my report. As you have to speak 
for the seven WEU countries at the forthcoming 
NATO meeting on 11th December I wonder 
whether you might not express a unanimous col-
legiate view of the WEU countries. I believe that 
this would be important because the doubts 
which still exist in some countries would be 
removed; in my view it is not a mere recital of 
the facts but active vigorous political action 
inspired by the Assembly which can produce a 
European policy which is becoming ever more 
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necessary as demonstrated by the Luxembourg 
meeting. 
To use your own metaphor, Mr. President, I 
agree that WEU's first objective must be to finish 
building its own house. I am convinced that, 
before there can be any European policy within 
the Atlantic Alliance, the seven WEU countries 
must arrive at a single view and make practical 
efforts to achieve an even greater measure of 
agreement between themselves. There can be no 
doubt about this. I also believe however - and 
this is the Assembly's general view - that the 
time is now ripe for any applications aimed at 
enlarging WEU. I refer in particular to Portugal 
which made its application a long time ago and is 
awaiting a reply. We cannot keep waiting indefi-
nitely countries which belong to our alliance and 
to the EEC and I believe, therefore, that a reply is 
now due and should be given promptly. 
Mr. President, in the dialogue established 
between the Council and the Assembly which, as 
I have said, has already produced positive results 
and replies, we wish to confirm our determi-
nation to be constructive. We have to 
acknowledge that some replies have already been 
given. For example, a particularly important 
decision was taken in Luxembourg to set up a 
committee of political directors representing the 
foreign and defence ministers; this is a significant 
step in the implementation of the Rome decla-
ration. We believe that the formation of such a 
high-level group can lead to ever greater 
involvement in the problems of our interna-
tional organisation. 
We may also note the reply to the Assembly's 
Written Question 271. There are still some vague 
features but the reply is more specific regarding 
the role of the Standing Armaments Committee 
mentioned in paragraph (xi) of the preamble. 
Even if I am speaking in the name of the 
Assembly I believe as an Italian that we must be 
particularly attentive to this point. It is also 
important that the whole of the WEU Assembly 
should be involved in the formation of a working 
group on the Mediterranean which - and this is 
the point and intention of my question - will be 
specifically concerned and involved in the role of 
WEU in the modern form of warfare known as 
terrorism which is waged not by isolated groups 
and fractions but by groups which are manipu-
lated by political powers because the 
involvement of certain countries is being more 
and more clearly revealed by court cases and by 
the political information coming from the secret 
services of a number of countries. For example, 
we must not forget the public statements of the 
German courts concerning the Berlin outrage 
and the involvement of a specific country. 
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As we listened to you we saw signs of progress 
on the problem of our Assembly's budget. In 
general your remarks seem highly encouraging. 
As you will have seen from the debate in the 
Assembly the problem of the budget is a per-
manent obstacle to the work of the Assembly. 
We consider, however, that it is a matter not 
solely for the Assembly but also for the Secre-
tariat-General. The reorganisation and reac-
tivation of WEU with the provision of adequate 
funds and equipment involves both the 
Assembly and I repeat the Secretariat-General. 
We support the requests for more resources. We 
acknowledge that our structure which is politi-
cally important and meets a basic need in 
East-West relations has been as it were a light 
hidden under a bushel but today political rela-
tionships demand greater attention. We have 
therefore appreciated your open-minded 
approach but this must be given practical 
expression in the two ways we have indicated. 
Reading the Luxembourg communiques I was 
pleased to note that the Council of Ministers 
acknowledged the potential role of the WEU 
Assembly. We are the link between European 
public opinion and public opinion in our coun-
tries. As parliamentarians we have an important 
role both in our own countries and in this 
Assembly and I do not believe that defence 
problems can be dealt with solely by technical 
solutions. It is important to create what I might 
call a cultural and political dimension which is a 
European defence dimension; hence the 
important role of the Assembly which has 
already been recognised in theory. 
We are determined, ladies and gentlemen, to 
continue working for disarmament and for a pos-
itive relationship leading to full agreement 
between East and West. We believe that a 
balance should be established at progressively 
lower levels but this word " balance " which was 
repeated yesterday by Lord Carrington and in 
authoritative terms today by the Chairman-in-
Office must be the focal point of East-West rela-
tions and the cardinal principle of security; 
balance not only between the great powers but in 
the European theatre both for conventional 
weapons and for the missiles deployed there. 
There is one overall security not confined to rela-
tions between the great powers but taking due 
account of our position and our role. 
In this context it is extremely important to 
keep a close watch on the negotiations in both 
Geneva and Vienna taking a careful look, as 
Lord Carrington urged yesterday, at the 
problems of modernisation, equilibrium and 
information. 
From this standpoint, we feel that the replies 
given on such problems as relations between the 
Independent European Programme Group and 
the information which should be given to the 
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Assembly are completely inadequate. We also 
feel it most important that the role of the 
agencies should be defined in precise terms. 
There are general indications. There is certainly 
still some time left. The commitment was that 
their role should be defined by 1987 but we could 
have offered some guidance or ideas if the 
Council had given us fuller and more specific 
information about the agencies' role. 
We know that on 14th November the Secre-
tariat-General informed the Council of Ministers 
of the mandate planned by the Council for 
Agency Ill but the Assembly has no details on 
the subject. Everything seems to us to be still at 
the general level. Even though Lord Carrington 
said with great good humour yesterday that he 
had answered all requests for information, we do 
not find access to the sources of information to 
be easy or that the agencies can obtain full and 
adequate information. 
There is another problem which we have 
raised several times in meetings of the General 
Affairs Committee and is also reflected in the 
document I am submitting. I am referring to the 
creation of an independent information centre or 
some form of co-ordination of information 
centres on an independent European basis. We 
cannot operate with second-hand information. I 
believe that the countries of Europe have the 
power, capacity, technical knowledge and intelli-
gence to establish at least this important element 
providing independent sources of information. 
What institution is better equipped than WEU to 
do this? 
These are the problems covered by the report 
which, as I said before, was unanimously 
approved by the committee and I hope will be 
approved in the same way by the Assembly. 
In conclusion I would like to repeat to the sec-
retariat and to the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council our wish for active and not passive col-
laboration, our wish to introduce dynamic ele-
ments because I believe that the role of the 
Assembly has been basically important over the 
last few years. We carried on so that we could 
reactivate our organisation. The Assembly has 
succeeded in maintaining unchanged the prin-
ciples on which it was founded in 1954 after the 
unfortunate failure of the EDC. I believe that this 
small flame which has been kept alight can 
develop into something important and signif-
icant at European level within the Atlantic 
Alliance which is stin the fundamental basis of 
our security. In this framework we wish to be an 
active and not a passive element as our history 
and our traditions demand, being as they are the 
traditions of European history. 
(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, ladies and gentlemen, we voted for this 
report in committee after a debate and a number 
of additions which we believe to be improve-
ments; these were accepted by the Rapporteur 
and are now included in the draft recommen-
dation submitted for approval. From this report 
as amended and more restrained than the 
original text through the removal of some of the 
original remarks concerning relations between 
the Assembly and the Council, we wish to take a 
number of political questions which we consider 
to be some of the most important. 
The first is that the text repeats the com-
mitment to implement the Rome I declaration in 
full. This means, therefore, working towards the 
reactivation of our institutiori which we, 
moreover, consider to be possible particularly 
because of the political opportunity for major 
options and choices concerning security and 
defence policy. In this context we have to inform 
the Assembly that we yesterday informed the 
Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, 
and our President, Mr. Caro, of the resolution 
recently adopted by the leadership of the Italian 
Communist Party. The interest shown by the 
people we met whom we should like to thank 
here publicly, and in particular Mr. Caro's will-
ingness to consider this resolution as material for 
study and reflection and therefore to submit it to 
the appropriate committee, will give our col-
leagues a clearer insight into our views, which we 
consider to be well-founded and likely to be 
widely approved because they give priority to the 
political line of meetings and negotiation in pref-
erence to a military approach, as, the means of 
achieving balanced agreed disarmament and a 
Europe without nuclear weapons. I 
It is therefore natural for us and wholly in line 
with our attitude to security questions and hence 
to questions relating to the powers of our insti-
tution, to give priority to the work of the 
Assembly. As the Rapporteur said earlier, the 
democratic and political contribution which the 
Assembly has always made to WEU is that of 
seeking a European political role within the 
western alliance, enabling Europe to make its 
voice heard in the negotiations on security and 
disarmament so that there is no turning back 
from Reykjavik and so that the possibilities 
which emerged there can be translated into 
binding commitments for the two superpowers 
and for the world as a whole. 
We believe that WEU has a special place in 
this field and that no other European institutions 
have the same competence. We agree that the 
Luxembourg meetings have given fresh hope and 
offer new possibilities which we welcome, partic-
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ularly as regards relations between the Council 
and the Assembly. We support therefore the pro-
posals to strengthen and increase the efficiency 
of our institutions and of the agencies in par-
ticular. The provisional solution recently 
achieved at our insistence - I mean the insis-
tence of the Assembly - on matters relating to 
finance and the budget, which we have already 
agreed, does not remove the need to repeat yet 
again that our Assembly and its requirements are 
inadequately recognised. We think therefore that 
in our reply to the Council's thirty-first annual 
report this basic requirement must be reiterated 
since we are convinced that, in order to develop 
our institution's potential, our Assembly must be 
recognised as a representative democratic 
expression of the political will essential for our 
peoples to make valid choices. 
Lastly, I should like to thank our German, 
British and French colleagues for accepting the 
request that the working group on security set up 
by their governments should be brought under 
the aegis of WEU. In our view a real possibility 
for reactivating our institution and reaffirming 
the status of WEU lies in the need for our inde-
pendent capacity to affirm moral and political 
principles for disarmament, negotiations and the 
untiring search for peace. 
We have to say in all sincerity that we still dis-
agree on some points with the Rapporteur whom 
we would like to thank for his efforts. These dif-
ferences, however, do not prevent us from con-
firming that we shall vote in favour, as we said in 
committee, particularly in view of the Rappor-
teur's willingness to accept other contributions as 
happened in committee and because we are con-
vinced that it is through a unified stance by the 
Assembly in its relations with the Council that 
the desired strengthening of WEU can be 
achieved. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Masciadri. 
Mr. MASCIADRI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bianco's report, 
which I support and will give my vote, echoes 
and interprets doubts concerning the activities of 
the Council and its real commitment to the 
genuine reactivation of WEU. Yesterday, in his 
impassioned and detailed speech the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council tried to prove the 
opposite and to demonstrate that the Council is 
seeking to revitalise WEU and the Assembly. 
Serious doubts remain, however, concerning 
any real determination to work consistently for 
the reactivation of WEU, seeing that the words 
are leaves and the facts before us are the fruit. 
What is more these doubts which we have always 
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problems are discussed, that its reactivation is 
planned but has still not taken place. And there 
is no need to prove that reactivation is necessary; 
yesterday morning the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council and many other speakers on the budget 
declared that this is the moment for reactivation. 
It is very much the time for immediate action 
because there are clear signs of public concern 
that European governments are not involved in 
the disarmament problem; and there is also 
concern regarding the possibility, if not the 
danger, of an agreement between the Soviet 
Union and the United States ignoring Europe's 
long-term interests. 
I do not believe that we should miss so good 
an opportunity which may never be repeated. Of 
course, this cannot be achieved solely through 
partial agreements from which nations are 
excluded; nor can any genuine reactivation of 
WEU be achieved by meetings like those in 
Luxembourg between government officials even 
ofthe highest rank as is the case for the represen-
tatives of the foreign and defence ministries. Of 
these relations we know nothing; it is as if we 
should be given no information of any kind. And 
this is a most annoying problem which has been 
with us for much too long. 
We should recall, however, that the modified 
Brussels Treaty requires the governments to 
report to the Assembly on the manner in which 
the treaty is implemented even if this takes place 
outside WEU. It is very important to note that 
the Council normally fails to provide the 
required information and, to quote examples, it 
does not provide the Assembly either with the 
necessary funds or with the information it is 
required to supply; it refuses for example to 
report on the work of the IEPG, gives no infor-
mation on the Anglo-Franco-German security 
secretariat, no information on the activities of 
the political directors for and on behalf ofWEU, 
no information on the work prepared by the 
agencies. The agencies were one of the out-
standing points in the Rome declaration. Much 
was heard of them in previous reports. Some-
thing was said of their roles but there were, in 
fact, no adequate details of what the agencies 
were to do. Today we know nothing about the 
work of the agencies as though everything were 
secret and as though information on the 
agencies' work could not be submitted to us for 
consideration with the result that the Assembly 
has to work without the tools it needs to produce 
satisfactory ideas and opinions and has to go 
every time to the press for unofficial information 
almost like a secret society. 
This is inconceivable. So far as it is not secret, 
the work of the agency should be made 
known. 
had are shared not only by some of us but also Finally, I must say that the unified infor-
by the press which says, whenever WEU's mation arrangements of which the Secretariat-
lOO 
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General spoke in June have not yet been set up. 
There can be no point in increasing the activities 
of governments if the Council does not inform 
the Assembly and the press of the results. 
Among the questions of greatest importance 
for European security, the Council refers in its 
thirty-first report to the strategic defence initi-
ative and I imagine that we shall later get further 
information. I note with concern, however, that 
nothing is said about disarmament, or European 
arms co-operation which is still a fundamental 
problem requiring energetic action because we 
cannot all go it alone, without even informing 
our partners and working for some uniformity. 
Nor is there a word about the fight against ter-
rorism. 
In approving Mr. Bianco's report, the com-
mittee wished to record a unanimous, vigorous 
protest against this attitude on the part of the 
Council. The reactivation of WEU cannot be 
achieved simply by meetings of government offi-
cials but requires close and honest alignment of 
the Council's programmes with those of the 
Assembly which must be kept informed. This is 
the only way to genuine reactivation; all others 
are likely to fail. 
I shall therefore be voting for the report pre-
pared by Mr. Bianco, whom I wish to thank most 
sincerely for his excellent work. All of us in com-
mittee expressed our appreciation of his efforts 
by voting unanimously in favour without even a 
single abstention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Sarti. 
Mr. Sarti does not wish to speak. 
I therefore call Mr. Rauti. 
Mr. RAUTI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, I should also like to 
start by congratulating Mr. Bianco on his 
excellent work, because it was not easy to under-
stand the significance of the present phase of 
foreign policy, which is of extreme delicacy, par-
ticularly for us Europeans. I shall vote for the 
report even though, more than on other occa-
sions and particularly at this very delicate stage 
ofWestern European foreign policy as a whole, I 
have reasons certainly for doubts if not for 
censure or criticism. 
On the basis of Mr. Bianco's report, a large 
part of our debate is directed particularly to what 
I might call the awakening which has followed 
the summit meeting in Iceland. Europe con-
tinues to occupy a terribly and dramatically sub-
ordinate position, involving the danger that an 
agreement may be reached between the two 
superpowers which would disregard Europe and 
what have been correctly defined as its basic, 
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essential and continuing interests. As we all 
know at the very recent two-day meeting held a 
few days ago in Luxembourg between the foreign 
and defence ministers, and not only government 
officials, even the British minister and other 
speakers agreed - as France argued even more 
forcefully - that any zero option between the 
United States and Russia for the elimination of 
medium-range missiles - Russian SS-20s and 
American Pershings - makes no sense or rather 
is dangerous for Europe because the Soviet 
Union has not stopped adding to its arsenal of 
short-range missiles; what is more, Russia con-
tinues to have crushing superiority in terms of 
conventional armaments, without mentioning its 
frightening stock of chemical weapons about 
which strangely enough nothing is ever said in 
Europe. 
As has never been the case previously, 
therefore, there is a clear and precise tendency in 
Europe to " associate " all types of nuclear 
weapons in the debate on the subject and to 
"link" nuclear and conventional weapons. It is 
only in that context that Europe would be safe-
guarded with its security guaranteed and would 
get away from the subordinate position which I 
just mentioned; this is, however, the present 
position in which Europe may at any time be left 
dangerously behind, to become once again the 
object and in no way the controller of a foreign 
policy which affects it directly. 
This leads quite logically, rather than politi-
cally, to the efforts, the hopes an.d the encour-
agement aimed at WEU's ultimately becoming 
the European pillar of.security and armaments; 
the encouragement to do something serious, 
practical and effective in that direction, seeing 
that there has been talk of this for years already 
and there was no need for the summit in Iceland 
to demonstrate that Europe is regularly ignored 
and could well be dangerously left out when the 
two superpowers meet again in what I am 
obliged to describe as the "spirit of Yalta ". 
I have to tell Mr. Bianco, in his capacity also 
as leader of the Italian Delegation, that it is not 
enough to say that Europe must ~hange its tune 
and stop following events; it is not enough to say 
that it must anticipate events. Something more 
precise needs to be said in clearer terms. 
On this basis and endorsing the often bitter 
criticism in Mr. Bianco's report, I shall vote in 
favour so that it may serve to give a thrashing -
it does not seem too much to say - to the 
Council of Ministers of WEU, with its positive 
and well-directed denunciation of so many 
unfulfilled commitments and too many disap-
pointed hopes. 
As regards its capacity for a unified, inde-
pendent assessment of the foreign policy which 
concerns it more directly, and as regards its inde-
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pendent capacity to manage its own security and 
military problems, this Western Europe of ours 
has lost many years and has been marking time 
for many years. We have little time left to make 
the leap forward that we want, that the times 
demand and the public is calling for if we do not 
wish to give formal notice of Europe's official 
withdrawal from foreign policy and security 
problems and at the same time destroy any 
further hope that Europe can remain part of 
world history. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I note that 
Mr. Cifarelli is not here. 
I therefore call Mr. Mezzapesa. 
Mr. MEZZAPESA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, 
I understand that my friend Mr. Sarti is embar-
rassed and is tempted not to speak because on 
this subject we are unfortunately obliged to 
repeat ourselves and to say the same things. 
However, may a teacher of Latin be allowed to 
recall the old saying "repetita juvant" before 
any act of desperation or in other words the res-
ignation of Europe as Mr. Rauti said. 
The central problem dealt with by the most 
valuable report drawn up by Mr. Bianco and 
submitted to us on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee involves a detailed analysis of all the 
political, organisational and procedural aspects 
of the reactivation of WEU. As I said, a story 
which is unfortunately always old but still new. A 
subject which we are obliged to take up in a 
boringly monotonous fashion at every session of 
our Assembly. A subject which, when discussed 
in general terms in Rome in October 1984, pro-
duced the solemn Rome declaration concerning 
which we clearly deceived ourselves into 
believing that all the disputes had been ended 
and all the doubts and mental reserves regarding 
the clear and definite political will had been set 
aside; namely, the view that WEU was the 
essential instrument through which Europe 
would be able to speak with a single voice and to 
participate on equal terms in working out a 
common policy for disarmament and the limi-
tation of weapons. Unfortunately, however, this 
was not so; unfortunately, it still is not so. And 
the Rapporteur is obliged to recognise that, 
because of the many failings and uncertainties, 
the public time and again doubts the real and 
sincere intention ofthe governments of the seven 
member countries to act consistently on the 
Rome declaration. 
There is a danger that WEU may be put into 
mothballs or may even have been so already; the 
pessimists would say that right from the start it 
has been kept going by the kiss of life. 
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Mr. Bianco's report analyses the causes of this 
precarious situation and the failures arising in 
particular from an unco-ordinated, irregular and 
irrational relationship between the Assembly and 
the Council of Ministers which has created what 
I would call the absurd and contradictory mental 
atmosphere which we saw yesterday. On other 
occasions we have complained that the govern-
ments pay little attention to the Assembly's 
work; yesterday annoyance was expressed - by 
some - that too many ministers were attending. I 
would say that it was better to have too many 
than too few. 
When there is no perfect partnership between 
parliament and government and between the leg-
islative and executive powers, parliament cannot 
work properly and without a working parliament 
the whole system is likely to fail and be 
destroyed. This is true for the democratic life of 
each state and is even more true for democrati-
cally representative international bodies like 
ours. 
The report lists the causes of the situation and 
suggests remedies. We agree entirely with the 
diagnosis and with the prescribed cure. May I be 
permitted to stress one point; the political and 
diplomatic events of the last few years, from the 
various disarmament conferences in Geneva and 
Stockholm to the Reykjavik summit, which has 
inevitably dominated all our speeches over the 
last few days, confirm one basic observation. 
Europe must have its own independent 
European forum for discussing security. We 
must not be afraid of efforts by others to remove 
mutual distrust and to achieve disarmament and 
security in order to create the conditions for a 
lasting peace. We must however ensure that 
others do not move in that direction over our 
heads, not out of unworthy jealousy nor out of a 
simple need to participate as protagonists but 
because we are convinced that no policy for a 
lasting peace can be constructed without Europe 
and even less if an attempt is made to construct 
it against Europe. 
I do not think that we should fear the so-called 
zero option because this was above all a 
European idea and we cannot do other than 
welcome the fact that it has now been taken up 
by others. We must, however, work for parallel 
negotiations on disarmament, Euromissiles, 
short-range missiles, conventional weapons and 
chemical weapons so that everyone will have a 
guarantee that there is no cheating, that there is 
no exploitation and that the will for peace is 
unconditional, firm and sincere. 
One last thought before I conclude. As Mr. 
Bianco also said clearly in his report there must 
be no special agreements, either bilateral or 
trilateral, between certain states. As our foreign 
minister said, there must be no club for the spe-
cially privileged. Special privileges should be 
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given only to the cause of peace and the cause of 
Europe. We view with suspicion some tendencies 
to set up restricted and exclusive working groups 
on European security problems. We are not con-
vinced by the arguments advanced on the subject 
because there can always be so many different 
arguments. In the time of de Gaulle it used to be 
said that the economic dominance of Germany 
must be balanced by the military dominance of 
France, combined with an association with Great 
Britain as a sort of second insurance in relation 
to the United States. Today it is said: let us bring 
together - always in a working group - the most 
exposed country and the two European nuclear 
powers. We say no. Separate discussions must be 
abandoned and everything must be brought back 
into WEU, that is the new WEU reactivated by 
new credibility and effectiveness. 
For defence purposes Europe cannot become a 
means of perpetuating privilege for anyone 
because any such privileges are discriminatory 
and block the emergence of genuine European 
awareness. Precisely for that reason the EDC 
plan of 1954 was based on the elimination of all 
discrimination, including discrimination con-
cerning types of armaments. It is only in this way 
that, as our Rapporteur and all of us hope, a 
" defence spirit " can be reawakened in the 
peoples of Europe to support the European com-
mitment of diplomats and politicians. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council to reply to the 
various speakers. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I can of course only give you a 
partial reply because your debate has not fin-
ished. Mr. Robert Goebbels, Secretary of State, 
will stay with you throughout and, if you wish, 
could speak at the end of the debate on Mr. 
Bianco's report. 
I was very pleased to have heard the views 
exchanged and to observe their high level. In 
view of the late hour I shall be brief. 
I note a complete identity of view between 
your Assembly and the Council with regard to 
the constructive dialogue between the two organs 
of your organisation. I can assure you that the 
ministers who speak to you do not do so as vis-
itors but in their capacity as essential partners in 
the dialogue you seek. In the positions you have 
taken we have found backing and support for the 
action we pursue, namely the reactivation of 
WEU. I can already tell you that I am optimistic 
about the role that your Assembly expects to play 
in that reactivation. When Luxembourg took 
over the chairmanship of the Council a few 
months ago we expressed our wish to meet your 
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Assembly not just in its plenary sessions but also 
in the person of its President, its enlarged Bureau 
and its Presidential Committee and to do so at 
least once a month. I offer you that as evidence 
of our intention to treat the WEU Assembly at 
least as favourably as the European Parlia-
ment. 
One of the speakers deplored the lack of infor-
mation in the summary reports on IEPG, 
security in the Mediterranean, the agencies and 
SDI. The slimness of the texts that I have had the 
honour to submit to you on behalf of the Council 
is not due to any ill will on the part of the 
Council or to the " top secret " nature of the doc-
uments concerned but simply to the fact that the 
work of the Council on these various subjects is 
not yet completed and that the mandate given to 
the Secretariat-General has not yet come to an 
end. So it is just a matter of waiting and I hope 
that the Chairman-in-Office will be able to 
present you with more detailed reports on these 
various subjects at later sessions. 
I was particularly struck by Mr. Bianco's 
comment to the effect that he hoped our organ-
isation would be active rather than passive and 
that it would act before events rather than react 
after them. The objective is one I readily accept 
but it is difficult to put into effect because the 
members of WEU do not include the two leading 
actors on the world stage, if I may so describe 
them, and because these two main partners in 
the East-West dialogue, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, set the pace and sometimes 
create surprises as at Reykjavik. It was described 
as an historical turning point but no one, in the 
United States or anywhere else, had I think 
anticipated the scale of the contacts and the pre-
agreement achieved before everything flew apart 
at the last minute because of the prior condition 
that the Soviets wanted to impose regarding the 
SDI. However, the potency of the idea floated at 
this summit, namely the prospect of a world 
without nuclear weapons, will continue to busy 
minds in Europe and those of the governments 
responsible for European security. We are 
already well embarked on this thinking 
process. 
That brings me to my last reply concerning the 
next NATO meeting. We have been asked to 
present a joint WEU position at this meeting in 
Brussels which I, personally, consider to be 
highly important placed as it is at a turning point 
in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. 
In this debate, the Chairman of the WEU 
Council will try to present the consensus 
achieved in Luxembourg on certain points, 
which I have just had the honour to tell you 
about. The Chairman has been given no 
authority to present a joint and co-ordinated 
viewpoint at the Brussels meeting. There is no 
text that could be presented as a document 
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agreed by the Seven, but nevertheless, the 
Chairman will speak on behalf of the Seven 
taking his cue from the conclusions of th~ 
Luxembourg meeting. In this way we shall try to 
show to our partners in the alliance that WEU 
exists, that it has arrived at certain common 
restrictions with regard to the Reykjavik meeting 
and that it will be trying in future to add to the 
degree of consensus already achieved. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - Mr. 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, thank you 
very much. You have my congratulations and 
best wishes for every success in your activities. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of 
the day: 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Document 
1078 and amendment). 
2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of 
France. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
- the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts; Revised draft 
budget ofthe administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1986; 
Draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 (Resumed joint debate on the reports 
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of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration, Documents 1069 and 
addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 
and addendum). 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and debate on the revised report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 1075 and amend-
ments). 
5. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council; Political 
activities of the Council - reply to the 
thirty-first annual report of the Council; 
European security and the Mediterranean 
(Votes on the draft recommendations, Doc-
uments 1075 and amendments, 1078 and 
amendment and 1073). 
6. Revised draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1986; Draft budget of the 
administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1987 (Votes on the 
draft budgets, Documents 1071 and 
addendum and 1072 and addendum). 
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
- the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts (Vote on the 
motion to approve the final accounts, Doc-
ument 1069 and addendum). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? .. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.) 
ELEVENTH SI'ITING 
Tuesday, 2nd December 1986 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
first annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1078 and 
amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Antretter, Mr. 
Giust. 
4. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France. 
Replies by Mr. Chirac to questions put by: Mr. Muller, 
Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Goerens, Mr. 
Ahrens, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Close, Mr. Soell, Mr. Sarti, 
Sir Anthony Grant. 
5. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
first annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1078 and amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. 
Fourre, Mr. Eisma, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Burger, Sir 
Paul Hawkins (point of order), Mr. Burger, Mr. Cifarelli; 
(points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Cox, the 
President; Mr. Bianco (Rapporteur). 
6. European security and the Mediterranean (Vote on the 
revised draft recommendation, Doe. 1073). 
Speaker: Mr. Katsaros (Observer from Greece). 
7. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council (Revised report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Doe. 1075 and amend-
ments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Freeson, Mr. 
Amadei (Rapporteur). 
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's 
report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised 
draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the 
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987 (Resumed joint debate on the reports 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration, Does. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1072 and addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. 
Bassinet, Mr. Burger, Mr. Goebbels (SecretaryofStatefor 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council), Sir Dudley Smith 
(Chairman and Rapporteur), Mr. Cifarelli (point of 
order). 
9. Change in the membership of a committee. 
10. Date, time and orders of the day of ~he next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
l. See page 21. 
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3. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first ann~al report 
of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1078 and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
political activities of the Council - reply to the 
thirty-first annual report of the Council, 
Document 1078 and amendment. 
In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Muller. 
As Mr. Muller has not yet arrived, I call Mr. 
Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. Bianco 
for his excellent report, for his co-operation in 
the committee and for his flexible attitude during 
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the discussion of the report. Although he did not 
abandon any part of the subject or of his views, 
his attitude made it far easier for the report to be 
approved unanimously. 
What I particularly like about the report is its 
frankness in revealing that the relationship 
between the two political organs of our 
organisation, the Council and the Assembly, is 
still not free from inactivity, disruptions and 
contradictions. 
There is undoubtedly a natural tension 
between these two bodies, a tension such as 
exists between parliamentarians and govern-
ments in any democracy in the world. But if the 
relationship between governments and parlia-
mentarians in other countries were marred by 
the same distrust, the same disregard and, in 
many instances, the same ignorance, as relations 
between the Council and the Assembly ofWEU, 
I do not think the government of any democracy 
would last all that long. 
We might be tempted, Mr. President, to see 
the many visits by ministers to our Assembly as 
the expression of a special and increasing interest 
on the part of the governments in our work and 
especially in improved co-operation. But the 
manner of those visits to the Assembly which I 
have observed for almost seventeen years leaves 
me in some doubt over that interpretation. The 
ministers are nearly always in a hurry, they 
scarcely ever have the time to make a serious 
attempt to tackle our questions. We cannot, of 
course, expect a question raised spontaneously to 
be followed by an answer that is correct down to 
the very last detail. But we can expect a minister 
who comes here to allow himself enough time for 
a discussion with us, otherwise there is no point 
in his coming. I must, Secretary of State, exclude 
the visit of your minister from this criticism. He 
is one of the few exceptions I have witnessed in 
the last seventeen years. 
On the other hand, when we get back home, 
we shall be able to see from our newspapers what 
this or that minister has said in his statement to 
the Assembly. And we must ask ourselves: is the 
Assembly not simply being used as a kind of 
acclamatory body, something like a sounding 
board for statements by ministers who want it 
publicised in the media that they have once 
again stood up for the harmonisation of arma-
ments, for joint defence efforts? 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the 
report clearly indicates the many areas in which 
relations between the Council and the Assembly 
are still unsettled. When we read this list, we are 
forced to the conclusion that Rome was perhaps 
not meant quite so seriously after all, that the 
Rome declaration was no more than a flash in 
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the pan, or that the fault was perhaps ours, the 
parliamentarians', in that we took the ministers' 
words too seriously. 
I will take up only a few of the points raised by 
Mr. Bianco. France, the United Kingdom and 
the Federal Republic set up a working group 
which is supposed to consider security in Europe, 
a task statutorily entrusted to WEU. Another 
organisation is set up, as if we did not already 
have a surfeit of organisations in Europe, para-
lysing and hampering each other. God knows, we 
are not short of organisations: what we are short 
of is solidarity. Why is this task not left in the 
hands of WEU, or at least dovetailed with our 
work? 
Another point is that, in the Assembly's view, 
it is also Western European Union's responsi-
bility to consider the problem of international 
terrorism, as we have said in a recommendation. 
This view appears to be shared by the terrorists, 
judging by the security measures in and around 
this building, but our ministers, our governments 
are saying nothing about it. The Chairman-in-
Office of the Council pointed out today that the 
ministers had considered aspects of terrorism 
and reached agreements in the European Com-
munity. All well and good, but I wonder if the 
European Community is really the appropriate 
organisation for discussion of the fight against 
terrorism, as long as WEU exists? 
And then there is Portugal's application to join 
WEU, which was submitted years ago. The 
Assembly's appropriate committee - and the 
same goes for other committees - has discussed 
this with our parliamentary counterparts and the 
government in Portugal. Now the Council says: 
we want to wait until WEU has been reorganised 
before taking a decision on enlargement. But 
how much longer is the reorganisation of WEU 
going to take? Is our organisation not beginning 
to offend against good manners, against interna-
tional, or at least European, courtesy? 
Or take the budgetary situation. The 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council told us today 
that the funds made available for the Assembly 
will decline. The genteel term for this is " minus 
growth". The worst of it is that the Assembly's 
budget has to cover pensions for our staff. Ladies 
and gentlemen, if we know how old the staff are, 
how many more years' service they have and 
what grades they have, we can work out when 
there will be nothing left of our budget. That, 
then, is the situation in which the Assembly has 
to work. And the advice we were given yesterday 
by the German Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, that the members of WEU and of the 
budget committees should get together, will be 
pointless until the governments, which draw up 
the draft budgets, increase the appropriations for 
the WEU Assembly. We are aware, after all, that 
at least those members who support the gov-
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ernment in power - and this is true of all parlia-
ments - are not initially inclined to deviate from 
the government's proposals. So, here again, we 
ask for bread and are given a stone- and this at 
a time, Mr. President, when the Reykjavik con-
ference has surely made it sufficiently clear how 
necessary our work is, how much a joint 
response to defence policy issues is needed from 
Europe. In talks with many of our American 
counterparts we have constantly found that they 
too are awaiting this European response and do 
not want a German, a French and a British one. 
What they want is Europe's response. If Europe 
cannot come up with a joint response, the world 
will pass us by. 
I believe that the efforts of both superpowers 
at the moment are very seriously aimed at a con-
tinuation of the discussions and that the two 
leaders of the superpowers are also making 
serious efforts to achieve success. But in these 
circumstances - it might have been different if 
the superpowers had not been willing to talk - a 
contribution is expected from Western Europe, 
and WEU is really the only organisation 
authorised to give this reply. What therefore now 
needs to be done, in my opinion, is to increase 
and improve co-operation in our organisation, 
and Mr. Bianco's report provides a good basis 
for this, which I hope the Council is also pre-
pared to use. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Antretter. 
Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, the 
Rapporteur said today during his oral presen-
tation that our policy, the policy of Western 
European Union, must be active. I agree with 
him and would add that this is the opposite 
of the view expressed yesterday by the NATO 
Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, which was 
that we should wait, like the fisherman who will 
eventually hook something. I believe Europe 
needs to be active, not passive. Europe, and 
peace, need movement if by the year 2000 
Europe is to be more than a dummy standing 
between the eastern and western blocs, more 
than a colossus on feet of clay. 
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the parliamentary Assembly able to give its 
views on the activities of the Council prior to 
31st December 1985? How can one talk of 
vitality, when the Rapporteur has to point out 
that the Council has hidden away somewhere in 
the thirty-first annual report the principles on 
which it agreed over the SDI issue, instead of 
calling a press conference or at least issuing a 
communique on their approval? 
Did the Council not decide to set up a press 
service in the Secretariat-General? What has 
been done to implement this decision? The delay 
surely cannot be entirely due, as the Secretary-
General claimed, to the difficulty of finding 
somebody suitable! It surely cannot be true that 
the Council takes no notice of comments in the 
international press. Otherwise it would certainly 
have noticed that for months not one observer 
outside WEU itself has given the reactivation of 
our organisation the slightest chance, insofar as 
the media devote any space at all to WEU. It is 
surely not enough to produce at regular intervals 
dry, administrative-type reports in which inter-
esting information is sometimes so hidden away 
that it can hardly be found. 
So my question is: when is the newly-created 
working group for public relations activities to 
start work? My information, I am sorry to say, is 
that no staff have yet been appointed. 
I can only give this warning: if the Council 
believes the problems connected with our 
security are such that they are not suitable for 
public debate, it is all the more ~mportant for it 
to increase its efforts to develop public awareness 
of the problems and needs we now face. If things 
go on as they are, no prophetic powers are 
needed to predict that it will soon be quite 
impossible to explain the situation to the public. 
The importance of enlisting public support has 
long been recognised elsewhere. 
But, ladies and gentlemen, there is another 
very important point here which has not been 
sufficiently emphasised today: in Rome and 
afterwards it was said time and again that WEU 
was the appropriate instrument for an effective 
security, defence and peace policy just because it 
was an organisation with a parliamentary 
assembly. How seriously should this be taken, in 
view of the principle of zero growth which 
increasingly prevents the Assembly from partici-
Anyone who had faith in the almost visionary pating in the reactivation of WEU? This 
declarations of the Council of Ministers in Rome Assembly can be effective only if it has budgetary 
two years ago must regard Mr. Bianco's report- powers and the European Court of Auditors 
his creditable report - as an inventory of unful- examines the implementation of the budget. It 
filled promises, unavailable information and surely cannot be true that we are supposed to 
inactivity. The aim of this inaction is quite obvi- work effectively for an independent pillar within 
ously not to further but to prevent the the alliance when we have to argue with officials 
revitalisation of WEU. over typewriters! 
How vital, it might be asked in connection There is something else affecting the Council's 
with the introduction to Mr. Bianco's report, is political activities and, here again, there is cause 
an organisation, when only in December 1986 is for concern: will the Council give some priority 
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to the questions of disarmament and arms 
control, given the situation since Reykjavik, or 
will it push them into the background in favour 
of other subjects? It is, after all, striking that no 
mention at all is made of these issues in the list 
of contents of part one of the thirty-second 
report on the Council's activities. 
What activities is the WEU Council in fact 
undertaking with respect to disarmament, at a 
time when interest is focused on this problem? I 
am sure that public attention should be drawn to 
WEU's opinion on the proposals put forward by 
Gorbachev on 15th January 1986 and by the 
Warsaw Pact in June 1986. In this respect the 
report on the Council's activities in the first half 
of 1986 is just as unsatisfactory as the report on 
the period up to 31st December 1985, because it 
says nothing about a possible joint European 
position. 
Can the parliamentary Assembly take it that 
the Council will be commenting on Reykjavik 
and SALT II soon? Is it prepared to oppose those 
who consistently quench every glimmer of hope 
on the disarmament horizon so that nothing 
shall hamper the arms build-up? Mr. President, I 
am afraid the Council does not have a great deal 
of time left. Mr. Bianco is right when he says that 
ministerial speeches already scarcely cover up 
the Council's deficiencies, and that it will soon 
be impossible to conceal them at all. The Council 
is in the process of losing all its credit, and the 
Assembly cannot hope, Mr. President, to 
maintain its past credit unless the Council 
manages to ensure that real substance is given to 
the reactivation of WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Giust. 
Mr. GIUST (Italy) (Translation). - I too 
approve Mr. Bianco's report, its content, the 
points he made in addition to the written report 
and above all its subject: the political activities of 
the Council. 
Tomorrow afternoon we shall be taking 
another important report, that of Mr. Terlezki on 
behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations, and the draft resolution accom-
panying it. Paragraph 3 of that draft resolution 
contains a sentence I consider to be very 
important, fundamental even, to the debate we 
are now holding on Mr. Bianco's report. 
Paragraph 3 of Mr. Terlezki's recommen-
dation reads:" To approach their national parlia-
ments and governments to ensure that they 
acknowledge the due central and priority role of 
the Assembly, which is the most direct 
expression of the political and democratic will of 
member countries ; ". 
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I find the same idea in Mr. Bianco's report. 
When we refer to the political role of the Council 
we also have to question ourselves about the 
ambiguous position we are in as WEU, i.e. as the 
European military community in defence of the 
peoples of Europe. There is certainly an ambi-
guity in the construction of Europe, as present in 
the EEC in the form of the European Parliament, 
claiming as it does with ever-increasing insis-
tence the right to real democratic representation 
of the will of the nations; and the same applies to 
the Council of Europe where the representatives 
of the twenty-one member countries are striving 
to build up the concept of the right of the 
Assembly of the Council ofEurope to express the 
will of the peoples of the twenty-one countries. 
In this report by Mr. Bianco dealing with the 
political activities of the Council, we too should 
take the opportunity to reiterate a claim that is 
now growing old but is still very important 
today. If we want to build a credible European 
defence community for the tasks of peace in 
which we believe, we have to get away from our 
present ambiguous and abnormal situation and 
reassert the Assembly's democratic right to be 
the central point of reference for WEU. 
It is from that standpoint that I support Mr. 
Bianco's report and the reassertion of that right 
which I find in it. I have no illusions. We are a 
long way from having a European government 
and parliament that would be the real 
materialisation of such a hope. We are far from 
having a credible plan that would override 
European nationalities and - why not? -
national defence strategies. But we have to 
pursue this objective if we want to give credi-
bility to the idea of the Rome declaration, if we 
want to give credibility to the idea of defence and 
of real representation for Europe in military and 
defence terms and if we want to give real credi-
bility to the concept of peace that we are pur-
suing over and above our nationalities and 
through the will of our peoples. 
There has been talk of improving relations, but 
that is not just up to us. It is the WEU Council 
that has to improve its relations with the 
Assembly. It must be understood that both the 
Council of Ministers and the WEU Council have 
to give up some of their prerogatives, they have 
to recognise that the Assembly is an effective, 
credible and democratic representative body 
which has to be entrusted with the decision-
making task at least on the most important 
political issues and military policy of our 
Europe. 
If that, Mr. President, is the conviction of this 
Assembly of ours - and, on the evidence of Mr. 
Bianco's report I believe it is- we have before us 
a more realistic and more credible outlook for 
the Assembly and for the whole WEU system. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As agreed, 
ladies and gentlemen, I am suspending the 
debate on the report in reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council presented by Mr. 
Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee because the time has come for the address 
by the Prime Minister of the French Republic as 
indicated in our order of business. 
4. Address by Mr. Chirac, 
Prime Minister of France 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Jacques 
Chirac, the Prime Minister of the French 
Republic. 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, allow me first to welcome you on behalf 
of the Assembly and to tell you how much we 
appreciate the honour you do our Assembly by 
coming here and speaking to us. For many 
reasons, we are clearly at an important juncture 
in the history of Europe. 
Your appearance at the Assembly of Western 
European Union in Paris, which reflects the 
French Government's attitude towards us, will, I 
am quite sure, further intensify our awareness of 
that pressing need of the times we are living in, 
namely the need to organise the defence of 
Europe in the close Atlantic solidarity that binds 
us all together. 
Thank you, therefore, Prime Minister, for 
coming. Would you please come to the 
rostrum. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, it is an honour and above all a great 
pleasure for me to follow, twenty-four years later, 
in the footsteps of Georges Pompidou, Prime 
Minister under General de Gaulle, in taking the 
floor before your Assembly. 
In the name of the French Government, I am 
delighted to greet the representatives of our 
seven nations, with all the diversity of belief and 
outlook which enriches every democratic 
assembly. 
I particularly want to thank the Chairman-in-
Office, Mr. Poos, for the efforts his country has 
made over the last few months to make our work 
truly effective. 
The development of a European awareness in 
the field of defence undoubtedly concerns us all. 
It involves the commitment of all our govern-
ments, and we are all aware of the role France 
has played in restoring WEU to its rightful place. 
It also depends on the consent of the citizens 
you represent, and I take this opportunity to pay 
tribute to the role your Assembly has played both 
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in carrying the torch of the institution from the 
very beginning and in making a crucial contri-
bution to its revitalisation. 
With your permission, I also extend special 
congratulations to your President, Mr. Jean-
Mane Caro, for the competence and authority he 
has displayed in exercising his mandate, which 
coincides with a decisive period in the history of 
Western European Union. His commitment 
reflects the historic vocation of Alsace, the beau-
tiful land which elected him and which, after 
symbolising the divisions of our continent, is 
now the symbol of its advance towards unity. 
Born in 1954 of the need to associate the 
Federal Republic of Germany with the collective 
security of Western Europe and to lay the foun-
dations for a new solidarity, WEU was inspired 
by a vision of the future: the affirmation of the 
European identity in matters of security which, 
for obvious reasons, could not be fully expressed 
in the economic and military conditions of the 
post-war years, when the United States bore 
almost the whole brunt of the burden in the face 
of the already menacing power of the East. 
Recent years have shown that this 
organisation, richer thus far in potential than in 
concrete achievements, was meeting an ever 
more pressing need. 
The disturbances which preceded the 
deployment in Europe of new American missiles, 
the rather confused debates surrounding the 
American strategic defence initi,ative, and, just 
recently, the latest developments in the 
American-Soviet dialogue at Reykjavik all add 
up to a threefold lesson. 
First, Europe needs an institution of its own, 
capable of informing public opinion and of 
explaining exactly what is at stake, so that the 
people of Europe can give . knowledgeable 
support to the decisions required in order to 
guarantee our security. Such an institution 
already exists: WEU, the only European 
organisation to have been granted competence in 
defence matters by treaty. Its original structure, 
incorporating governments, members of par-
liament and experts from the international 
agencies, saves it from one of the prevailing 
weaknesses of Western Europe, where expert 
analyses are all too often oat of phase with 
debates based on opinion. Yet to face up to the 
challenges of security, governments clearly need 
to be able to base themselves on an awareness of 
the realities involved. This goal will be all the 
better achieved insofar as WEU provides an 
unquestionable reference point in its own field. 
The purpose of your work is to demonstrate that 
defence matters can and must stand above differ-
ences of opinion. 
The second lesson is that although we are well 
on the way to European unity in economic 
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matters, we are still at the teething stage as far as 
security is concerned, where Western Europe all 
too often appears to be at the mercy of forces 
beyond its control. This state of affairs is intol-
erable to anyone who believes in striving to con-
solidate European unity. 
Finally, the hopes and perhaps even more 
importantly the anxieties aroused in our coun-
tries by the Reykjavik summit have made us 
more clearly aware of the demands of our own 
security. Our belief in our common destiny 
should give a new boost to co-operation at every 
level: in bilateral relations, between the members 
of WEU and within the Atlantic Alliance. 
In the field of security Europe is faced with 
challenges unprecedented in range and intensity. 
WEU has a major role to play in helping to come 
to terms with these challenges. 
Take technology first of all. The Soviet Union 
and the United States devote considerable 
financial effort, in keeping with their resources, 
to research and development with regard to new 
weapons systems. In these circumstances the 
countries of Europe cannot afford to take the risk 
of reducing or dispersing their efforts. 
France, for its part, is determined to make the 
necessary financial effort to maintain a modern 
defence apparatus. But France is also aware that 
rapidly changing technologies, the increasing 
complexity of modern weapons and the rising 
cost of developing and manufacturing them, call 
for a pooling of efforts with our allies. It is 
therefore important to seize every available 
opportunity for co-operation, from the research 
stage right through to arms manufacture. 
The intergovernmental Eureka project and the 
Community scientific and technological research 
programme open up a promising path in the 
civilian sector. 
Co-operation between our countries' indus-
tries in military fields in which, together or sepa-
rately, they have developed a certain know-how, 
is another essential step. A joint appreciation of 
our real military needs in the face of what is in 
many respects a common threat is also essential 
if major projects are not to be hampered by over-
exclusive demands with regard to weapons 
design and production schedules. But however 
much co-operation there is between our experts, 
our general staffs or our industrialists, European 
co-operation on arms issues cannot flourish 
without the commitment of governments. In this 
area, alongside a broader institution such as the 
IEPG, whose main task this is, WEU also has a 
specific and important part to play. 
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any major joint European arms project. 
Moreover, the particular features of your 
organisation, whether in the role of the parlia-
mentary Assembly, or in the close association of 
the foreign affairs and defence ministers with the 
work of the Council, give it a special political 
potential in such matters. 
We must return to the exemplary spirit of the 
1960s, when numerous joint projects were 
carried out. To achieve such a goal will require 
some imaginative thinking about new forms of 
co-operation, making the most of each nation's 
know-how and not necessarily leading to 
eo-production deals wherever a swap-buying 
policy would enable our countries to modernise 
their armies at a lower cost. 
The French Government is fully aware that 
the highly exceptional financial effort to which it 
has committed itself under the new military 
equipment programme act - which I wanted to 
implement as soon as the government was 
formed, and the purpose of which is to achieve a 
substantial effort, in relation to past experience, 
on behalf of equipment for our armies - needs to 
be backed by the successful conclusion of negoti-
ations on major arms projects which can be 
carried out jointly: tanks, helicopters, third-
generation missiles and anti-aircraft defence are 
among the fields in which, over and above indus-
trial considerations, a common political will 
must emerge. 
The other great challenge concerns the stra-
tegic global balance. The scope of the proposals 
put forward by both sides at the Reykjavik 
summit in October seemed to shake the very 
basis on which our conception of United States-
Soviet relations was founded. Now that the sur-
prise has worn off, we Europeans must find 
answers to the fundamental questions which 
have just been put to us. 
The first concerns the possible withdrawal of 
medium-range American missiles based in 
Europe. Their deployment, justified initially by 
the Soviet monopoly of this type of weapon, also 
symbolised the strengthening of the strategic link 
between the two sides of the Atlantic. Although 
we can only rejoice at the Soviet Union's 
declared intention to dismantle most of its 
SS-20s, we must nevertheless prevent the pos-
sible repatriation of American missiles from 
weakening the ties between Europe and the 
United States. We do realise, of course, that the 
commitment of our American allies is first and 
foremost a political reality which does not 
depend solely on any particular category of arms, 
but undoubtedly corresponds to the deep-seated 
interests of both America and Europe. 
It is important, however, that any agreement 
It should be remembered first of all that WEU which the United States and the Soviet Union 
countries are always to be found at the source of might reach should include all the necessary 
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guarantees with regard to verification and 
shorter-range missiles capable of reaching most 
areas of Western Europe, particularly from terri-
tories belonging to the Soviet Union's allies. 
Failing this, such an agreement might in itself 
give rise to fresh imbalances. France was pleased 
to hear the reassurances which the British Prime 
Minister recently received from the President of 
the United States on this important point, as on 
several others. 
The zero option cannot be considered as an 
end in itself but must be part of an all-embracing 
approach, taking into account the various factors 
which determine Western European security. Let 
us beware of allowing the prospect of spectacular, 
but nevertheless partial, agreements to lead us to 
the hasty conclusion that the threat has suddenly 
been dissipated. 
We cannot repeat often enough that the peril 
hanging over us in the form of the formidable 
nuclear, conventional and chemical arsenal of 
the East must always be perceived in its entirety. 
In view of the inherently superior strength of the 
Soviet Union in conventional and chemical 
weapons on the European continent, our security 
will long continue to rely on the presence in 
Western Europe of a sufficient number of 
American nuclear weapons. 
What, then, are we to think of the proposals to 
reduce and even eliminate strategic weapons? If 
the two superpowers agreed initially to sub-
stantial reductions in their current strategic 
arsenals, which are obviously overstocked, 
France would welcome such a decision as an 
unprecedented success, since no previous 
agreement has ever led to a decrease - quite the 
contrary - in the number of nuclear weapons. 
This simple fact suggests that we would be 
wise not to rush our fences. An agreement on the 
vast scale just envisaged by the United States 
and the Soviet Union as a first phase would have 
to be tested before we could reasonably look 
ahead to subsequent phases. The importance the 
United States itself has always, and rightly, 
attached to observing and verifying disarmament 
agreements, is an argument in favour of a 
gradual approach, in which the priorities are 
clearly defined. 
Meanwhile, nobody in the alliance doubts that 
deterrence, in Europe and in the world at large, 
will continue to rely on nuclear weapons and on 
the existence of complementary systems. We 
believe that missile-launching submarines are of 
absolutely primary importance in this respect, as 
their invulnerability guarantees the defender's 
response capability, however sudden the strike. 
As we can see, the area we have to consider is 
vast. In view of the importance of the stakes, it 
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would be a pity to limit or curb 0111r thinking for 
fear of encroaching on the debates ofthe Atlantic 
Alliance or bilateral talks between allies. 
WEU has the advantage of bringing together 
nations which, while retaining their individual 
identity, have decided not to n~glect a single 
factor involved in the building of Europe. 
The Atlantic Alliance, on the other hand, is a 
defence alliance. Whatever common values it 
encompasses, its member states are not com-
mitted to the same unification effort as those in 
our organisation. It is this long-term prospect, 
together with the habit, formed over thirty years, 
of acting in concert at every level, which lends 
such particular significance to our solidarity in 
this specifically European context. This kind of 
concerted action can only help to reinforce the 
overall solidarity between allies. A strong united 
Europe that respects the separate identity of its 
members is a guarantee of the vitality of the 
alliance and the basis for a heruthy, balanced 
relationship between the two i sides of the 
Atlantic. 
I am convinced, and I must stre~s this, that the 
threat to the Atlantic Alliance is !not the risk of 
division but the feeling, whether justified or not, 
that decisions vital to European security might 
be taken without Europe's having.any real say in 
the matter. Recent developments in the strategic 
dialogue between the United States and the 
Soviet Union confirm this conv,ction, which I 
know is shared by all the European leaders I have 
met of late. 
WEU must play a greater parti in subjects so 
crucial to our future role. The organisation can 
already boast some undeniable achievements. 
The ministerial statements, the reports and rec-
ommendations by the Assembly and the work of 
the experts make up an impressive record and 
provide a basis for our further wotk. But it seems 
to me that the time has come for us to agree to 
give this activity the political inspiration it still 
lacks. It is WEU's mission to celebrate without 
further ado the solemn bond which unites our 
seven nations in matters of security. 
Why not give it its formal blessing in the eyes 
of the world by drawing up what I would like to 
call the Western European charter of security 
principles? 
We are indeed unanimous on the following 
essential principles: 
- Nuclear deterrence is still the only effective 
way of preventing war in Europe. There is no 
alternative in the foreseeable future. Any devel-
opments which may occur as a result of technical 
progress must aim to reinforce deterrence not to 
question it. 
- The threat which hangs over Western 
Europe must be considered as a whole: the full 
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range of nuclear arms and the imbalance of both 
conventional and chemical weapons. Deterrent 
capabilities and disarmament efforts must be 
defined in relation to this overall threat. 
- Maintaining the defence effort of the 
European states on a level in keeping with the 
threat is an imperative necessity. It is also the 
necessary basis for the political strengthening of 
Europe. In this respect the contribution of the 
independent French and British nuclear forces is 
an essential factor. 
- Deterrence in Europe requires a strategic 
linkage between the two sides of the Atlantic, 
which is represented by the presence of 
American conventional and nuclear forces on 
our continent. 
- The aim of disarmament must be to 
increase security at lower levels of armament, by 
means of realistic and verifiable agreements. 
This list is simply indicative. I am certain that 
the more carefully we look into these ideas, the 
more we shall be struck by the extraordinary 
unity of European viewpoints on these issues. 
At the same time we shall be able to continue 
our bilateral exchanges, which naturally include 
our American allies, and in which France 
actively participates. 
The charter I have just referred to would give a 
new dimension to our co-operation. Public 
opinion in our various countries would be in a 
better position to understand the reasons under-
lying national or joint decisions taken on defence 
matters. It would also be of use to the Atlantic 
Alliance, where our convictions are all too often 
expressed in a fragmented manner and where an 
assurance of this nature might serve as a useful 
example. Our American allies, in their negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union, would know they 
could count on a solid consensus of European 
opinion on the major principles of our common 
security. And finally, it would make the USSR 
more aware of the reality of a Western Europe 
which is increasingly asserting its unity and reso-
lution, which also apply to defence issues. 
By celebrating in this way the deep-rooted 
agreement which unites them on such vital 
issues, the seven members of WEU would be 
adopting an approach in which other countries 
could join if they so wished: I am thinking in 
particular of our neighbours on the Iberian pen-
insula, Spain and Portugal. 
WEU - and to my mind this is its true raison 
d'etre - is destined to become, sooner or later, 
one of the keystones in the building of Europe. 
Its expansion would thus be perfectly in keeping 
with the 1984 decision to revitalise it. 
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France is aware of the legal and political 
problems which will need to be overcome in 
order to achieve this goal. The consolidation of 
what has been achieved through reactivation 
does not call for precipitate action, but our 
political stance must be perfectly clear, and we 
must do everything in our power to make the 
reality of Western European Union live up to its 
name. 
As I have already assured you, France is deter-
mined to contribute to the emergence of a 
common European awareness on defence 
matters, which would also draw more substance 
from the responsibilities of some of our members 
outside Europe, and from our other obligations 
within the Atlantic Alliance. 
The charter of basic security principles which 
France calls for today would represent an 
important step, not only in the history of WEU, 
but also, and perhaps primarily, in the 
achievement of the grand vision of Europe. Such 
an initiative would demonstrate still more 
clearly our determination to base our security far 
more firmly than at present on an active soli-
darity in keeping with our efforts and with what 
is and should be Europe's rightful place in the 
world. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Prime Minister, for your important statement 
which has already aroused considerable interest 
among the members of our Assembly, some of 
whom have put their names down to ask ques-
tions. I know you will do your best to reply 
within the time you are able to allow us. 
If you agree, Prime Minister, perhaps you 
could answer questions you do not have time for 
in writing. They can be passed on to you through 
me. 
I call Mr. Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Prime Minister, thank you for 
your statement. I should like to ask you a 
question in two parts. Do you believe that 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty still 
guarantees the deployment of French nuclear 
weapons in the event of an attack on a member 
country of Western European Union? 
Second, what do you think of the comments of 
the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the question of the zero option and 
the SALT 11 limits? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - In reply to your first question 
regarding Article V of the treaty, I would simply 
say that France, as a member of the alliance, nat-
urally assumes all its responsibilities as laid 
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down in the treaty without reservation of any 
kind. 
With regard to committing the nuclear 
deterrent, it has always been agreed, and this 
applies both to the United States and to the 
United Kingdom and France, that there could be 
no legal system making the use of nuclear 
weapons automatic for the simple reason that, to 
be effective, there had to be a measure of uncer-
tainty about the employment of the nuclear 
deterrent. 
That being so, no state could have an auto-
matic commitment in this field. The fact remains 
that a clear statement of the duties which France 
recognises to be its under its commitment in the 
alliance and the strengthening of the solidarity it 
desires - as I said a moment ago - in the field of 
European security naturally implies that France 
considers its security to be exposed not at its own 
frontiers but at those of its neighbours. 
As to the judgment made by Mr. Genscher, the 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have no 
comments to make on the viewpoint he has 
voiced. 
With regard to the zero option, I perfectly 
understand that this goal should be pursued if it 
genuinely corresponds to reality. I will not 
conceal from you the fact that I am perhaps more 
reserved - it is a question of shade of opinion -
in my view of the validity of the zero option. I 
have to ask you to let me have a second look at it 
before taking a positive stance on this pro-
cedure. 
In other words I want security to be assessed as 
a complete entity including - as I just said -
nuclear weapons and conventional and chemical 
forces and, in the nuclear field, the various cate-
gories involved. So to what would the zero 
option, as discussed in the various forums, 
apply? I am a little worried about this although, 
of course, I am perfectly ready to consider all the 
possible consequences. 
I have no comment to make either with regard 
to the overshoot of the technical ceilings defined 
by SALT 11 which it would appear our American 
allies are contemplating except to say that these 
technical ceilings, which have no value in them-
selves because they have not been ratified, have 
already I think been exceeded in some sectors by 
the Soviets themselves. 
That being so, I repeat that I am in favour of a 
procedure for reducing both American and 
Soviet strategic nuclear weapons which naturally 
means beginning by agreeing not to raise the 
ceilings that have already been accepted. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
113 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Prime Minister, the new French defence 
planning act makes provision for the manu-
facture of chemical weapons. Does France intend 
to respect its undertakings under Articles Ill and 
IV of Protocol No. Ill of 23rd October 1954? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Naturally, France would like to 
see the end of chemical weapons provided, of 
course, that this were verifiable and controlled 
and that the weapons were really destroyed. But 
France could not in any circumstances accept the 
idea of giving up a particular type ofweapon ifit 
might be exposed to the threat of the same type 
of weapon in the hands of others. Given the situ-
ation as it is today, France considers that it has 
to have a chemical deterrent that would cause a 
potential enemy to reflect on the rjsk it would be 
taking by using chemical weapons1 That explains 
the decisions I took in the new defence planning 
act but that, of course, in no way diminishes the 
earnest wish of my government for the complete 
and total disappearance and destruction of all 
chemical weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bianco. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). - Prime 
Minister, your presence in our Assembly is 
undoubtedly a highly important event and bears 
witness to the regard in which our international 
organisation is held by your government. One 
statement in your address is of particular signifi-
cance to us: " But it seems to me that the time 
has come for us to agree to give this activity the 
political inspiration it still lacks. " 
Towards the end of your address you gave this 
important statement more concrete form by pro-
posing that there should be a "Western 
European charter of security principles". 
Explaining your ideas for the implementation 
of this proposal you used the words: " at the 
same time we shall be able to continue our 
bilateral exchanges which naturally include our 
American allies ". 
My question is this: Do you think that, before 
striking an understanding and agreement with 
our American allies, we ought to work out a joint 
position among the Seven ofWEU so as to arrive 
at a united position before we negotiate with our 
American ally? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - I am not so naive as to think 
that things have to be spelled out that clearly. All 
of us, rightly and naturally- we are independent 
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powers - have relations with our American allies 
as we have relations with each other from which 
we draw a number of consequences, obligations 
and advantages. 
I simply say that it would be legitimate and 
probably profitable to the alliance in terms both 
of its strength and its cohesion, for Europe to 
reinforce its ties of solidarity thus enabling it to 
speak more coherently first in the dialogue with 
our American allies within the alliance and 
second vis-a-vis the rest of the world. It was 
never, of course, in my mind that that solidarity 
should have to come before any discussion with 
the Americans; that would be both naive and 
impracticable. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Prime 
Minister, you have been asked several questions 
on armaments. Now perhaps we could return to 
your proposal for a Western European charter of 
security principles; I should imagine that is what 
will stand out from your statement this 
afternoon because it is a major project. 
If I may, I would like to go back over some 
possibly more technical points. Among Europe's 
security requirements, you mentioned tech-
nology which is a major factor, of course, and in 
that connection you mentioned the armament 
industries several times. May I therefore ask you 
this question: Does the French Government con-
sider it desirable for the armament industries to 
be associated with the WEU bodies responsible 
for studying and defining the problems of facil-
ities for arms co-operation? Does the French 
Government think that an initiative through the 
WEU agencies or facilities provided by them 
might be an answer to this problem? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. Valleix, I for my part think 
it is highly important that genuine co-operation 
should be established between the big arms 
industries in our countries. As a way of creating 
the synergy I referred to a moment ago, France 
would therefore be in favour of the arms indus-
tries being associated in some way with the work 
of your organisation. As to the form ofthat asso-
ciation it is clearly up to you to decide and make 
proposals to governments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Goerens. 
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powers could France consider reducing its own 
nuclear arsenal? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). -Unfortunately, Mr. Goerens, the 
question seems to me premature, or at all events 
not one for today. 
France has always said that when a number of 
conditions were met, when the arsenals of the 
great powers had come down, say to a very sub-
stantially lower level than at present and not too 
far away from the level of the independent 
French and British forces, and provided also that 
the same kind of progress were made in the field 
of conventional and chemical weapons - or 
briefly, when it could then be sure of not losing 
in its capacity to deter what it was losing in 
armaments - then France would be ready to 
reduce its own arsenal but certainly not before. 
Unfortunately, I have to say that in the present 
situation there are no prospects for any 
reduction, as far as France is concerned. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Prime Minister, I am a German 
parliamentarian but to make it easier for you to 
reply I am putting my question in French. 
Prime Minister, could you indicate the condi-
tions and cases in which French forces would or 
would not intervene alongside their allies in the 
Atlantic Alliance were an armed conflict to break 
out in the area covered by the North Atlantic 
Treaty? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. Ahrens, France has entered 
into the undertakings set out in the treaty. Auto-
matically - I am repeating what is in fact a con-
stant of French policy - France would wholly 
respect its obligations and would be wholly, 
unreservedly and actively at the side of its allies. 
The only question that could arise is the one 
raised a moment ago, namely, the use of the 
nuclear deterrent. I said what I thought I had to 
say on that point but I repeat that France is fully 
aware that, increasingly, Europe's security is 
indivisible, that its own security is not confined 
to its own frontiers but that it also depends on 
the security of its neighbours and that France is 
also defending itself at the frontiers of those 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). neighbours. This is, of course, the reason why 
- Prime M~nister, ~y question is this: from what France seeks to strengthen its ties of solidarity in 
level ofvenfiable dtsarmament by the two super- furtherance of European security. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
~r. WILKINS<?N. (United Kingdom) (Trans-
lat.w~). - You said m your speech, Mr. Prime 
Mimster, that the allies should seize every pos-
sible opportunity to co-operate and when d~fining areas of co-operation, you said that anti-
aircraft defence was an area in which common 
political will among the allies should be demon-
stra.ted. !\:fay I put it to you that a unique oppor-
tumty exists to enhance the interoperability and 
standardisation of command and control of the 
air defence of our alliance by the procurement by 
l'ar!lle~ de l'air ~f the ~3A AWACS aeroplane, 
which IS already m service with NATO in West 
Germany and with the United States Air Force 
w~r~dwide, and _which might be ordered by the 
Bntish Royal Alf Force? The air threat to our 
countries is greatly increasing, especially from 
cruise missiles and air-breathing manned pene-
trating bombers. This is a technical matter but 
in the view of many experts, it provides a uniqu~ 
opportunity that would greatly enhance the 
strength of our alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. Wilkinson, I am not an 
expert capable of debating this point in detail but 
our air defence certainly has to be strengthened. 
There is no doubt at all about that. It is also 
certain that we have to take a joint decision and 
try to reinforce our solidarity in this field too. It 
is also true, lastly, that a comparative study is in 
progress as between the Nimrod system and the 
use of American AWACS. The British are 
studying these two possibilities just as we are. I 
recently had occasion to point out to the British 
Prime Minister that I hoped that our collabo-
ration and cohesion in the study of this question 
could be stepped up so that we could take the 
~ecessa.ry steps as soon as possible, particularly 
smce, m the 1987 draft budget about to be 
approved by parliament, my government plans a 
considerable increase in defence expenditure -
11% over 1986 - which includes the appropria-
tions for launching the action needed to 
strengthen this form of defence against attack 
from the air. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Prime 
Minister, how do you think that Western Europe 
can plan for its security once the United States 
has deployed its SDI system and the Soviet 
Union, as is likely, has set up a similar defensive 
system? 
What should Europe do today in order to 
prepare for that eventuality given its chronic 
weakness in conventional forces and the bud-
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getary restraint that seems to be general all over 
Europe? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - My first comment is on the last 
part of your question. I earnestly hope that 
Europe will realise that to live better we first 
have to survive and that budgetary restraint in 
the defence field would be a vital mistake in the 
present situation and show a lack of sense of 
responsibility with serious consequences for the 
future. 
In any case, I can tell you that this is not the 
intention of the French Government. We have 
ju~t tabled a defence planning act which, as I 
sa~d,. calls for an 11% increase in defence appro-
pnatwns followed, each of the following four 
years, by one of 6%. This will enable us to meet 
all requirements for the modernisation of our 
forces. 
I would wish the same to be true of all 
European countries because nothing would be 
more serious than a further weakening of 
Europe's capacity to defend itself. 
RetuT?-in~ to the start of your question, my 
firm behe~ IS that government means being ready 
for what IS coming. Also, being quite a fan of 
pol~tical science ficti~n I am quite ready to 
beheve that the ~ay wtll come when SDI might 
have real effectiveness because, following the 
pattern that has obtained since the world began, 
whenever someone made a better sword 
someone else made a better shield. 
But things are not simple, the prospect of a real 
def~nce .ag~inst missiles is still a long way off. 
Whllst It IS true that the Soviets have been 
researching this field for over fifteen years and 
have probably made some progress therefore and 
that the American administration has launched a 
vast research and development programme the 
fact re.mains that, for the next twenty-five y~ars, 
there IS not the slightest chance of the balance 
necessary for peace being based on anything else 
but the nuclear deterrent. 
Over that period what must Europe do? That 
was your question. 
First it has to be alive to its own duties - and 
not expect everything to come from others - it 
h~s to.unite mo~e and s~rengthen solidarity and, 
with Its Amencan alhes, credibly assert its 
capacity, will and determination to defend itself 
against every type of attack; in other words it 
must have the means of deterring any kind of 
assault. 
Second, Europe has to be a leading actor in a 
real disarmament policy. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Chirac (continued) 
Third, it has to be careful not to be led along a 
road where disarmament could make Europe a 
hostage, in other words, options where disar-
mament would apply only to nuclear missiles 
leaving intact the considerable imbalances in the 
conventional and chemical fields. 
Last, it is essential that every care be taken not 
to allow any kind of break to develop between 
Europe and the United States, not that I think 
our American allies have this in mind. I know 
that there have been moments in their history 
when they were tempted by isolationism but that 
never lasted very long because it was obviously 
absurd. We saw that very clearly during the two 
world wars: isolationism cannot and therefore 
does not work. 
But that does not mean that we have to rely 
wholly on our allies for our defence. It would not 
be in the interests of our countries - and it is not, 
incidentally, something we have in mind- or of 
our dignity. 
In this period when there is hope that the 
shield will be strengthened, we have to reinforce 
the practical and political means we have of 
developing solidarity and European union in 
every field and to take an active part in a bal-
anced, overall reduction of the risk, i.e. a disar-
mament policy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Prime Minister, following on 
from your comments about the growing com-
plexity of modern armaments, I should like to 
ask you if your government, having criticised the 
Vienna negotiations on reductions in conven-
tional forces for covering too small a geo-
graphical area, is now prepared to play an active 
role, in view of the offers of negotiation made by 
the Warsaw Pact, in a much larger area, which is 
now to extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
especially as this geographical area complies with 
demands France was making in the 1960s, par-
ticularly under General de Gaulle. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - I appreciate the reference to 
General de Gaulle. 
The problem today is that of the framework in 
which the negotiations for the reduction in con-
ventional arms should take place. As we all 
know, there are two opposing ideas. The first is 
that there should be an alliance versus alliance 
forum, and the second that the best forum is still 
the CSCE. 
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I am firmly in favour of the second. 
The point is that the alliance versus pact dis-
cussions have, in my view, got us nowhere; they 
have not proved that they can work. I am not 
trying to analyse why but just noting. On the 
contrary, with the thirty-five countries of the 
CSCE I observe that some significant progress 
has been made and in a relatively short period of 
time. What is more, this forum has the merit of 
involving all the nations concerned in security 
because, after all, the war or peace issue concerns 
every European nation. So I think this forum is 
probably the most effective and psychologically 
the most legitimate. 
What is the situation today? 
First there is the position of our American 
friends and allies who are firmly opposed to con-
tinuing these negotiations in the thirty-five-
country forum. I think they are wrong but that is 
how it is. France is equally firmly against joining 
in an alliance versus alliance discussion. What is 
more, there is no procedure for the purpose. 
Next, we see that European governments are 
generally more in favour of the thirty-five-
country discussions within which, moreover, it 
could well be that some subjects not necessarily 
of interest to all countries could be dealt with in 
smaller groups. This is one solution and France 
is ready to discuss with its European and 
American allies the possibility of working out 
such a formula for discussion which might 
enable differing requirements to be reconciled, 
under the umbrella - as they say - of the thirty-
five, particularly those which are, and this has to 
be recognised, to some extent secret or confi-
dential. 
But I repeat that I am not at all in favour of 
alliance versus alliance negotiations in which 
France would not, whatever happens, take 
part. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Sarti. 
Mr. SARTI (Italy) (Translation). -Prime Min-
ister, my question is a nice point of terminology. 
In your opinion is it still right to assert that our 
union is the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance? If so, would you like to say what your 
government's opinion is on the possibility of 
enlarging the union to European countries that 
are already part of the Atlantic Alliance? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. Sarti, I have never been 
very fond of these architectural metaphors. You 
referred to a pillar, but everybody knows that 
there are many pillars " in my father's house ". 
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That said, we are unquestionably an essential 
and important part of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
rest is a matter of how one assesses or phrases it. 
However, I have already said that I am in 
favour of enlargement. True, one can argue 
about the enlargement of the European idea itself 
or about the right time for it. One can debate 
whether it would not be better to strengthen 
Europe in-depth before enlarging it, which would 
unquestionably be to the detriment of that 
greater depth. These are two different paths. You 
have to be a realist in politics. 
The situation we have is that of an enlarged 
Europe, so I can hardly see how we could discuss 
our security problems for very long in the 
absence of Spain, for example. We have the same 
difficulties, the country is our neighbour, part of 
the European Community. What I say about 
Spain also applies to Portugal. 
I am therefore in favour of enlarging Western 
European Union. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Prime Min-
ister, I know that your time is precious. With 
your agreement, a representative will ask the last 
question, but before giving him the floor I would 
like to read out the names of representatives who 
wanted to ask questions but have not been able 
to: Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mr. 
Antoni, Mr. Berger, Mr. Antretter, Mr. 
Kittelmann, Mr. Fourre, Mr. Hardy and Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges. I am really very sorry for 
them but, as was said a moment ago, we will 
transmit their questions to the Prime Minister. 
I therefore call the last speaker, Sir Anthony 
Grant. 
Sir Anthony GRANT (United Kingdom). -
Having regard to the ministerial decision at 
Venice to ensure the widest possible co-ordi-
nation against terrorism, does the Prime Min-
ister consider that concerted and strong retali-
ation by all Western European countries is 
necessary when the involvement of the govern-
ments of some countries in terrorist acts in 
Western Europe is proved? You will realise that I 
have in mind, among others, the wicked conduct 
of Syria. If we are not to get unity in Western 
Europe against this modem evil, how shall we 
ever defeat it? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Prime Minister. 
Mr. CHIRAC (Prime Minister of France) 
(Translation). - It is certainly true that the 
defence of our European values requires that we 
all share the same resolve. That presupposes a 
specifically European appraisal of the facts and a 
European consensus of concerns regarding what 
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Europe should do in certain parts of the 
world. 
I think the European Economic Community 
had no difficulty in reaching a common position 
on this subject at the last meeting at which these 
problems were discussed by the ministers for 
foreign affairs and I can tell you that, so far as I 
know, it will have no difficulty in confirming 
that agreement and that reasonable and mean-
ingful solidarity very clearly when the next 
European summit is held in London on Friday 
and Saturday next. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Prime Minister for giving us so much of your 
time. As you see we would have liked to have 
gone on talking with you for much longer. I 
would like to thank you again for the honour you 
have done us and I hope the work of the 
Assembly and the Council will ultimately make 
WEU reactivation a reality in the eyes of the 
public. 
Thank you once again, Prime Minister. 
I now propose to suspend the sitting for a few 
moments. 
(The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.55 p.m.) 
5. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annt.al report 
of the Council 
(Resumed thbate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committu and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1078 
and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is resumed. 
The next order of the day is the resumed 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Document 1078 and amendment. 
I call Mr. Linster. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, after the numerous statements 
prompted this morning and afternoon by Mr. 
Bianco's report and particularly after the very 
detailed address we had from the Chairman of 
the Council and the questions and answers that 
followed there is little left for me to add about 
this document which is excellent in itself. This is 
particularly true after this morning's Presidential 
Committee paper and yesterday's address by the 
President of the Assembly and his memorandum 
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which have to be seen in close relation to the 
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council. 
The point is that this reply reviews the period 
covered by the thirty-first annual report, namely 
the first half of 1986. With the very tangible pro-
gress that has been achieved in recent months 
and which everyone with President Caro leading 
has welcomed, it is interesting to note in the 
present context how relevant most of the recom-
mendations proposed by Mr. Bianco on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee still are. I say 
" most " intentionally because it seems to me, 
particularly after the informal meeting in 
Luxembourg to which Mr. Amadei and the other 
speakers including yourself, Mr. President, have 
made frequent and positive reference, that some 
of the recommendations in Document 1078 
although perhaps not completely overtaken by 
events have lost some of their point, or in other 
words, have less explosive political resonance 
than they had immediately after the somewhat 
disappointing meeting in Venice. To borrow an 
expression used by Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, in today's debate, most of 
the recommendations preach to ministers who 
are already converted since the Luxembourg 
meeting following on the heels of Venice. I refer 
in particular to the recommendations on bud-
getary problems but also the recommendation in 
paragraph 15 on enlargement and, of course, the 
very first recommendation confirming the Coun-
cil's intention to implement in full the decisions 
contained in the Rome declaration. In the 
meantime we have received not only verbal 
assurances but also written proposals from the 
Council which clearly contain the same 
message. 
A series of more technical recommendations 
relate in particular to the form, nature and 
quality of the information given by the Council 
to the Assembly. On this point much more pro-
gress is still needed. The same applies to the role 
of the agencies and the information on their 
activities which our Assembly ought to be able to 
receive in a different manner. 
With the Rapporteurs of the General Affairs 
Committee, therefore, I appeal to the Council to 
show the same positive good will in those two 
fields in the future as that which it has begun to 
display under the Luxembourg chairmanship as 
regards budgetary problems and, above all, the 
more political issues. 
Mr. President, whilst paragraph (i) of the pre-
amble to the draft recommendation proper 
emphasises that the explanatory memorandum 
cannot be dissociated from the recommendation, 
I would like to make it clear that I shall be voting 
for the recommendation as such, bearing in 
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mind the comments I have just made, but dis-
tancing myselffrom some of the views expressed 
in Mr. Bianco's explanatory memorandum and 
in particular the need to make use of military 
resources to deal with the threat of international 
terrorism. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - In 
view of the time and having already expressed 
my views at our last session on the problems 
related to the reactivation of Western European 
Union I shall confine myself to stressing the few 
positive points that have come up since then, 
although they must not allow us to forget every-
thing that remains to be done. 
In particular I would like to speak on a point 
raised by Mr. Bianco on several occasions in his 
report and which Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General 
of WEU, has raised in this Assembly, namely, 
the possibility of setting up a European institute 
with responsibility for research or studies on 
defence problems according to the needs of the 
moment. Underlying these semantic questions 
there is a problem of definition to start with. The 
proposal to promote the creation of a European 
institute for defence research proved impossible 
to implement. What is important is to set up a 
research institute and to use what already 
exists. 
The point is that there are already many 
research institutes that are international in both 
field and structure. A new one would create a 
danger of competition and would be seen in that 
light by those that already exist. In addition, the 
financing and joint financing problems that 
would arise would cause harm to these existing 
organisations and institutes. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to imagine a state-type organisation 
having authority over a research institute of the 
university type which is generally only able to 
function in complete and total freedom. 
In reply to the question I put to him in 
Luxembourg, the Secretary-General told us that 
he was going to ask the directors of research 
institutes to meet and consider possible forms of 
co-operation. This initiative is certainly to be 
welcomed but I do not think it will get us very 
far. 
What our Assembly has several times called 
for is co-ordination of the work of the existing 
research institutes whose role is to advise people 
with influence in civilian and political life on 
what is required for an effective defence policy. 
May I remind you that our country, France, has 
particularly wide and successful experience in 
this field. The Institut des hautes etudes de 
defense nationale, whose fiftieth anniversary 
France is celebrating at the moment, was set up 
to propagate the spirit of defence. One of its 
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characteristics is that it brings together in 
intensive courses members of the armed forces, 
government officials, heads of associations and, 
more recently, parliamentarians and industri-
alists and others working in the private sector. It 
has developed new teaching methods and the 
former students association is helping consid-
erably to disseminate the spirit of defence in our 
society. 
Recent history has shown that this is useful 
and I have to say that French society is one of 
the most consistent in its attitude on the subject. 
There are, of course, similar institutes in other 
countries even though their working methods 
and teaching techniques are not the same which 
is perfectly understandable. 
There can be no question at the moment of 
setting up a European institute for defence 
research but what is possible and realistic is to 
use existing institutes and organise European 
courses in the national establishments. Infor-
mation about several projects of this kind has 
been published in recent years, in particular in 
the magazine Defense Nationale. 
Yesterday, Mr. Cahen told us that, on 13th 
November last, France proposed in Luxembourg 
that trainees from our seven countries should be 
invited to a course at the Institut des hautes 
etudes de defense nationale in 1988. This sug-
gestion deserves the encouragement of our 
Assembly and should be followed by others. 
If there is to be continuity and balance, some 
organisation will need to co-ordinate these 
exchanges. Why not instruct a WEU agency to 
take this on? The Assembly's recommendations 
to that end have remained a dead letter up to 
now. This is only to be regretted and explains 
why I have brought the matter up again, Mr. 
President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, allow me to return to the point being 
discussed in this Assembly a few moments ago 
on the problem of strengthening Europe's 
position in the alliance. 
The fact is that today there are many who 
agree in saying that an era of the alliance is 
coming to an end. Political and technical change 
in the developed world require that we rethink 
the forms of our solidarity in the Atlantic 
framework. 
Twenty years ago, President Kennedy was 
already proposing that the Atlantic Alliance 
should be restructured on the basis of two pillars 
- one European and the other American. 
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" It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can 
protect us all against the fragmentation of our 
alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full 
reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in 
facing the Atlantic agenda. " 
The two defence concepts that, for thirty years, 
have been the intellectual framework of the alli-
ance's defence policy - " massive retaliation " 
and " flexible response " - were fashioned in the 
United States and this is natural, after all, 
because one pivots on that country's strategic 
forces and the other on its tactical nuclear 
resources. It was at this time that the era of the 
superpowers began as one of the results of scien-
tific and technological advances. Lacking unity, 
Europe was unable to qualify in this race of the 
giants. They say you must not change horses in 
midstream and so we have to work with what we 
have and use it to meet our most pressing needs. 
In that connection, it is relevant that WEU, 
while not perfect, will have to be the " legal 
pillar " supporting the enlarged defence edifice. 
But the problem is not one of structures but of 
whether or not we have the will to use those that 
exist for the right purposes. 
This is where we are faced with the realisation 
that there has to be a communicating passage 
between the two alliance systems. 
The two treaties- the Washington Treaty and 
the modified Brussels Treaty - have the same 
central theme, the " assistance procedure ". But 
far from overlapping on the same question, the 
two, on the contrary, are complementary, cre-
ating an interpenetration between the two alli-
ances for a specific geo-strategic area: Europe. 
The biggest differences between the two texts 
lie in the mechanism by which government com-
mitments are guaranteed. To begin with, the 
extent of the response is wider in Article V of the 
WEU treaty because assistance under its terms 
embraces everything - military and other means. 
But, as Waiter Schutze has pointed out, as long 
as this group is not in a position to have a mil-
itary structure capable of translating that assis-
tance commitment into effective reality, the 
power of WEU is an illusion. That is why the 
reactivation of the Council as a true 
intergovernmental executive is really essential to 
give any value to the application of this 
article. 
Second, there is the problem of the automatic 
nature of the response. In the WEU framework 
the statement that assistance is automatic -
which is the case - means that once the 
aggression is confirmed the other states have no 
power of judgment about the necessity for 
response. 
Nevertheless, the paramount problem remains 
that of the confirmation and qualification of the 
aggression. If it is the state attacked that is 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Fourre (continued) 
responsible for determining whether there is 
aggression or not and if that binds the other 
states then assistance is effectively automatic. 
But if, on the contrary, it is claimed that this 
finding does not bind the country's partners or 
that qualifying the aggression as such is a 
decision for all the WEU members, then in that 
case the mechanism is not really automatic and 
the link that binds the WEU Seven together is 
not much stronger than that uniting the NATO 
Sixteen. The wording of Article V ofthe Brussels 
Treaty is not sufficient of itself to settle this 
issue. 
The assistance procedure is just as different in 
the military resources available for the purpose 
as in its application. 
The characteristic feature of NATO is its 
system of military integration among the states 
belonging to the alliance, and the real interde-
pendence among them that it institutes. Under 
the Brussels Treaty, each state retains the 
potential of its own defence resources. WEU 
therefore offers a framework within which indi-
vidual independence, solidarity and equality are 
all respected which is why I feel that this kind of 
defence system, first, is a better solution for 
Europe in search of its own identity in order to 
safeguard its own security whilst preserving a 
large measure of sovereignty over its defence 
resources and, second, also preserves an ade-
quate framework for the building of a European 
pillar in the Atlantic defence system. 
It was in that light that General de Gaulle 
seemed to see things when he said in 1954: 
" The agreements signed in London and Paris 
are of themselves far preferable. For whilst 
they offer a basis for the joint defence of the 
free nations of Europe, including Great Britain 
and Germany, they allow France, in principle, 
an army, a presence and an action outside that 
Europe." 
The reactivation of WEU would provide the 
European partners with a vehicle for expression 
within the Atlantic treaty and would improve the 
balance of the Atlantic system in the eyes of the 
European public. Countries like Spain, for 
example, might want to secure their defence 
through an alliance but without, for all that, 
joining an integrated system. WEU could offer 
that possibility and in that way these countries, 
like France, could create separate relationships 
on either side of the Atlantic. 
In the relationships to be established and the 
agreements to be entered into between the two 
sides of the Atlantic, the word must be co-oper-
ation, not dependence. 
In the name of effective western defence, WEU 
cannot accept that this defence be wholly subject 
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to NATO which alone ensures United States par-
ticipation in the defence of Europe and gives 
Western Europe the benefit of the deterrent 
value of American strategic nuclear weapons. 
It is therefore essential to develop an effective 
instrument for concerted action but, as President 
Mitterrand has pointed out, it would be absurd 
" to put another alliance in the place of the 
Atlantic Alliance, that would be meaningless ". 
There are several reasons why WEU may 
qualify as a forum where the European partners 
can discuss problems concerning the security of 
their countries whilst retaining privileged rela-
tions with NATO. By harmonising their posi-
tions, the European countries can bring an end to 
any dissymmetry within the alliance by pre-
paring a European alternative should the 
American commitment fail to be fulfilled. 
Clearly just saying that the reactivation of WEU 
will contribute to the cohesion of the alliance is 
not enough for this to be so. It has to be seen in 
this way by all the members of the alliance. 
In the end, the eagerness to see a reactivated 
WEU has given it an " Arlesienne " look -
European style. Having never, unfortunately, 
managed to get beyond the stage of wishful 
thinking, the statements of intent soon wearied 
the well-informed. Through so greatly wanting 
its renaissance, many hopes have faded and the 
enthusiastic have become increasingly rare. 
It is no surprise that twenty years after WEU 
was set up there should be plenty of voices to say 
it should be brought to an end. 
WEU should be a place where the countries of 
Western Europe can discuss European arms pol-
icies with the object one day of arriving at the 
principle of European security because there is 
no European defence apart from the alliance. 
Industrial interests are too diverse and con-
flicting. On the other hand it is desirable that 
common priorities and converging options be 
expressed among Europeans through WEU, since 
there can be no sound joint policy without close 
co-operation on armaments. 
But this co-operation on armaments would be 
an asset for the security of Europe and if that is 
so, then the notion of" defence-mindedness " is 
no less important. 
But any talk of problems of" strategy " and all 
that they imply economically and geographically 
leads at once to the realisation that there is, at 
the moment, no appropriate forum for doing so. 
Except by thinking up an " acceptable, slow 
and gradual solution so that no one should feel 
there is any threat to his existence or security ... 
in other words by giving WEU the second wind 
it needs to overcome the obstacles facing us 
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today and by preparing for ... the self-assertion of 
a Europe that is master of its own security". 
The approach here is that by calling for co-
operation in armaments a strategic plan will be 
fashioned out of the defence needs of each ofthe 
states concerned. 
We would then have taken a great step forward 
together. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Eisma. 
Mr. EISMA (Netherlands) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, when we read Mr. Bianco's report, we 
are struck by developments in two spheres: on 
the one hand, relations between the two super-
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and on the other, relations between the United 
States and the European allies. The development 
in relations between the United States and the 
European allies is of crucial importance to 
European security, as Prime Minister Chirac's 
statement this afternoon has also made clear. 
The Reykjavik meeting also lent particular 
emphasis to this point. Matters essential to 
European security were discussed there without 
Europe being involved or consulted beforehand. 
If decisions had resulted from the American pro-
posals in Reykjavik, there would have been a 
de-linking of European and American security. 
That is exactly why Europe must pay more 
attention than before to its own security situ-
ation and its strategic relationship with the 
United States. Our premise is that this should 
take place within the framework of the alliance. 
To this end, the European countries must co-
operate more closely in military matters, which 
will require a greater effort in terms of both man-
power and equipment, with all its budgetary 
implications, where conventional armaments are 
concerned. Only then can the influence of the 
European partners in the alliance become more 
substantial, based as it will be on military 
strength. 
We agree with Helmut Schmidt when he says 
that the Europeanisation of defence will be based 
primarily on military co-operation between 
France and the Federal Republic. But it must not 
stop at that. Effective contributions from the 
other European countries will also be very 
important. Western European Union is, in our 
view, the most suitable body for devising a 
common security concept for Europe, simply 
because French involvement is guaranteed. 
Prime Minister Chirac has referred this 
afternoon to France's desire to develop a 
European security policy together with the other 
European countries in Western European Union. 
We very much welcome this explicit 
statement. 
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The reactivation of Western European Union 
is therefore badly needed, but it must not be 
accompanied by fragmentation into smaller 
forums of countries. We therefo11e support the 
recommendation in Mr. Bianco's report that the 
working group on security in Europe should be 
integrated into Western European Union. This 
working group on security was set up by France, 
the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom 
and joined by Italy later, at the Bonn meeting. So 
this working group must be given a status within 
Western European Union so that the other 
member states may also be involved. I hope the 
Chairman ofthe Council is working to this end. 
We are very satisfied with the meeting in 
Luxembourg ofthe foreign and defence ministers 
of the member countries of Western European 
Union. This meeting is a sign that a European 
security policy is needed, following Reykjavik. 
Above all, we agree with the outcome of this 
meeting, with the decision that th~ defence min-
isters should henceforth be more closely 
involved in the Council's activities. We also 
support the idea of a new political committee 
consisting of the political directors of the foreign 
and defence ministries. 
All these new activities undertaken by Western 
European Union can contribute to the estab-
lishment of a common European defence policy. 
Only then will there be a better balance in NATO 
between the United States and the European 
allies. I need hardly say that we support Mr. 
Bianco's excellent report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - I will begin by complimenting Mr. 
Bianco once again on his excellent report and 
recalling that, when making our preparations in 
the General Affairs Committee, we had a good 
and very harmonious discussion on the main 
lines of this report. I am sure Mr. Bianco will 
well remember the harmony in which these com-
mittee discussions took place, leading eventually 
to this excellent report. 
Since the report was drawn up there have of 
course been a number of developments which 
could not be taken into account. But I wonder if 
this meeting of the Assembly is the right place 
and time to go so far as to hang out the national 
or international flag. I am still inclined to be 
wary until we see in black and white in the docu-
ments whom we shall be getting from the 
Council of Ministers. It is in fact quite clear 
today that the unease which was and still is 
apparent in the Assembly following the Rome 
declaration on reactivation has certainly not 
diminished. On the contrary. I will very briefly 
discuss the causes, because I have heard during 
today's debate that not enough has been said 
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about why we so welcomed the ministers' pro-
posal that WEU should be reactivated. 
The point at issue was European political 
co-operation, which could not assume proper 
form and substance in the European Community 
of the Ten and later the Twelve, so that in the 
extremely important area of security it was nec-
essary to look for another forum - not the kind 
of forum the ministers deemed Western 
European Union to be. Very well, but as long as 
the situation in the European Community is that 
European political co-operation ·cannot assume 
proper form and substance for reasons known to 
the rapporteurs and the Assembly, WEU will 
have to be used for this purpose. I should like to 
emphasise that we cannot simply allow the 
brakes to be put on this development again in 
two years' time, which is obviously what we are 
afraid of at the moment. 
The French Prime Minister did not want to 
use the term " European pillar ", and I shall not 
do so either. But we do urgently need to make it 
clear within the North Atlantic Treaty, a treaty 
which we regard as indivisible, that Europe 
intends to act as a loyal partner in the alliance. It 
must therefore be possible for a certain element 
of community to appear in Europe's security 
policy. 
The whole idea behind reactivation, greeted 
with so much enthusiasm at the time, seems to 
have come to a dead end in some ways. When I 
ask myself why this is, there can be only one 
answer: as I said in committee, the real problem 
is that the Council of Ministers does not have 
enough political will. I do not want to link this 
directly to the budgetary situation facing the 
organisation, distressing though it may be. But 
what I will say today is that political will may not 
be translated into money, although I find that 
budgetary problems are often used to camouflage 
a lack of political will. 
Mr. President, reference has been made today 
to Luxembourg and to Reykjavik. As a direct 
result of the fact that the superpowers almost 
reached agreement in Reykjavik, I feel that the 
need for a Europe that can speak with one voice 
has only been increased, if it is really to influence 
the factors that are of such crucial importance to 
the preservation of peace in the world. 
I just want to make one remark about the 
question of enlargement. I want to draw a dis-
tinction here. I believe it is clear, given the devel-
opments there and the veiled assurances from 
the Council of Ministers respecting Portugal, that 
priority must be given to Portugal. I would also 
refer in this context to the statements made by 
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers this 
morning in this Assembly and conclude that Por-
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tugal is now entitled to a very clear and early 
answer. 
As for other countries that might accede to 
Western European Union, I must point out that 
you would have to look a long way to find una-
nimity in the Council of Ministers. In fact, there 
is no unanimity. A few months ago we visited 
Copenhagen. I must say that there was no sign of 
any enthusiasm from Denmark on the part of 
either the ministers or parliament about acceding 
to Western European Union during our visit. I 
think the Rapporteur will agree with me. 
My position is this. In the light of what still 
has to be done to reactivate Western European 
Union, we would be wise to keep up the pressure 
on the ministers and to place rather less 
emphasis on enlargement until the time comes 
when reactivation has been completed or is at 
least well under way. 
Mr. President, let us hope the ministers will 
see rather more reason for reactivation and show 
rather more political will for it than they have in 
the last two years. In view of the major problems 
which Europe and the world have on their plates 
today, problems such as arms control, SDI and 
disarmament, we shall then be able to achieve 
results more quickly. I believe that is the line we 
must follow; though again, Portugal excepted. 
Mr. President, I have almost finished. Mr. 
Bianco's report raises many questions. The com-
mittee has consciously endorsed the 
Rapporteur's questions. That is also why the 
very first paragraph of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation refers to the report itself. I sin-
cerely hope that the Council of Ministers will 
actually answer these questions, so that the 
enthusiasm for the reactivation of Western 
European Union that was aroused in Rome in 
October 1984 will also be kept alive and reaf-
firmed in the Assembly in the future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Secretary of State, ladies and gen-
tlemen, Mr. Bianco's reports are never short on 
authority and warmth, both in direct proportion 
to the discretion of our Italian colleague. 
I shall speak on three points: WEU and 
security, WEU and the non-member countries 
and WEU and the media. 
With regard to security, terrorism has become 
a kind of dangerous armed politics. Alone or in 
co-operation with other European organisations, 
WEU can and must help in the fight against 
"God's madmen", "Action Directe ",the" Red 
Brigades " and other terrorist groups that are so 
difficult to hunt down. 
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Every terrorist attack causes grief, revulsion 
and sometimes bereavement and it is difficult to 
find the ideal answer which can, in all cases, only 
be the result of European co-operation at all 
levels. To make concessions to terrorists is to 
underestimate the real nature of the danger but a 
great deal of experience is necessary to cope with 
widely differing situations and to be able to make 
the choice between rational negotiation and 
armed intervention. Everywhere, the hostages 
problem has been a human tragedy for the coun-
tries affected, primarily the United States, Israel, 
Germany, Italy and France. 
For the moment, France is the country most 
affected and needs the co-operation of all its 
allies - our only strength is in unity. 
With regard to relations between WEU and the 
non-member countries it has to be recognised 
that some countries in Europe which are not 
members of WEU have played or are playing a 
part in European security. Sweden is one 
example. 
Sweden is a neutral country but is subject to 
repeated incursions by Soviet submarines spying 
on its coastal defences and communications 
systems. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Burger, 
may Sir Paul Hawkins interrupt you? 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
By all means! 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Paul Hawkins with the permission of the 
speaker. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). - On 
a point of order, Mr. President. I draw attention 
to a television programme that is taking place in 
our midst. I do not believe that that is correct 
behaviour. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Please 
carry on, Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Sweden's defence budget, neglected for years, has 
now gone up substantially to cover anti-
submarine measures. We were told that, in 1984, 
six Polish youths claiming to be students went 
round Sweden knocking on doors to sell pictures 
by contemporary Polish artists, but not any-
body's door, only those where Swedish air force 
pilots lived. 
We were also told that hundreds of military 
uniforms have been stolen in Sweden over the 
last few years which suggests that they are now in 
the USSR and will be used for fifth column 
units. 
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On this evidence one has to question whether, 
after all, the Russians really want peace or 
whether they are playing poker with the Ame-
ricans and their allies. 
Though President Reagan may be in rough 
water at the moment I still approve his nego-
tiating tactics: the only valid policy with Moscow 
is to be firm. 
So, WEU has to make an effort to speak with a 
single voice though this is not always easy. We 
have to have a uniform viewpoint and the rest of 
the world has to be able to count first on 
European solidarity and secondly on that of the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Lastly, as regards relations between WEU and 
the media, I am certain that the reactivation of 
the union - and here I support what Mr. Bassinet 
has just said - will not be possible without 
effective help from the media - the press, radio 
and television. Our organisation must be 
recognised by the public. 
Some sections of the press, incidentally, seem 
to attach more importance to Mr. Gorbachev's 
words than to what Mr. Reagan says. The 
impression is sometimes that the Russians want 
peace and the Americans want war. In fact, peace 
needs many things as well as arms, foremost 
amongst them being respect for freedom and 
human rights throughout the world. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cifarelli. 
Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, this means that I have the honour of 
being the last speaker in this debate. I put my 
name down to speak and I wish to do so for two 
basic reasons. 
This first is that Mr. Bianco, the Rapporteur, 
has done a really remarkable job. In a way, he 
has done what an examining magistrate would 
do in a criminal investigation, separating the lies 
from the truth, identifying the limits to certain 
responses and the hollow features of the 
promises too freely made and analysing the 
reality of the Rome declaration. As is so often 
said, words are forgotten but actions live on. 
Currently, we are in a situation of reduced 
resources, a marking-time situation that I feel to 
be unacceptable. There are many things to be 
done and reforms to be made, because the situ-
ation is becoming more difficult every day. Mr. 
Bianco made this point very well. 
That is why, instead of speaking to this report 
and reading a speech written in Rome 
beforehand - my colleagues who do so never-
theless have my respect - I prefer to speak unre-
hearsed because I feel that what I have to say is 
part of a real dialogue and part of the exchange of 
ideas that should take place in this chamber. 
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I am therefore very happy to be the last to 
speak because in that way I can take account of 
what the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, 
said, not contradicting what I have just said 
about words being forgotten and actions living 
on but for another fundamental reason. 
Historically, the founding of our organisation 
was the reaction to the let-down after the 
abortive attempt to create a European defence 
community. It was in Paris that this failed and 
that is where the club of the Seven reacted, using 
an existing treaty as a basis for European inte-
gration. 
With Europeans and governments in disarray 
in this very difficult situation we thought that 
something had to be done so that Germany and 
Italy were not left out of this urgent, complex, 
necessary and inevitable defence task. Western 
European Union was the starting point towards 
that goal. In the bad times, our ancestors called 
on the Lord and sought to know his ways. I think 
that, at a particular moment, the ways of the 
Lord linked a very serious situation, as revealed 
at Reykjavik, to a highly uncertain and perhaps 
dangerous situation in the East-West dialogue 
and sent the new use of the Western European 
Union treaty off course. 
When we met in Rome and adopted the 
so-called Rome declaration we were on positive 
ground and agreed that we had to use an existing 
organisation for Europe's defence and security. 
Now we are going to use the organisation to deal 
with a situation like that of the emperor with no 
clothes. We could have gone for the zero option 
that we invented ourselves as Europeans in a sit-
uation that was leading us to the edge of the 
abyss in terms of defence and security. 
We all want disarmament. We all want peace. 
On that subject there is nothing further to be 
said. But what matters to us is that if peace 
depends on defence and defence on security then 
we have to consider what to do about the situ-
ation as it now is. 
For us Europeans, therefore, a major com-
mitment on defence resources is an urgent need. 
Mr. Chirac's address today states the French 
position. The truth is that the next step forward 
has always depended on France's attitude. We all 
know that Europe cannot be built without France 
and, without question, the stop-go signals have 
always depended on France. Direct elections to 
the European Parliament were a French decision. 
Considerable efforts had been made before but 
direct universal suffrage was not effective until 
President Giscard d'Estaing decided to call upon 
Europeans to adopt it. 
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as possible but its salient message is that Europe 
needs an institution ensuring permanent contact 
with public opinion on these problems. Without 
defence-mindedness in Europe there can be no 
serious attempt to build that defence. 
Mr. Chirac also pointed out that European 
integration has been achieved in the economic 
area but not in defence nor, therefore, in security. 
The reason for the concern of those who feel 
absolutely that there has to be a united states of 
Europe is the fact that, for years, defence and 
security problems were more or less taboo and 
left exclusively to the Atlantic Alliance. The lofty 
minds sensitive to the cause of peace would 
never discuss them but peace is achieved by per-
forming our duty to defence. If there is no 
defence there are no states. If that duty is not 
performed we are nothing but traitors to the 
countries we represent and the nations we have 
to govern. 
Mr. Chirac referred to the hopes and mis-
givings that followed the Reykjavik meeting. At 
this time of hope and anxiety we have, it seems 
to me, Mr. President, had an answer to your call. 
You have sent out several reminders of this need 
in the name of our Assembly and we have had a 
response. It has been in words, admittedly, but 
there has also been a gesture and attendance at 
very high level the impact of which on public 
opinion will be positive. We should register this 
and strengthen our resolve. 
Protests are important and I agree with the 
case made by Mr. Bianco for this Assembly vis-
a-vis the Council. We must draw the relevant 
conclusions from that analysis. We are on the 
way to revival and today we should use this his-
torical opportunity presented to the Assembly of 
Western European Union. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr. 
Cifarelli, you were the last member down to 
speak in this debate. In you I salute the perfect 
European militant, present as you have been in 
every debate on Europe since the war and I 
thank you again for your contribution to our dis-
cussions. 
The debate is closed. 
Before asking the Rapporteur to reply to the 
speakers I would like to tell you how I propose 
we should proceed for the rest of the day. 
You know how the various reports stand. I 
would have no objection to the Assembly voting 
on Mr. Bianco's report to which there is only one 
amendment immediately after his reply. 
Following that vote we would, as scheduled, 
consider the report on the Mediterranean pre-
sented by Mr. Kittelmann to which there are no 
We read the text of the Prime Minister of the amendments but on which I have decided to give 
French Republic's address with as critical an eye the floor to one of our colleagues present here 
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who could not, for material reasons, be called to 
speak yesterday afternoon. 
Next I shall call the four speakers whose 
names are down for the resumed debate on the 
three budgetary reports presented by Sir Dudley 
Smith, who will, of course, reply to the 
speakers. 
If we keep to our time schedule we shall also 
be able to vote on the proposal of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs. 
Only after these three items of business have 
been despatched shall I call Mr. Amadei on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments to start one of the major 
political debates of this session. He will be fol-
lowed, of course, by the members down to speak 
up to 7.30 p.m. at the latest, and the debate will 
be continued tomorrow morning. 
I would like to tell the Assembly that, because 
of the decision that has been taken, there will be 
no voting after 6.30 p.m., as the Rules of Pro-
cedure lay down, but those down to speak will 
continue to have the floor. 
As far as I am concerned, as President, I shall 
consult as required so that I can propose to you 
an order of business for tomorrow morning 
having regard to our heavy workload, the 
number of speakers down to debate Mr. 
Amadei's report and the number of amend-
ments. We have the noteworthy privilege of a 
minister's attendance at our discussions in the 
person of Secretary of State Mr. Goebbels, 
representating the Chairman of the Council. We 
have two other ministers as well to address us 
tomorrow and we shall organise our proceedings 
as best we can in view of that fact. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. As you know, I have 
some sympathy with you because of the 
appalling complexity of the situation that now 
faces the Assembly. It is worse than I expected 
when I referred yesterday to the proliferation of 
visiting speakers. We are becoming like vaude-
ville or the circus as a result of that appalling 
confusion. 
I am deeply worried about tomorrow's pro-
gramme. We gather at 9.30 a.m., a minister is 
coming at 10 a.m., another is coming at 11 a.m. 
and half an hour after we resume at 3 p.m. 
another minister is coming. Regardless of the 
view that we take of Mr. Amadei's report, the 
debate is fundamental - it is the most important 
debate of the week, perhaps of the year. For that 
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members may have taken the broad hint that 
you gave, Mr. President, that there will not be 
any votes after 6.30 p.m. 
I find the whole thing confusing. The WEU 
Assembly will be reduced to sheer farce and 
vaudeville if we carry on like that. Our expe-
rience now will lead the Presidential Committee 
and the Assembly to look carefully at how we 
conduct our business. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, let us not get our roles mixed. The 
President is there to listen to the views of you all 
but also to perform his duty and make proposals 
to you about the work of the Assembly. At the 
moment we are merely applying the decisions 
taken and there has been strictly no change. I 
therefore mean to go on with the proceedings in 
the way the Assembly has itself decided. I shall 
later inform you of my proposals for 
tomorrow. 
So far, you can see, in spite of my difficulties 
in organising this session, I have done my best 
not to restrict the right to speak or the speaking 
time of any parliamentarian wishing to take the 
floor, apart from constraints imposed on time-
tables by the ministers who wish to address us. 
That being so, I shall, as President, make sure 
the rights of parliament are respected. I do not, 
for the moment, intend to open a debate on the 
order of business. We will see what we can do 
once the time for voting has passed. Please do 
not complicate my task with points of order. You 
have my assurance that the problem will be dis-
cussed tomorrow morning when the sitting is 
opened. 
Mr. Amadei, I am happy to call you because 
you are a rapporteur. 
Mr. COX (United Kingdom). - I wish to speak. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Cox, I 
have called Mr. Amadei. 
(The President continued in English) 
I will call you, Mr. Cox, but I ask you to avoid 
starting a new debate with points of order. My 
task is complicated by the situation. Please help 
me. 
I call Mr. Amadei. 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I fully realise that the way in which 
our work is proceeding is none of your fault or 
responsibility. I am not making a point of order 
but merely pointing out that I should have 
spoken today at 3 p.m. and that the vote on my 
report was scheduled for this evening. 
report to be interrupted as frequently as it will be My concern and misgivings, Mr. President, 
is scarcely fair. It is scarcely fair that Mr. Amadei stem from t~e . fact th:~.t t~e whole of the 
will present his report this evening when many Assembly, maJonty or mmonty and those who 
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will be voting for as well as those voting against, 
consider the report on disarmament to be 
important, certainly one of the most important 
on the order of business for today. 
In addition, Mr. President, because of commit-
ments that cannot be postponed in the Italian 
Parliament - there is a vote of confidence 
tomorrow - I shall not be able to be here and 
therefore I do not see how we can conclude this 
debate which is, I repeat, considered important 
by everyone. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cox. 
Mr. COX (United Kingdom). - Further to the 
point of order, Mr. President. May I assure you 
that many members of the Assembly appreciate 
the impossibility of your task on many occa-
sions? We genuinely try to help you. You have a 
difficult job, but I believe that as parliamen-
tarians we have a right to bring to your attention 
the fact that in a limited session of barely four 
days - really three days - already this week we 
have had four outside speakers, and four are due 
to speak tomorrow. 
I know that you are not in a position to make 
the decision, Mr. President, but you can rec-
ommend that not so many speakers should come 
to the Assembly. This is a parliamentary 
assembly, not a showcase for European politi-
cians to come here and speak. Such a recommen-
dation would help. 
In the Council of Europe in Strasbourg there is 
a fair indication of when the list of speakers is to 
close. A similar procedure here would be 
helpful. 
As Mr. Amadei himself has shown, he is in an 
appalling position tomorrow, when he has firm 
commitments in his own parliament. Whatever 
our views may be on his report, it will be a major 
debate. Unfortunately, we shall not be able to do 
justice to it. I am making a genuine effort to help 
you, Mr. President, as I am sure all members of 
the Assembly try to help you in view of the diffi-
culty of your task. Are you prepared to back what 
I think would be the overwhelming desire on the 
part of the Assembly not to have so many 
outside speakers and to try to keep to a time-
table? In that way we could avoid some of the 
problems that we shall face tomorrow. How can 
we have a major debate on an important subject 
when the Rapporteur is not here? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have a 
very simple reply to my colleagues who have 
spoken on this point which goes back to a matter 
we discussed at the opening of the session. I then 
undertook, and the Assembly agreed, to review 
the whole problem of the session having regard 
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to the large amount of time that would be taken 
up by ministerial speeches. On both sides there 
are views for and against in line with the inten-
tions both ofthe Council and ofthe Assembly. It 
is the Presidential Committee's task to review 
everything and take the necessary steps in 
agreement with the Council. 
My second point is this. The reason I made my 
proposal a minute ago, and I apologise to Mr. 
Amadei, is that, in the light of the information I 
have in my files on the nature of the amend-
ments and the number of speakers, it seemed to 
me quite obvious that we could not get through 
to voting on Mr. Amadei's report this afternoon. 
I have over twenty-five names down to speak -
over twenty-five! I thought, therefore, that it 
would best serve the interests of the Assembly to 
finish, if we could, with the three reports that we 
have to vote upon and which do not, on the face 
of it, present any political problems. I shall ask 
Mr. Amadei to speak at the end of the debate so 
that he can at least present his report today in 
accordance with the order of business. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - I ask 
to speak on a point of order. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - No more 
points of order, please. 
I call Mr. Bianco. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, I intend to save the 
Assembly time by making my address very, very 
brief. 
First, I wish to thank the seventeen speakers in 
the debate, each of whom has made an effective 
and valuable contribution from personal expe-
rience, strengthening so to speak the points made 
in the report itself. 
I would also like to stress how much was 
common to what they had to say. They were all 
inspired by the desire to reactivate our 
organisation for which, Mr. President, over and 
above the complex procedural questions, I feel 
that today has been a day of vital importance. 
The statements that have been made, the 
views expressed by all our colleagues of the 
problems involved, the requests that have been 
put and, more generally, the more fruitful dia-
logue now established between the Council of 
Ministers and the Assembly all add up to a point 
of vital importance that has to be entered, in my 
view, on the assets side of the activities of our 
Assembly. 
Lastly, I would draw your attention to the fact 
that, at long last, the press - an instrument tuned 
with particular sensitivity to the actions of the 
international organisations - is beginning to pay 
considerable attention to our organisation, an 
indicator of its importance and weight. 
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These are points that we have to count as well 
worthwhile. 
I shall not deal with the questions put by 
speakers individually. They expressed their 
agreement and I thank them for doing so. At this 
point I simply want to stress that the decisive 
political event of this debate will be what I hope 
to be the unanimous vote in favour of the report. 
To conclude I would like to ask the representa-
tives in the Assembly to pass on the conclusions 
of our debate in their parliaments and I would 
add that my request, in a special amendment 
that I hope will be approved, that there should be 
a single voice when the seven countries of our 
organisation meet their American partner is an 
important and vital matter needing the support 
of your votes here and the pressures that every 
parliamentarian can bring to bear in his own 
country. 
I conclude by thanking the Assembly for its 
support and you, Mr. President, the Secretariat-
General and the Chairman of the committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, we shall now vote on the draft recom-
mendation on the activities of the Council as set 
out in its thirty-first report. 
I have Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco, 
which reads as follows: 
1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at 
the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, 
the joint views of the Council on the implica-
tions of the Reykjavik meeting; " 
Mr. Bianco, do you wish to move your 
amendment? ... 
Does anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I now put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1078, as amended. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case, The vote will therefore be 
taken by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
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The draft recommendation, as amended, is 
adopted unanimously 1• 
6. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Vote on the revised draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1073) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the vote on the revised draft 
recommendation on European security and the 
Mediterranean, Document 1073. 
Before that, however, I call Mr. Katsaros, as I 
undertook to because he was unable to speak 
before. 
Mr. KATSAROS (Observer from Greece). -
Thank you for allowing me to make a short 
speech, Mr. President. 
I also congratulate Mr. Kittelmann on his hard 
work on this report. However, it says that in 
January 1986 the Greek Deputy Minister of 
Defence was reported as saying that Greece was 
to deploy a new defence system along its borders, 
particularly in the Aegean Sea, involving 600 000 
men, as a purely preventive measure. That 
number is completely unrealistic as Greece could 
never keep such a great number of soldiers. 
Greece has recently reduced the duration of mil-
itary service and we now have an even smaller 
army than is reported. Indeed, during her long 
history Greece has never had such a tremen-
dously large army. 
I must respond to Mr. Inan by saying that it is 
Turkey, not Greece, that does not help to solve 
the Cyprus matter. If Turkey intended to solve 
the problem, she should have withdrawn her 
forces from the island immediately, in line with 
decisions made by the United Nations. It is 
deplorable that Turkey keeps Greek and Greek 
Cypriot soldiers prisoner and refuses to give the 
slightest information about them. 
Mr. lnan spoke of Greek claims on the Aegean 
shelf. Greece does not claim anything more than 
she has established from international contracts. 
Greece demands nothing but she is going to give 
nothing. That is a clear and honest position. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
for making your statement so brief in the 
interests of the Assembly. 
We shall now vote on the whole of the draft 
recommendation in Document 1073. 
Are there five members who request a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
I. See page 22. 
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That is not the case. The vote will therefore be 
taken by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1• 
We have thus concluded our consideration of 
Mr. Kittelmann's report. Our thanks and con-
gratulations to both him and the committee. 
7. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
(Re11ised report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1075 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the revised report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 
disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual 
report of the Council, Document 1075 and 
amendments. 
I call Mr. Sinesio. 
Mr. SINESIO (Italy) (Translation). - A 
moment ago I wanted to relieve some of the 
tension that had built up in the Assembly and I 
would like to say immediately that the presence 
of various ministers and of Prime Minister 
Chirac, in particular, is important because the 
political image of the Assembly is not deter-
mined solely by speeches and points of order but 
also by the people that attend the Assembly, 
which is not a club but a very popular forum that 
you, Mr. President, represent with great 
authority. We welcome everyone, therefore, who 
wants to speak to us. 
I wanted to make a proposal regarding Mr. 
Amadei's report that would release him from his 
duties in our Assembly and send him back to 
Italy and restore him to the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies for his commitments which cannot be 
put off. With twenty-five members down to 
speak and twenty amendments already tabled, 
Mr. President, we really have to look into so 
important and meaningful a document, prepared 
as it has been with great enthusiasm and mer-
iting the recognition of this Assembly in the form 
of careful scrutiny at so critical a moment of 
international affairs. I believe this report to mark 
the first step, the first stirrings after the con-
ference in Iceland. I therefore formally propose 
to the President and the Assembly that it be 
referred back to the committee so that the 
amendments can be considered there and better 
l. See page 24. 
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preparations made for another session in the 
light of the results that Mr. Amadei has already 
obtained and which we value. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr. 
Sinesio, is this a formal proposal under the Rules 
of Procedure for reference back to the com-
mittee? ... 
Mr. Sinesio tells me it is and therefore, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure, this 
request for reference back takes priority over the 
debate in progress. This being so I must rule the 
proposal to be in order and, under Rule 31 of the 
Rules of Procedure, only the proposer of the 
motion, one speaker against and the rapporteur 
or the chairman of the committee concerned are 
entitled to speak. 
Is there anyone who wishes to speak against 
Mr. Sinesio's proposal? ... 
I call Mr. Freeson. 
Mr. FREESON (United Kingdom). -We are in 
considerable difficulty over this report - that I 
accept. There will be quite a number of delegates 
listed to speak tomorrow who, unless matters 
change rapidly tomorrow - and that rests very 
much with you, Mr. President, and the Bureau -
will have some difficulty in participating in this 
debate when it takes off fully during the course of 
the next day or two, because we have other 
duties. So I do not speak as one who has the cer-
tainty of participating in that debate, although I 
have my name down to speak. But I wish to 
object to any referral back to the committee 
today in this session. I will try to avoid any 
comment on the nature of the report for I do not 
consider that that would be right but in my view 
this is the most substantial report on our agenda 
- with all due respect to other reports and to the 
ministers who have been before us - reinforced 
by what has been going on internationally as a 
background to this report since it was drafted. 
For us now to refer it back to the committee so 
that it does not come before us again until the 
middle of next year- and that is what it amounts 
to - would be a negation of our responsibilities. 
We have spent a lot oftime- and this is my last 
comment in objecting to this move - yesterday 
and today and no doubt we will be spending 
more time before we close on Thursday, as we 
have done at session after session, claiming what 
a wonderful organisation this Assembly is if only 
the Council of Ministers would give us the 
resources. Our behaviour over major political 
matters as far as our responsibilities as a parlia-
mentary assembly are concerned has been a dis-
grace to ourselves, for which we should be 
ashamed, on more than one occasion when we 
have dodged major political debates for one 
reason or another. 
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Now to send back to the committee the most 
important item that we have before us in this 
session, the most important against the back-
ground of what has been going on, would be 
another example of the failure of this Assembly 
to conduct itself properly, of which we have seen 
too many examples during the three years that I 
have been a delegate here. 
There have been many examples of our 
refusing to conduct ourselves as a proper 
debating assembly, reviewing certain defence 
matters. I strongly object, no matter what our 
difficulties may be, to sending this issue back to 
the committee. I hope that you, Mr. President, 
bearing in mind the general situation, will find 
some way of ensuring that we have a continuous 
debate, beginning now and continuing without 
interruption tomorrow. I hope you will ensure 
that other matters that might interrupt our pro-
ceedings are put back until later in the session. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall 
make my comments after hearing the chairman 
or rapporteur of the committee concerned in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of Rule 31 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
I call Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Mr. AMADEI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, as Rapporteur I can only regret the 
fact that this request has been made. But I do not 
think that after it has already been referred back 
to the committee once a debate on so important 
a subject can be postponed any further and put 
off for another session. 
There is another point I would like to make to 
you, Mr. President, and to the Clerk. It is not 
possible to discuss Mr. Sinesio's proposal at this 
time. In my opinion the request is not admissible 
because Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure lays 
down that a motion on a point of procedure can 
only be moved once in the course of a debate and 
I think that we are not yet into the debate 
whereas it is only during the debate that a pro-
posal of this kind can be accepted. At this 
moment, in my view, it is not admissible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Rapporteur, I have consulted the Clerk because 
the interpretation of Rule 31 was after all con-
nected with this debate. I was advised of pre-
vious interpretations of Rule 31 by the Pres-
ident. 
It also seemed to me perfectly legitimate that 
the Rules of Procedure should allow the 
Assembly to give a quick answer to Mr. Sinesio's 
question since otherwise I would have had to 
interpret Mr. Sinesio's proposal as another point 
of order which would have initiated yet another 
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debate. Applying Rule 31 enabled me to avoid 
that and thus save the Assembly's time. 
I am therefore going to have to ask the 
Assembly to vote on Mr. Sinesio's proposal. 
In reply to Mr. Sinesio and Mr. Freeson, I 
would point out that my intention was to 
propose to you an order of business for 
tomorrow that would have enabled Mr. Amadei 
to have as coherent a debate as possible on his 
report in the light of the difficulties with which 
we are faced. I was not able to do so because of 
this request from Mr. Sinesio. 
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure the 
Assembly now has to vote on Mr. Sinesio's pro-
posal for reference back to the committee. 
The bell calling the Assembly to vote having 
been rung and the stipulated five minutes having 
elapsed, the Assembly can now vote in accor-
dance with the rules. 
I now put Mr. Sinesio's motion to the vote by 
sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The proposal to refer the report back to the 
committee is agreed to. 
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financi(ll year 1985 -
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
Revised draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Resumed joint debate on the reports 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
Does. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1072 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed joint debate on 
the reports of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on 1the accounts of 
the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1985 - the1 auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts, the 
revised draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for th~ financial year 
1986 and the draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1987, Documents 1069 and addendum, 
1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum. 
I call Mr. Sinesio. 
Mr. SINESIO (Italy) (Translation). -Mr. Pres-
ident, when I presented the committee's report 
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on the budget of the ministerial organs for the 
financial year 1985 (revised) and 1986 at the last 
session, I had an opportunity to point out a 
number of inconsistencies in the present proce-
dures for drafting and approving budgets which, 
ultimately, could only harm the development of 
WEU's activity and the clarity and effectiveness 
of the relations between its organs. As you 
yourself pointed out in this Assembly yesterday, 
the vague and evasive replies given by the 
Council to the recommendations voted by the 
Assembly in that connection and the rough water 
that the draft budget for 1987 sailed into in its 
procedural passage prompt me to go back over a 
number of essential points that call for careful 
thought. 
The financial policy of the Council hinges on 
the application of the principle of zero growth. 
What that principle is exactly and its purpose are 
not clearly explained but we can however 
observe its effects. First of all it means that all 
government contributions are kept constant in 
real terms. To that end the Budget Committee, 
which is the Council's financial advisory body, 
uses the foreseeable trend in consumer prices as 
a reference growth rate. But experience has 
amply taught us that this has always been lower 
than the real rate of inflation, that there are cate-
gories of expenditure in the budget whose growth 
has no connection with the increase in consumer 
prices but is very much higher, that extraor-
dinary expenditures in a financial year have to be 
offset by reducing ordinary operational spending 
and that the cost of meeting new pensions also 
has to be offset by reducing ordinary operational 
spending. 
It is therefore clear that because of its arbitrary 
statistical evaluation and the fact that it triggers 
off automatic internal compensatory mecha-
nisms for all new and major items of expen-
diture, the zero growth criterion implies a 
gradual reduction in real terms of resources 
available for normal operating activities. 
Over these last few years, the situation has 
become particularly untenable for the Assembly. 
I only have to quote the pensions problem. Up to 
1983 the pensions account showed income, rep-
resented by the contributions of staff in service, 
to be in surplus over outgoings for the pensions 
paid. As of 1984, in other words when the first A 
grade officials reached the age of retirement and 
left, the situation was completely reversed. The 
statistics are eloquent: taking 1983 as index 100 
the figure for 1984 was 446 and those for 1986, 
1987 and 1988 will be 663, 1 071 and 1 750 
respectively. In other words, in the space of the 
last five years, the pensions account will have 
increased by a factor of over 1 7 even allowing for 
contributions by serving staff. 
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It is simply absurd to think that the Assembly 
budget can continue to absorb this very large 
increase in pensions without serious harm to its 
activities. What is more, the examples I have 
quoted, which cannot be challenged, force us to 
conclude that the application of this zero growth 
yardstick belies its definition because, in reality, 
it imposes not zero growth but negative 
growth. 
It seems to me that the time has come to ask 
the Council to throw out this strange criterion 
which, as we have seen, has no valid technical 
justification and, in addition, is all wrong politi-
cally. Indeed, if we take the view that the term 
zero growth conveys the idea of a static state, 
which means there can be no new initiative, how 
do we justify its continuance at a time when, fol-
lowing the Rome declaration and above all after 
Reykjavik, WEU is called upon to play a 
dynamic role in asserting Europe's real identity 
and making Europe master of its own destiny? 
There is another point that also has to be 
made, I feel. The application of the zero growth 
criterion has created an unacceptable spirit of 
competition and unease in the WEU organs for it 
is clear that in the distribution of the envelope of 
available resources, competition gives an 
advantage to those organs which, like the 
Secretariat-General, have more frequent, direct 
contact with the Council and with its financial 
advisory committee. Further proof of this is the 
repeated refusal to buy a telex for the Assembly 
whilst the Secretariat-General and the Paris 
agencies are authorised to have a system for the 
teletransmission of documents. With this dis-
criminatory treatment there has to be a change in 
the procedure for approving the Assembly's 
budgets. It is also unacceptable for budget pro-
posals decided jointly by the Presidential Com-
mittee and the Budget Committee to be dis-
cussed by a committee of government experts, 
who can have no direct or detailed knowledge of 
the Assembly's problems, before being submitted 
to the Assembly itself and the Council for 
approval. Instead, the financial independence 
and autonomy of the Assembly would require 
that once the total has been set for the annual 
operating budget, the Assembly should have the 
responsibility for its allocation, obviously subject 
to respect for the rules of proper administration 
and subsequent audit. 
Mr. President, I realise I have said nothing 
new compared with last year because certain col-
leagues, and in particular Mr. de Vries and Mr. 
van Tets have, when presenting their reports, 
already dealt with these basic problems in this 
Assembly in the past. However, the debate on 
the draft budget for 1987 has given me a chance 
to sum them all up. That leaves me to remind 
you that the Assembly, in its awareness of these 
problems, has already recommended appropriate 
solutions to the Council. 
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The time is now ripe for a general review of 
the whole problem. As other speakers have 
pointed out during this debate, we need to avoid 
fruitless discussions on organisation or internal 
procedures in WEU at a time when, instead, it 
should be demonstrating its potential for 
dynamic and effective action. 
So the first thing is to do away with so-called 
zero growth. To me it is like a trap that will even-
tually have this Assembly gasping for air and 
unable to breathe, politically that is, or speak to 
Europe with that dignity and political signifi-
cance that we Europeans always need if we wish 
to preserve the freedom and democracy we have 
won. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Masciadri. 
Mr. MASCIADRI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I shall be brief because I have only 
time to deal with one point and shall drop the 
others I wanted to make. I have to say that I 
have read with great care and approve whole-
heartedly the report by Sir Dudley Smith which, 
incidentally, is on the same lines as Mr. 
Goerens's report. I am more than ever convinced 
that the Assembly cannot perform efficiently if 
budget cuts continue to be made with only one 
apparent logic, that of reducing the burden on 
the member states' budgets - which seems 
strange enough to me given the figures that I 
shall set out later compared with the total 
budget. What is at stake? I shall not discuss the 
merits of the small items, e.g. whether it is useful, 
whether it was useful, or whether it will be useful 
to buy a typewriter. I shall certainly not discuss 
the advantages of having the telex system that 
ought to be installed and I shall not discuss the 
need for or possibility of certain journeys by the 
committees or whether they are useful or not 
useful and where I rely naturally on the 
Chairman but above all on the committee which, 
in its wisdom, will be able to know what is 
essential or necessary and what is not useful. 
There is one figure above all that really 
impressed me and it is on this figure that the 
whole argument should hang, I feel, because it 
implies certain highly important judgments of 
relative value on which we ought to reflect. I am 
talking about the grand total for the draft budget 
for the Assembly organs which, including pen-
sions, comes to 18 410 000 francs. For each of 
the four biggest nations - France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Italy - this means total outgoings of 3 682 000 
francs for 1987. 
Now, the government representatives have 
proposed a straight cut in this modest sum, to be 
used mainly for the political operations of our 
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own administration, of 893 000 francs which, 
again for each of the four countries, means a 
saving of 162 785 francs, a sum that is clearly of 
no value or account because no one will try to 
tell me that the budget problems of the four 
countries I have referred to can be cured by 
saving 162 000 francs. 
I also have to observe - with pleasure or bit-
terness, I do not know which - that this is the 
lowest-cost parliamentary assemb>ly in the world 
and I am not talking about the industrialised 
countries that we all are but the countries of the 
third and the fourth world. I do not think there is 
one parliamentary assembly attended by so 
many parliamentarians of seven different 
nations that costs such an insignificant, almost 
derisory, amount. Of course this goes back to all 
the economies that have been made, firstly those 
in the staff- a staff that deserves all our praise. I 
shall make one simple comparison because I 
think it is essential that we should raise the 
problem. In WEU there are twenty-seven offi-
cials and my comparison is with the operations, 
number of officials and employees in general 
working at the Council of Europe of which we 
are members. There they are eight hundred, not 
twenty-seven. This kind of imbalance is eloquent 
testimony to the merits of those who work in 
WEU. I do not say that the eight hundred 
employees at the Council of Europe are too 
many but only that the twenty-seven officials 
working in WEU are too few. So I take this 
opportunity to stress the great merits of these 
officials and also to say to all of you that they are 
too few and that although they may work mir-
acles they are not able to give our work the full 
assistance required. 
I have finished with my list of figures which I 
feel to be the most telling part of what I have to 
say - though I think they impoverish our debate 
- and I wonder whether it is rigqt for parliamen-
tarians from seven nations to b~ arguing about 
162 000 francs when, instead, we ought to be 
thinking about quite different questions like 
world politics and events in Europe. 
In my view, if we want to give greater meaning 
to WEU's activity then we have to have a budget 
that is less tight than the present strait-jacket, 
which could well hold back the development we 
need particularly in this post-Reykjavik period. 
For these reasons I shall vote for the report but 
with certain reservations - also made by various 
colleagues - on which we need to insist because I 
do not feel that a situation of this kind can be tol-
erated any longer. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - After 
the statements by so many of our colleagues I 
need not repeat how important it is for the 
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Assembly to have a reasonable budget. I can only 
approve what has been said, namely that the pro-
posals before us are more than unsatisfactory. 
In spite of the late hour and the few represen-
tatives present I would nevertheless like to raise 
an important question. I do not understand the 
proposal made this morning by the Chairman 
and Rapporteur ofthe committee. To begin with, 
the 1987 budget was based on the work of 
experts that we all held to be unacceptable. We 
threw it out together with the zero growth rate it 
proposed. The Council of Ministers took the 
same attitude because, after some pressure and 
exchanges of view, it decided - in the words of 
Mr. Cahen's letter of 27th November " notwith-
standing the recommended reductions, to allow 
the following amounts ... ". The decision, as the 
Council pointed out, was equivalent to an 
increase of under 0.5% not including pensions. 
This morning Mr. Poos said that he had taken 
our request on board but that there was a 
sizeable obstacle apart from the pensions 
problem. Speaking as Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers he said he was ready to discuss 
things again because we all agreed that the pro-
posals made were not wholly satisfactory. That is 
why I do not understand the Rapporteur's pro-
posal that the Assembly should approve the 
budget. We believe that a 2.5% rate of increase at 
the very least is necessary. Perhaps there is some 
room for manoeuvre and debate between this 
figure and the 0.5% decided by the Council of 
Ministers. 
In line with what you said yourself, Mr. Pres-
ident, in your introductory address, would it not 
be wiser for our Assembly not to vote for the 
budget but to instruct the Presidential Com-
mittee, i.e. the body with authority to speak in 
our name outside the sessions, to take up the 
matter again with the Council of Ministers? 
Naturally, this would delay the approval of the 
budget and maybe mean that we would have to 
exist on the provisional twelfth for a month or 
two. But I do not see why we should accept this 
budget which, though we all agree it has been 
improved from the initial zero growth proposal 
by what the Council of Ministers has proposed 
today, still seems to us to be too small. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Please 
allow me to interrupt you, Mr. Bassinet. 
I would like the minister to know that I will be 
asking him to reply to Mr. Bassinet and I thank 
him for this in advance. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - Nat-
urally, it has to be expected that these discus-
sions will not be over by 31st December and the 
Assembly could, once again, have to carry on for 
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a month or two on the provisional twelfth. Even 
so, this procedure would be better for the func-
tioning of our Assembly. I am sorry to be 
speaking with so few representatives in the house 
and at so late an hour but if we have to have 
resounding declarations on the reactivation of 
WEU, then it is just as necessary for the 
Assembly to have the resources it needs. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
I would like to support what Mr. Bassinet has 
said. I can tell the members present that they can 
trust the Luxembourg chairmanship to find a 
reasonable solution - as, moreover, Mr. Poos 
has already proposed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
calling the Rapporteur, may I ask you, Secretary 
of State, if you have any comments to make on 
these last statements? 
Mr. GOEBBELS (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, it is not my intention to get 
involved in the debate on your report, but I can 
confirm what Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, said here this morning. He pointed 
out that he had tried to steer the discussion at a 
recent informal meeting of the ministers for 
foreign affairs and defence in Luxembourg in the 
direction that your Assembly would have 
wished. He tried to suggest an objective, per-
manent yardstick for your Assembly's future 
budgets. He proposed that we should use the 
annual growth rate in the administrative expen-
diture of all the Community institutions so that 
there should be no discrimination as compared 
with the growth rate agreed each year by our 
budgetary experts in the seven member states for 
all the estimates for the Community institu-
tions. 
He then added that the objective was twofold: 
" to assimilate WEU with all the Community 
institutions in accordance with the express provi-
sions of the single European act and to relieve 
our Permanent Council of the fruitless budgetary 
discussions we know too well ". 
I cannot of course enter into any firm and def-
inite undertaking in the name of the Council. 
The Chairman has promised he would take up 
this question again at the next meeting of the 
Council in Luxembourg scheduled for April. But, 
though the Chairman takes the chair, he does not 
take the decisions. The effort needed to give our 
Assembly the means to reactivate has to be made 
by the member states. I do not know what the 
result of our negotiations will be but, in any case, 
I can assure you that the Luxembourg presidency 
will do everything possible to arrive at this, or 
some other, objective, durable criterion, so that 
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we may save ourselves these somewhat fruitless 
discussions in future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration to close 
the debate. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - I am 
put in some difficulty by Mr. Goebbels's speech 
and by the suggestion made by the previous two 
speakers. This is one of the examples of the 
futility of the way in which this place is run. We 
started our debate, which was broken into by a 
statement. I was told that I had to go outside, so I 
missed what the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council said, although it has been repeated by 
his colleague. I should have liked an opportunity 
to discuss the position with officials of the 
Secretary-General. The last statement that I had 
before the speech this morning was the letter sent 
to Mr. Moulias from the Secretary-General last 
night, which clearly stated the position. Although 
I do not agree with some of it, it explains what 
agreement had been reached by the member gov-
ernments of the Council of Ministers. I assumed 
that we had to operate along those lines, but now 
we hear that there is some possibility of an 
improvement if we get to April. We have heard 
from the ministers' bench a reiteration of what 
the Secretary-General said. This is a most 
peculiar way in which to go on. 
The implication is that if we accept Mr. 
Bassinet's motion, we might well get more 
money, but we might not. I hazard a guess that 
we shall not and that we shall sacrifice the good 
will that we are getting in the better arrangement 
with the Council of Ministers. We were pro-
posing to bring forward a motion suggesting that 
the Presidential Committee needed to get the 
lines fully parallel by the end of three months. I 
still think that that is the best way forward, but I 
am in the hands of the Assembly. Only half a 
dozen members are present, so it would be quite 
improper to consider taking a vote tonight. I am 
trying to do the best by the Assembly and to do 
more than merely sum up the debate. 
I see that we have at least two officials here. 
Perhaps they could pay attention for a moment. 
Can they advise me which way they and min-
isters would like us to proceed? To use a collo-
quial phrase, is the budget still up for grabs? Is it 
possible that in three months' time they will be 
able to come forward with a proposal? If so, I 
would fully support Mr. Bassinet and continue 
on a monthly basis for the time being. Is this just 
a pious hope? Must we continue our thorough 
negotiations as we proposed before the 
Chairman-in-Office made his speech? 
Would the officials from the Secretary-
General's office let me know the answer 
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tomorrow morning, as I assume that we are to 
take a vote then? On the basis of such advice, we 
can reach a decision about whether to go Mr. 
Bassinet's way. 
It is pointless summing up. I am grateful for 
the support that I have received. We need a 
much more representative Assembly before we 
can take a decision on this important matter. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cifarelli. 
Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I would like to propose that the vote 
be postponed until tomorrow morning. At this 
moment only four representatives are present. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - There is no 
vote. 
Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - In 
that case, Mr. President, allow me to make a 
point regarding the voting on the accounts and 
the draft budget because these are two different 
things. The accounts tell us what has happened 
in the Assembly and the draft budget is a 
forecast. If we could approve them, then the 
whole question would be settled. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Cifarelli, your vast parliamentary experience 
says that both we and you are right because there 
are three votes to be taken one after the other. 
But we decided there would be no voting after 
6.30 p.m. and so whatever the nature of the doc-
uments we have to vote on we cannot do so until 
tomorrow as the Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs has just reminded us. The 
order of business has the votes on the three 
drafts as the first item tomorrow morning. 
Before we vote I shall call the Chairman of the 
committee again and he will be able, as he has 
asked, to explain the significance of the commit-
tee's proposal to the Assembly. In that way we 
should be able to confine the discussion 
tomorrow morning to the presentation of this 
proposal by the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs. 
Then we shall go on to Mr. Wilkinson's report 
on helicopters and afterwards hear the addresses 
by the two ministers, Mr. Fischbach and Lord 
Trefgarne. 
9. Change in the membership 
of a committee 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before 
closing the sitting I have to tell you that the 
Italian Delegation has notified me of the candi-
dature of Mr. Rodota to replace Mr. Lapenta as a 
titular member of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
10. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd December, 
at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
- the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts; Revised draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1986; 
Draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1987 (Votes on the draft texts, Documents 
1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum 
and 1072 and addenda). 
2. European helicopters for the 1990s (Presen-
tation of the report of the Committee on 
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Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, Document 1077 and amend-
ments). 
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of 
Defence of Luxembourg. 
4. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of 
State for Defence Procurement of the 
United Kingdom. 
5. European helicopters for the 1990s (Debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions, Document 1077 and amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.) 
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trative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
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1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda). 
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman 
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S. European helicopters for the 1990s (Presentation of and 
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ments). 
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Rapporteur), Sir John Osbom, Mr. Stegagnini. 
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Luxembourg. 
7. Address by Lord Trefgame, Minister of State for Defence 
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9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 9.35 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Statement by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, before we proceed to the orders of the 
day I have an announcement to make. 
l. See page 29. 
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In view of the important questions so far 
covered by the orders of the day of this session 
and bearing in mind the work still before us and 
the difficulty experienced by the Assembly 
hitherto in dealing satisfactorily with the various 
issues before it, and having regard also to the 
somewhat exceptional political situation created 
for Western European Union by the current 
crucial events which, to mention only three 
interventions, were described in the important 
addresses and comments of Lord Carrington, 
Mr. Poos and Mr. Chirac yesterday, I wish to 
inform you of my decision, in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure, to hold a special session 
of the Assembly to enable it to complete its work 
programme and enhance the contribution made 
by WEU in coping with the rapid pace of current 
events. 
I will ask the Presidential Committee, which is 
to meet on Thursday morning, to take the nec-
essary decisions with regard to the date, the 
duration and the orders of the day for the 
purpose I have just broadly outlined. 
On behalf of the Presidential Committee I 
shall, ladies and gentlemen, let you have this 
information as quickly as possible, so that each 
of you, as well as the Assembly committees, can 
make the necessary arrangements. Account will, 
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of course, be taken of the commitments of our 
members and of the Council as well as of our 
commitments in the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 -
the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts 
Revised draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1987 
(Votes on tM draft texts, Does. 1069 and addendum, 
1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for votes on the accounts 
of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final 
accounts, the revised draft budget of the admin-
istrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1986 and the draft budget of the 
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 
the financial year 1987, Documents 1069 and 
addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and 
addenda. 
Before taking the three consecutive votes, I 
call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - As 
you know, Mr. President, and as you reminded 
the Assembly, I wound up the debate on the 
budget last night. It is only fair to the Assembly 
to mention this. In view of the comments of the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and, 
indeed, the further comments of his deputy last 
night, I promised that before finally taking the 
decision to move this motion this morning I 
would have consultations with officials of the 
Secretariat-General ofWestern European Union. 
Having done that, and having had informal con-
sultation with you, Mr. President, afterwards, I 
am persuaded that it would be sensible to 
proceed as we had originally intended and not to 
put the budget in abeyance, as was suggested by 
two of our colleagues, Mr. Bassinet and Dr. 
Burger, in last night's debate. 
The debate having been concluded, I should 
like to move three items. The first is the 
approval of the budget of 1986, which is before 
the Assembly, and which is now past history, but 
it is important that we ratify it. 
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Secondly, I move that we approve the draft 
budget for 1987, which also has been before the 
Assembly and has been the subject of our 
debates. 
I should like also to move another motion, 
which probably evokes the spirit of what I said in 
my opening address on the budget, and shows 
what the Budgetary Committee felt strongly. It 
has been in evidence during the debate in 
speeches by members from all quarters of the 
Assembly. The motion has been printed and I 
understand that it is available if members do not 
have a copy. It is as follows: 
"The Assembly, 
Noting that the Council, in communicating its 
prior opinion, has explained that it was con-
tinuing to study in detail the problem of the 
place of pensions in the budget of the 
organisation and that it will study in detail the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon 
as possible; 
1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of 
the present session its draft budget, as 
amended by the Council, on condition that 
within a maximum of three months a supple-
mentary budget for 1987 be established taking 
into consideration the requirements of the 
Assembly as set out in the documents already 
submitted to the Council; 
2. Consequently INSTRUCTS the Presidential 
Committee to negotiate with the Council to 
this end." 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
ask the Assembly to vote on the three reports 
which have been debated and commented on by 
the Chairman and Rapporteur of the com-
mittee. 
The first vote is on the motion to approve the 
Assembly's final accounts for the financial year 
1985, Document 1069 and addendum. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by sitting and standing. 
I now put to the vote the motion to approve 
the final accounts of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1985. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The motion is agreed to. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. You will recall that, yes-
terday evening, before you made the welcome 
decision that was announced this morning, 
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several of us were very angry that debate was 
stifled. In view of that and the unsatisfactory 
character of the Assembly this week, we sug-
gested that we would vote against the budget. 
May I take this opportunity to express my appre-
ciation of the decision that was made this 
morning and to say that we ought never again to 
have an Assembly that is as unsatisfactory and 
incoherent as this week's has been? I felt it 
appropriate to abstain on the last vote, but I trust 
that we shall never again have the experience of 
the past few days. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the revised draft budget of the 
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 
the financial year 1986. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless a 
roll-call vote is asked for by ten representatives 
or substitutes in the chamber. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I now put to the vote the revised draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The revised draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1986 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the draft budget of the 
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 
the financial year 19 8 7. 
To the draft order in your possession I add the 
full text of the statement and proposals just 
made orally by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, as the two texts are 
linked. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless a 
roll-call vote is asked for by ten representatives 
or substitutes in the chamber. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I now put to the vote the draft order in 
Addendum 11 to the draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 19 8 7. 
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(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft order is agreed to unanimously 1• 
Consequently the draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987 is agreed to. 
5. European helicopters for the 1990s 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 1077 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with the orders of the day we shall now 
proceed at once to the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions on 
European helicopters for the 1990s, Document 
1077 and amendments. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the committee. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - It is 
an honour to introduce this report on European 
helicopters for the 1990s on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions. 
The report was passed nem con by the com-
mittee with one abstention. At first sight, the 
subject matter may appear narrow and the 
material specialist and technical, but one of the 
great merits of this Assembly is that its debates 
are illumined by the technical insight of spe-
cialists. Arms collaboration was identified by the 
Secretary-General ofNATO, Lord Carrington, in 
his address as one of the two primary tasks of the 
Assembly, and no less a person than the Prime 
Minister of France, Mr. Chirac, identified heli-
copters as one of the areas of collaboration that 
are of singular importance. 
I am impatient of those who belittle an 
informed exchange of views about the technical 
arguments that underlie the principles and 
strategy of European defence. As my committee 
has consistently provided well researched, 
detailed and specialist information to support 
the European space programme so we believed it 
to be our duty to address another key area of 
industrial and technical competence for our 
continent's defence - helicopter policy which, for 
too long, has been the Cinderella of European 
security planning. 
There are certain broad themes that underlie 
the report. First, our armies and air forces have 
undervalued the importance of helicopter mil-
1. See page 30. 
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itary operations. I say armies and air forces 
because in a minority of NATO countries, 
including the United Kingdom, there is a 
division of responsibility for the operation of 
helicopters between the army and the air force, 
based largely on the size and weight of the air-
craft. 
Such a divisive responsibility is probably an 
additional complicating factor in evolving pol-
icies for the procurement and operation of heli-
copters but not, I would emphasise, fatal. Unity 
of command and control of rotary wing aircraft 
as well as their efficient logistic support are 
probably more important than who actually 
operates them. Nevertheless, in broadest terms, 
European armies and air forces have had rela-
tively much smaller helicopter inventories than 
those of the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union. That applies to transport heli-
copters, anti-armour helicopters and anti-
helicopter helicopters alike. 
The deficiency is paradoxical since a defensive 
alliance such as ours must rely on mobility and 
fire power to concentrate force strategy at the 
decisive point to counter the potential advantage 
of surprise of the Warsaw Pact and its undoubted 
preponderance of armoured formations and 
helicopter-borne assault units. Of course, 
European armed forces have no experience com-
parable with that of the United States armed 
forces in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan 
to bring home to them the full benefits of the hel-
icopter in the modem land-air battle. 
The European decolonisation conflicts in 
Africa, the Middle East and the Far East have of 
course involved extensive use of helicopters but 
much more in support of relatively small-scale 
operations, such as the deployment of special 
forces and anti-guerrilla units than in mass for-
mations like the United States air cavalry. The 
French army with the Gazelle HOT missile com-
bination, the German army with the BO 105 
HOT missile combination, and the British army 
with the Lynx TOW anti-tank missile combi-
nation have all up to now relied on anti-tank 
adaptations of essentially utility aircraft. To their 
credit, the Italians with the Agusta 129 Mark I 
have seen the way forward and put into service a 
truly European dedicated anti-tank helicopter. 
In anti-submarine warfare the Europeans 
have, by contrast, fully exploited the potential of 
the helicopter. This is true of aircraft such as the 
Super Frelon in service with the French navy, 
the British with the Westland, and the Italian 
Agusta version of the Sea King, a Sikorsky 
machine built under licence, and a Franco-
British Lynx. For the future the Anglo-Italian 
three-engine EH-101 is under development by 
EH Helicopters, an Agusta-Westland joint 
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company, and the first prototype should fly next 
spring. For anti-submarine operations the 
EH-101 has considerable potential. It also has 
potential as a transport aircraft in both civil and 
military versions. 
For future anti-tank operations the picture is 
more confused than it should be. The British and 
Italian general staffs have agreed to harmonise 
operational requirements for a new anti-tank hel-
icopter, a dedicated machine for the 1990s, and 
at a later stage in this process the Dutch and 
Spanish general staff joined in. In October of this 
year the national armaments directors of Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
agreed to go ahead with a two-year feasibility and 
predefinition study of the Agusta 129 Mark II 
light attack helicopter for their requirements 
based on the use of the Trigat, which is a three-
nation- France, the United Kingdom and West 
Germany - " fire and forget " anti-tank weapon. 
The combined requirement should be for over 
three hundred and fifty aircraft, although basic 
decisions on such key features as the choice of 
engine - I hope very much the Franco-British 
RCM-322 will be chosen- need to be made and 
numbers of crews also have to be decided. A 
joint company established in Rome with a 38% 
Agusta holding, 38% Westland, 19% Fokker and 
5% Casa has been set up. The Franco-German 
experience over the PAH-2 and HAC-3G and 
HAP programmes merits considerable study. 
Moves towards co-operation between the 
French and German general staffs and between 
the two industrial partners, MBB and 
Aerospatiale, have gone on for literally years, 
almost ten years, culminating in a memorandum 
of understanding signed by the two defence min-
isters in May 1984. However, the collaboration 
has been fraught with problems and indicates 
clearly that political will is not enough for the 
success of a collaborative programme. There has 
to be commonality of operational requirements 
and doctrine. In this case the divergences 
between the French and the German general 
staffs were considerable. The German general 
staff believe that their aircraft would operate 
with the benefit of air superiority but would have 
to have all-weather characteristics and be heavily 
armoured. The French did not regard air superi-
ority as a necessary precondition and regarded 
the air environment as likely to be adverse and 
hostile, and therefore they developed two aero-
planes, one an anti-helicopter helicopter, as well 
as the anti-tank helicopter. 
These complications have not been fully 
resolved although the governments maintained 
their determination to pursue a joint pro-
gramme. Indeed, the French National Assembly 
sponsored a report specifically into this par-
ticular abortive programme, and one hopes that 
these difficulties will ultimately be resolved. 
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There is considerable uncertainty about 
transport helicopters, too. In September 1985 a 
memorandum of understanding was signed 
between France, West Germany, Italy, the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom for the devel-
opment of the new nine-tonne helicopter, essen-
tially to fulfil two requirements - a tactical 
transport helicopter and shipborne programme 
for the new NATO frigate, the NFH. Up to seven 
hundred machines could be required and the 
into-service date could be as early as 1993 or 
1994. However, here again, although a 
predefinition capability study was submitted to 
the defence ministries last month, difficult deci-
sions lie ahead. The French have the possibility 
of developing further the Super Puma and the 
British could perhaps most sensibly procure a 
combination of Black Hawk aircraft to replace 
their ageing Wessex fleet and a transport version 
of the EH-101 to replace the Puma. The 
navalised version of the Black Hawk, the Sea 
Hawk, could provide an option especially if 
powered like its land counterpart by the 
RCM-322 for European operations. This could 
be an option for the German and Italian navies. 
The new British frigate, the type 23, has been 
designed to carry the EH -101. 
To summarise the picture I would refer 
members to the recommendations. In so doing I 
remind them that the problems of the European 
helicopter industry are a microcosm of the 
European arms procurement picture as a 
whole. 
Before concluding I must allude to the extraor-
dinary Westland affair, which convulsed British 
political life just under a year ago. I do not see 
the acquisition by Sikorsky as an American 
Trojan horse within the citadel of the European 
helicopter industry. It was much more an imme-
diate practical step to cure a short-term indus-
trial problem of over-capacity and lack of work 
pending the full entry into production of the 
EH-101 and ultimately the Agusta 129 pro-
grammes. 
The episode was marred by excessive political 
controversy and hyperbole and anyway the new 
European programmes such as the Agusta 129 
Mark 11 and the NH-90 were a decade away, so it 
was inevitable that Westland turned to its 
licensor, Sikorsky, to fill its factories with 
short-term work. 
For the future there is a difficulty in that 
Europe will have to compete with the great 
resources of the United States in a fragmented 
sense, and the importance of a concerted 
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developed by Turbomeca and Rolls-Royce. That 
has considerable potential. However, I am 
always aware of the fact that in Europe we have 
four principal manufacturers, Aerospatiale, 
MBB, Westland and Agusta, and that the United 
States, that vast market, also has four - Hughes, 
Bell, Sikorsky and Boeing Verto~. To these main 
four European manufacturers w~ are adding two 
new ones, Casa of Spain and FQkker. 
It is a picture that urgently cries out for 
rationalisation and consultation on re-equip-
ment timescales. This Assembly can play its full 
part in informing public opinion on the issues 
involved. It has a prominent and useful part to 
play in this essential element of European arms 
procurement policy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank you 
and your committee for your report, Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
In the debate I now call Sir John Osborn. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - May I 
be the first to congratulate John Wilkinson as 
Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions, and our 
Rapporteur, on what has been a challenging and 
thought-provoking report on the subject of 
European helicopters for the 1990s. The value of 
this report is that it gives the Assembly a doc-
ument dealing with helicopters in Europe and it 
has stimulated discussion in our own com-
mittee. 
When this report was discussed in committee, 
John Wilkinson knows that I may have been 
critical. However, I hope that he realises that my 
observations were meant to be constructive. 
When I did my own research I had expected that 
there would be a plethora of reports on this 
subject from national parliaments, let alone the 
North Atlantic Assembly and the European Par-
liament. 
After all, industrial production, including that 
of the aircraft industry - in this instance heli-
copters - is an interest of the EEC Commission. 
I welcome the fact that we have a minister 
dealing with defence procurement to speak to us 
and I shall pursue this matter at question time if 
I catch your eye, Mr. President. 
If I have a criticism of this report it concerns a 
lack of perspective in balancing ,the military use 
of helicopters with their civil role. No helicopter 
manufacturer- for that matter, no aircraft man-
ufacturer - should be too dependent on the mil-
itary use of his product. That is a personal view, 
but I believe that it has wide support among 
manufacturers. 
European helicopter strategy is brought home to It was last December that our Chairman pro-
us more and more. We have great problems of posed that the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
over-capacity - up to 40%. We have a strong logical and Aerospace Questions should look 
engine industry, with the RTM-322 being jointly into this subject. Both he and I knew - John 
139 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir John Osborn (continued) 
Wilkinson touched on this- that Westland were 
in difficulties. One reason was its over-
dependence on defence contracts. In our debates 
in committee I found that members from coun-
tries other than my own were misinformed about 
the Westland issue due to a series of press reports 
that had concentrated on sensation rather than 
reality. 
I should like to make a few observations for 
the information of the Assembly on the 
Westland and British helicopter scene. Our 
Rapporteur had two very informative defence 
select committee reports from my country to 
help him with his own report - the third report 
entitled " The defence implications of the future 
of Westland plc" and the fourth report entitled 
"Westland plc: the government's decision-
making". In paragraph 25 of the latter it is said 
of the time when Sir John Cuckney became 
Chairman of Westland, in June 1985: 
" At this stage, then, despite the serious 
financial problems which the company faced 
and despite its known importance as a defence 
contractor, the collective judgment of the gov-
ernment was that a public sector rescue was 
not justified and that a market solution should 
be sought. " 
In the third report, at paragraph 88, it is said: 
"Sir John Cuckney characterised the 
European helicopter industry, ' state-owned or 
with major state participation, as overmanned, 
unprofitable and with surplus capacity'. " 
That, I think, justifies this report. The important 
thing was to support the position chosen by 
Westland plc. 
When I was a technical director of a Sheffield 
steel company I was a supplier to the aircraft 
industry. When I attended the Farnborough air 
show this year I could claim to have had 
thirty-five years' fairly regular attendance as a 
supplier to the industry. All new companies in 
new industries grow like Topsy - haphazardly. 
Westland was no exception. It was a subsidiary 
of John Brown, Glasgow, and Clyde shipbuilders 
and Sheffield steel and engineering manufac-
turers. John Brown's home was in my constit-
uency. I have known many directors and staff of 
that company and they all favoured a closer rela-
tionship with Sikorsky and, with a Western 
European hat, and after hearing Lord 
Carrington's challenging address, I sense that a 
North Atlantic Assembly approach would still 
permit Westland to co-operate in a European 
context. 
There is a need for much more comprehensive 
information about the civil use of helicopters. 
They range in mountainous areas from the con-
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struction of power lines to the building of 
mountain homes. They also have an important 
role in the extraction of oil from the marine envi-
ronment. 
Another issue of interest in political assem-
blies is that of safety. Safety, particularly with the 
larger helicopters, and research into the auto-
matic monitoring of mechanical components, 
especially gears, are considerations that ought to 
be promoted on a national scale. The recent 
Chinook disaster in the Orkney and Shetland 
Islands highlighted the vulnerability of heli-
copters. Maintenance of the rotors, rotor blades 
and regular replacement of certain mechanical 
parts has always been a vital function in the use 
of helicopters. 
The third report of the British defence select 
committee refers to international helicopter pro-
duction. In table 2 of that report there is a ref-
erence to 20 000 military helicopters in service in 
the western world. Of those 72% have been built 
in the United States. 
I have tabled two amendments. I shall 
comment on the role of the helicopter and anti-
helicopter missiles in moving the second 
amendment but I must comment now on the 
new paragraph after paragraph (i) following the 
challenging and stimulating address from Lord 
Carrington. He referred to NATO, Western 
European Union and the European Community 
being aware that: 
" The process of political co-operation within 
the Community, for reasons that are well 
known and fully understandable, although not 
necessarily admirable, does not address 
defence issues. " 
He went on: 
" It is much more constructive to try to make 
them work more effectively together towards 
what is, after all, our common objective. " 
I also welcome the example given by Lord 
Carrington when he asked: 
" I hope that this is not too revolutionary -
why not set up European research and devel-
opment establishments, multinationally paid 
for and multinationally manned? " 
The Chairman of the committee knows that I 
think that the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions should take up 
that challenge, which also involves aerospace 
matters. I admired the speech of Mr. Cahen, the 
Secretary-General of WEU, and I hope that he, 
too, will consider the implications of Lord 
Carrington's challenge. Coming back to my 
theme, I hope that you, Mr. President, will send 
copies of our report and the speeches of Lord 
Carrington and Mr. Cahen, together with a copy 
of the report of our debate, to the Presidents of 
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the European Parliament and of the North 
Atlantic Assembly. 
The future of the helicopter industry and 
perhaps of vertical take-off aircraft and other 
new developments is one aspect of the challenge, 
but the Assembly must also face wider issues. 
Therefore, I hope that the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
will continue to review the helicopter industry, 
with the advice of the North Atlantic Assembly 
and the experts in NATO and with the advice of 
the European Community. The helicopter 
industry has civil as well as military interests. I 
hope that the industry will be looked at as a 
whole, and not only by the Assembly. Therefore, 
I hope that you, Mr. President, will take the hint 
and ensure that the other two assemblies are 
aware of our deliberations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I am 
pleased to announce the arrival of Mr. 
Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, 
and bid him welcome. 
I call Mr. Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I have looked closely at the report 
presented by Mr. Wilkinson whom I wish to con-
gratulate on his work on the subject of European 
helicopters for the 1990s. I can endorse the 
general line of his analysis and his final recom-
mendations but I think that stronger accent 
should have been placed on European collabo-
ration in this field. Today, with their leading 
firms, the WEU countries have the men, tech-
nology and production capacity needed to co-op-
erate in the construction of helicopters which 
should be as " European " as possible. This 
would have the additional advantage of ensuring 
effective operational and logistic stan-
dardisation. 
In Italy, under the terms of a special law on 
research and development into certain military 
equipment including the EH-101 mentioned 
earlier, it has proved possible for the first time to 
set up consortia of technologically advanced 
companies making optimum use of each one's 
experience and research and with the advantage 
of sharing the very high costs of research and 
eliminating merciless competition between com-
panies on components of weapons systems. 
I wonder whether it might not be possible, 
through WEU which should in a sense seek to 
promote an international agreement between the 
member countries, to take similar action to 
promote aircraft in general and helicopters in 
particular, thus eliminating the useless compe-
tition which has hitherto taken place through 
bilateral agreements between industries in the 
sector. 
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The possibility of balanced research, devel-
opment and production by the industries in the 
WEU countries would have a beneficial effect on 
international markets where competition by 
individual countries - as demonstrated by the 
fight for control of Westland - has no positive 
economic effects and no major political or mil-
itary effects for the defence of Europe. 
Of course, it is not intended that greater col-
laboration in the European production of heli-
copters should replace or run counter to the com-
mitments which the individual WEU countries 
have with the United States through the IEPG. 
At worst such collaboration could be on a greater 
scale and more effective whatever the result of 
joint research and production in the sector. 
I believe that all this could be achieved 
through the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors who, with specific directives from their 
defence ministries, hold meetings every six 
months on this very subject. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, in accordance with the orders of the 
day we shall now adjourn the debate on the 
report presented by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions. 
The addresses by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of 
Defence of Luxembourg, and Lord Trefgarne, 
Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the 
United Kingdom, will be followed, with their 
agreement, by a single question and answer 
session. According to the questions asked, the 
two ministers will reply individually or one after 
the other. This is a method we have employed in 
the past, and I thank the ministers for consenting 
to facilitate our work in this way. 
6. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence 
of Luxembourg 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Once again, 
Mr. Fischbach, I bid you welcome to our 
Assembly, which is, I am sure, well known to 
you. As in the case of your colleague, Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I thank you 
for discharging the Chairman's duties jointly 
with him. May I say how grateful we are for your 
participation in our debates. 
The WEU Assembly has always wished min-
isters of defence to attend sessions and your 
presence here not only meets this wish but also 
confirms the special role of WEU. Speeches and 
events both prove that the Assembly and the 
Council now share an identity of view in this 
regard, and it is proper that this should be 
emphasised. In this connection you have played 
a notable role, as you recently demonstrated by 
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preparing and ensuring the success of the minis-
terial meeting in Luxembourg. I am grateful 
therefore for what you have done and have 
pleasure in inviting you to the rostrum. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour and a great 
pleasure for me to be addressing you less than 
three weeks after the WEU Council meeting in 
Luxembourg. As you know, that meeting was 
dominated by two main themes: the aftermath of 
Reykjavik and the reactivation of WEU. 
After Reykjavik, Europeans scrutinised, ana-
lysed and interpreted the discussions which had 
taken place between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and which had seemed to come 
close to an agreement. As regards the 
reactivation of WEU, it was the Europeans who 
were responsible for initiating and following up 
the idea and it is now up to them to determine 
how it should be brought to fruition. 
Reykjavik was an event of global significance: 
for a few days and hours the international com-
munity held its breath. Was the world about to 
witness a spectacular change of direction away 
from the well-trodden paths of traditional arms 
control? 
The reactivation of WEU on the other hand is 
a slow and almost imperceptible process 
attracting little attention from the international 
community and remote from the public at large. 
Reykjavik has generated many questions and 
doubts, especially in European circles. The 
reactivation of WEU can provide Europeans 
with means of answering some of these ques-
tions, and, by the same token, of fulfilling a more 
effective role in the overall process of arms 
control and disarmament. 
The fact is that Reykjavik has given rise to 
many anxieties, some of them vague and general, 
some of them more specific. Europeans, and not 
Europeans only, were taken off guard; they were 
not prepared for what seems almost to have been 
decided, although it is true that some spectacular 
disarmament proposals had been advanced 
earlier, such as Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion of 
15th January 1986 that the world should be freed 
from nuclear weapons up to the year 2000. But, 
to say the least, these proposals came out of the 
blue and had to be treated with caution. 
Reykjavik, on the other hand, was something 
of a quite different order. Here we had not a dra-
matic exchange of proposals channelled through 
television and the press, but genuine negotia-
tions, even if they had not been prepared in the 
manner customary in the past and despite the 
fact that everything moved with rather 
breakneck speed. 
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On this occasion Europeans began to ask ques-
tions about the future of their security system, 
which had safeguarded their peace for four 
decades. What was to become of nuclear deter-
rence? Would the importance of this form of 
deterrence be diminished by the reduction of 
nuclear forces? After all, the Reykjavik discus-
sions had envisaged the elimination of all stra-
tegic ballistic missiles as well as the zero option 
for Europe in the field of intermediate nuclear 
weapons. 
How was a reduction of the nuclear element 
likely to affect the security of Europeans as guar-
anteed hitherto by the nuclear deterrent of their 
American allies? What was to become of the doc-
trine of flexible response, according to which the 
Europeans should be able to repel an attack at 
any level of military force involving conven-
tional, tactical nuclear or strategic nuclear 
weapons? 
The credibility of the European defence system 
lies in the ability to threaten to match any level 
of violence chosen by an aggressor with a higher 
level of response, i.e. in the projected mastery of 
escalation. Equally, the determination to con-
clude hostilities at the lowest possible level of 
violence is also part of this doctrine. 
If one element in this mechanism were to be 
weakened or eliminated, would not the whole 
system suffer in consequence? Would it not 
aggravate the imbalances at other levels? Would 
the result not be to intensify the anxieties created 
by the American loss of strategic superiority at 
the end of the sixties? 
By its twofold decision of 1979, NATO sought 
to counteract the imbalance in intermediate-
range missiles created by the massive Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 type missiles. This decision 
would, it was hoped, stabilise the extended 
nuclear deterrent, i.e. the one which is intended 
to protect the peoples of Europe. 
This stabilisation at the level of intermediate 
nuclear systems was seen as a means of con-
tinuing to neutralise, to a certain degree at least, 
the lower levels comprising the so-called " battle-
field " nuclear weapons and conventional forces. 
Would the abandonment of intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles not be liable to add in some way 
to the importance of those levels? 
At the conventional level, the Warsaw Pact 
has long held numerical superiority in terms of 
tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft. The effects of 
this quantitative superiority might well be aggra-
vated by the very marked improvements in 
quality achieved by the pact. 
In the case of short-range nuclear missiles, the 
Soviets have in recent years deployed some 300 
SS-21s with a range of 120 kilometres and 240 
SS-23s with a range of 500 kilometres, to replace, 
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or more often to back up, missiles of an older 
type. The Europeans, or more specifically 
NATO, have only a very limited number of 
Pershing Is and a limited number of Lance mis-
siles to set against these systems. The European 
fear is that, even after the reduction or elimi-
nation of intermediate-range systems, the 
Soviets, thanks to their shorter-range systems, 
could continue to pose an undiminished threat 
to the military objectives in Western Europe. By 
this I mean the most sensitive targets such as air-
ports, lines of communication and conventional 
military establishments. 
Europe wonders whether the Soviets might not 
be tempted to exploit their partial and sectorial 
advantages for political purposes at least. 
In order to forestall such risks and to keep 
intact the strategy of deterrence by flexible 
response, any reduction at the strategic and inter-
mediate levels should be accompanied by negoti-
ations on conventional and short-range nuclear 
forces aimed at achieving a balance of forces at 
the lowest possible level, but also and above all a 
balance at a level subject to credible verifi-
cation. 
Those are some of the vital questions Euro-
peans are asking in the aftermath of Reykjavik, 
and they are far from finding any definite 
answers. In any event, Europeans should get 
together to discuss and analyse the situation with 
a view to co-ordinating and harmonising their 
positions. 
This brings me to the second subject I wanted 
to take up with you today: the reactivation of 
WEU and the future role of defence ministers 
within the framework of a reactivated Western 
European Union. 
As was stated in Rome in October 1984, dis-
cussions and consultations on problems relating 
to the military security of Europe are an essential 
and fundamental argument for the existence of 
WEU. It was also understood that such discus-
sions and consultations cannot be satisfactorily 
conducted without the active participation of the 
defence ministers. Such participation should 
help to improve the internal balance of the 
organisation and should, of course, be conducted 
in a spirit of mutual collaboration with the min-
isters for foreign affairs. 
While it is true that the defence ministers do 
participate in the work of the Council following 
the Rome declaration of 1984, it is also true that 
this participation has not always been entirely 
satisfactory to those responsible for defence 
matters. It is therefore important that they 
should use the process of reactivation - now in a 
crucial phase - to integrate themselves fully into 
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the structures and machinery of Western 
European Union. 
A number of steps have been taken in this 
direction, some of them by the Luxembourg 
Chairman-in-Office. Letters have been 
exchanged between him and the various defence 
ministers. Bilateral contacts have taken place on 
the occasion ofNATO meetings, as in the case of 
the recent meeting of the Nuclear Planning 
Group at Gleneagles. I had a lengthy discussion 
about our future role with Mr. Giraud when I 
met him here in Paris. A meeting of defence 
experts took place on the morning of 24th 
October in London, attended by the permanent 
representatives of WEU, who were joined in the 
afternoon by the political directors. During the 
ministerial meeting in Luxembourg the seven 
defence ministers had a working breakfast 
together to discuss their future role. 
The ministers are agreed that, to reinforce that 
role, more topics of more specifically military 
interest should be included on the agendas for 
Council meetings. Experts from the ministries 
should meet more often, either alone or with the 
political directors or the heads of politico-
military departments. Defence ministers, too, 
should be more involved at all levels of the dia-
logue between the Assembly and the Council. 
When they met in Luxembourg on 14th 
November, the defence ministers agreed to 
examine certain aspects of the problems raised 
by Reykjavik. Their experts are to meet twice 
before the next Council meeting to analyse these 
problems. 
The other topics which the ministers want 
WEU to consider are the question of security in 
the Mediterranean basin and, beyond that, our 
various questions concerning threats outside the 
NATO theatre which affect European security. 
The second topic is that of European co-oper-
ation in arms production, relations with the 
IEPG, the allocation of resources to defence and 
the exchange of information on long-term 
defence programmes and defence strategies. 
These are the subjects of permanent interest to 
which WEU should in future address itself. 
I know and am grateful that the Assembly has 
always sought a closer association with defence 
ministers, and I hope that it finds satisfaction in 
the present developments in this area. The 
greater involvement of defence ministers in the 
work of WEU can only have positive repercus-
sions for the whole organisation and help to 
advance the reactivation which is so close to our 
hearts. ' 
That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to 
you. I thank you for allowing me to address you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I am most 
grateful to you, Minister. 
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for Defence Procurement 
of the United Kingdom 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We are 
most appreciative, Minister, of your presence 
here. Your position in Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment lends great weight to your contribution 
in connection with the report by Mr. Wilkinson's 
committee. 
I now invite you to the rostrum. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom).- I 
understand that, earlier in your proceedings this 
week, concern was expressed that ministers who 
spoke at this Assembly should be neither long-
winded nor superficial. I shall try to be 
neither. 
I am the first minister from the British Min-
istry of Defence to address this Assembly in 
recent years. I do so at a time when the issues of 
the defence of Europe, and of the role of WEU in 
it, are under particular scrutiny. 
If the Reykjavik meeting did nothing else, it 
caused us in Europe to think hard about the 
defence of our continent and about the responsi-
bilities of Europeans for ensuring this defence. 
Some of the old certainties seem to be being 
called into question. Doubts are expressed in our 
press and by sections of our public and political 
opinion about the nature of the threat facing us, 
about the role of nuclear weapons, about military 
doctrines and about the relative responsibilities 
of Europe and the United States. If I am to be 
brief, I cannot address all of these issues, so I 
propose therefore to deal with just two- what is 
the nature of the threat facing us and how should 
the task of dealing with it be shared between 
Europeans and Americans? 
At one level, the nature of the threat is easy to 
identify. It is the Soviet Union and its military 
allies in the Warsaw Pact, but what is it about the 
Soviet Union that we find so threatening? It is, I 
would suggest, the combination of its ideology 
and its military capability. 
Russia has always been a difficult country for 
the West to understand. It is a society in which 
secrecy presides over everything, and it is a 
society with a view of the world that has always 
emphasised that security can be achieved only 
from a position of national strength. Russian 
rulers have traditionally been obsessed by their 
vulnerability to invasion and encirclement, and 
they meet this danger both by building up large 
forces and by expanding constantly their own 
borders. A nineteenth-century czarist minister is 
reputed to have confessed that, to Russian eyes, 
the only secure frontier was one with Russians 
on both sides of it. 
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To this has been added in the course of this 
century an ideological conviction that the 
balance of forces in the world must inevitably 
move in Russia's favour. The success of the Bol-
shevik revolution in 1917 established in power a 
party whose view was of a world divided into 
two implacably opposed systems, each struggling 
to shift the global balance of power in its own 
favour. It established a party that held it as a sci-
entific truth that communism would triumph in 
the end and which saw its duty as giving history 
a helping hand wherever possible. 
It is this ideological element which marks the 
crucial difference between communist societies 
and our own. The Russians are cautious people. 
We can expect that, in reviewing the security sit-
uation in Europe, they will take a prudent view 
of whether military adventurism would pay, but 
we cannot expect them to refrain from it because 
it is wrong or because they have no business 
interfering in the affairs of other countries. Their 
moral values are not ours, and the frontiers of 
Europe would not be what they are today if the 
Soviet Union interpreted self-determination or 
territorial integrity in the way that we do. 
I am glad therefore that this Assembly is 
addressing itself to the nature ofthe Soviet threat 
and that tomorrow you will debate a report on it. 
If we are to carry public support for defence 
efforts in Western Europe, we must be able to 
explain to our people why it is that defence is 
necessary. We do not need to over-dramatise, 
but we do need to explain how Soviet society is 
different from ours. 
We also need to remind our publics of the mil-
itary facts. It has become fashionable in some 
quarters to question whether there is in reality a 
serious military imbalance between East and 
West Europe; or to argue that somehow things 
would be easier if on the western side we adopted 
" defensive " or " non-provocative " philoso-
phies. 
But let us consider reality. At the level of stra-
tegic nuclear weapons there exists rough parity 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Although the Soviet concentration on large 
intercontinental ballistic missiles gives them a 
potentially significant advantage in missile war-
heads and throw weight, against that the United 
States enjoys superiority in submarine-launched 
systems. 
At the theatre level in Europe, however, the 
Warsaw Pact has a dramatic advantage. They 
have a four to one superiority in long-range 
intermediate nuclear warheads, a nine to one 
advantage in shorter-range INF missiles and an 
eight to one advantage in short-range missiles. 
These figures are daunting enough, but they do 
not include several hundred medium bombers, 
or the thousands of dual-capable tactical aircraft 
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and artillery which are deployed in numbers 
which greatly exceed those on the NATO side. 
As far as the conventional balance is con-
cerned, it makes sense to look first at the ready 
forces available on the central front. Here the 
position is clear: fifty-seven Warsaw Pact divi-
sions against thirty-three NATO divisions. 
Critics have argued that our divisions are not 
comparable with those of the Warsaw Pact. That 
is true, for our armies are organised differently, 
As a result, our divisions are larger because they 
include a higher ratio of support troops, while 
their divisions are leaner but have more tanks 
and more artillery. NATO is, of course, a 
defensive alliance and we do not therefore need 
to match a potential aggressor on a one-to-one 
basis. But bear in mind that Warsaw Pact rein-
forcements, which could be quickly mobilised 
and deployed to the central front, are closer than 
most of the alliance's reserves, which would have 
to be moved across the Atlantic from North 
America, and, in the event of a conventional 
attack on Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact 
would of course be able to pick the time and 
place, and deploy its forces accordingly while we 
would have to disperse our forces to meet all 
eventualities. 
Equipment is another vital factor. For the fore-
seeable future, mechanised forces will be the key 
to any European battlefield. From their 
investment in tanks and artillery both sides 
appear to agree on that. On the central front we 
are outnumbered by well over two to one in 
tanks and by almost three to one in artillery. The 
broader picture, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is 
even more disturbing for the overall Warsaw 
Pact superiority then rises to three to one in 
tanks and well over three to one in artillery. This 
amounts to 50 000 of their tanks against 17 000 
of ours, and 33 000 of their guns against 10 000 
of ours. We would attempt to redress this 
imbalance by making use of our tactical air 
power. But even here we are outnumbered by 
two to one in fixed-wing combat aircraft. Quality 
of equipment is of course an important factor, 
and the West retains a technological lead over 
the Soviet Union in many key areas. We should 
not forget the old dictum that quality is only 
more important than quantity if you have 
enough of it! 
At sea the picture is rather different. NATO 
has about the same number of submarines, and 
more aircraft-carriers and more surface escorts, 
but the threat is also different. The Soviet navy 
would not attempt to occupy and control areas of 
the high seas but to disrupt our vital transatlantic 
reinforcement routes. Numerical superiority is 
not necessary to achieve that. Soviet submarines 
and surface forces would inevitably enjoy the ini-
tiative and although I do not doubt that we 
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would eventually gain the upper hand, it is 
crucial that we do so at the outset of hostilities to 
ensure that reinforcements arrive in time to 
influence the land battle in Europe. 
What counts, particularly when our primary 
aim is to deter rather than fight a war, is what is 
immediately to hand or readily available through 
credible reinforcement plans, and on the basis of 
current dispositions there remain serious dispar-
ities which we will not, for the foreseeable future, 
be able to rectify using conventional forces alone. 
For the past forty years our security has 
depended on nuclear weapons. It still does. In 
looking for an alternative, we must make sure 
that we look for a better way, not just a different 
one. 
This does not mean that we should not seek 
agreement with the Soviet Union on arms 
control. As the British Prime Minister and the 
United States President agreed recently, we must 
give priority to an agreement on intermediate 
nuclear forces, with restraints on shorter-range 
systems, to a 50% cut over five years in United 
States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons 
and to a ban on chemical weapons. But reduc-
tions in nuclear systems will increase rather than 
reduce the importance of eliminating conven-
tional imbalances and we must not therefore 
delude ourselves either that total nuclear disar-
mament can be achieved overnight. The vision 
of a non-nuclear world should not be allowed to 
obscure what we need for effective deterrence 
now, or the modest but real steps that we can 
take to secure reductions in weapon levels and 
improve East/West relations. But to replace the 
current situation of strategic stability with an 
unstable international environment in a world 
made safe for conventional war is not an 
attractive prospect. 
The security of Europe will continue to require 
effective nuclear deterrence based on a mix of 
systems, which was confirmed at Camp David. It 
is for this reason that the British Government 
intends to maintain its strategic nuclear 
deterrent. We believe that it provides an 
essential element in the alliance's deterrent 
strategy, and because deterrence must be 
credible, we are modernising our strategic forces 
with the acquisition of the Trident 11 system. We 
welcome, therefore, President Reagan's reaffirm-
ation at Camp David of the United States' 
intention to proceed with its strategic 
modernisation programme and the confirmation 
that he gave of his full support for our plans. 
Europe's security will also require a mix of 
responsibilities. Two treaties embody them: 
those ofthe North Atlantic Alliance and Western 
European Union. The alliance provides the fun-
damental guarantee of our security and the con-
tribution and involvement of the United States 
is crucial to that guarantee. 
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That commitment is based on a unique trans-
atlantic bargain - the pragmatic self-interest of 
all sides underpinned by a common heritage, 
shared experience and a joint commitment to the 
principles of freedom and democracy. It is a 
unique bargain and one which we should not 
take for granted. Not only is the American stra-
tegic nuclear guarantee irreplaceable, but to 
attempt to do without America's conventional 
contribution would place an intolerable burden 
on the rest of the alliance. Not even the most 
sanguine critic of the present conventional 
balance could fail to accept that the withdrawal 
of six ready divisions, 5 000 tanks, more than 
800 guns and surface-to-surface missiles, more 
than 700 fixed-wing combat aircraft and 350 
armed helicopters would tip the scales heavily 
against us. 
The recent tendency in some quarters to 
question and criticise the United States presence 
in, and commitment to, Europe is, therefore, 
alarming. It throws into question the very foun-
dations of partnership on which the alliance has 
been based for so long. It seems to reflect an 
implicit assumption that the Soviet Union no 
longer poses any threat, military or otherwise, to 
the West. I hope that I have made it clear that I 
regard that assumption as absolutely mistaken. 
Europe and America face a common challenge 
and we should not be seduced into feeling that 
somehow the Western Europeans can deal with 
this threat on their own: we cannot. In the face of 
the common challenge, we need to continue to 
work together as sovereign and equal partners, in 
an Atlantic Alliance which each of us has freely 
chosen to join. 
But within the alliance we Europeans have our 
own particular responsibilities. We must ensure 
that our pillar remains strong and that we carry a 
fair share of the common burden. Already the 
European allies collectively provide the major 
part of the ready forces in Europe - most guns, 
most tanks, most aircraft, most men - and of the 
naval forces in the Atlantic and European waters. 
Even after full mobilisation and reinforcement, 
European forces would predominate - and by a 
wide margin. But Reykjavik has pointed up the 
importance of improving the European effort. It 
is a major goal of the United Kingdom's security 
policy to achieve this. We aim to do so through 
our national contribution, our bilateral contacts 
with our European allies, and through active par-
ticipation in the bodies devoted to European 
security co-operation. 
Our record is not unimpressive. We have been 
in the forefront of the improved European con-
tribution to our collective defence effort, with a 
20% increase in real terms in our defence budget 
since 1979. In addition to their nuclear roles and 
their commitment to the defence of the United 
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Kingdom, our forces make major contributions 
to alliance capabilities on the central front and in 
the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. We also 
maintain reinforcement forces for the flanks. 
And outside Europe we retain the ability and the 
will to undertake our residual security responsi-
bilities scattered throughout the world, and to 
protect British - and western - commercial, 
political and economic interests. The combined 
British and Omani exercise currently taking 
place in Oman demonstrates our national capa-
bility for rapid strategic deployment out of 
area. 
In all areas of our defence effort we welcome as 
much co-operation with European allies as pos-
sible. A crucial area is that of defence equipment, 
where the work of the Independent European 
Programme Group is vital to the task of ensuring 
that we get maximum value for money from our 
limited resources and preserve Europe's defence 
industrial capability. We must pursue vigorously 
the process of harmonising operational require-
ments, avoid wasteful duplication of effort in 
research and development and establish 
collaborative projects to meet the harmonised 
requirements wherever it is sensible and cost-
effective to do so. The relaunch of the IEPG by 
defence ministers in The Hague in November 
1984 has so far proved to be a remarkable 
success - more successful, indeed, than many of 
us dared to hope. In the first eight years of its life 
the IEPG did much useful work, but produced 
no harmonised operational staff targets. In the 
past two years it has produced ten. Progress is 
also being made on the establishment of 
collaborative European defence research pro-
jects. 
We must sustain the momentum of 
achievement in the IEPG. But in doing so we 
must not forget that the purpose of our work is 
not the launching of political initiatives, valuable 
though they may be, but to get effective and 
affordable hardware into the hands of our armed 
services. 
The IEPG is the central European forum on 
equipment matters. But the European body 
which carries the overall responsibility for the 
security of our continent is WEU. Its treaty 
embodies the most far-reaching defence com-
mitment ever undertaken in Europe by a British 
Government. 
WEU is not an operational body. But its con-
tribution lies in the fact that WEU has its own 
particular and unique strengths. It is, for 
example, the only European body in which both 
defence ministers and foreign ministers are able 
regularly to meet together to discuss the wide 
range of defence and security issues which are of 
common interest. The members ofWEU include 
all the European countries which maintain forces 
in Germany, the two European nuclear powers 
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and the five INF basing countries. It is a 
homogenous group of countries which take seri-
ously the obligations which the WEU treaty 
imposes. As the Prime Minister of France so 
aptly pointed out yesterday, it also has the 
advantage of bringing together countries which 
have taken a common decision to build Europe 
together in all its aspects. It is, thus, a natural 
forum for member countries to meet at all levels, 
from experts to ministers, to exchange views, 
pool ideas, improve their understanding of each 
other's security concerns, and move towards 
common perceptions on a range of common 
problems. WEU should be a ginger group - a cat-
alyst for decisions - even if some of those deci-
sions have by their nature to be taken else-
where. 
There is still a fair way to go in the process of 
WEU reactivation, but we are moving in the 
right direction and Britain is confident that the 
role identified for WEU in recent years will be 
valuable. 
I am, as I have said, the first British Defence 
Minister to address this Assembly since reacti-
vation, but officials from my department have 
been working in close partnership with their 
foreign ministry colleagues on all aspects of 
WEU's activity and my ministerial colleagues 
have, I know, played a very full part in discus-
sions at ministerial level. As WEU now seeks to 
build on and consolidate its role as an important 
ginger group on security issues, the full 
involvement of defence ministers and officials in 
all member countries will become more 
important. I may have been the first, but I cer-
tainly do not think that I will be the last, British 
Defence Minister to come here to speak to you. I 
thank you for the opportunity to do so. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister, for your interesting and important 
address. We are most appreciative to Her Maj-
esty's Government for having sent to the WEU 
Assembly a government member with responsi-
bility for military and defence matters. 
A number of speakers have asked to put ques-
tions to the two ministers. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rap-
porteur of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I wish 
to ask Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgarne a 
question that I put earlier to Lord Carrington. It 
concerns the zero-zero option for INF arms 
control in Europe. 
May I suggest to the ministers, particularly to 
Mr. Fischbach, who so eloquently expressed 
some of the problems associated with this 
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option, that to pursue it would risk removing a 
vital part of the ladder of escalation in the 
strategy of flexible response upon which Europe 
relies for its security? Lord Trefgarne was right to 
underscore in categorically clear terms the total 
theatre imbalance existing in Europe - four to 
one in INF and nine to one in short-range 
systems. Was not the French Prime Minister, 
Mr. Chirac, correct yesterday when expressing 
his personal anxieties about the zero-zero option, 
and was he not further correct to say that to 
pursue that option risked decoupling Europe 
from the United States in that if we dismantle 
our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise mis-
siles there will not be any medium-range 
American or NATO systems in place in Europe, 
so that Europe will have to move, if it seeks to 
escalate, directly to the strategic option? To do 
that would be a difficult decision for our United 
States allies. Would not that further emphasise 
the importance of the French and British stra-
tegic nuclear deterrents which would, in that 
eventuality, provide a trigger for the American 
nuclear guarantee? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fischbach. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - The question is 
crucial to the present debate on the strategy of 
deterrence or the flexible response. Clearly, if 
Europeans accept the zero option, one element in 
the flexible response strategy will disappear, i.e. 
the medium-range missiles or INF. But that does 
not, in itself, put an end to deterrence or the 
flexible response, since it is perfectly feasible to 
imagine a flexible response at the level of con-
ventional weapons and short-range nuclear 
weapons without involving any higher level 
which would be looked upon as escalation. 
If and when the zero option is accepted and 
there is a massive reduction in strategic weapons 
and INF, these reductions will obviously have to 
be accompanied by parallel negotiations on con-
ventional weapons and, more specifically, on 
short-range nuclear weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom). -
Naturally, I have some sympathy with Mr. Wil-
kinson's view. I remind him that in 1979 we took 
the twin-track decision, which included the 
concept of seeking to eliminate these weapons. I 
wonder whether the military result of achieving 
the zero-zero option is perhaps quite as stark as 
Mr. Wilkinson suggests. We shall retain the air-
launched systems, which are not part of those 
discussions. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Ahrens. 
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(Translation). - Mr. President, we have listened 
to two ministers. May I put a brief question to 
each? 
I will begin with Mr. Fischbach. Minister, you 
reported on the meetings of the defence min-
isters. What interests me is the subjects you dis-
cussed. Can you be more explicit than you were 
in your statement? What form do the defence 
ministers ofWEU feel contact with the Assembly 
should take? Is there to be a dialogue between the 
defence ministers and the Assembly as well? 
I want to put my second question to the 
British minister. I must first say that I live with 
my family in my constituency 100 kilometres 
from the border. This may explain my question. 
Minister, do you share my view that the 
equipment, distribution and training of the land 
forces in Central Europe do not comply with 
their forward defence mission? To be more 
precise, do we not have a surplus of armoured 
units, which can, of course, only operate deep in 
enemy territory, and do we not have a serious 
shortage of troops really capable of ensuring 
effective forward defence, directly on the frontier 
with the Warsaw Pact? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - The reply to the 
first question is that defence ministers are basi-
cally concerned with military and defence 
problems, although this does not mean that they 
only have a technical role. Speaking for my 
defence colleagues, I can say that, on the con-
trary, we are determined to fulfil our eminently 
political role even if it is complementary to that 
of the ministers for foreign affairs. 
Turning to the topics we should like to see 
dealt with, I referred to some of these in my 
address. They include subjects dictated by 
current political events as well as issues of per-
manent concern. Of the latter I will mention only 
security and problems outside the NATO area 
which are liable to affect European security. 
The problems dictated by current events obvi-
ously relate to the aftermath of Reykjavik, i.e. to 
the political and military implications of the 
various approaches and solutions contemplated 
there. At the same time, the ministers also laid 
stress on one topic in particular - that of 
problems outside the NATO area. Their main 
concern is to evaluate possible threats to the 
member states ofWEU in the form of subversive 
warfare originating from the Mediterranean 
basin, the Middle East or North Africa. They are 
also concerned to assess the resources needed to 
counter these threats. 
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In reply to the second question, I would repeat 
that contacts with the Assembly are our major 
concern. We wish and are determined to 
maintain the best possible relations with your 
President, the Presidential Committee and the 
Assembly itself. In dealings with our colleagues, 
we insist that we should be given the opportunity 
on every occasion to explain to the parliamen-
tarians what we are doing and why. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom).- I 
shall answer the second part of the question, 
which was addressed to me. Every military plan 
is, of course, a compromise, making the best use 
of the facilities and the weapon systems that are 
available, but you may be assured that it is no 
part of alliance policy to abandon parts of 
Germany if the attack takes place. I do not think 
that I can give any higher assurance than that. 
We shall be there, fighting for you to the last 
man. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Paul Hawkins. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). -
Lord Trefgarne's speech was one of the most 
interesting and fascinating that the Assembly has 
heard because he addressed himself not only to 
defence but to the psychological make-up of 
Russia as opposed to Europe. I have never heard 
that said here before. It is an immensely 
important thought, which must be in our 
minds. 
I also welcome Lord Trefgarne as someone 
who has been concerned with many constituency 
problems of mine, and he has always been most 
helpful and sympathetic. I want him to be 
helpful and sympathetic over this matter, which 
is not connected with armaments at all. We were 
greatly encouraged by the Rome meeting, when 
we were told that we were to be reborn. So far the 
birth has not yet taken place in the Assembly. 
Does the Minister realise that his government 
are saying that there must be zero growth in our 
Assembly's expenditure and that zero growth 
must cover all expenditure, including pensions? 
Does he realise that in a few years' time pensions 
will eat up 15% or 16% of our total expenditure? 
I hope that he will take this thought home with 
him - I know that he is not a Treasury minister 
- and that Mr. Younger will put our case in the 
cabinet. 
I hope that Lord Trefgarne will address 
himself to this. Perhaps he can say that in future 
the Assembly might know something about the 
expenditure of the other parts of WEU - the 
office in London and the group of experts. We do 
not know anything. We do not know what they 
do, and we should, so that we are involved in the 
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whole activity of WEU, which Lord Trefgarne 
praised, and I was glad to hear that. 
Finally, I wanted Lord Trefgarne to know, 
because the media is sure to say this, that we do 
not want that expenditure just so that we can 
come to Paris and have a good time. We all want 
to be able to help in the defence of the way oflife 
of Europe, and in the peace process. Will Lord 
Trefgarne please take this message home to our 
government? I should be grateful if he could 
answer any of my questions. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Lord 
Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom). - I 
am familiar with the problems that Sir Paul 
Hawkins mentions. I had the privilege to attend 
the reception given by the French Foreign Min-
istry last night, and every delegate whom I met 
mentioned it to me. I am not sure that I have 
much in the way of comfort to offer. It is cer-
tainly not a matter for the Ministry of Defence. I 
understand that it is a matter for the British 
Foreign Office and the British Treasury, but I 
undertake to convey delegates' strongly-felt 
views back to London. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Lady 
Jill Knight. 
Lady Jill KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - This 
morning we have two ministers for the price of 
one. Although we are not forced to put questions 
to both, we are tempted to do so, and I intend to 
give in to that temptation. 
My question, although slightly different, 
follows that asked by Sir Paul Hawkins. Yes-
terday Mr. Chirac and this morning Mr. 
Fischbach and then Lord Trefgarne assured us in 
different ways that they had great regard for the 
work of WEU and recognised the need for the 
reactivation of our body. I should like to explain 
one thing. WEU is struggling to do two wholly 
different jobs. One is to give a platform to min-
isters from all the member countries, which takes 
a great deal of time out of our sessions here in 
Paris. None the less, that is very important. The 
other job is to look in depth at different 
problems, all connected with defence, to work on 
reports that will be helpful, to produce recom-
mendations that we feel should be adopted and 
generally to act as a semi-parliamentary body. 
Lord Trefgarne said how fundamental it was 
to explain why defence was necessary, showing 
how important this body was. In that regard, I 
should like to see his speech writ large in every 
newspaper in Europe, particularly his compar-
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us to do, because we cannot fulfil both functions 
on our budget. I have to tell both ministers that 
we are a little tired of hearing a lot of kind words 
in speeches and not getting a lot of support in 
member parliaments for the job that we do. 
Therefore, I ask both ministers to take back to 
their respective governments the understanding 
that we in WEU will grind to a halt and be 
unable to carry out our present twin functions 
unless we hear more than soft words of 
support. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - My colleague, Mr. 
Poos, already spoke about this yesterday, but I 
should like to repeat and emphasise his remarks. 
At the last meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
Luxembourg, all the foreign and defence min-
isters joined in expressing their willingness to 
seek a solution to the budget problems. A 
solution satisfactory to your Assembly will not 
merely be sought, it will be found. 
Regarding the first statement by the hon-
ourable member, I can only express my 
approval, as the matter concerns WEU, which is 
the only European institution empowered to 
discuss the problems of European security. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -I call Lord 
Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the Uni~ed Kingdom). - I 
do not have much to add to what Mr. Fischbach 
said, but I can underline the importance that 
United Kingdom ministers attach to WEU, as I 
said just now. I also undert(J>ok to Sir Paul 
Hawkins to report your anxieties to London. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
have noted Mr. Fischbach's statement which 
centres basically on the fundamental issue of 
security. Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-Office ofthe 
Council, yesterday used the very expressive 
formula" fewer weapons for more security". In 
the global debate, in which all mankind and 
Europeans especially, have a fundamental stake, 
as to whether the discussions should take place 
in the CSCE or between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, 
yesterday confirmed very clearly that France 
favoured the .CSCE. Would you confirm the 
position of your government, Mr. Fischbach? I 
thank you in advance and trust that we shall find 
ourselves on common ground rather than at 
odds. 
isons. He also called us a ginger group and a cat- Lord Trefgarne, let me say how pleased we are 
alyst. We have to decide what our ministers want to see you here - all the more so as it is a long 
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time since the United Kingdom expressed a view 
in this forum. 
I shall not revert to the subject of the budget; 
as a Frenchman, I am just as aware of the 
problem as my colleagues and the other delegates 
to this Assembly. Thank you for being an ambas-
sador - I crave your indulgence for the demotion 
- and for ensuring that all the governments 
move in the direction suggested by Mr. Poos. 
The last question I wish to put to you relates to 
an item of information received this morning. 
Even we parliamentarians get our information 
via the newspapers and the radio. This morning 
it was the radio. It referred to a 10% participation 
by the United Kingdom Government in the 
Hermes project. 
The matter lies at the heart of our respective 
areas of responsibility. Are you able to confirm 
this news? And is there any likelihood, as and 
when matters develop, of this British partici-
pation being confirmed and possibly rounded 
up? I hope I am not giving wrong information. If 
my information is correct, I would like your con-
firmation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The ques-
tions are directed to both ministers. 
I call Lord Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom). -
With the permission of the Chairman of the 
Council, I should like to answer the point about 
the Hermes project. I am sorry to say that my 
officials have drawn a blank in the few seconds 
that we have had to think about it. Perhaps I can 
check the information and let Mr. Valleix know 
later. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - The Luxembourg 
presidency, speaking of course on behalf of the 
seven member states, maintains its fundamental 
support for the dialogue as conducted between 
the member states of the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO in the various places where negotiations 
are in progress. I mean the CSCE, the CDE and 
the MBFR. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
May I make one quick suggestion and then ask 
two quick questions? 
My suggestion for solving the budget problem 
is simple. If this parliamentary Assembly were 
given the determination of the budget that the 
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other two organs enjoy, we would soon find that 
the budgets of those other two organs would be 
so cut that they would be delighted to give us 
what we deserve. 
Will Mr. Fischbach convey to his colleagues 
that it is not so much that we have visits from six 
ministers during a session that irritates us, but 
that it would be appreciated if one minister came 
along at the beginning, made a speech and then 
listened for the rest of our proceedings? We are 
getting sick and tired of ministers answering 
questions for an hour or so and then dashing 
away. 
The valuable feature, as Lord Trefgarne said, 
is informal conversation with delegates when 
ministers are not surrounded by their advisers 
and minders and can talk politics to their 
political friends. That is the danger for ministers 
- they get divided from their political friends by 
their officials, who hate politics. 
Lord Trefgarne said that one of the problems 
of a future war was that the Soviets would try to 
cut off supplies to Europe from North America 
and elsewhere. Is he able to assure us that NATO 
forces have sufficient ships available for mine-
sweeping? In view of the appalling reduction in 
the size of fishing fleets, there must be doubt 
about NATO's ability to find sufficient mine-
sweepers quickly enough. Does NATO have suf-
ficient vessels to undertake the work that Mr. 
Ahrens talked of- getting troops over to the con-
tinent in time? We want assurances on both 
counts if Lord Trefgarne can give them. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - Mr. President, I 
fail to understand the question put by the hon-
ourable member. 
You know better than anyone that the 
Luxembourg presidency is, and will remain, per-
manently represented throughout this session. 
Secretary of State Goebbels has been here 
since Monday and has not left the chamber. He 
has therefore been able to follow your debates 
very closely. In this respect the presidency is per-
forming no more than its duty. Mr. Poos as 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council spoke yes-
terday. He shared this privilege with me. I wish 
to emphasise that we were invited in due form by 
the Assembly which we have had the honour to 
address. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I can only 
repeat my thanks and congratulations to the 
Luxembourg presidency for its exemplary atten-
dance throughout this session. 
I call Lord Trefgarne. 
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Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom). -
As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg will know, we have 
recently commissioned a new class of mine-
sweeper- the River class- for the Royal Naval 
Reserve. Eleven are in service and another is 
coming shortly. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is right to 
say that quite a significant part of our capability 
in that area rests on our ability to take up certain 
ships from civil commercial activity in times of 
tension or war. He is also right to say that in 
recent years the number of deep-sea trawlers 
available for this purpose has declined sharply. 
We have therefore recently conducted a study to 
see what other types of ship might be available 
and I am glad to be able to assure him that we 
have identified a number of other vessels that 
will meet the requirement as we now foresee it. 
The critical problem in transporting supplies 
from the United States to the United Kingdom 
and thence to Europe will not be to find the nec-
essary ships but to ensure that the sea-lanes are 
kept open. I mentioned that problem at the end 
of my speech. Keeping the seaways clear is not a 
function of the transport capability but for other 
naval and air force capacity that we can make 
available for the purpose. I am satisfied that 
there are sufficient commercial transport ships 
available for that purpose, but the problem of 
keeping the seaways open is rather greater. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Osborn. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). -
Thank you. I ask my question as a one-time 
engineer-scientist and industrialist who is a 
member of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. Lord Trefgarne 
knows that I warned him that at public meetings 
I am always frightened by questions that my 
friends and colleagues ask. I hope that he will 
bear that in mind. Mr. Fischbach spoke about 
the reactivation of WEU and the role of min-
isters of defence in Luxembourg at the minis-
terial conference. 
In a very wide review, which I appreciated, 
Lord Trefgarne spoke about equipment and the 
balance between Warsaw Pact countries and 
European arms in the European theatre. I ask 
him a question in his role as Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement. He might like to 
comment on the British scene, the supply of 
defence equipment in our country, the level of 
research on defence, the amount spent on it and 
the impact of privatisation of the Royal Ord-
nance and of competition. 
I warned when I was a member of the 
European Parliament that I was among those ten 
years ago who interested themselves in Com-
munity defence procurement. The Commission 
and the Twelve are interested in the manufac-
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turing capacity of military equipment 
standardisation and procurement. I know that 
ministers of defence determine the expenditure 
within their own defence budgets but I remind 
Lord Trefgarne that Lord Carrington, the Secre-
tary-General of NATO, has stressed the need to 
co-ordinate and co-operate in manufacture, the 
need for longer production runs and research in 
Europe. 
My question is to Lord Trefgarne but the 
Chairman of the Council, Mr. Fischbach, might 
like to comment: how does he see his role as a 
British minister responsible for procurement in 
WEU, which he has emphasised, or NATO and 
even the EEC, with fellow European defence 
ministers in bringing about co-ordination and 
co-operation? In other words, how can he bring 
his influence to get better value for money on a 
European scale? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Trefgarne. 
Lord TREFGARNE (Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom). -
That is a very wide-ranging question but I cer-
tainly see it as my principal role as the British 
Minister for Defence Procurement to ensure that 
the sums of money that the British Parliament 
can make available for defence procurement pur-
poses are spent to the best effect. The sum of 
money made available in this current year, for 
example, some £8.25 billion, is enormous by any 
standards and it is therefore a clear duty of mine 
to ensure that I get the best value for that money 
and the best equipment I can into the hands of 
the British armed forces. To achieve that I am 
quite clear that I now need to take a Europe-wide 
view of the main procurement projects that we 
undertake. Of course, that is not always possible. 
Sometimes there are particular projects for 
which we alone have the expertise. In other cases 
there will be projects where the expertise lies in 
other countries. So sometimes we shall be buying 
systems from other European countries and, 
indeed, from other countries around the world as 
well; but, perhaps more, we shall be conducting 
collaborative projects. 
The cornerstone of European collaboration in 
which Britain participates at present is the 
European fighter aircraft project but there are 
other major projects coming along, too, and Mr. 
Wilkinson referred to some of them in his 
remarks about the helicopter industry. That is 
the answer to the question. My duty is to get the 
best value I can for the money that parliament 
makes available and I am clear that the major 
way to achieve that is through European collabo-
ration. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone else wish to speak? ... 
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Ladies and gentlemen, that brings to an end 
the questions to the Council members attending 
the sitting. I express to them my warm thanks for 
their co-operation. 
8. European helicopters for the 1990s 
(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1077 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions on European 
helicopters for the 1990s and the vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 1077 and 
amendments. 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - My 
intervention is to express solidarity and, I would 
add, amity for our Chairman and Rapporteur, 
seeing that his report was unanimously approved 
by the committee. 
To stress the importance attaching to the man-
ufacture of helicopters and the market for them 
in Europe in terms of industry and modern mil-
itary technology would be to repeat what is 
already familiar, and I shall not therefore go over 
this ground again. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the quality of this 
report is already manifest in its table of contents, 
which shows how comprehensively the whole 
subject has been covered. I shall therefore 
address myself more to the realities behind our 
present debate. 
My purpose is to draw attention to the rela-
tionship between our debate on helicopters and 
certain other discussions which have taken place 
over the last forty-eight hours. To begin with, we 
are talking about co-operation, and co-operation 
is, indeed, the basic theme of this report, which 
brings out the expertise we have gained, which is 
far from negligible, in the specific area of heli-
copters- a subject less familiar than aeronautics 
in general. This advance is properly stressed in 
the report, which shows where the strengths lie. 
Unfortunately, it also brings out the weak points, 
and I am grateful to our British Rapporteur for 
not side-stepping either the strengths or the 
weaknesses. 
I shall dwell at greater length on the weak 
points, as it is these which have something to 
teach us. Wherever the report speaks in favour of 
European co-operation, such co-operation comes 
up against an obstacle of one kind or another. 
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We are in favour, in general defence terms, of 
linking up with our great American partners, and 
we are not opposed to some scientific or even 
industrial co-operation, where this is feasible 
between Europe and the United States. Here I 
will mention a French example, as my own 
country is also involved - in the non-pejorative 
sense of the word. I refer to SNECMA-GE co-op-
eration on aircraft engines. This is a successful 
development, which we hope will be continued. 
But it must be said that we feel some appre-
hension about the Anglo-American partnership 
represented by Westland-Sikorsky helicopters. 
We need assurance that in this new devel-
opment, in this new Anglo-American co-oper-
ation, we shall retain a degree of control, hope-
fully with a major British content, which implies 
a real European impact and not merely a 
position of subservience to the dominant 
American partner. 
Having made this point, ladies and gentlemen, 
I would like to see us apply it to advantage when 
considering the current possibilities for co-oper-
ation. I trust that the Franco-German dialogue 
will produce practical results. This stage has not 
yet been reached, and I therefore hope that 
France itself will take heed of the remarks made 
by the French Prime Minister yesterday and that 
our German partners will reciprocate. You will 
have noted that the Prime Minister made ref-
erence to technology in the face of the unprece-
dented challenges we have to confront in the area 
of European security. 
" Linking of requirements " were the words he 
used. This is an attractive concept, although a 
difficult one to implement and it entails the joint 
evaluation of military requirements in response 
to a threat which is in many ways identical. Gen-
erally speaking we Europeans have to confront 
an identical global threat, and joint evaluation is 
essential if major projects are not to be ham-
strung by requirements which are too exclusive 
in their equipment specifications or in the time-
tables for their implementation. It is my hope 
that both the Germans and the French will adopt 
this recommendation with the need for disci-
pline which it implies. 
The Prime Minister's reply to my specific 
question about WEU's contribution to possible 
co-ordination between European industrialists 
and to obtaining manufacturers' views on this 
subject also struck a positive note which is highly 
relevant to this aspect of our deliberations, and, I 
hope, to European military co-operation with all 
its industrial implications. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall 
now make a proposal which is liable to have 
budgetary consequences. Having regard to the 
debates which have taken place during this 
session, yesterday especially, and bearing in 
mind also the experience of previous colloquies 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Valleix (continued) 
successfully held in the past by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions - and here I am thinking both of the 
colloquy on aeronautical co-operation held in 
Toulouse with its follow-up two years later in 
Paris and of the Munich colloquy on space 
matters without necessarily contemplating an 
event of the same magnitude, since helicopters 
are a more specialised subject - and having 
regard finally to a suggestion by our French col-
league, Mr. Prat, who is an expert on helicopter 
engines and has proposed that a study be carried 
out in this field, I take the liberty, Mr. President, 
of suggesting that a colloquy, or if not a colloquy 
then at least a meeting, should be organised. I 
apologise for making this proposal in a 
somewhat hasty fashion and without previously 
notifying the Chairman ofthe committee. I hope 
he will forgive me. But this would satisfy the aim 
of associating European industrialists with our 
parliamentary activities here and with govern-
mental actions at Council level by bringing about 
meetings between partners in the defence indus-
tries - in this case between helicopter manufac-
turers. Such a meeting could also be arranged 
with representatives of our governments who 
specialise in these problems. 
Such a measure might also provide us with an 
opportunity to show greater willingness to co-op-
erate and to do so more effectively by widening 
our range of human contacts. In developing such 
contacts we could examine the more specific 
question of engines, which are a valuable trump 
card for the European helicopter industry. 
Those, Mr. President, are the remarks I wished 
to make. They naturally imply enthusiastic and, 
I hope, unanimous support for the report. The 
adoption of my proposal, without overstraining 
our organisation's resources but taking account 
of the statements repeated again this morning, 
might enable us to carry co-operation further by 
bringing together the partners in industry who, in 
the final analysis, are the ones who give sub-
stance to the policy which we wish to see further 
reinforced between our seven countries. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Paul Hawkins. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). -
Thank you Mr. President, for calling me twice in 
a very short time. 
I congratulate John Wilkinson, our Chairman, 
whose knowledge of aeroplanes, helicopters and 
other such matters is probably greater than that 
of anyone else on our committee. I am no expert 
on helicopters but I can recognise the great need 
for them. Troops need support of a type that they 
can feel is of help to them. 
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I urge - not necessarily on our Rapporteur 
who understands the point - the need for co-op-
eration among the nations of WEU in buying 
and using military weapons. That was under-
lined by Lord Carrington and Lord Trefgarne. 
Such co-operation requires the will of parlia-
ments, ministers and civil servants as well as 
industry. Everyone is jealous of industries in his 
own constituency yet it is vital for our collective 
defence that we co-operate. 
When I first came to WEU about ten or eleven 
years ago I attended a colloquy at the National 
Assembly in Paris dealing with co-operation in 
weapons buying. I remember Herr Dornier 
speaking at that meeting. We have, alas, lost him 
in the past year or two. We have moved some 
distance since that time, but not nearly far 
enough. For the sake of the safety and defence of 
Europe, for the defence of the ratepayers and the 
taxpayers of Europe, we must co-operate so as to 
use the brains and the industry of our nations to 
produce the best weapons possible. 
The Tornado plane has probably been the 
greatest success of such co-operative effort. The 
Tornado is based in my constituency at RAF 
Marham. I have been there and discussed this 
plane with the pilots and those who service it. 
They told me that they had grave doubts about 
the plane before it was put into service. Now 
they tell me that it is the best plane they have 
ever flown, quite the most wonderful plane to 
service and to look after, and a far greater success 
than they ever expected. 
A side effect of helicopters is that they cause 
even more disturbance to the average population 
and country district than the Tornados, which 
make a heck of a noise. The Tornados fly over 
very quickly, but the helicopters fly low, over 
individuals and gardens. The children are 
frightened to death of them. Since my constit-
uency is rural I have to tell members that the 
cows in calf sometimes give birth before they 
should because of the noise from the helicopters. 
Animals are frightened by helicopters. 
I have in my constituency the largest battle 
training area in the United Kingdom, at Stan-
ford ... 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I am in the same position in 
Germany. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). - I am 
interested to hear that comment. We are now to 
have an extension at Stanford, if the Ministry of 
Defence has its way. I support that proposal. The 
battle area will be extended by another 3 500 
acres, involving three more villages. There have 
been meetings in the area over the past few 
weeks, not all of them full of sweetness and light. 
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The main questions are when helicopters will 
get quieter and whether we can prevent them 
from flying over villages. Pilots need a point of 
reference, but sometimes they seem to delight in 
flying over villages and herds of cattle. That may 
be a complete misunderstanding, but I hope that 
I shall be given a few words of reassurance about 
noise and the production of quieter heli-
copters. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I now call the Chairman and Rapporteur of the 
committee. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - We 
have had a fruitful debate and I thank all the par-
ticipants. I start by expressing my gratitude to 
the Clerk of the committee, Mr. Floris de Gou, 
who has been an unfailing source of wise advice 
and expertise. This is the first report on which he 
has assisted a rapporteur and our committee has 
been lucky to have him. I also thank Mrs. 
Wingate and all those who were responsible for 
the translation and typing of the report. 
I thank Sir John Osborn for his observations. I 
greatly respect his industrial and European 
expertise and I assure him that, in the words of 
the Tom Lehrer song, "When I can I plagiarise 
and let no one else's work evade my eyes". 
However, I did not go so far as to lift whole sec-
tions from the report of the Select Committee on 
Defence, excellent as it is. It is a useful guide to 
the helicopter industry in the United Kingdom 
and Europe. 
My report emphasises the lack of a civil 
market for helicopters in Europe. That is made 
clear in paragraphs 20 to 22, which spell out the 
disadvantage that we suffer compared with the 
United States. No doubt we and the helicopter 
business would benefit from European research 
and development being concerted more effec-
tively, as Lord Carrington suggested, but I do not 
believe that the European Commission should 
involve itself in that task. I have never thought 
that bureaucratic intervention would solve the 
problem. The answer lies principally in con-
certing operational requirements and re-equip-
ment timescales. The market must also play its 
part, because there is over-capacity and the com-
panies involved must make profits in the manu-
facture of military equipment. 
Our colleague, Mr. Stegagnini, said that the 
report should have laid greater stress on 
European collaboration. To be candid, I thought 
that it was almost wholly oriented towards an 
enhancement of such collaboration. Of course, as 
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ation. Paragraphs 69 to 72 address themselves to 
that issue. A reasonable balance must be struck 
but the priority must be to ensure that the 
European industry collaborates effectively. 
There was never really a battle for control of 
Westland. The stake of Sikorsky and Fiat was 
always a minority stake, even after its recent 
enlargement, though it could be argued that the 
participation of United Technologies in West-
land gives it an additional influence and strength 
and a potential credibility to exploit the 
European market. A former Chairman and 
Rapporteur of our committee, Mr. Valleix, 
rightly reminded us of the importance of Franco-
German collaboration in the new anti-helicopter 
and anti-tank helicopter being a success. We all 
wish that project well. 
I am sure that my report has many weaknesses 
and I am sympathetic - as I hope is shown by 
my remarks and by the report - to the worries of 
Mr. Prat and others who rightly bring home to us 
the great importance to our security and our 
industrial base of the helicopter engine industry. 
Turbomeca is a company of remarkable capa-
bility and expertise, as is the small engine 
division of Rolls-Royce. The colloquies that the 
committee and Assembly have sponsored have 
always been worthwhile and I am sympathetic to 
the idea of a parliamentary hearing involving 
industrialists. I am not sure that it should 
involve only helicopter industries, but perhaps it 
could examine the importance of the aero-engine 
industry for Europe's security. 
I was glad that Mr. Valleix said that my 
country was to participate - to the extent of 10% 
- in Hermes. The committee and I have always 
said that the United Kingdom should support a 
manned space programme and the Hermes 
launcher. Hotol and Hermes are not mutually 
exclusive, but the CFM-56 is a power plant of 
exceptional capability and that is one reason why 
I suggested to the French Prime Minister yes-
terday that it would be good for European 
defence and for our aero-engine industry if the 
French air force and the Royal Air Force bought 
the Boeing E-3A aircraft equipped with the 
SNECMA-General Electric CFM-56 engine for 
airborne early warning. 
My colleague, Sir Paul Hawkins, who is a 
stalwart of our committee and a great advocate 
of collaboration, reminded us of the dangers of a 
parochial attitude. We need a broad vision and 
the Tornado is a product of such vision. It is 
proving its worth, and the family of Franco-
British helicopters - the Gazelle, the Lynx and 
the Puma - have also been remarkable sue-
cesses. 
members ofNATO, we cannot exclude the possi- We are all looking towards a successor gener-
bility of buying equipment from the United ation of European helicopters. The Agusta 129 
States or the possibility of transatlantic co-oper- Mark 11, the NH-90 and the Franco-German 
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anti-helicopter and anti-tank helicopter are the 
planes of the future, though that is not to say that 
there could not be a place for the Black Hawk 
built under licence, particularly if it had a 
European engine, the RTM-322. 
We hope that you, Mr. President, feel that our 
deliberations have been fruitful. It has been a 
worthwhile debate and I look forward to moving 
on to the amendments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank, 
you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your observations and 
replies. 
I also wish to stress the quality and importance 
of your work in an area of outstanding interest, 
particularly to those aware of WEU's role. My 
only regret is that the obligations and commit-
ments of many of our colleagues have prevented 
more representatives from taking part in the 
debate. 
I am advised of two amendments to the draft 
recommendation on European helicopters for 
the 1990s tabled by Sir John Os born. 
Amendment 2 reads as follows: 
2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Bearing in mind the role of the EEC in co-or-
dinating manufacturing capacity, including 
that of the aircraft industry and, in particular, 
the helicopter industry; " 
I call Sir John Osborn. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - I 
made my point about the amendment in the 
debate, in my question to Lord Trefgarne and in 
a letter to Lord Carrington. 
We have a problem of co-ordination, co-oper-
ation and research, to which Lord Carrington 
referred, with helicopters and the aircraft 
industry. I felt that after paragraph (i) of the pre-
amble to the draft recommendation there should 
be a new paragraph, which has been discussed in 
the debate. Our Rapporteur accepted the point 
when I raised it in committee, and we discussed 
it yesterday. He is not keen, and I should like 
him to know that I am disappointed that we 
cannot grasp this nettle now. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the committee's opinion? 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I must 
give the advice of the committee clearly. We 
have discussed the amendment not once but 
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committee has never felt that the European 
Community was the right body within which to 
co-ordinate such manufacturing capacity. It has 
never had a role in co-ordinating manufacture 
within the aircraft industry in Europe. Such con-
sortia as Airbus Industrie, Panavia, Europe's 
missile dynamics group and the space consortia 
have all progressed satisfactorily without the 
interference of EEC. We feel that IEPG is the 
right group for consultation on operational 
requirements and equipment timescales. We 
believe that our own body has a constructive 
co-ordinating role to play. Much as I sympathise 
and agree with the motivation behind the 
amendment, the advice of the committee would 
be to vote against it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Os born. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - I 
have decided not to tread on my Rapporteur's 
toes. I should like to withdraw my amendment. I 
should like you, Mr. President, to note the case 
that I have put and the Rapporteur's reply, 
bearing in mind that I have been a member of 
the European Parliament and that ministers have 
arms in many countries - WEU, IEPG, NATO 
and the part of the Community concerned with 
manufacturing capacity. I hope that the Secre-
tary-General will note Mr. Wilkinson's response. 
Perhaps the point should be pressed in another 
way and on another occasion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The official 
report of this sitting will reflect faithfully the 
exchange of views which has just taken place 
between you and the Chairman of the com-
mittee. The whole Assembly as well as the com-
mittee will certainly watch future developments 
as regards the important point you have 
raised. 
Amendment 2 is withdrawn. 
Sir John Osborn has tabled Amendment 1 
which reads as follows: 
1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Aware that the role of the' helicopter in 
modern warfare is influenced by the use of 
anti-helicopter missiles such as the 'Stinger' 
and by the use of ' anti-helicopter ' heli-
copters," 
I call Sir John Osborn to support his 
amendment. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - I 
introduce this amendment on the tactical side. In 
it I refer to the" Stinger", but I could have used 
the word " Blowpipe " or any other equipment. 
twice, although I confess that the second consid- You regretted, Mr. President, that we had not 
eration in committee was briefer yesterday. The had contributions on a big enough scale from 
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members of other committees. The tactical use 
of any equipment, let alone strategic use, should 
be subject to the opinions of other committees, 
but that is not a point that I want to press. 
The third report of the British Select Com-
mittee on Defence, to which I referred and on 
which Mr. Wilkinson commented, summarised 
the helicopters in service with British forces and 
future requirements. I am certain that other 
NATO and WEU countries have defined theirs. 
Mr. Wilkinson dealt ably with the tactical side. I 
have great respect for his mastery of the subject. 
Paragraph 14 of the explanatory memorandum 
states: 
" The helicopter has once again confirmed its 
position as a very important if not indispen-
sable means of personnel and logistic support. 
However, the vulnerability of transport heli-
copters, in particular to ground-air missiles 
and other anti-aircraft defence in the frontal 
zone, is significant. " 
My amendment ensures that that is mentioned 
in the preamble and the recommendation. I am 
grateful for information in Jane's Defence 
Weekly of 15th November, which refers to the 
use of Stinger by the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. 
It states: 
" sources said rebel forces have destroyed at 
least nine Soviet and Afghan helicopters and 
one or two jet aircraft. " 
Reference is made to the impact on Soviet heli-
copters and helibome Spetsnatz special opera-
tions forces, which have attempted to stop sup-
plies of those weapons. The most remarkable 
effect has been not on the Russians but on the 
rebels in two respects. First, the supply of those 
anti-helicopter missiles has been a boost to their 
morale as the outside world seems not to have 
forgotten them. Secondly, the SA-7 missile was 
not reliable. It did not take to being carted over 
mountains and conked out. The Stinger has 
proved to be more reliable. The trouble is that 
the Soviets have defensive mechanisms for 
steering missiles such as the Stinger away. 
Infrared screening and the use of flares are 
examples of that. 
In another sense, the use of those weapons in 
Angola and the help being given to Savimbi is 
important, but what is much more significant 
than the use of the Stinger in Afghanistan is the 
use of the Blowpipe. The Soviets have means of 
defending their helicopters from heat-seeking 
missiles such as the Stinger. However, the 
Blowpipe is optically guided. The advantages 
and disadvantages of the Blowpipe and Stinger 
are relevant. 
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This is a tactical subject that should have been 
debated in the context of the report. I hope that 
reference will be made to it in the recommen-
dation. I therefore ask Mr. Wilkinson, who is 
very competent and well versed in the matter, to 
reconsider what we discussed in committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amend-
ment? ... 
What is the committee's opinion? 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I must 
remind the Assembly that the committee con-
sidered this matter twice, and twice came down 
unanimously against accepting the amendment. 
It is technically correct that the Stinger is an 
effective weapon. Sir John Osbom rightly 
reminded us of the success of the Mujahedin in 
Afghanistan when they have used the weapon 
against Soviet helicopters. The amendment 
refers to just one hand-held anti-helicopter 
weapon, and to accept it would distort the pre-
amble to the recommendation, which concerns 
helicopters for the 1990s. Sir John Osbom men-
tioned paragraph 14, but paragraphs 15 and 16 
and, to some extent, 1 7 also refer to tactical 
issues. We should not distort the report with 
such tactical additions. Again I sympathise with 
the spirit of the amendment and I know that, in 
detail, my friend and colleague is right, but I ask 
the committee not to accept the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Osbom. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - I had 
agreed that I would have welcomed Mr. Wil-
kinson moving on this subject, but he has not. 
There are four paragraphs on tactics and I had 
hoped that there could have been reference in the 
recommendation to the tactical use of heli-
copters. 
Helicopters have been useful in the Falklands, 
Vietnam and other theatres of war. Modem tech-
nology produces equipment that might make the 
role of the helicopter less certain, but then the 
users of helicopters developed equipment to 
overcome Blowpipe and Stinger. The helicopter 
has been important in all defence operations, but 
it is vulnerable. I had hoped that Mr. Wilkinson 
would accept that point in the preamble, but if he 
will not, I hope that you, Mr. President, will note 
that it is for other committees to consider this 
matter. I hope that Mr. Wilkinson will continue 
to review helicopters and that other committees 
will comment on the report. I also hope that the 
North Atlantic Assembly and the European Par-
liament will comment so that WEU can continue 
its work. I therefore withdraw the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amend-
ment 1 is withdrawn. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
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On a point of order, Mr. President. Can you tell 
us under what rule you are permitting speeches 
concerning the withdrawal of an amendment? I 
have glanced through the rules twice and can see 
none that permits a member to withdraw an 
amendment without getting the consent of the 
Assembly. Some of us wanted to support Sir 
John Os born. As there appears not to be a rule in 
this connection, do you agree, Mr. President, 
that the Rules Committee should consider the 
matter so that the point is covered in future? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In view of 
the very interesting exchange which has just 
taken place on the two amendments, the nec-
essary steps should be taken so that the recom-
mendation by the Committee on Scientific 
Technological and Aerospace Questions can tak~ 
account of the exchange of views on these two 
amendments, which have been withdrawn but 
which have elicited an important reply from the 
Chairman of the committee. 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. Is it in order for me to 
suggest that we have the views of Sir Paul 
Hawkins, Sir John Page and Sir Anthony Grant 
so that we have the concerted effort of all the 
British knights present? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Your 
humour always finds a ready response in the 
chamber. We shall none the less vote on the 
unamended draft recommendation. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I had 
assumed that Mr. Wilkinson's report would be 
accepted without question, although I expected 
Sir John Osborn's amendment to be accepted by 
his conservative colleague. I came in to support 
Sir John Osborn's amendment. As a fellow South 
Yorkshire member of parliament, I felt that I had 
some obligation in that regard. Where do I 
stand? The amendment is the property of the 
Assembly, not of Sir John Osborn. I came to 
support it, but he has apparently been allowed to 
withdraw it. Dr. Miller has described the dif-
ference in standing between Mr. Wilkinson and 
Sir John Osborn, but I expected them to accom-
modate each other. They have not, and I want to 
support Sir John Osborn's amendment. 
Although I listened carefully to Mr. Wilkinson, 
who speaks with great authority on these 
matters, I still believe that what Sir John Osborn 
said should be considered properly by the 
Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - You are 
perfectly at liberty to take over the amendment 
withdrawn by Sir John Osborn. We are, I think, 
referring to Amendment 1, which was the second 
to be tabled. 
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So, Mr. Hardy is now sponsoring Amendment 
1, tabled and then withdrawn by Sir John 
Osborn. I shall follow the prescribed procedure 
and ask if anyone wishes to speak against the 
amendment. This reopens the debate, but is 
entirely in order. 
I call Lady Jill Knight on a point of order. 
Lady Jill KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - This 
is an important departure from the rules which 
we have all understood. Certainly, in the House 
of Commons if a question is tabled and the 
person concerned is not there to present that 
question or wishes to withdraw it, we have no 
right to put supplementary questions. My view 
has always been that the person who has put 
down an amendment has the right to withdraw 
it. Surely that cannot be overturned by some 
objection at the last moment. I beg you, Mr. 
President, to recognise that to allow another 
member to pick up an amendment that has been 
dropped by the person who tabled it is an 
important departure from the rules. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, if you wish, we have time for a debate 
on procedure for the enlightenment of the 
Assem~ly. Before calling Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 
who Wishes to speak on this subject, I should 
point out that I have consulted the Rules of Pro-
cedure with special reference to the rules cov-
ering this issue. 
I have decided to accept the proposal of Mr. 
Hardy who is now sponsoring an amendment 
which had been withdrawn. In this case the final 
decision lies with the President of the Assembly. 
The Rules of Procedure are not specific on this 
point. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I wonder, Mr. President, whether you can kindly 
tell us how far back we may go to reopen matters 
that have been decided. It had been decided for 
good or ill - and I thought for ill- that Sir John 
should be allowed to withdraw his amendment" 
and you have quite rightly proceeded, saying that 
we were going to take a vote. You have now 
changed that decision and that puts all of us who 
normally would wish to support the chair in an 
impossible position. How far back may we now 
go and perhaps decide that we may want to take 
up Sir John Osborn's Amendment 2, which came 
before Amendment 1? It puts us in a difficult 
position, Mr. President, if, having given a ruling, 
you are then persuaded to change it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I can only 
agree with your comments, Sir Geoffrey, but it is 
up to me to decide whether a proposal by 
members can be entertained when an 
amendment is withdrawn. The fact is that an 
amendment remains the property of the 
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Assembly. If any member present wishes to take 
over an amendment, I consider that to be within 
the Assembly's rights. There is nothing in the 
Rules of Procedure to prevent such a course. 
That, in any event, is my ruling. 
I am grateful to you, Sir Geoffrey. I am aware 
of your close reasoning and of the honesty and 
objectivity of all you say about the Rules of Pro-
cedure. I shall ask the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges to examine this case 
with reference to our debate so that there can be 
no argument. 
I call Mr. de Beer. 
Mr. de BEER (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I do not wish to dispute the fact 
that a member is always entitled to take over an 
amendment which has been withdrawn by 
someone else. In the present case, however, I 
would ask whether there is not a requirement to 
comply with the time-limit for tabling amend-
ments before the start of the debate. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In the 
absence of any requirements laid down in the 
Rules of Procedure, I am unable to answer your 
questions. The chair confirms the right of a 
member of the Assembly to take over an 
amendment which has been previously with-
drawn but has not yet been voted on. This is the 
right and privilege of every Assembly pres-
ident. 
For the completeness of the debate, does 
anyone, with the exception of the committee, 
wish to speak against? ... 
I call Sir Paul Hawkins to oppose 
Amendment 1. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). - I am 
against this amendment because it was con-
sidered twice in the committee and to the best of 
my recollection was unanimously turned down 
on the second occasion: I was not present on the 
first. On that reasoning I feel that we should not 
reopen discussion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Sir Paul. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Sir 
Paul Hawkins summarised the position quite 
accurately. The verbal amendment of Mr. 
Hardy, which is identical to Amendment 1 ofSir 
John Osborn, was considered in detail by the 
committee on two occasions, on the second 
occasion in rather less detail than on the first. 
We had a very full debate the first time and on 
both occasions the committee voted unani-
mously against it. I think that there is no reason 
now to incorporate it in the text. 
158 
TWELFTH SITTING 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 1 tabled 
and withdrawn by Sir John Osborn and now 
sponsored by Mr. Hardy and opposed by the 
committee. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by sitting and standing. 
I now put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is negatived. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1077. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless at least five representatives 
or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a 
vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I now put the draft recommendation to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted una-
nimously 1• 
I call Dr. Miller for an explanation of vote. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - May I give 
an explanation of vote, Mr. President? I voted in 
favour because I felt that there was nothing in 
the report with which I did not completely agree. 
I apologise to the Rapporteur and Chairman of 
the committee for not taking part in the debate, 
as I understand he would have liked others to do. 
I had to prepare two speeches for debates which, 
unfortunately, did not take place, concerning a 
committee of which I am a member. 
I know John Wilkinson's competence in this 
and other areas and, on reading his report, I 
found it to be excellent. His draft recommen-
dation was equally excellent. I felt that what I 
should do was to ensure that I voted for it. I 
whole-heartedly and unreservedly apologise for 
not speaking during the debate, when I would 
have said something similar to the remarks that I 
have just made. 
l. See page 31. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Dr. Miller. What you say is well and agreeably 
put. 
I forgot to reply to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on 
one point. 
Following the withdrawal of Amendment 2, 
which was tabled first, I could not have allowed a 
representative, as I allowed Mr. Hardy, to take 
over the tabled amendment since it had already 
been disposed of. I was able to do this only in the 
case of the later amendment on which no 
decision had yet been taken. 
The point of this comment is to convey to you 
the view of the chair concerning an amendment 
taken over during a sitting. 
9. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3.25 p.m. with the following orders 
of the day: 
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1. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of 
Defence of Italy. 
2. Outline of a new booklet on Western 
European Union (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations and 
vote on the draft order, Document 1081 ). 
3. Parliamentary and public relations (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations and vote on the draft resolution, 
Document 1 080). 
4. Developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations (Presentation of the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Document 1079). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.) 
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Speakers: The President, Mr. Close (Rapporteur). 
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be 
published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, 
Minister of Defence of Italy 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Spadolini, 
Minister of Defence of Italy. 
l. See page 34. 
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I am greatly honoured, Minister, to welcome 
you in the name of the Assembly to this chamber 
which you know so well, having taken part in 
some major debates particularly since the Rome 
decision to reactivate WEU. 
May I salute you as one of the eminent 
members of the Council of Ministers, and the 
Italian Minister of Defence. I would recall the 
determined part you have played in giving WEU 
its particular character in accordance with the 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty and enabling it 
to respond to the challenge of a world situation 
and world events in which Europe and especially 
WEU have a crucial role to play. 
With you to spur it on, the influence of WEU 
can only be more strongly felt and produce more 
concrete results. It is in that spirit that I am glad 
to invite you to the rostrum. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, members of the 
Assembly of Western European Union, it is my 
pleasure, speaking for the Italian Government, to 
stress the value of this session of WEU. 
Great world events, which were to some extent 
unexpected and disconcerting, have sharpened 
European thoughts on defence policy. Such 
reflection naturally finds its place here in your 
Assembly which as the French Prime Minister, 
Mr. Chirac, said yesterday is one of the keystones 
of European construction and the high point in 
the life of WEU, with governments and parlia-
mentarians working together for the construction 
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of European defence which must have the 
consensus support that can only be expressed 
through the parliaments. 
If anyone had any doubts until yesterday there 
can now be no further doubt that the road to uni-
fication and a European identity lies through a 
common defence policy. 
The meeting between the President of the 
United States and the General Secretary of the 
Russian Communist Party at Reykjavik was an 
unexpected turning-point in the disarmament 
negotiations and unquestionably produced 
moments of drama and surprises for everyone 
and possibly also for the people actually 
involved. 
For the first time since the end of the war there 
was a feeling that the two superpowers were on 
the point of making mutual concessions of great 
significance for peace. Clearly there was a leap 
forward. This was not merely an exercise aimed 
principally at impressing public opinion, as had 
unfortunately been the case on many occasions 
during the prolonged negotiations in Geneva. 
World public opinion and European public 
opinion in particular realised, as the results of 
the summit gradually became known, that this 
time both sides - although probably for com-
pletely different reasons - really wished at least 
to reduce the vast nuclear arsenals which have 
been growing for too long as though by a vast 
process of spontaneous reproduction. 
Although no agreement was reached in Reyk-
javik, amazing steps forward were taken towards 
a realistic dialogue and in particular towards 
agreeing methods for such a dialogue. From one 
standpoint we can say that nothing will ever be 
the same again after Reykjavik. The method of 
such negotiation has been changed crucially and 
the point of no return has probably been 
passed. 
Paradoxically, although Europe was not 
present in the Icelandic capital where the fate of 
the world was being decided, the discussions 
principally concerned Europe. What was basi-
cally at stake was the future form of our 
defensive structure; the first consequence of this 
should therefore be to strengthen in us Euro-
peans, over and above any other consideration, 
our desire for a specific defence union if we wish 
to continue, as for so long during our history, to 
be if not the main protagonists at least essential 
characters on the world political scene. 
Above all it is now apparent that Europe can 
no longer put off the determination of a 
European security structure taking proper 
account of all forms of deterrence; that is of the 
unified security framework within which the 
various separate negotiations for armaments 
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control can be carried on and assessed. In other 
words it is pointless to conduct and assess the 
negotiations separately when there is only a 
single security equation. 
This is not to be seen as an effort to seek cri-
teria of " commensurability " between nuclear 
armaments and conventional forces; it is an affir-
mation that the concept of securtity is one and 
indivisible. 
The Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik 
opened wide prospects for an ambitious stage in 
disarmament. Admittedly, the summit was not 
conclusive and the events and declarations 
which have followed the meeting pose questions 
concerning the intended objectives. 
These new prospects which the Italian 
Government welcomes with great hope and 
confidence, mean that we Europeans must think 
about how to ensure that " more disarmament " 
is matched by" more security", above all for our 
continent which is at the heart of East-West rela-
tions. It is not a matter here of putting obstacles 
in the way of the procedure outlined at 
Reykjavik or of going back to certain sector 
agreements, such as the zero option for theatre 
nuclear weapons which was the basis of the dual-
track decision taken in NATO on the 
deployment of Euromissiles. What is needed 
rather is consideration of how this result can be 
attained in a situation of equilibrium and 
security. 
From this point of view, the zero option for 
long-range theatre nuclear missiles clearly leaves 
a continuing heavy imbalance in favour of the 
Warsaw Pact in the number of short-range mis-
siles deployed for distances under 1 000 kilo-
metres. As the zero option must not be chal-
lenged again, equal emphasis must be laid on the 
need for a speedy restoration of the balance for 
short-range missiles. This balance should be res-
tored over the same time span as the implemen-
tation of the zero option. We cannot ignore the 
fact that since the so-called Euromissiles were 
deployed in Europe the Soviet Union has under-
taken a massive increase of its capability in that 
sector, with a preponderance of nine to one 
according to NATO estimates. This is not a 
problem we can ignore - the zero option is a 
combined military, political and moral choice -
as it is linked with humanitarian intentions. That 
is why we demand that, together with any 
agreement on the zero option for longer-range 
Euromissiles, an agreement should be reached at 
the same time to restore the balance for short-
range missiles and tactical systems. 
If other Soviet nuclear systems are capable of 
threatening the targets we wish to protect by eli-
minating the SS-20, Pershing and cruise missiles, 
then, if we wish to maintain the idea of removing 
the threat of theatre weapons, we must consider 
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all theatre weapons and not concentrate on what 
would be the mere appearance of an 
agreement. 
It is difficult to see at the moment when the 
necessary agreements can and should be reached 
and how they should be made as symmetrical as 
possible. But we should here and now give some 
thought to how mutual security can be safe-
guarded if the zero option, which still has our full 
support, becomes reality. 
There are two possible ways: either sufficient 
short-range missiles can be deployed to reach 
parity with the Warsaw Pact forces or we can 
give more detailed consideration in WEU to the 
creation of a non-nuclear ground-based anti-
missile system within the wider concept of 
defence against attack from the air. 
This raises the question of how, without the 
security provided by the deterrent effect of inter-
mediate-range weapons, Europe can accept the 
existing imbalance of conventional forces. Is 
Western Europe prepared to increase its conven-
tional forces by the substantial measure required 
to bring them up to the level of the eastern bloc 
forces? Or is the eastern bloc prepared to bring 
its own conventional forces down to levels at 
which they no longer pose a threat or exert 
pressure on Western Europe? 
From a backward look at the deterrent, it 
seems clear therefore that everything takes us 
back to the origin of the problem, namely the 
imbalance of conventional forces, the great issue 
to which this Assembly has also devoted much 
attention. There can be no question of starting to 
make changes in the deterrent if no action is 
taken to correct the imbalance which first created 
the need for the deterrent itself. 
The Italian Government agrees with Lord Car-
rington's remark that the " most vulnerable 
point of NATO is the imbalance between the 
alliance and the Warsaw Pact as regards conven-
tional forces ". 
Today, after Reykjavik and its extraordinary 
breakthrough there is new light on the possible 
terms of a balance which will ensure security. We 
must, however, take account of the fact that no 
substantial progress has been achieved during 
the years of talks on mutual balanced conven-
tional force reductions, although we should not 
underestimate the most recent results of the 
Stockholm conference on multilateral security 
measures, advance notice by both sides and the 
observation of military activities. 
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measure would provide a real basis for stability 
and security in Europe. 
The Budapest appeal for conventional disar-
mament therefore calls for an adequate reply 
containing clear negotiating proposals for 
defreezing the situation. 
It is a matter of obtaining the necessary gua-
rantees so that during the implementation of the 
zero option and the elimination of the imbalance 
of short-range missiles, the negotiations for a 
balanced reduction of conventional forces can 
achieve significant progress leading to greater 
security. 
But while this is proceeding very gradually as 
it must, the Italian Government fully agrees with 
the three points made by Lord Carrington who of 
course spoke in the name of the whole Atlantic 
Alliance but, above all, interpreted the require-
ments of the so-called European pillar of the 
alliance which corresponds to the underlying 
logic of WEU. 
While a greater effort to restore a conventional 
balance in Europe is awaited, we urge that WEU 
should commit itself actively in three directions: 
first, concerted efforts by our defence ministers 
to improve conventional defences by means of 
long-term programmes based on the use of 
advanced technology; second, the creation of 
European research and development agencies in 
the key sector of defence production; third, the 
pursuit of an industrial defence policy based on 
common European rules and practices for pur-
chases and supplies. 
In all these three directions WEU can do a 
great deal by establishing procedures aimed at 
co-ordination and agreement on financial, legal 
and technological matters. 
I welcome Mr. Chirac's proposal for major 
joint armaments projects. 
As Europeans we wish to make an active 
contribution to the disarmament process. This 
will only be possible if the process we would like 
to see guarantees our security within the Atlantic 
Alliance because there can be no European 
security outside the alliance. We do not wish to 
lay down binding preconditions for the various 
stages. We do however wish the process to be 
balanced. This will guarantee progress towards 
the successful achievement of this vital 
objective. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe is 
now feeling increasingly isolated. " Irangate " 
with all its complications and all the problems it 
has created for our American allies is the source 
of new concern and also new dangers in the 
Serious negotiations on conventional forces Mediterranean, to which a country like the one 
should be proposed to the Russians and fully for which I am speaking is particularly sensitive 
public~se~ in order to. persu~d~ Moscow t.o having recently experienced all the aggression 
comm1t 1tself to a drastic cut m 1ts forces; th1s and threats of international terrorism. 
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The anti-terrorist agreement established 
between Europe and the United States in the 
Tokyo declaration at the cost of many sacrifices 
and doubts - which dominated our work in 
Venice and also Luxembourg - seems to be in 
danger or at least to require drafting in fresh 
terms against the background of an America in 
torment from self-doubt. 
Defence against terrorism and defence of the 
Mediterranean in the wider context of European 
defence are two closely-linked issues. We must 
use all our forces including those of countries 
which are not members of the military alliance. 
Both for the negotiations on conventional forces 
and for fresh studies into means of protecting 
Europe if the zero option is adopted, France's 
contribution is essential; and we must once again 
pay tribute to this Assembly which brings 
together a variety of institutions and views under 
the common European banner. 
As I am the first member of the Italian 
Government to speak after the Prime Minister of 
the French Republic, Mr. Chirac, I must say that 
the proposal for a European security charter, of 
which the practical specific content will have to 
be considered, is a worthwhile proposal for 
Western European Union and one which should 
receive the full attention of all the European 
states including countries like Portugal and 
Spain which Mr. Chirac also mentioned. 
We agree that deterrence in Europe requires 
the closest strategic unity between Western 
Europe and the United States and we are 
convinced that the political strengthening of 
Europe requires a common defence in line with 
the ideas of the great federalist tradition which 
we have supported for many years. There are 
however, independent views on ways of 
achieving the zero option and these views must 
be at the heart of this and future debates before 
the fixing of any common bases accepted by and 
acceptable to everyone and valid for a European 
security charter designed to meet the needs of the 
seven countries. 
To conclude, our aim is to restore a partner 
relationship between Europe and the United 
States based on a consistent and courageous 
acceptance of European responsibilities - that is 
our responsibilities - in matters of conventional 
defence, which are taking on vital importance for 
the security which we must all feel to be 
European; otherwise there will be no security. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. As is the custom in this Assembly -
and with your agreement - a number of repre-
sentatives will now put questions to you. 
I call Mr. Sarti. 
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Mr. SARTI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Spa-
dolini, you have spoken to us today as Minister 
of Defence of the Italian Government but I am 
sure that as the former editor of some of Italy's 
leading newspapers you will have noted an out-
standing feature of this morning's European 
press. Because of your efforts, those of members 
of government and above all of our President, 
Mr. Caro, WEU has today hit the headlines in 
the main European dailies. This is of vital 
importance to us. My question is can the Italian 
Government confirm the statements made 
during the recent debate in the Italian Par-
liament on the finance bill that the Government 
of the Italian Republic is prepared to give speedy 
practical effect to its sympathetic attitude 
towards increasing the Assembly's resources as 
requested and repeatedly affirmed throughout 
this debate, in Mr. Bianco's report and during 
the whole course of our work? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - I must thank Mr. Sarti for his 
appreciation of the Italian Government's contri-
bution to the recent reactivation of WEU fol-
lowing the Rome conference to celebrate the 
organisation's thirtieth anniversary which put an 
end to the separation of the foreign and defence 
ministries and associated them in giving gui-
dance to the heads of an organisation, which is 
the only one empowered to discuss European 
security and in so doing removed a number of 
shortcomings which had been revealed by expe-
rience. 
As the ex-editor of a newspaper I also share his 
satisfaction at seeing WEU on the front page of 
the leading European dailies. This is more than a 
mere article; it is the consequence of a renewed 
and sharper European awareness which derives 
also from the singular and complex manner of 
Europe's reaction to Reykjavik when it found 
itself in the middle of major discussions from 
which it seemed somehow to be excluded. There 
is a clear need for us all to assert our identity as a 
continent and an identity on the way to a future 
common defence. 
On the third point I can give an absolute gua-
rantee to Mr. Sarti regarding the Italian Govern-
ment's commitment, as declared by Mr. 
Andreotti and myself in Luxembourg, to provide 
funds to supplement the very miserly budgets 
which the European states allow to WEU. I can 
do so with even more certainty because the 
finance bill has already been approved by one 
house of parliament - the one of which I am not 
a member - and the bill is now before the senate. 
I can also guarantee my personal support as a 
senator. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cifarelli. 
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Mr. CIFARELLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, you will not be surprised that there 
have been several Italian speakers, not because 
of any national alignment or nationalist attitudes 
but chiefly in expression of our gratitude to Mr. 
Spadolini for his contribution to this debate. 
This is not the first time he has been with us. 
I share his overall assessment, expressing the 
view of a leading newspaper man, when he said 
that after Reykjavik nothing will be the same as 
before and that we are faced with the conse-
quences whether good or bad. 
In this context I have two questions to ask. 
Does Mr. Spadolini think that serious negotia-
tions on conventional weapons involving 
Europe, which is about to be organised and 
regards the strengthening of WEU as of vital 
importance, should take up this most serious of 
all problems once the nuclear shields have been 
withdrawn and could make reasonable further 
economic, administrative and industrial efforts 
to achieve conventional rearmament? Because a 
conventional balance will not fall from heaven. 
My second question is as follows. Seeing that 
wars are now either fought by proxy or with 
concealed bombs, does Mr. Spadolini, who has 
so often spoken on the subject of international 
terrorism, think that WEU could set up special 
bodies for this kind of war, not to take the place 
of the police or the courts in the democratic 
countries where the rule of law applies but to 
create a special awareness of the terrorist threat 
as it affects European defence? 
May I remind Mr. Spadolini that a great deal 
has been said at this session concerning security 
in the Mediterranean. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - With my thanks to Mr. Cifarelli 
for his appreciation of the government's attitude, 
I shall now try to answer his two questions. 
I think that any serious negotiations on 
conventional weapons, for which I have called 
formally after Stockholm, must be based on the 
willingness of the governments favouring them 
to provide the necessary means for conventional 
defence on a rising scale inversely proportionate 
to any reduction of nuclear weapons for which 
we must work. 
To the extent that we have serious hopes- and 
it was not by accident that I mentioned the 
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achieved with the level of each side's conven-
tional forces and the greater must be our rea-
diness to back their effort. We are well aware that 
conventional weapons cost more but no country 
should sit back behind the permanent nuclear 
shield of the United States; this applies particu-
larly, of course, to countries which have no 
nuclear weapons of their own and I am therefore 
referring specifically to the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy which have always observed 
their commitments under the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. 
I think, therefore, that this effort should be 
made to match the momentum of detente and 
the advance towards a better relationship than at 
present between the two sides in continental 
Europe itself because otherwise it is clear that by 
giving up even a minimum defence policy, 
Europe would give up the search for and the 
defence of its identity - I use the term made 
famous by Braudel concerning the identity of 
France. 
I must say that this awareness of common 
European security is shared in my country not 
only by the government parties but also by the 
biggest opposition party. It would be well to read 
carefully, as I have done, the joint document on 
European security put before parliament, which 
says much the same things as I have said in this 
Assembly. 
The second point concerns wars by proxy and 
concealed wars. I took part in a debate at Venice 
and urged a measure which was not very great 
but to some extent anticipated WEU's interest in 
defining the means for a co-ordinated fight 
against terrorism. The Venice conference took 
place five or six days before the Tokyo confe-
rence with its declaration committing the indus-
trialised countries to a common political fight 
against terrorism in preference to the military 
option. 
I would say to Mr. Cifarelli that I do not 
believe that WEU can set up institutions in the 
true sense but should help to establish the condi-
tions for a joint analysis of terrorism and for this 
purpose the existing groups are of great impor-
tance particularly in the connection, which I 
tried to establish in my previous report at 
Luxembourg, between the defence of the Medi-
terranean and defence against terrorism which in 
the Mediterranean is a by no means negligible 
part of the warlike aggression. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Budapest appeal - that once the nuclear negotia- Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Yes-
tions have been started towards the zero option, terday, Mr. Chirac declared himself unequivo-
which will take a number of years, the Soviet cally in favour of enlarging WEU to include Por-
Union will back this mutual reduction of the tugal and Spain. Is that your position, too, in 
level of deterrence in Eastern Europe, the greater view of the fact that it would bring our southern 
our conviction that good results can quickly be flank into balance with Central Europe? At the 
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Mr. Close (continued) 
moment, the southern flank consists solely of 
Italy as against six Central European countries. 
In your address you said that a possible 
counter to the presence of SS-21, SS-22 and 
SS-23 short-range missiles was a renewed quanti-
tative balance or the redeployment of an anti-
missile system by the Europeans. 
Would you agree, Minister, with the 
conclusion that even if we achieve this new 
balance, it would not constitute in any way the 
same deterrent that theatre nuclear forces gave 
us at European level? 
These short-range missiles, equipped with 
nuclear, chemical or conventional warheads, are 
capable of covering the whole of Europe whereas 
the response that we would command would not 
allow us in any eventuality to reach Soviet ter-
ritory. In other words, deterrence at this level is 
non-existent. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - In reply to Mr. Close I would say 
that my government and I myself favour the 
entry of Spain and Portugal into WEU. The 
subject was discussed in detail at the most recent 
meeting of foreign and defence ministers in 
Luxembourg. 
There must be a balance between the southern 
flank of the alliance, the importance ofwhich has 
become crystal clear in recent years and what I 
might call Central Europe. I see this not so much 
in terms of more or fewer Romance language 
speakers as compared with those of Anglo-Saxon 
stock. I would not say this, particularly because I 
believe that Spain is essential to Western Europe 
now that the Iberian peninsula has awakened 
from its centuries-old slumber in " Spanishness " 
as though it were different from Europe. This I 
would say is the chief new feature in the discreet 
enquiries from Spain and the open application 
from Portugal to join WEU. 
Looking at the ideas which have always deter-
mined the course of history this is the one of 
most importance. Spain and Portugal now feel 
themselves to be part of European defence; thirty 
of forty years ago this was a completely foreign 
idea because of a lingering centuries-old philo-
sophy, regardless of the totalitarian regimes in 
both countries. Hence the importance of this 
point. 
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tries without reservation or distinction. From 
this point of view it might be tactically wise for 
enlargement to take place after reactivation of 
the organisation has been completed as was sug-
gested in Luxembourg. 
We must bear in mind, however, the moral, 
political and may I say cultural value of Spain 
and Portugal's adhesion for European defence 
and for maintaining a balance between the 
defence of Central and Mediterranean Europe. 
The second point is problematic. I did not 
state a choice. What I said was that, in the 
context of the dominant importance of conven-
tional defence, there were two possible 
approaches. Either to deploy a number of short-
range missiles in order to have parity during the 
negotiations - and in any case the suggestion in 
Reykjavik was that fresh negotiations on such 
missiles should be started within six months. 
This is the first approach. The second I suggested 
might be for WEU to make more detailed studies 
aimed at a non-nuclear ground-based anti-
missile system, within the concept of enlarged 
defence against attack from the air. 
I do not wish to be too definite and categorical 
on this second point. Looking at the problem of 
nuclear deterrence it is clear to me that this type 
of anti-missile defence has no deterrent effect on 
a potential competitor who has any kind of 
nuclear system. But we here start from the dif-
ferent point that, within the need for a balance 
after long-range missiles have been withdrawn, 
the element of extended air defence, particularly 
against missiles, must be ev:aluated for the 
defence of Europe. Naturally, of course, it has to 
be remembered that France and the United 
Kingdom are still independent nuclear powers; if 
we had forgotten this we were clearly reminded 
of the fact yesterday by Mr. Chirac here in WEU. 
I would say, therefore, that this is a legitimate 
matter of concern but less so in the thought that 
we shall have to look for a kind of defence based 
progressively less on deterrence of the enemy 
and more on the belief that everyone is working 
for a new world order in which ultimately there 
will be no further need for deterrence. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. Spadolini, I shall be asking you the question 
I have already put in writing to Mr. Chirac from 
whom I am expecting a written reply. 
As you know, the Italian Parliament has for 
some time been discussing a new law on the 
There is, however, another important point arms trade which is a burning issue these days 
which must be mentioned as we have now both nationally and internationally. May I ask 
touched on this delicate issue. I am referring to you if you do not think that, before any final 
the fact that the entry of Spain and Portugal national legislation is adopted on the subject, 
comes at a time which has seen the full emer- steps should be taken at international level and 
gence of common awareness in the seven coun- particularly in WEU to promote an agreement or 
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Mr. Stegagnini (continued) problem is to limit and end all illicit arms pur-
chases. 
at least precise directives on the subject, The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
common to all the European countries which are Pollidoro. 
major producers of modem weapons and that we 
should not adopt specific national measures or Mr. POLLIDORO (Italy) (Translation). -
attitudes which may damage the Italian industry Minister, I welcome your statements and your 
or even give rise to unfair competition and dis- positive attitude on two points in particular. 
putes with companies in allied countries? The first is your assessment of the results of 
I think this is an important point and that Reykjavik which has opened fresh prospects for 
WEU is the best place for its discussion. I should the East-West negotiations on disarmament. The 
be grateful for a reply. second is that you have reiterated in strong terms 
the correct western position on the zero The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the option. 
Minister. 
I am also pleased because the attitude to the 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence for outcome of the Luxembourg meeting has seemed 
Italy) (Translation). - I would in a way like .to to me to be somewhat confused at this session of 
reverse Mr. Stegagnini's question and ask him WEU. We have for example heard suggestions 
and the other Italian representatives to WEU to concerning the need for a kind of European SDI 
launch an initiative on the subject both in the which in our opinion would in no way help good 
Parliament of the Italian Republic and in the relations with the Soviet Union as we must be 
other parliaments. This is in fact an initiati_ve ready and willing to continue the disarmament 
which would come much better from parha- negotiations. There also seems to have been 
ments than from governments as I myself tabled some alarm amongst European politicians 
a bill on the arms trade in Italy about eighteen concerning the possibility that a disarmament 
months ago, together with I think seven or ei~t agreement might be reached with Eastern 
other ministers. This bill has been redrafted m Europe. This, I repeat, is what we see~. to 
parliament by a small committee and will come understand from certain European political 
up for debate within a few days or weeks. forces. 
The point put by Mr. Stegagnini is undoub- Since the Luxembourg meeting I have read in 
tedly correct. Without binding international the Voce Repubblicana a statement by you that 
agreements, no country can co!ltrol the . arms " in view of the probable imbalance of conven-
trade and particularly clandestme and Illegal tional weapons between East and West the need 
trade; just as I say to Mr. Stegagnini, as I have is to reduce their potential or to increase ours". 
been saying almost alone for years- no country We can only repeat that we are ready for this. I 
can possibly fight terrorism without a world wish to thank you for having quoted the recent 
agreement on anti-terrorist law. They are the Communist Party report on security policy in 
same thing because, may I also say~ the .arms Europe and the world which we su~mitted t<? Mr. 
trade and terrorism have been closely mterhnked Caro and Lord Carrington to explam the attitude 
over the last fifteen years. Just as rules are of the Italian Communist Party to international 
needed for Europe and beyond Europe to combat questions and to the alliances, including NATO, 
all evasions and breaches in the arms trade, the of which we are a member. 
same applies to the totally out-of-date and inade-
quate laws for the fight against terrorism even Regarding your statement that it is necessary 
though some progress has been made recently. to reduce their potential or increase ours, I would 
ask you if you consider it more useful, if we are 
I must say, not purely in defence of my aiming at the lowest possible level, to find out 
country which has many faults which I have exactly what the Soviet attitude is. That is, do 
sometimes criticised bitterly, that as regards the you consider it more useful to "see the cards" 
arms trade we are certainly not masters of and ascertain real attitudes as demonstrated by 
anybody and our national defence is open to the Stockholm experience, and the new attitudes 
great damage from other countries as regards of the new leaders. Or do you consider it better 
armaments and ruthless competition. I think to arm at once to restore the balance and then to 
therefore that the line you suggested is not easy negotiate which would appear to be the view of 
or immediately achievable but I see it as an some political circles? Or again, would it be 
essential target for mankind and for Europe if we better to rearm during the negotiations? Rather, 
are to escape from all the politically destabilising might not this trigger off a new race? ~hi.s is an 
factors which the unlimited and monstrously important question. Do you favour venfymg the 
swollen trade in arms carries with it. negotiating cards first? Otherwise the attitude 
I conclude by recalling that Lord Carrington would be to rearm first and then negotiate but 
spoke of joint procedures for sales and pur- this seems to have failed at least as regards the 
chases, naturally of a legal nature. The real power which has favoured it over the last few 
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Mr. Pollidoro (continued) 
years. I should be very interested to hear your 
reply on this point. 
So far as Italy is concerned we of the Com-
munist Party are in favour of increasing alloca-
tions for the reactivation of WEU and have 
already declared ourselves in favour of this in the 
Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - I have no difficulty in replying 
because I said in my first speech that serious 
negotiations on conventional weapons should be 
proposed to the Soviets at once and fully 
publicised to persuade Moscow to agree to a 
drastic reduction of its forces. Clearly if the nego-
tiations failed or ran up against insurmountable 
obstacles, the European countries should in the 
interval consider ways and means of beginning 
to strengthen their conventional weapons, a 
process which would probably take longer than 
the negotiations. I have every confidence 
therefore in repeating that my view is that nego-
tiations on conventional weapons should be 
restarted immediately. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I am pleased to note the 
presence of one other Mediterranean represen-
tative in the chamber, since France gives the 
impression of not wanting to be identified with 
the Mediterranean. I express my satisfaction and 
sincere thanks to Mr. Spadolini for presenting a 
Mediterranean viewpoint today as he did last 
June. 
With considerable wisdom, he has described 
the disregard there is in the Atlantic Alliance and 
Europe proper for the Mediterranean region as 
far as defence is concerned with all the risks that 
such an attitude entails. This needs repeating and 
the attention of Europe and the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance needs to be drawn to the Medi-
terranean which has, unfortunately, become an 
ocean of crisis. 
I would like, if I may, to put a direct question. 
Both Mr. Chirac yesterday and Mr. Spadolini 
today clearly expressed the viewpoints of their 
respective governments with regard to enlarge-
ment and we are grateful to them for doing so. 
However, only two countries were mentioned 
with any frequency. 
We would, of course, be happy to see Spain 
and Portugal in Western European Union but 
this somewhat insistent preference smacks to us 
of limitation. It is not very" nice", really, given 
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our presence in this chamber and the interest we 
take in the defence of Europe amd the Atlantic 
Alliance in general. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - I wish to thank the represen-
tative of our Turkish friends for having so 
strongly supported the Italian Government's 
position on defence in an area which has hitherto 
so far been unduly neglected in the Mediter-
ranean which is the focus of crises and I would 
say of every crisis. I confirm the links between 
the governments of our two countries. 
As regards armaments there is no limit to be 
set to what is a European concept and to a 
certain extent a universal concept. I would 
merely add that the Turkish Republic is not yet a 
member of the European Community and that 
these problems have to be appro~ched gradually 
but without prejudice and exclusions, realising 
that the construction of Europe including its 
common defence will take what may probably 
not be a very short time. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Budtz. 
Mr. BUDTZ (Observer from Denmark). -
Thank you for giving another obServer the floor, 
Mr. President. 
My question has already been partly asked. I 
should like to inform the Minister that I am a 
social democrat from Denmark, and he is pro-
bably aware that in all the Western European 
social democratic parties we are having a serious 
debate on the future role of Europe. We are not 
in the slightest doubt that there must be a new 
role for Europe. The big problem is where, how 
and when. Of course, one of the possibilities 
must be WEU. Understandably, that has been 
mentioned. I am happy to note that the French 
Prime Minister yesterday and the Italian 
Minister of Defence today underlined the need 
for Europe to play a much bigger and more pro-
minent role. 
You, Mr. Spadolini, and Mr. Chirac men-
tioned two countries - Spain and Portugal. Mr. 
Inan also referred to them. That is probably 
because those two countries have already applied 
for membership. That is underl!ltandable, and I 
fully respect it. I am not even sure that Denmark 
will ever apply for membership, but there are 
five other NATO countries - Turkey, Greece, 
Iceland, Norway and Denmark. I might be right 
in assuming why you did not mention those five 
countries, but I am not sure that it is clever to try 
to split Europe in that way. 
After Reykjavik, we are all aware that Europe 
must play a new and much more prominent role. 
There is not the slightest doubt about that, and 
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Mr. Budtz (continued) 
the social democratic parties agree. But if one 
divides Western Europe once more, what does 
one achieve? Later we might participate in 
dividing Europe because there might be some 
important nuances in how we look at WEU and 
its work. On the other hand, we must have some 
co-operation. It could be European political co-
operation - I do not know; we must do some-
thing about it. We are not paving the way for a 
united Europe by splitting it. Therefore, will you 
confirm, Mr. Spadolini, that you mentioned 
those two countries because they have applied 
for membership, and there were no other reasons 
for not mentioning the others that are partici-
pating in North Atlantic co-operation? 
Thank you for your patience, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - The reply could be very short. I 
wished to speak only of the countries which have 
applied to join WEU because it would have been 
interfering in Denmark's internal affairs to ask 
that country to do so. From the standpoint of 
protocol - and there is nothing to stop me com-
menting on a known political fact - as I said to 
the Turks and I say to the Danes, Europe must 
be enlarged as a defence entity so that we are 
tending to favour aligning the nucleus for 
common European defence as closely as possible 
with the countries which also support the 
Atlantic effort, while accepting that there are 
countries with different treaties in the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
You, Mr. Budtz, referred to Norway which has 
its own regime excluding certain bases while 
other countries accept the installation of supra-
national bases. These countries have taken dif-
ferent positions in NATO as regards certain 
commitments. I think, however, that there is still 
a need to enlarge Europe for defence and to go 
into the ways in which it can be enlarged in order 
to produce fruitful results. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hill. 
Mr. HILL (United Kingdom). - You made 
great play of a joint defence policy, Mr. Spa-
dolini. As you will know, that is almost impos-
sible, whether it be in NATO or WEU. If one 
were to examine each country, one would realise 
when one got to the United Kingdom that there 
the political parties have wholly opposed policies 
on defence. It may be that certain people are 
being brainwashed by Mr. Gorbachev's well-
managed public relations exercise in Reykjavik, 
and we have already heard one or two strange 
views here today. However, I suspect that in 
most countries political union will not hold on 
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any JOint defence policy. Currently there are 
stresses in the alliance. In its talks with the 
United States, the United Kingdom is already 
having difficulty in bringing President Reagan 
back from the brink of complete nuclear disar-
mament. I think that Mrs. Thatcher succeeded. 
The political stability of western defence is in 
jeopardy. You may take a more optimistic view, 
Mr. Spadolini, but if you had listened to the 
debates here this week, you would realise that, 
whether it is WEU or NATO, all politicians must 
take a firmer line. The USSR is winning the pro-
paganda war. It is promising paradise forever 
provided that we lie down and take the 
punishment. This is what all defence ministers in 
Europe must say: " Do not believe the harpie in 
Moscow. Believe your own conscience. Your 
own defence is in yourself. " Then the public will 
be more assured about European defence. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - There is in fact no question to 
answer. I have heard a confession of the diffi-
culties encountered by the European idea in the 
United Kingdom and I might add in every 
country. There are indeed problems in every 
country but over the last few years a common 
awareness has emerged between the European 
countries as regards production for example. 
I should like to quote one example which 
directly concerns the United Kingdom. Five or 
six years ago who would have thought it possible 
that five-power agreement could be reached on a 
fighter aircraft for the nineties? Does the fact that 
five countries signed an agreement for the fighter 
aircraft in Madrid on 8th July 1984 constitute 
common defence or not? The fact that France 
later withdrew because of difficulties with its 
industry and that your great country the United 
Kingdom remains confirms the possibility of 
developing joint production and research 
methods, common structures and common 
supply facilities because all of us - British, Ita-
lians and apart from the military aspects French 
and Spanish - are linked in the command 
structure of the Atlantic Alliance which imme-
diately involves the surrender of some national 
sovereignty to other organisations and is to some 
extent supranational. 
I have no illusions that European defence is 
just around the corner. I am aware that the diffi-
culties in your country are encountered in dif-
ferent forms in other countries. I know that the 
party politicians are free to take whatever view 
they like on these subjects and no one would 
wish to limit party dialectics. But I also know 
that what is written, as Hegel said, in the stars of 
history, that is in the wide open European 
spaces, is bound to happen however much men 
may resist. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Kittelmann. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Minister, taking up 
your remark about the irritation - the term you 
used was rather more restrained - in Europe 
with regard to the United States, what do you 
expect the United States' response to be if 
Europe does not go in for the conventional rear-
mament that we are all demanding? 
Second, how, in your opinion, should the 
United States' attitude towards Libya today be 
assessed, now that over six months have passed 
and a change of heart is clearly visible in Libya 
and above all in its President, or Colonel as he 
calls himself? In contrast to the excitement that 
arose immediately afterwards, would you say 
that there is now more sympathy for the Ame-
rican response? 
Third, what do you believe should now be 
done for the Mediterranean countries? What, in 
your opinion, can now be done to strengthen the 
southern region? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - These are two very different 
questions. I shall try to explain my position in 
regard to a problem which has arisen rather than 
to the question asked. I shall not speak of United 
States annoyance with Europe regarding conven-
tional weapons because, as things stand, defence 
as agreed has been based on nuclear weapons as 
from the moment that the Germans, British, Ita-
lians, Belgians and Dutch asked for Euromissiles 
to strengthen common European and Atlantic 
defence and to involve the United States, as was 
not previously the case. This was in particular 
the position of the German Government in 
1979. I would say, however, that in recent 
months there has been some incentive for a fresh 
speeding up of conventional defence, against the 
prospect of the zero option which has not yet 
been agreed as the whole process broke down at 
Reykjavik. 
Clearly, therefore, the process is one of hope 
which we Italians share for the success of nego-
tiations for a radical balanced reduction of inter-
mediate-range missiles in particular. This brings 
up again the question put by other parliamenta-
rians. The European governments must under-
stand that conventional defence costs more than 
accepting nuclear arsenals in Europe and the-
refore calls for a financial effort to co-ordinate 
and rationalise armaments and to integrate the 
economies of the various European countries. I 
do not, therefore, see the subject in exactly the 
same way as the representative of the United 
States Congress who keeps on asking for Europe 
to meet its own expenses. 
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If I have understood correctly, the second 
problem is terrorism and the attitude to Libya. 
As an Italian directly involved I must say that I 
do not think that the Libyan regime was weak-
ened by the American bombing. I find that the 
military action taken did not reduce Kadhafi's 
power, assuming that that was the intention. I 
find it somewhat difficult to imagine how it can 
be reduced now that America is involved in aid 
to a regime like that of Iran which certainly does 
not behave like a humble penitent. 
There is the third question of what is to be 
done in the Mediterranean. A Franco-Italian-
Spanish group for naval aircraft co-operation has 
carried its studies to an advanced stage. Quite 
clearly the Mediterranean problem is of imme-
diate interest to Italy and to two countries like 
France and Spain which are half Mediterranean 
and half Atlantic, because if Colonel Kadhafi 
wins the day in Chad not only France will be 
affected but also Spain and Italy, and if Libyan 
or Arab terrorism is unleashed in Spain it will 
not affect that country only. We are all involved 
in this struggle which should be co-ordinated at 
military level; but I do not feel able to approve 
military action against terrorism in the light of 
experience over the last few years from Lebanon 
to Libya. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pal umbo. 
Mr. PALUMBO (Italy) (Translation). -May I 
first express to you, Minister, my satisfaction at 
your statement concerning the enlargement of 
WEU to include not only Spain and Portugal but 
all the European members of NATO which we 
hope may apply. This is an important state-
ment of which I wish to underline the positive 
political significance. 
My question concerns another aspect of 
Western European security. At Reykjavik, the 
United States and the Soviet Union came very 
close to agreement or at least so it seemed. It 
seems to have been felt here that there were signs 
of an American attitude favouring United States 
interests exclusively at the expense of European 
interests. As the star wars shield cannot protect 
Europe but only the United States, may this be 
the first sign of United States isolationism in 
relation to Europe? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - As a historian I have some 
doubts as to whether we yet know the full story 
of Reykjavik. I therefore suggest that it was not 
only SDI which led to the failure to reach 
agreement that Sunday afternoon when we were 
all following events anxiously on our television 
screens. The disagreement over SDI was pro-
bably the last straw on top of the other complex 
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elements including the balance of nuclear 
weapons. 
Secondly, I do not feel that I can at present say 
that the star wars shield covers anything at all, 
not even America because it has not yet proved 
itself. This shield is a challenge to science and 
research stretching at least ten years ahead and is 
rather like a book opened before us; and the 
United States has taken a heavy gamble, which 
will now probably encounter more resistance and 
greater obstacles in terms of votes in Congress, 
with the new situation now existing in America. 
In my view, however, it has never been envi-
saged even by the United States as an alternative 
to nuclear or conventional defence, except in the 
message delivered in 1983 by President Reagan 
looking to the supplanting and total removal of 
nuclear weapons, a subject on which scientists 
are divided even in America. 
I do not feel therefore that I can answer the 
second point in the sense that I am unable to say 
whether space research although inevitable in 
today's world can resolve the problem of force 
balances. 
The third subject stems from the first two, 
namely whether there is not a tendency towards 
isolationism. This threat is so real that the 
leaders of the three countries I mentioned as 
wanting Euromissiles want them in order to 
prevent American isolationism. The British and 
Italian Governments reached an agreement -
and on this subject I recall an admirable article 
by Aron, the great inspiration of the lay tradition 
- to combat a constant tendency towards isola-
tionism in America in relation to Europe. The 
risk America runs is as great as that which it 
creates and involves America just as much as 
Europe. Clearly if the zero option is achieved 
things will change. There will still be risks of 
American isolationism and the risk of the idea of 
Europe as a third force for which we lack the 
necessary strength. As Mr. Chirac said and he 
cannot be suspected, these risks must now be 
removed by close military and strategic co-ope-
ration between the United States and Western 
Europe because otherwise we would run the risk 
of American isolationism towards Europe and 
European isolationism towards America. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Minister, let me begin by 
thanking you for your statement this afternoon. I 
believe it has shown once again that Italy, the 
Italian Parliament and the Italian Government 
take particular account of the common interests 
and common needs of Europe, not only in decla-
rations of principle but also in practical policy. 
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I have three short questions. The first concerns 
international terrorism. I know that your country 
is particularly threatened by it and that you are 
personally concerned with overcoming it. Our 
Assembly has considered this question on many 
occasions. In Recommendation 435 we said that 
the problem of the terrorist threat was a matter 
for WEU and one which WED's agencies could 
be instructed to investigate. My question to you, 
Minister, is this: what do you think of the 
Assembly's view on this, and do you see any 
chance of its being accepted by the defence 
ministers and ultimately by the Council of 
foreign ministers? 
My second question is directly connected with 
the problem of international terrorism. You 
yourself have just said, Minister - and I share 
this view - that there is a close link between the 
international arms trade and terrorism. What 
opportunities do you see for restricting the inter-
national arms trade, and would your country 
join in efforts by other countries to place restric-
tions on it? 
My third and last question I put to you in your 
capacity as Italian Defence Minister. What do 
you think of the establishment by France, the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany of a working group to consider security 
in Europe? Do you not believe that WEU rather 
than an additional working group should be res-
ponsible for these matters? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - I thank Mr. Ahrens for his kind 
words about my country and the efforts that Italy 
is making in this struggle. My country is certainly 
very much exposed to international terrorism. 
With regard to the first point, I would say that 
WEU can certainly impart political impetus 
through the group it has set up but the initiative 
for devising new ways of combating terrorism is 
a matter for other organisations. I would not give 
WEU any operational functions under this 
heading. 
I confirm the Italian Government's total rea-
diness to join in any combined action for 
controlling the arms trade at international level 
with commitments that other governments 
would be prepared to enter into as well. Being 
particularly exposed by its geographical position 
to the risks of illegal arms trading, Italy is parti-
cularly alive to the need for a discipline that 
would avoid the two dangers I consider to be 
particularly serious: first, the clandestine use of 
national territory and second the ultimate desti-
nation of the arms. We have to have guarantees 
with far greater international backing that ships 
in fact go where they are supposed to go. No 
European government, including the Italian 
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Government, is in a position today to have the 
means of controlling and monitoring the final 
destination of arms shipments. It is not possible 
that a country should send properly licensed 
shipments of arms- even to a friendly country, 
not involved in any local warlike conflict - and 
then see those arms find their way to a theatre of 
war through triangular trading. 
For my part, I repeat that the Italian 
Government is ready to co-operate; in the next 
few weeks it will be busy on a series of amend-
ments proposed by the government itself to the 
bill on arms dealing. 
With regard to the proposed three-member 
directorate, I have to say that it has no formal 
substance for me because its existence has always 
been denied. I am too close a friend of France, 
the United Kingdom and Germany to believe 
that they would stoop to telling lies, which never 
go undiscovered for very long anyway, so I 
accept the denial remembering that in 1983 
something similar that was being organised was 
brought to an end when I visited all three 
European capitals to prevent an organisation of 
this kind from being set up. 
I have always spoken for four- or five-sided 
arms agreements or else bilateral agreements - as 
we have with the United Kingdom, Germany 
and France. 
My concern is that if an industrial defence axis 
between France and Germany gets too strong it 
could prompt other countries to feel they ought 
to have bilateral agreements to match. I prefer 
agreements between four or five countries. 
In any case WEU is a homogenous forum 
where ideas can be exchanged on disarmament 
and which is therefore ideal for working out a 
European approach to defence. If there have to 
be directorates, they would best be controlled by 
parliaments because we ought not to forget that 
the " Directoire " led to a First Consul and then 
an Emperor. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bianco, the last speaker on the list. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). - Minister, 
we well know your deep commitment to Europe 
and your strong convictions of the part this orga-
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importance. The first concerns the question that 
you have raised, namely, the request that 
security policy should be dealt with in the 
context of WEU - not through agreement 
between certain governments only. This 
amendment was approved unanimously but 
there is a further step and that is the request to 
the Council of Ministers to work out a position 
agreed by the WEU governments, so that in 
NATO on 11th December it will be possible, for 
the first time after Reykjavik and after the 
important meeting in Luxembourg, to express a 
joint view through the Chairman of the Council 
and a document drawn up by the seven coun-
tries. 
This was unanimously approved by the 
Assembly; we know the difficulties but we ask 
what the Italian Government intends to do in 
that direction. 
To conclude I would like to make one other 
point. There is no doubt that enlargement to 
include other countries could well be important 
but we feel that the first need, in view of the diffi-
culties associated with security policy, is to 
consolidate unity among the existing countries 
and to think of enlargement later. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) 
(Translation). - I thank Mr. Bianco for sup-
porting this approach which reflects the general 
line not only of the present government but also 
of its predecessors because our country has of 
course always been to the fore in advancing the 
cause of Europe even in the midst of so many 
difficulties. 
I agree absolutely with the desirability of the 
amendment which stresses the fact that security 
policy cannot be dissociated from what is WEU's 
essential role or, therefore, subcontracted to indi-
vidual governments outside the framework of an 
agreement - which enables me to repeat what I 
said before about a possible directorate. 
On the second question I believe a common 
European position is certainly essential in 
NATO but we must not forget that there are 
some countries in NATO that are in WEU and 
others playing an important part that are not in 
WEU. So the process can only be gradual. 
nisation can play in the development of a Speaking for the government, I am not at 
security policy for Europe; your address has present in a position to say whether on 11th 
already confirmed this fact. You have already December we will be able to have a joint 
replied in part to a question put by Mr. Ahrens, document which, presented at NATO, could 
which was my question, but there is one aspect I cause many countries to make reservations. I am 
would like to stress. Yesterday the Assembly thinking of Turkey, Denmark and Norway, 
voted unanimously for a recommendation in a countries that cover the far north of Europe and 
report in answer to the thirty-first report of the the southern flank. I was recently in Norway and 
Council of Ministers. In my opinion two para- on the border with the Soviet Union and I know 
graphs in that recommendation are of particular the efforts that have been made by Norway; 
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because let us not forget that it hosts no NATO 
or American bases or nuclear bases and yet has 
been performing a difficult task ever since 1949. 
I know too the importance that Turkey repre-
sents for Europe's southern flank just as I realise 
the importance of Greece for the south-east of 
Europe. 
For this reason I am not able, as representative 
of my government, to approve this formally 
except as an earnest of the day that WEU will be 
able to talk organisation to organisation with 
NATO, as WEU will then represent the reality of 
Europe and its defence which is assured by 
NATO. 
I have always been against - and I have 
worked hard in recent years to prevent - the 
feeling of antagonism that surfaced between the 
NATO dimension and the WEU dimension 
almost as though there were something opposing 
the two; little Europe versus big Europe. 
However I think that the closer association and 
integration that are essential for the future will 
take more than a few days. All this requires a 
process combining the consolidation of WEU 
with the removal from the Atlantic Alliance of 
the elements of doubt and crisis that have 
plagued it over the last few years. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
very much, Minister. Allow me on behalf of the 
Assembly to express our appreciation of your 
great willingness to answer our questions yet 
again. Our discussion with you has been free and 
open and we have had precise answers which will 
certainly inspire us in our future work. 
Thank you too for your mastery of all the stra-
tegic and political facts, including those setting 
the natural geopolitical boundaries of Western 
European Union through the interesting dialogue 
we have also had with the observers from non-
member countries. 
Thank you again, Minister. We hope to see 
you again soon. Your presence is always of the 
greatest help. 
We shall now go on to the next order of the 
day. 
Mr. BIANCO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, I would like to ask for an adjournment 
please. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That is per-
fectly in order, Mr. Bianco. You see that freedom 
of speech goes even as far as suspending the 
sitting. 
I agree. 
The sitting is therefore suspended for a few 
minutes. 
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(The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and 
resumed at 5.20 p.m.) 
(Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is resumed. 
4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European 
Union 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
and 11ote on the draft order, Doe. 1081) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on the outline of a 
new booklet on Western European Union and 
vote on the draft order, Document 1081. 
I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges. 
Mrs. HENNICOT -SCHOEPGES (Luxem-
bourg) (Translation). -Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, the text I have the honour to present 
is not a report in the usual sense but it would be 
wrong to underestimate its importance at this 
particular time. 
With your permission I have a number of pre-
liminary remarks to make. Our committee 
decided to update the information booklet 
brought out on 29th October 1982 and presented 
to the Assembly by my Luxembourg colleague, 
Mr. Albert Berchem, not because they felt we 
had come to end of the restructuring ofWEU but 
so that national parliaments and the public could 
be kept informed about the situation as it now 
stands. Of course, the updating of this infor-
mation has to follow closely on events. That, 
moreover, is the substance of the draft order that 
we shall be asking the Assembly to vote upon. 
I would first like to thank everyone who has 
helped in writing the text and in particular the 
members of the Secretariat-General, all the offi-
cials and experts in the organs concerned and, of 
course, the members of the committee. 
The outline of the booklet puts the Assembly 
last in the list of WEU organs. Some colleagues 
have told me that it should have been first. 
To underscore its importance I shall be pro-
posing to the Assembly that it ask our President 
to add a foreword to the document in order to 
show that the parliamentary Assembly of WEU 
member countries is indeed the central pivot of 
our cor.tmon security and defence policy. 
Today, possibly more than ever, we need to 
make every possible effort to inform national 
parliaments and the public about the existence, 
activities and future of WEU. The information 
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given has to be clear, precise, readable and easy 
to understand. 
The outline for the new booklet goes back to 
the origins of the European Defence Community 
which became Western European Union in 1954 
and thereafter led a quiet - I almost said peaceful 
- life for thirty years up to the Rome declaration 
of 1984 which decided on its reactivation. 
Awareness of the need of a common policy to 
reinforce peace and security in Europe in the 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance led the seven 
member countries to restructure the existing 
organs to give more coherent expression to their 
common resolve. 
In this present simplified outline four different 
levels can be identified: the government level 
with the Council of Ministers and the Permanent 
Council, next the Secretariat-General, third the 
agencies and expert committees and, lastly, the 
parliamentary Assembly. 
Needless to say the efficacy of the different 
organs is not always measured by the number of 
meetings they hold. It is also true that budgetary 
resources are sometimes in inverse proportion to 
those of the Assembly. 
The first goal of our Assembly should, there-
fore, be either to make the existing organs more 
effective through better co-ordination or else to 
achieve more stringently-controlled activity. It 
would be useful to ask the Council for a study on 
this subject. 
The paper we are discussing reports on the 
changes that have taken place, particularly at the 
level of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments, the abolition of the international secre-
tariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the institution of three new agencies respon-
sible for security questions but with different 
individual terms of reference. 
The Assembly has found it difficult to assess 
the effectiveness ofthe new agencies and has said 
so in a number of recommendations. 
Another reorganisation has concerned the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments some of 
.whose activities were wound up on 1st January 
1986. Yesterday, the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council told us that other initiatives had been 
proposed at the informal meeting of the Council 
in Luxembourg last November, in particular the 
quarterly meetings of policy directors. The Secre-
tariat-General has therefore been asked to make 
a study of the administrative structures and 
office locations. Should important decisions be 
taken, these would clearly need to be embodied 
in the text of the booklet. 
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The reactivation has not altered the structure 
of the Assembly and so far no solution has been 
found to its financial problems. Its role, 
however, cannot be denied. It is vitally 
important that defence questions be discussed in 
a parliamentary assembly. Ours is the only 
Assembly in Europe with the mandate to do this. 
In that light, its mission is clearly significant and 
highly important. 
Would it not be wise, in order to increase its 
effectiveness, to combine the parliamentary 
mandate of the WEU Assembly with that of the 
North Atlantic Assembly? Article IX of the 
treaty provides that members of the WEU 
Assembly also represent their countries in the 
Council of Europe. 
As you know, the fields of interest and action 
of these two assemblies are totally different 
whereas security and defence are the major 
concern of both the North Atlantic and the WEU 
assemblies, so that the parallelism between their 
terms of reference is quite evident. Would it not 
be best to have this problem analysed in depth at 
international level since it would be difficult to 
ask most national parliaments to find valid solu-
tions for this matter at individual level? 
I shall make one last remark. The historical 
part of the booklet recalls the events that led our 
countries to join together to ensure their security. 
The thinking of the time stemmed from a phase 
in our history where Europe, because it did not 
have a solid democratic platform, was drawn 
into the worst trial of its existence. Co-operation 
in security was the logical outcome of the post-
war period. 
That co-operation must not in any way 
prevent the voice of our peoples' elected repre-
sentatives being heard. Our Assembly therefore 
has an essential role to play and we cannot 
accept disparaging remarks about it at any level. 
A common defence policy is impossible without 
parliamentary control. 
Not that our Assembly, of course, is proof 
against pitfalls to which all parliamentary assem-
blies are exposed. But any move to displace 
decision centres beyond parliamentary control 
should find us alert and vigilant. 
Finally, Mr. President, I now ask the Assembly 
to approve what the committee has done in the 
writing and updating of the new booklet. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In the 
debate I call Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, the draft orde!l' in Document 
1081 on the outline for a new booklet on 
Western European Union is short, but speaks for 
itself. The number of speakers is small, even 
though we are discussing relations with seven 
parliaments and the public in seven countries, 
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and as Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges said when pre-
senting the report, that is a very important 
subject. We are in fact talking about one of the 
few means we have of maintaining relations with 
the public and the parliaments. 
I have not long been a member of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, 
but as such I should like to compliment Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges on shouldering the task of 
.bringing the WEU booklet up to date. 
Mr. President, you will recall that I drew up 
the motion for an order in Document 1003 of 5th 
December 1984 backed by a large number of 
members. It concerned the publication of the 
history of the third decade of WEU. I corres-
ponded with you about this, Mr. President. On 
30th May 1985 you sent me this answer: " You 
may be sure that the draft budget for 1986 will 
take into account wishes expressed in Document 
1003. " You did that, but thanks to the econo-
misers you did not succeed. I will not resign 
myself to this, and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges 
must forgive me for using her report as a peg to 
hang my problem on. It is not, after all, my per-
sonal problem. If we now draw up a new guide, 
we should use it to guide the public and parlia-
ments not only through the institutional laby-
rinth of WEU but also through its history. Its 
history has not been completely recorded, at least 
not for the public. The second decade culmi-
nated in plans for the reactivation ofWEU. This 
is not unimportant. NATO and the European 
Parliament are much better known to the public 
than WEU. Of WEU's present, past and future 
significance the public knows nothing at 
present. 
At the Council of Europe a motion was 
recently tabled for a resolution on education for 
peace. In my opinion, this is a subject that might 
also have been considered by the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations. The pro-
posal came, let it be noted, from the countries 
that are more or less sitting in the waiting room 
before becoming members ofWEU. How is edu-
cation to be provided without history? 
What I have said so far, Mr. President, is only 
indirectly connected with Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges's report. I have already apologised for 
this. I will conclude by asking her and our com-
mittee Chairman to consider proposing, when 
passing on the order, that the booklet should also 
refer to the literature on the history ofWEU, not 
just a few lines on its origin and the relevant 
dates but a real account of this organisation's fortu~es over the last thirty years. It might also 
refer to the two parts that already exist, and I 
hope that a reference can be made to the third 
part that has yet to be written. 
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Finally, the presentation of the booklet will 
have to be rather more up-to-date. The cover, the 
external appearance of the booklet must be such 
that people are eager to pick it up, which unfor-
tunately cannot be said of the previous editions, 
whose layout has been insufficiently modem and 
attractive. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Morris. 
Mr. MORRIS (United Kingdom) (Trans-
lation). - I congratulate Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges on this very worthwhile document 
and the Chairman of the committee on pushing 
on with this important work. 
When I joined WEU in 1983, one of the first 
things that I did was to read the booklet about 
WEU to get a better understanding of what it was 
all about. One of my major disappointments was 
that I had to read it about three times to 
understand WEU's work. The new text is a great 
deal clearer, and I congratulate Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges on producing such a lucid booklet. 
We talk about reactivation of WEU and yet 
time passes swiftly. It was just over two years ago 
that we had the Rome declaration, and since 
then we have had budgetary constraints. As a 
member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, I am as aware of that as 
anybody. It is not before time to update our com-
munications, and I suggest that the booklet 
should be just the first step. 
The committee should spend some time 
thinking about what it will do with the booklet 
when it has been produced. As Mr. Tummers 
said, it is important that the booklet is up-to-date 
and is prepared in such a manner as to force 
itself on the reader rather than withdraw from 
the reader, by which I mean that its layout and 
typescript should invite the reader's in~erest. Th_e 
committee should also spend some t1me const-
dering the booklet's distribution. 
I do not think that I am overstating the case 
when I say that I doubt whether many parlia-
mentarians in our countries know what WEU 
does, and I hope that every parliamentarian in 
each of our domestic parliaments will receive a 
copy of the booklet. It is also important that 
defence interests receive a copy. I do not mean 
just civil servants, and I would include major 
defence contractors and the interested media. 
Although leader writers might know about WEU, 
I wonder whether some of the up and coming 
younger writers know about its importance. We 
ignore at our peril the universities and senior stu-
dents of economics, politics and defence, and I 
hope that the committee can secure access to the 
libraries that serve those interests. 
I have already said that the booklet is readable 
and a major improvement on the old one, but 
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there should be what is often called a throw-away 
leaflet. There should be a simplified leaflet - a 
precis - which, if made available in large 
numbers, would help the communication 
process. 
We were all deeply moved by Mr. Chirac's 
speech yesterday. He encapsulated the impor-
tance of the work before us when he said that 
Europe needed an institution of its own capable 
of enlightening public opinion and demons-
trating exactly what was at stake. We do indeed 
need to enlighten public opinion. I hope that this 
will be the first of many booklets. As a member 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration, I shall continue to fight for 
greater resources for this very worthwhile 
work. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur 
for the Committee on Parliamentary and Public 
Relations. 
Mrs. HENNICOT -SCHOEPGES (Luxem-
bourg) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, I can be pleased that so few speakers 
have taken part in the debate, given the quality 
of the statements by Mr. Tummers and Mr. 
Morris and the worth of their suggestions. 
I agree on the need to write the history of 
Western European Union but we are in a cleft 
stick, so to speak, because time presses. 
The old booklet is out of print and if WEU 
wants something to distribute, the new version 
has to be printed quickly. I therefore propose 
that Mr. Tummers put his suggestion to the Pre-
sidential Committee. The information could be 
circulated, perhaps, at several levels because 
what he is asking for would be targeted at a more 
knowledgeable readership. Our booklet on the 
other hand, is intended for parliaments and a 
wider public and therefore needs to be simpler 
and easier to read. 
I wholly agree with the idea of peace edu-
cation. I myself have suggested several times in 
our committee that WEU should be mentioned 
in school text books. For that to happen an 
approach would have be made to the national 
governments. At the moment school books refer 
to UNO and sometimes the Council of Europe 
but never to WEU. Every country would have to 
correct the books currently used in schools. 
I thank Mr. Morris for what he said. I had the 
same reaction as he did on first acquaintance 
with the original booklet. I too read it several 
times before understanding it. Even now I still 
find it complicated and the way the different 
structures interact is difficult to grasp. 
175 
THIRTEENTH SITTING 
A reference was made to distribution in 
member countries' parliaments. Here there is a 
gap to fill because even the political parties in the 
national parliaments are not iscluded in the 
WEU mailing lists. They ought to be receiving 
automatically not only the WEU information 
booklet but also certain major reports. 
Lastly, I thank Mr. Morris for his suggestion 
about distribution to the other media. If we want 
the public to be correctly informed about our 
work we need to contact the mass media and the 
universities. I am sure that Lady Jill Knight, the 
Chairman of our committee, will do what is 
necessary. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady 
Jill Knight, Chairman of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations. 
Lady Jill KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - I 
should like to make one or two quick comments 
on behalf of my committee. First, members of 
parliament are inundated with documents to 
read. None the less, I believe that they will learn 
quite a lot if they read Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges's document, not least because this was 
indeed an eye-opener to me. She points out that 
no limit is placed on the Council's responsibi-
lities and the preamble to the treaty underlines 
that its aim is: " To ... preserve the principles of 
democracy, personal freedom and political 
liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule 
of law ... ; to strengthen, with these aims in view 
the economic, social and cultural ties ... ". In 
others words, nothing is outside the responsibi-
lities of WEU and I will bet that not many 
members know that. I would say to Mr. Morris it 
was precisely because of our anxiety that so few 
people in our parliaments understood what 
WEU was that we embarked upon a taxing and 
tiring programme of carrying our committee to 
all of our members' governments to explain 
exactly what we do. 
Finally may I ask you, Mr. President, to take 
particular note of the request by Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges that Mr. Caro be asked to write a 
preface to the book? I underline that that sug-
gestion was not just in her report. She made that 
novel suggestion with the complete approval of 
the Chairman of the committee, and I hope that 
attention will be drawn to that. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, I asked you if the Bureau would 
make the effort to have a history written of 
WEU's third decade. You did not answer. Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges was kind enough to take on 
this task, but this question was addressed directly 
to the Bureau because I have been in contact 
with it on this subject. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I did not 
reply because I did not think the question was 
addressed to me personally. My presence in this 
chair is quite temporary and I shall pass on your 
request and also that of the Chairman of the 
committee to Mr. Caro. 
We shall now vote on the draft order in 
Document 1081. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
ten or more representatives or substitutes present 
in the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting 
and standing. 
I put the draft order in Document 1081 to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft order is agreed to unanimously 1• 
I thank the Chairman of the committee and 
the Rapporteur for their good work. 
5. Parliamentary and public relations 
(Pruentation of and thbate on the report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rellltions, 
and vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 1080) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on parliamentary 
and public relations and vote on the draft reso-
lution, Document 1080. 
I call Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
Mr. TERLEZKI (United Kingdom). - Before 
presenting my report I wish to draw attention to 
paragraph 23. There is an error there in that I 
have promoted Mr. Eggar to the office of 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs when that position is already 
occupied by Sir Geoffrey Howe. I hope that I 
shall not be in trouble when I return to the 
House of Commons next week. Mr. Eggar is a 
minister at the Foreign Office and is doing 
excellent work. 
It gives me great pleasure, having been a 
member of WEU and of this committee for a 
short time, humbly but proudly to stand before 
you as Rapporteur. When the committee decided 
l. See page 35. 
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at the end of the last ordinary session to select 
from the texts adopted by the Assembly those 
which in its opinion should be debated in 
national parliaments two main issues were pro-
minent. The first was the threat of international 
terrorism, a matter of major importance to all of 
us. We consequently selected the Assembly's 
recommendation on security and terrorism and 
tried to encourage our colleagues to discuss those 
matters and put questions before their respective 
parliaments. 
As the report on parliamentary and public 
relations and the collected texts relating to parlia-
mentary action in the implementation of the 
Assembly recommendations show, governments 
have had to answer many questions put by 
members in several parliaments, particularly 
France, Germany, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom. If governments have decided to 
pursue their fight against international terrorism 
in larger bodies rather than in the framework of 
WEU, we can only hope that they will speedily 
succeed in achieving co-ordinated and successful 
action. Since the problem remains unsolved and 
therefore topical, we must all keep a continuing 
watch in our respective parliaments. 
The will of member governments to give 
further impetus to the work of WEU led our 
committee to select the recommendation dealing 
with reactivation of WEU, its tasks, structure 
and place in Europe, for national debate. It is 
encouraging that these questions have played a 
considerable role in parliamentary debates in 
several member countries in the past six months, 
although the intensity of discussions has varied 
from country to country. However, all represen-
tatives of member governments have stressed 
that their governments attach great importance 
to the work of WEU. For the first time, in May 
1986, the United Kingdom Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office presented a written report to 
parliament on the activities of WEU, and in the 
latest Queen's speech its work was mentioned, 
again for the first time. My parliamentary col-
leagues, Mr. Christopher Murphy, Sir Anthony 
Grant and others, have provided information 
about WEU activities at national level. 
Returning to our own activities, it was the 
intention of the committee to accelerate and 
accomplish its special information action plan in 
member parliaments during the year and to 
present a summary. Unfortunately, the critical 
financial situation of the Assembly did not allow. 
Financial difficulties continue to prevent the 
Assembly from fulfilling its duties properly. In 
particular, it still lacks the minimum technical 
requirements for fast and co-ordinated follow-up 
action in member parliaments and for the speedy 
communication of information. The WEU 
Assembly remains the only European parliament 
without a telex or telefax. We can only ask you 
all to continue pressing upon governments the 
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need to provide the Assembly with the means 
necessary to do its work speedily and effi-
ciently. 
It is mainly up to the individual initiative of 
every Assembly member to mention the work of 
the Assembly in his home country. Without pre-
suming to have full information about all 
debates in all parliaments, one still has the 
impression that only a few - often the same -
members are active in the cause ofWEU. Heads 
of delegations and rapporteurs should therefore 
help to intensify national debate. 
The political groups and parties in member 
countries could do far more to spread infor-
mation and discussion among the wider public, 
perhaps with the help of political foundations or 
of private or public associations. The committee 
appeals to all to seize every opportunity to 
discuss the role of WEU and particularly the 
recommendations ofthis Assembly, both in par-
liament and among the wider public, thus under-
lining the central role of WEU in defence and 
security matters. 
There has rarely been a more appropriate time 
for taking such action in the light of recent 
events. In the post-Reykjavik situation the 
European voice must be heard, and the dis-
cussion here has to be broadened into a wider-
ranging debate involving all member parlia-
ments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In the 
debate, I call Mr. Murphy. 
Mr. MURPHY (United Kingdom). - Having 
been mentioned in the report because of my 
work to promote WEU in parliament, I felt 
honour-bound to give my support to these 
excellent recommendations. In considering also 
public relations and WEU, we should, perhaps, 
be looking for a simple phrase that encapsulates 
the work of the organisation. I would suggest 
"eternal vigilance", for only in that way shall we 
safeguard the peace in Western Europe and, pro-
bably, the rest of the world. 
The Assembly is continually dealing with 
East-West relations and the consequent impor-
tance of the defence and security of Western 
Europe. I believe that we should pay particular 
attention to ensuring a balance of conventional 
forces in Europe and securing a verified 
worldwide ban on chemical weapons. 
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ment for it to be recognised in parliaments and 
among the public has become greater; hence the 
vital role of WEU in promoting the defence of 
Western Europe. In microcosm, Ollle has the exis-
tence of western democracy and free enterprise 
cheek by jowl with communism and state 
control. 
The British Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, has outlined her philosophy - which I 
share - that the state should be the servant, not 
the master. In Berlin, the allies allow almost 
complete self-determination to West Berlin and 
it has become, in effect, part of West Germany. 
The Russians have almost complete domination 
over East Berlin, with East Germany just a sham 
for their control. West Berlin has an adminis-
tration operating as the servant of the people 
who live there; East Berlin has an administration 
that is master of the people who cannot avoid 
living there. 
My knowledge of the British Army of the 
Rhine is such that I believe that " eternal vigi-
lance " could be its motto also, and that is 
equally true for the British Royal Marines, who 
train in Norway in the very different but vital 
techniques of Arctic warfare. The conclusions 
from my experiences in both potential war 
theatres are that we live perilously by not cur-
rently ensuring a balance of conventional forces 
and that not having recourse to chemical 
weapons puts our forces at a horrific disad-
vantage. 
The nations of WEU, together with our NATO 
allies, are engaged in nothing less than providing 
the front line for democracy in its struggle 
against totalitarianism - and this Assembly must 
not fail them. As a part of that challenge, we 
must ensure that we maximise the impacts of our 
parliamentary and public relations and thereby 
minimise the threat of our opponents seeking to 
influence opinion in our respective countries. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hill. 
Mr. HILL (United Kingdom). - I understand 
that this is Mr. Terlezki's first rapporteurship 
and I congratulate him on his excellent work. I 
know how intensely he feels about defence 
matters and he has information about the 
defence of Western Europe at his fingertips. His 
report will be read and respecteq by all. 
One problem with WEU is its image. As Mr. 
Chirac said yesterday, it is almost unknown. 
Perhaps symbolic - but, at the same time, the People know about NATO, but not about WEU. 
utter reality- of East-West relations is the city of Perhaps the name itself is to blame - it sounds 
Berlin. As I have had the privilege to visit both like the name of a women's knitting or sewing 
sides of that abomination, which is referred to as society. Perhaps we could change the name to 
a wall, but is, in truth, a monstrous cage, the Western European Defence Union, though, as 
need for " eternal vigilance " has become frighten- Mr. Spadolini told us earlier, there is little joint 
ingly clear to me and I believe that the require- defence policy and, at a time when the United 
177 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Hill (continued) 
States and the Soviet Union are having talks, 
Europe is virtually precluded. 
The public relations exercise must start with 
the title of our organisation and go on to the 
calibre of the work produced. I am sorry that 
some of my colleagues allow the secretariat to 
write their reports for them and perhaps to write 
policy rather than listening to members and 
writing the policy that they set out. Far too often 
we receive reports that are virtual replicas of 
reports issued two or three years previously. It is 
easy to write a report if one merely changes the 
dates and names. The quality of the work is not 
necessarily a reflection on members, who are 
always hard pressed for time. The back-up staff 
are not available and the staff that we have are 
also hard pressed. 
If the Prime Minister of France thinks that 
WEU should be enlarged to include Spain and 
Portugal, those who hold the financial strings 
must slacken them so that we can obtain more 
finance for our necessary requirements. For 
example, is it right that our President does not 
have a telex? Is it right that our delegations are 
stuffed into little rooms and have to try to grab 
for telephones? Is it right that this Assembly, 
which is the most uncomfortable that I have ever 
had the misfortune to sit in, should remain as it 
is? Surely a little good housekeeping must creep 
in. 
I am not one for asking my government to 
spend a lot of money; sometimes we get a frosty 
reply. However, could not our secretariat prepare 
a financial statement and prove that we face a 
number of problems? Shall we allow the present 
state of affairs to continue, fooling ourselves that 
we are WEU, about to be enlarged and having 
just been reactivated, but having none of the 
tools to do the job? We must stand firm. 
The report puts the problems in a nutshell. It 
is a poor reflection of progress in Europe when 
we have to instruct members to ask questions. 
We should all be asking questions in our parlia-
ments. The secretariat should put a detailed list 
of questions before us, so that we can get the 
answers to reinforce our demand for more 
finance. 
It is late, but there is much that we could go 
over in the document. My colleague, Mr. Ter-
lezki, has pointed out the problems and has 
made me think again. At the end of each session 
we should produce a list of questions for 
members in each delegation. Those questions 
should be tabled in every parliament and be fol-
lowed up. 
We must not complain that ministers come to 
our meetings. We want droves of ministers to 
come here and to be shuffied on to our uncom-
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fortable seats and to wait while others speak. By 
pushing the message through to our ministers we 
shall at last win the day. We must not give up 
hope and the report is a pointer to how to 
succeed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Enders. 
Mr. ENDERS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Terlezki on his 
excellent report. He has made a major contri-
bution to a better understanding of Europe and 
WEU. 
It sometimes comes as a surprise in political 
work to realise how ignorant people are about 
European bodies. The Council of Europe gets 
confused with the European Parliament, and 
very few people know what WEU is. 
The Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations makes a basic contribution to over-
coming this ignorance, and I should like to com-
pliment Lady Knight, our present Chairman, on 
developing new initiatives. We have visited the 
various countries, we have seen things for our-
selves and we have also acquired important 
information. Of course, the response was not 
always as we would have liked, but we hope that 
we have nevertheless helped to strengthen and 
improve WEU's public image. 
WEU and the members of this Assembly must, 
of course, have the necessary technical and eco-
nomic resources. Things were in a bad way but at 
least a start has now been made, and we hope the 
situation will be improved. 
But it remains to be seen whether the most 
recent measure affecting us parliamentarians is 
the ideal solution. I refer to the fact that we now 
vote with different-coloured voting cards. As the 
colour white appears a great deal, and as the 
voting cards are of a common shape, quite a few 
parliamentarians may find themselves doing 
what I did when I pulled out my invitation from 
the French Foreign Minister to yesterday's 
reception rather than my white voting card and 
so may not have voted in strict compliance with 
the rules. But perhaps this possible error can still 
be corrected. 
Reference has been made here to certain diffi-
culties. My old friend James Hill has spoken 
about them. Anyone who has sat on these 
uncomfortable benches for hours at a stretch and 
had to go up and down this dangerous staircase 
several times will be in favour of improvements 
to the physical conditions in this building. 
Present conditions may also be the reason for so 
few members being present here in the chamber. 
Of course, some have had to leave to take part in 
election campaigns or perform other tasks, but 
others who are here in the building, prefer other 
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more comfortable places to the rough benches 
here in the chamber. 
Mr. President, I have now been a member of 
this Assembly for fifteen years. I should like to 
combine my statement with a word offarewell to 
those who remain. In this decade and a half I 
have had a great deal of enjoyment and many 
happy experiences, which I recall with pleasure. 
We have worked together loyally and across 
party lines. 
When I have been asked what purpose is 
served by the Council of Europe and WEU I 
have been able to reply that the mere fact that 
parliamentarians - from seven countries here, 
from twenty-one in the Council of Europe -
discuss problems together contributes to the 
improvement of understanding between these 
countries, helps reconciliation and encourages 
readiness for peace. 
But if there are still confrontations, if they 
have not been eliminated altogether, I would 
recall the words of a member of my party, that 
great European, Carlo Schmid, who was also a 
member of this Assembly: many a problem is 
better solved over the white table than the green. 
We have had quite a few opportunities for this 
during our work, at our sessions. 
Looking back over the last fifteen years, I 
should also like to thank the Presidents who 
have guided the Assembly and the entire staff, 
which is not small, as we can see when we look 
about us here. My thanks also go to the inter-
preters working in those small booths and to the 
administrations of the countries represented 
here, who have given us many stimulating 
ideas. 
But I also wish to thank the parliamentarians 
who have contributed so much to mutual 
understanding and friendship. 
I will conclude with a promise to pass on the 
ideas I have received here. Recalling what we 
have achieved in the past and bearing in mind 
the common problems we face, I bid you all 
farewell. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur of the Committee on Par-
liamentary and Public Relations. 
Mr. TERLEZKI (United Kingdom). - First 
and foremost, I wish to thank my Chairman, 
Lady Knight, who was helpful, encouraging and 
very charming in pointing out any mistakes that 
I made. I am also grateful to the Secretary of the 
committee who worked so closely with all of us, 
particularly with me. 
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It is with some sadness that I heard that Mr. 
Enders is departing after fifteen years. As a new 
member of the Assembly who hopes to stay here 
for fifteen years, I am sad to see experienced 
members departing from this great institution 
because I wish to learn and ask for guidance and 
help, irrespective of party politics. It is sad to 
lose a man of such high calibre. However, I am 
sure that Mr. Enders hopes to keep himself 
occupied for a long time and I wish him healthy 
and happy retirement. 
As for my colleagues Mr. Hill and Mr. 
Murphy, all that I can say is: a friend in need is a 
friend indeed. I am grateful for their encoura-
gement. As I have colleagues of such high calibre, 
I sincerely hope that our committee will go from 
strength to strength and, with luck, hard work 
and determination I may have the pleasure of 
presenting the Assembly with a report detailing 
the expenditure that we so badly need. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Lady 
Knight, do you wish to speak? ... 
We shall now vote on the draft resolution in 
Document 1080. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
ten or more representatives present in the 
chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I put the draft resolution in Document 1080 to 
the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft resolution is adopted unani-
mously 1• 
I thank Lady Jill Knight and Mr. Terlezki for 
the quality of their work. 
6. Developments in the Soviet Union 
and East- West relations 
(Presentation of the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1079) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of the report 
of the General Affairs Committee on develop-
ments in the Soviet Union and East-West rela-
tions, Document 1079. 
l. See page 36. 
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I call Mr. Close, Rapporteur of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall not go 
into the details of the report you have received, 
and perhaps read, and thus add to the conside-
rable loss of time that the Assembly has already 
suffered this evening. I shall therefore be brief 
but the subject is important because ultimately, 
in East-West relations, it was Reykjavik and 
what I would call a truncated summit that was at 
the root of all the discussions and, in particular, 
the introductory address by our President and 
the statement by Mr. Chirac, the French Prime 
Minister, and various other speakers. However, 
it will help if I sum up again the general economy 
of the report for the light this throws on what 
happened at Reykjavik and its consequences for 
Europe in general and our Assembly in parti-
cular. 
One preliminary point. To my mind, the 
Reykjavik meeting was an interview between the 
two superpowers equipped with the ultimate 
weapon, which probably had domestic politics at 
the back of their minds - the proximity of the 
elections to the Senate and Congress in the Ame-
ricans' case and Mr. Gorbachev's concern to 
restore a failing economy on the Soviet side. All 
this was apparently done over the heads of the 
Europeans. 
The report has three separate parts: the 
USSR's internal policy and problems, its 
external policy and Europe's position in a debate 
in which we have really had no part. 
On the first part I shall be very brief. The sta-
tistics in the report are eloquent. Sixty per cent of 
Soviet exports consist of natural gas and oil. 
Now when you think that oil prices fell from 
around $26-27 per barrel in the third quarter of 
1985 to $10-12 in July 1986 and that the dollar 
was devalued it is easy to understand that, for 
the first time ever, the USSR's external trade 
balance is now $2.5 billion in the red. 
What is more, in order to increase its produc-
tivity and be competitive in the future, the 
Soviet economy, which is not up to the level of 
the economies of the developed European coun-
tries, needs the machinery that we possess - as 
stated in this report only 29% of Soviet machines 
are of international standard. 
I would just mention, in passing, the problems 
set by agriculture, alcoholism and a certain level 
of unemployment about which nothing is said in 
order to indicate that if Mr. Gorbachev wants to 
have the Soviet Union fit to face the future, i.e. 
the horizon of the year 2000, he has to make a 
fundamental choice which was never made from 
Khrushchev to Chernenko because of the 
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internal inertia which has always favoured 
spending on arms and defence to the detriment 
of the consumer society. 
There has definitely been a change since the 
new General Secretary of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics took office. Perhaps the 
change is not merely on the surface but I doubt 
whether it implies any challenge to the USSR's 
key objectives or its doctrine. Even so we have to 
admit that, since Mr. Gorbachev came to power, 
things are different both in the plan he has 
devised to put the Soviet Union back on its feet 
and in his various foreign policy moves; all the 
details of what he has done under both these 
headings are set out in the report before you. 
But, as far as Soviet external policy is 
concerned - this is the subject of part II - it is no 
less definite that the pressure on Western Europe 
is being kept up. Soviet expansion is also evident 
at world level using a technique cleverly com-
bining the direct threat with more indirect 
strategy, by proxy in most cases as in Africa or 
Central America. The fact that the Soviet Union 
has now developed what used to be a coastal 
navy into what is now an ocean-going navy 
enables it to make its power felt in every part of 
the globe. 
That said, it is clear that what happened at 
Reykjavik ought both - these are the two key 
principles - to arouse our interest and to induce 
us to avoid any rash enterprise. In other words 
we have to exercise the necessary caution not to 
become involved in negotiations that would 
prevent us from ensuring Europe's security 
which must, after all, be the continuing concern 
of the Assembly. 
That brings me to the third part of the report 
on which I would like to dwell at slightly greater 
length. What is Europe's position in the dialogue 
between the two superpowers and the Reykjavik 
summit that I have described as truncated? 
The discussions I attended in Istanbul proved 
to me that after a first glimmer of hope, the 
Reykjavik summit turned out to be utter dis-
illusion for Europeans, who consider that if the 
negotiations embarked upon there had been suc-
cessful Europe would have found itself stripped 
of its main defence capability. 
The curious thing is that all the experts, in 
their various writings, have expressed their mis-
givings about our future security. Let me try to 
sum up the article that seems to me to be most 
characteristic in that respect. In the International 
Herald Tribune, Christopher Bertram names the 
three cornerstones of European security among 
which he ranks the nuclear deterrent first. 
So what do we find? I shall not go over again 
what has already been said and repeated at this 
rostrum. Doing away with the theatre nuclear 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Close (continued) 
forces, i.e. the cruise missiles and Pershings, 
while leaving a hundred SS-20s in the Asian part 
of the USSR would put us in an extremely dif-
ficult and worrying position. These one hundred 
SS-20s could easily be moved back to the Urals 
to cover the whole of Europe and I cannot say I 
was satisfied with Mr. Spadolini's answer a 
moment ago because even if we manage to 
balance the short-range SS-21s, SS-22s and 
SS-23s in quantity, Europe's deterrent policy 
would be ineffective, the fact being that it is only 
effective if Soviet Union territory is within reach 
which it is with the cruise missiles and Pershing 
Us. 
That said, and still referring to the nuclear 
arm, what will happen if the Labour Party wins 
the election in the United Kingdom, if their 
declared policy is to have nothing to do with 
nuclear weapons at all? To my mind that means 
the end of any association between the French 
and British forces who might have to fill the gap 
left by the withdrawal of the American theatre 
nuclear forces. 
Lastly, I raised a political problem that no one 
has answered. I refer to the erosion of the credi-
bility of those by whom the deployment of Euro-
missiles has been defended in their national par-
liaments. They argue from two principles, first 
that of the " recoupling " of Europe and the 
United States, confirmed in the interviews with 
Ogarkoff and Ustinov in the New York Times 
and second the re-establishment of the deterrent 
at European level. 
I now come to conventional armaments. In 
some dream of the future one could imagine a 
world without nuclear weapons. Do I have to 
remind you of James Hossegart's article in The 
Times of 27th October? Put shortly, he said that 
unlike Alladin we had no way of getting the 
nuclear genie back in its lamp. Nuclear fission is 
here to say, unfortunately, and we shall have to 
live with it a long, long time, so we had better get 
used to it. 
Only yesterday, the French Prime Minister 
said that the nuclear deterrent was still, in spite 
of everything, a whole vital element in our 
strategy, in fact the beginning and end of that 
strategy, with the incalculable risk that a possible 
aggressor might contemplate, even given the irra-
tionality of a response at the nuclear level. 
Nevertheless nuclear deterrence has to be supple-
mented by deterrence based on conventional 
forces. 
In this field, the fact that needs stressing is the 
constant erosion of conventional forces. The 
paradox at the moment is that conventional 
forces are still more or less the same as they were 
when the " massive reprisals " strategy was 
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thought up with conventional forces being 
" testing forces " so to speak. 
In my opinion, WEU is the only valid forum 
where a unanimous European viewpoint can be 
voiced. It can reflect European countries' 
concerns about their security. It is high time that 
the Union looked into the problem I have just 
raised. I am sure there would not be one dis-
senting voice to say we should not strengthen the 
conventional arm. But how? Sophisticated 
equipment, high-precision guided weapons and 
other gadgets are no complete solution because 
they disregard the human factor- the troops. We 
need a study by the committees of our Assembly 
and particularly the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments to decide how our 
millions of reservists are to be used. To my mind 
they should be used to add weight to the 
deterrent without, thereby, representing any kind 
of provocation to the USSR. 
I have not the time to elaborate on this point. 
There is a whole school of thought that has 
looked into it and produced many studies on the 
subject. It is high time that we took an interest in 
the matter. For a justifiably anxious public 
opinion, WEU is thought to be a forum for 
making fine speeches and producing excellent 
reports, with conclusions and effective decisions 
sadly missing. 
However, the members of the Council have 
gone into dialogue with the various defence 
ministers and expressed their concern. 
To conclude, I would stress that conventional 
forces are going to play an important role to 
which I would urge you to give your attention. 
Think about the demographic situation for a 
start. We know the Bundeswehr is going to lose 
110 000 men, which is a quarter of the total since 
it supplies 500 000 men to the defence system in 
Central Europe. 
In addition solidarity between the United 
States and Europe on either side of the Atlantic 
could well be shaken. What would happen if 
Senator Sam Nunn's proposals went through? I 
am thinking of the possibility that Europe might 
cease to play an effective part in the burden-
sharing. In that case, the Americans might decide 
to ·pull out all or part of their troops from 
Europe. 
In that connection, I would draw the Assem-
bly's attention to the importance of the danger 
outside the WEU area and I was glad to hear the 
representative of the Council Chairman say this 
was of vital concern. 
The indifference of European public opinion 
to what is going on in Central America is, to my 
mind, disturbing. There is a link between events 
there - or what may happen in Mexico - and 
security in Europe. I am thinking of the possible 
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withdrawal of American troops in order to use 
them for sealing off the 2 000-mile long frontier 
between Mexico and the United States. These 
troops could also be used as a means of guaran-
teeing and securing American intervention based 
on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. 
I shall not dwell any further on these pro-
blems. I think we are at a crossroads. No doubt 
we are in the same position as Mr. Spaak in days 
gone by when be said: "We are afraid". Yes, 
Europe is afraid of finding itself alone again. It 
has lived under the comforting shade of the 
American nuclear umbrella, the erosion of which 
is no longer in doubt for anyone, in any case cer-
tainly not after the Kissinger speech in Sep-
tember 1979 - confirmed as it has been by the 
large-scale pacifist demonstrations, Chernobyl 
and other events. 
We have to remedy the weakness of our 
conventional forces and we must also take our 
part in the battle of ideas that is going on before 
our eyes, in which the Soviets are past masters. 
They are also highly skilled in the indirect 
strategy of disinformation and destabilisation. It 
seems to me that we are not countering this 
offensive with the co-ordinated, joint action for 
which WEU, precisely, could be the vehicle. 
If WEU and the Council of Ministers do not 
realise during this session, which seems to me a 
vital one, that it is time to express the funda-
mental viewpoints of European security, in a 
spirit of complete co-operation with our transat-
lantic allies, I am very much afraid that the 
words of Alain Mine in his famous book Le Syn-
drome finlandais will ultimately come true: 
" Europe, " he says " shines like a dead star. 
Eventually we could become the lungs of the 
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Soviet Union but with the status of a 'quasi-pro-
tectorate' ". I hope that our political will can save 
us from that terrible fate. 
(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank the 
Rapporteur and, through him, the General 
Affairs Committee for its excellent work. I would 
also like to compliment him on his very full 
report. I hope that the Assembly will give it all 
the attention it deserves. 
Ladies and gentlemen, in view of the fact that 
the order of business allows us to proceed in rela-
tively comfortable conditions, I ask your 
agreement to defer the debate on Mr. Close's 
report until tomorrow. 
7. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Thursday, 4th December, at 
10.15 a. m. with the following orders of the day: 
Developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations (Debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Document 1079). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
The sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m. 
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5. Close of the session. 
The sitting was opened at 10.30 a. m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
It is not a point of order, Mr. President. Not only 
is this the fourth time that the translation into 
English has failed, but it has been abysmal 
throughout. I have had complaints from people 
sitting in the gallery that it has been inaudible 
and pretty fractured. I have written to Mr. 
Moulias. I would ask for something to be done 
because I have to say to you, Sir, that if this 
standard were the standard that I found used in 
l. See page 38. 
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my business, people would very soon be 
changed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The nec-
essary action will be taken. Thank you for your 
intervention. 
3. Developments in the Soviet Union 
and East- West relations 
(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Fote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1079) 
The PRESIDENT (Translatiom). - The orders 
of the day now provide for th~ debate on the 
report of the General Affairs' Committee on 
developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 1079. 
As Mr. Close present~d his report at the end of 
yesterday's sitting, the debate is open. 
I call Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President ladies and gentlemen, a strange 
destiny ~eems to link the most significant 
reports, from the standpoint '?f def~nce and 
security, before the Assembly this ses_s10n. _Bo~n 
in a climate of sometimes even excessive faith m 
the capacity of earnest politicians' reasons and 
desire for peace to achieve positive results for the 
whole of humanity, the life of these reports in 
this Assembly has been somewhat tormented by 
the changes made to the original text as a result 
of the events that the headlines - and history -
have forced on our attention. 
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I remember the meeting of the General Affairs 
Committee in Copenhagen on 15th October. Mr. 
Close felt that the working paper presented at 
that time was incomplete because of events 
which might require the judgments it contained 
to be differently phrased and given different 
emphasis. There was the disaster of the Soviet 
nuclear submarine and the resounding shock of 
Reykjavik and also, perhaps, the need to give 
some thought to Soviet and American strategy in 
Central America and Africa. 
The weighty study by Mr. Close is based and 
constructed on solid foundations of personal 
knowledge and on tactical and strategical data 
describing situations of unquestionable fact. But 
the philosophy of many people even among our-
selves, who hoped for a different outcome after 
Reykjavik, made it difficult to achieve general 
agreement about the draft recommendation that 
the Rapporteur formulated on the basis of his 
analysis. There are even those, again amongst 
ourselves, who share the opinion that Pravda 
does not speak for itself but puts in the mouth of 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party, 
namely that " confidence in Reagan and his sup-
porters has collapsed". And this was said to have 
happened after the Irangate scandal, thus aggra-
vating and giving a new significance to what 
came after the halt - or rather interruption I 
hope - in the preparatory talks at Reykjavik. The 
hint of a divide between the Europeans and 
America seems to be stealthily gaining ground 
behind the scenes. 
To my mind this mistaken, immature and 
instinctive attitude surfacing here and there can 
only be understood as the mirror-image of a sim-
ilarly instinctive, immature, mistaken and proud 
isolationalism emerging in certain circles in the 
United States. Europeans cannot in fact do other 
than remain " Atlantic " knowing that, behind 
them, as a well-known journalist said a few days 
ago, there is always the American safety barrier. 
On 15th November, in Vienna, Shultz himself 
said: " The bitter experience after the first world 
war has taught us that the United States cannot 
isolate itself from Europe. Isolationism led us 
into a disaster that we are resolved shall not 
happen again ". We want Shultz to know that the 
same post-war period taught us Europeans just as 
painfully the ultimate identity of the deepest 
interests that bind together the countries on 
either side of the ocean. We want America to 
know that its European allies, in proper 
awareness of their responsibilities which need to 
be translated into rational common policy-
making, will adopt clear-cut and agreed posi-
tions, both internally and with their partner 
across the ocean, on disarmament, the zero 
option, arms limitations, political judgments and 
the relevant budgetary decisions, and the efforts 
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and sacrifices that Western Europe must make as 
an expression of its inalienable rights and 
duties. 
Rights of independence and free comparison, 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, but also 
onerous duties that have to be shouldered by 
those who, like us, seek with mind and heart a 
common future where peace is secure. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pecriaux. 
Mr. PECRIAUX (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my cer-
tainty that the report by our parliamentary col-
league, Mr. Close, would prove to be of high lit-
erary quality was matched when reading 
Document 1079 on developments in the Soviet 
Union and East-West relations by a real admi-
ration for his style and for his imposing col-
lection of historical and bibliographical refer-
ences. 
In your report, Mr. Close, I recognised the 
ability to communicate which I had previously 
found in your expensive essay in political 
advocacy entitled " The blue book". The quality 
of the writing is real enough, but the same cannot 
be said of the argument! You argue in favour of a 
freedom which is earned but I would add: a 
freedom which is earned according to your cri-
teria. 
My remarks cover three points: a brief look at 
the text as a whole, a comment on the preamble 
and a personal opinion about the recommen-
dation. 
The report which we are examining today 
gives an account which, to the unwary, might 
seem complete, at least from the scientific stand-
point. Actually, this is far from being the case. Is 
your analysis of the Soviet situation not too 
exhaustive? Are we, as you suggest, entitled to 
involve ourselves in Soviet sociology and in the 
internal life of the Soviet peoples? Should we be 
worried about the accession to power of Mr. 
Gorbachev and a new group of leaders younger, 
as you say, than their predecessors? Do you 
doubt Mr. Gorbachev's desire for reform? Is it 
genuine? If not, what are your arguments? 
Paragraph 135 concerns chemical weapons. 
What is to be said about them? Does the Soviet 
Union have a monopoly of chemical weapons? Is 
there no suggestion that such chemical weapons 
should be deployed in Europe in the event of a 
crisis? Your remarks are aimed at the Soviets, 
but reference might also be made to statements 
by the NATO Defence Planning Committee con-
templating the use in Europe of binary chemical 
weapons originating from the United States of 
America. If so, why not say so? No doubt, out of 
a concern for objectivity! 
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Turning to armaments, I wonder if I have cor-
rectly interpreted paragraph 136 of the report. Is 
there any fundamental need to rearm Europe? Is 
there any need to assume that there is a weakness 
in conventional forces in Europe? Is it not pos-
sible to open disarmament negotiations without 
a simultaneous build-up of conventional forces? 
The problem has been mentioned during this 
session by Mr. Spadolini in his replies to ques-
tions by Assembly members. What is your 
opinion, Mr. Close? 
Turning to paragraph 97 dealing with Africa, I 
wonder what is behind the, to say the least sur-
prising, comments it contains. Like some great 
navigator you go round Africa under full sail, 
without uttering the key word, the truly universal 
image encapsulated in the word apartheid. Why 
baulk at segregation? Let us be brave and close 
our eyes! 
As for Central America, I suggest you look at 
the report prepared by Ernest Glimm for the 
European Parliament. You will find there the 
text of the resolution on the situation in Latin 
America and the rulings of the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague handed down in 
1986. You will find expressed in the report the 
wish of the European Parliament that democratic 
freedoms, freedom of expression and funda-
mental human rights should be respected in 
Central America. 
I now pass on quickly to the essence of th,e 
report and the preamble. 
Paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the preamble 
referring to justification, internal dictatorship 
and military effort can only be described as 
pointless and provocative. Let us concern our-
selves rather with our own difficulties and hopes 
and not pass value judgments about what, if you 
will pardon the expression, is going on in our 
neighbours' back yard. 
Turning to paragraph (x), what do you mean, 
Mr. Close, by the phrase " true negotiations 
which would take account of the strategy now in 
force "? The phrase prompts me to ask: 
Involving whom? Where? How? At whose insti-
gation? On whose behalf? 
With regard to paragraph (xi) of the preamble, 
I wonder if we can assume that the USSR has a 
near monopoly of chemical weapons in 
Europe. 
Finally, I come to the recommendation 
proper. 
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the recommendation, 
which talk about anti-imperialism, the Soviet 
Union's military effort and the increase of con-
ventional forces, strike a jarring and brutal note. 
They seem to epitomise a crude anti-Soviet 
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attitude which is, if you will pardon the terms, 
both blinkered and untimely. 
In conclusion, it strikes me that the general 
philosophy of the report in Document 1079 is 
aimed rather at an arms build-up than at the dis-
armament so longed for by Europeans. 
Mr. Close, I shall listen most attentively to 
your replies, but will probably vote against the 
report notwithstanding. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS(Nether/ands) (Translation).-
Mr. President, is this report by Mr. Close a 
suitable instrument for cultivating good 
East-West relations? If not, what are its short-
comings? Let me answer these questions directly 
for myself. The report is not the most suitable 
means of achieving the goal for which it was 
drawn up, and this is due to the limited view it 
takes of the opportunities for forging satisfactory 
links and to its lack of understanding of the con-
nection between civil and military, social and 
cultural, political and economic elements, which 
is absolutely essential to good relations. 
Chapter Ill (ii) concerns civil co-operation. 
Anyone coming across the reference to Jakob 
Burckhardt in the first sentence of the explan-
atory memorandum might get the idea that this 
report is so cleverly constructed that it is bound 
to present arguments other than the cold war 
cliche in a new form. It was precisely the civil 
package described in Chapter Ill (ii) that con-
tained additional means of achieving good 
co-operation and establishing human relations. 
Detente, security and peace do not depend on 
the indulgence of the hawks. They are not a 
matter for government negotiators and dip-
lomats alone. The members oftlhis Assembly are 
members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe whose work is based on 
human rights. On the basis of human rights these 
members work in various committees on 
problems with legal, economic, social and 
administrative implications. 
Peace and security encourage humanity and 
were the principles initially enshrined in the ear-
liest version of the treaties by which WEU was 
created. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges recalled this 
yesterday in her report, and she refers to the pre-
amble of the modified Brussels Treaty, where all 
this is to be found word for word. Where peace 
and security need to be strengthened, the 
instrument used is deficient if it does not include 
cultural and social aspects. They create scope for 
present and future everyday life and form part of 
the common cultural heritage, whose signifi-
cance transcends national and political fron-
tiers. 
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SDI cannot then be discussed unless it is 
realised that space is just as much part of our cul-
tural heritage as Strasbourg Cathedral. I wonder 
why the General Affairs Committee, whose task 
it is, after all, to deal with general affairs, takes 
such a limited view of the resources for encour-
aging good relations. If the European defence 
identity about which Lord Carrington spoke the 
day before yesterday and the European cultural 
identity which is discussed so often do not corre-
spond, the parliamentarians of the Council of 
Europe and thus of WEU should feel concern. It 
is regrettable that this concern is not reflected in 
Mr. Close's report. I would even go so far as to 
say that it underlines the limited nature of his 
vision and his lack of insight into the mutual 
dependence between the political, social, cultural 
and other aspects of human life. To this extent 
the report is also unhistorical, and unhistorical 
documents are a poor foundation for the integral 
policy which WEU cannot do without. The dia-
logue between the superpowers must be inspired 
by a WEU which is intent on pursuing an 
integral policy. Oddly enough, the only assembly 
empowered to consider peace and security 
matters no longer has a cultural section, while 
the North Atlantic Assembly, which does not 
have this right, does have a cultural committee, 
and that is what Mr. Close means when he refers 
in his report to " various NATO bodies ". I shall 
not appeal here for the reconstruction of WEU's 
stock of available instruments, but I have taken 
part in the debate to draw the attention of the 
members of our Assembly to the fact that, 
because of the limited view it takes of human 
relations among the European countries, a report 
like this is more of a hawk's nest than a guide to 
good East-West relations. 
To complete the picture, I would refer lastly to 
the debate on East-West relations in the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and I would 
ask you, Mr. President, to have a reference made 
to these documents in the report. As this report 
and the recommendation based on it are so 
limited and inappropriate, my socialist col-
leagues and I shall consider not voting for it. 
(Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). - I 
have been surprised by the tone of the last two 
speeches, because the report was approved by ten 
votes to one in committee, with socialists voting 
in favour. There must have been developments 
in international relations or other areas, because 
it seems that General Close no longer enjoys the 
almost unanimous confidence that was demon-
strated in committee. 
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I do not believe that we shall improve rela-
tions with the Soviet Union by relying on hopes 
and expectations rather than on facts. I have 
noticed that so far no critic of the report has 
mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union, with 
whom we are supposed to be getting on better 
and better, continues to engage in mass genocide 
in an imperialist form in Afghanistan. 
The latest official figures show that five 
million men, women and children have been 
driven into exile and are now eking out an exis-
tence along the border with Iran and in Pakistan. 
I have been to some of those refugee camps and, 
if they are a sign of a thaw in the Soviet Union's 
imperialist attitude, I wish that more of our col-
leagues had the opportunity to visit the Afghan-
istan borders to see what is going on. The New 
Statesman, which is one of the two most 
left-wing political journals in Britain, has esti-
mated that 500 000 men, women and children 
have been killed in Afghanistan since the war 
began. If we want our rapporteurs to deal in 
facts, there is one fact. 
Some people hope and expect that the situ-
ation will change. Mr. Gorbachev, who is much 
cleverer than Mr. Brezhnev was, recently 
announced the withdrawal of 8 000 of Russia's 
110 000 troops in Afghanistan. Of course, those 
8 000 were mainly anti-aircraft troops and as the 
freedom fighters in Afghanistan have no aero-
planes, the Soviet Union did not consider it 
essential to keep those forces in that country. 
They have been replaced by more suitable 
troops. 
Afghanistan is a shocking example and we 
should all be thinking every day about how we 
can ensure the removal of the Russian forces. 
There has recently been in the United Nations 
the largest ever vote against Soviet policy. A 
massive majority, including left-wing countries 
in the third world, condemned the Soviet 
Union's action in Afghanistan. Perhaps those 
who speak of a new warmth in East-West rela-
tions could be a little less selfish and recognise 
that events in Afghanistan prove that there has 
been no such thaw. 
Some members have criticised the 
Rapporteur's comments about Africa, but he has 
never said one word in favour of apartheid, and 
nor have I. However, the policies of the West are 
making already poor people ever poorer in South 
Africa and in the front-line states to the north. 
Having made the moral gestures, we should 
spare a few moments to realise that we have 
caused great misery and impending starvation to 
thousands of people, who, whatever the condi-
tions in South Africa - I do not like apartheid 
any more than anyone else does - had decided to 
work there because they could not get a decent 
standard of living in their own countries. Let us 
have a little realism. 
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There are many areas of instability in Africa 
and elsewhere because of the continuing presence 
of the peace-loving, political-military merce-
naries from Cuba, who are paid for by the Soviet 
Union. Again, we see no sign of a thaw there. 
Efforts are being made to destabilise govern-
ments in countries where there is no apartheid. 
These Cuban mercenaries are sent to fight and 
die in countries in which Cuba has no con-
ceivable national interest. A similar situation 
applies in South Yemen and there are even 
Cubans in Afghanistan, learning from their 
Russian masters how to be peaceful. 
I welcome General Close's comments because 
they are realistic. As a defence Assembly, we 
must surely face facts and not be led astray by 
aspirations and hopes that are not supported by 
the facts. No one can argue with the facts that I 
have given. When I heard what had happened in 
Reykjavik, I thanked God for the first time for 
the SDI. If that had not proved a blocking point 
for the Russians, two other agreements would 
have been made. The first would have resulted in 
a reduction in the number oflong-range missiles. 
No one would have objected to that, because 
both sides have arsenals that are big enough to 
destroy the world twice over. However, as one 
government after another in Western Europe has 
realised, the second agreement would have led to 
a withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles. The 
SS-20s would have been moved behind the 
Urals, but even if they were moved far to the east 
they could be back in the front line within a 
week. The Pershing and cruise missiles would 
have gone back across the Atlantic and would 
probably never have been brought back. I cannot 
envisage our getting another double-track 
decision in Western Europe in a time of 
tension. 
Let us suppose that no intermediate-range mis-
siles were left in Western or Eastern Europe. 
Those who support disarmament do not 
mention one important fact. Since the difficulties 
arose over Pershing and cruise, the Russians 
have been installing in Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany what they call short-range tactical 
nuclear weapons. If those weapons are short-
range, Norfolk, Suffolk, London and most of the 
east coast of Great Britain, let alone the countries 
of Europe, are much closer to Prague and East 
Berlin than I realised. Those weapons, of which 
we have no equivalent, would have been left in 
position had the Reykjavik agreement gone 
ahead and not broken down because of SDI. 
Another thing would have happened. In the 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, apart from the 
short-range missiles such as the SS-21, SS-22 and 
SS-23, they have a ratio of seven to one in tac-
tical nuclear missiles, which would not have 
been affected had Reykjavik succeeded. That is 
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an appalling ratio. The Soviets also have an 
overwhelming supremacy in chemical warfare 
weapons and even they do not trouble to deny 
that. At the moment the Warsaw Pact has a 
massive chemical warfare armoury, which is not 
available to the West, for reasons that we know. 
It also has great superiority - too great for any-
one's happiness - in conventional weapons. 
Several paragraphs in the report refer to the 
balance of weapons. Unfortunately, there is not 
another debate in which one can talk about both 
politics and weaponry. In view of Mr. Close's 
recommendations, let me repeat the official 
figures. They are not Sir Frederic Bennett's 
figures and they do not come from a Conser-
vative Party source, but they are the official 
figures comparing the number of weapons in 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO is now in 
possession of 20 314 main battle tanks, and the 
Russians have 46 610, more than twice NATO's 
figure. In long-range and mediumrrange artillery, 
NATO has 8 974large guns and the Warsaw Pact 
has 24 000, which is three times as many. NATO 
has 452 fighter aircraft and the Warsaw Pact has 
1 075. If anyone thinks that that is a secure 
balance without a nuclear back-up, I look 
forward to hearing how we can expect our con-
ventional forces, when we have fewer troops and 
reserves, to defend Europe successfully for the 
foreseeable future. 
I support the report, as we did in committee. It 
is now being claimed increasingly that it would 
be better to do without the nuclear back-up and 
spend more money on conventional arms. We all 
know that it is more and more difficult to per-
suade western democracies to spend even the 
present figures on conventional warfare. They do 
not have any nuclear weapons that they could 
give up, as the British Labour Party claims, to 
pay for extra conventional weapons. Therefore, 
the talk about extra conventional forces being 
made available as an alternative to the nuclear 
umbrella is nonsense. No membetr of parliament 
from any country would dare to go back to his 
electorate and say: " I am afraid that we are going 
back to conventional weapons, and that will 
mean at least double - not a few per cent more -
present military expenditure, at the cost of social 
services, education and so on." We all know that 
we are fooling ourselves if we think that. 
I should like to add a postscript. In Britain, 
one political party, Her Majesty's official oppo-
sition, says that it can provide the extra forces to 
rectify the imbalance to which I referred, not by 
spending more money but by giving up our 
nuclear programme. Let me quote some more 
facts and figures. Any change from nuclear to 
conventional spending would take at least ten 
years to show effect if there wa$ an attempt to 
sustain the current levels of defence spending. 
What would happen if we were to give up our 
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sovereign nuclear deterrent so that more could 
be spent on conventional weapons? 
I said that the Russians had 1 07 5 aircraft and 
all of us in NATO have 452. If Britain gave up 
the nuclear deterrent, twelve extra aircraft would 
be provided in ten years. Also, instead of our 
sovereign deterrent, there would be three more 
small frigates to match up to the Soviet fleet in 
the Atlantic, which would not cause much heart-
searching in the Kremlin. To be absolutely fair, 
let me say that I am told that if we gave up our 
nuclear deterrent and spent the same amount of 
money on conventional weapons, over ten years 
we could provide 300 extra tanks. The figures 
show that Russia has 46 000 tanks compared 
with our 20 000, so I do not think that 300 extra 
tanks over the next ten years would cause pol-
icies to change in the Kremlin. 
I have sought to deal with facts rather than 
fiction and with realities rather than hopes. I 
congratulate Mr. Close on having the courage to 
do what we should do, which is to concentrate on 
realities and not daydream. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, our 
Rapporteur is an expert on the subject we are 
discussing and his very clear report is certainly a 
source of satisfaction to the European conscience 
of at least a section of our Assembly. 
It would be a serious mistake to believe that 
the Soviet threat no longer exists. 
To imagine that European security can be suc-
cessfully guaranteed without weapons is a dream 
and an illusion. Our security would not be 
assured were it not for the Atlantic Alliance and 
the co-operation of the European pillar. The 
Council of Ministers and the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU must endeavour to accelerate 
to their ideal cruising speed as quickly as pos-
sible. At the same time, we should remember 
that our young people no longer accept the 
hypocrisy so eloquently exemplified by arms 
deals be they " lawful " or " illicit " according to 
the circumstances. 
Drugs, arms and terrorism are an unholy 
trinity threatening to destabilise the West by cor-
rupting young people through addiction and 
exposing politicians to acts of terrorism. The 
absence of terrorist acts in the eastern bloc sug-
gests logically the hypothesis that the East is 
organising, or helping to organise, sales of drugs 
and the perpetration of acts of terrorism on our 
continent. 
Apart from this feature of East-West relations 
and leaving aside the economic links between 
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some eastern bloc countries and the West, 
including the twinning of eastern and western 
towns as their most recent manifestation, the 
heartless killings at the Berlin wall and elsewhere 
must bring home to us the fact that East and 
West are separated by ideological barriers. 
We must ask ourselves if honest negotiations 
are possible with totalitarian regimes where indi-
vidual liberties and human rights are flouted. All 
negotiations ending in agreement whether in the 
private, professional or political sphere, have a 
winner and a loser - a draw is the exception that 
proves the rule. 
Any negotiations which involve risks to the 
United States or to Western Europe are unac-
ceptable. It is henceforth vital that the United 
States consult its European allies before sitting 
down to the negotiating table with the East. I am 
aware that it is very difficult to find a common 
denominator between the Europeans in WEU 
and the Europeans in the NATO alliance whose 
common concern is the security of Europe. 
It is vital at all costs that we avoid placing the 
Atlantic Alliance in jeopardy or doing anything 
to impair smooth co-operation and collaboration 
in Europe. 
In this context, WEU demands to be heard on 
the basis of close collaboration between its 
Council of Ministers and the parliamentary 
Assembly. This constitutes the political council 
for European security proposed by the 
Luxembourg presidency. This very close and 
continuing collaboration will enable the min-
isters of defence and foreign affairs to keep in 
touch with the views of both WEU and NATO 
parliamentarians on the subject of political and 
military security. This is the charter of European 
security proposed by Mr. Chirac. 
I am not a specialist in military matters, but I 
have listened attentively to the outstanding 
speakers who have taken this rostrum. The old 
medical dictum " prevention is better than cure " 
when applied to European security could, I 
think, be rephrased as follows: prevention by bal-
anced deterrence is better than subjugation due 
to naive and unpardonable weakness. 
As a Luxembourger, who has forgiven the law-
lessness of 1940-44, I move among Frenchmen, 
Belgians and Germans virtually without fron-
tiers, and consider myself to have a truly 
European outlook. If necessary, I am prepared to 
defend this liberty and assist in safeguarding it 
for future European generations. Come what 
may, let us be on our guard. Let us be sceptical of 
the new Gorbachev style, with its peace doves in 
space. 
In East-West relations, the decisive and crucial 
question is to establish a balance of deterrence at 
the lowest possible level. A definition of such a 
OmCIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Burger (continued) 
balance, acceptable to the representatives ofboth 
blocs, would provide the best guarantee for a 
lasting peace. 
Any hope of normal human relationships 
implying the free movement of people from East 
to West and from West to East will doubtless 
always remain a dream, given the existence in 
the East of totalitarian regimes where the 
expression of opinions and criticism is for-
bidden. 
Athletes from eastern bloc countries are spe-
cially privileged in being able to move about the 
world with only discreet supervision by their 
regime. In token of my political objectivity and 
advocacy of fair play, I would say that Soviet 
football is in my opinion the best in Europe, if 
not the world. To field against the Soviets a team 
of ten players without a goalkeeper would be to 
court disaster, and the same is true in the mil-
itary context. 
Ladies and gentlemen, as Mr. Poos has said, 
let us close ranks with fresh determination to 
face up to our future tasks as a" political forum" 
for the security of Europe without encroaching 
on the areas of responsibility of other 
organisations like NATO, with which we hope to 
collaborate in a better climate in future. 
As head of the Luxembourg parliamentary del-
egation, I take this opportunity of expressing to 
our President, Mr. Caro, my sincere thanks for 
the kind words which he has daily addressed to 
the Luxembourg presidency. 
I am sure you will not be disappointed that 
another small country has been involved from 
the start in helping to construct the various 
European organisations. My thanks to you, Mr. 
President, and to all our fellow delegates. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Burger. 
I call Mr. Palumbo. 
Mr. PALUMBO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I am down to 
speak on the report presented by Mr. Close on 
behalf of the General Affairs Committee but 
what I have to say also has bearing on points in 
the report presented by Mr. Stokes on behalf of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, which we have not been able to discuss, 
the report presented by Mr. Bianco on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee, which has 
already been discussed and unanimously 
approved, and the report presented by Mr. 
Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, which we decided 
not to discuss but instead approved Mr. Sinesio's 
motion for reference back to the committee for 
further consideration. 
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The basic subject of all these reports is in fact 
the same and they are the logical consequences of 
each other, but they unfortunately come to dif-
ferent conclusions and are even contradictory on 
certain major points. 
Mr. Close's report on developments in the 
Soviet Union and East-West relations is the nec-
essary premise for the threat assessment in Mr. 
Stokes's report, while Mr. Amadei's analysis of 
disarmament problems and Mr. Bianco's reflec-
tions on some aspects of the activities of the 
Council of WEU do no more than summarise 
the efforts of the parties involved to preserve 
peace and emphasise the role which Europe and 
in particular our seven-power Europe can and 
should fulfil in making an active contribution to 
the attainment of that great objective. 
These four reports are so closely connected 
that I wonder whether it would not have been 
possible to merge them into a single text, in order 
to eliminate the inevitable contradictions which 
are particularly evident in Mr. Amadei's report, 
whose conclusions I could not have approved 
without appropriate amendments. 
I turn now to the report by Mr. Close whose 
draft recommendation I can fully support. 
The failure of the Reykjavik summit to 
produce any positive results - and the 
impression would have been the same if it had 
been an apparent success - highlighted a truth 
which no European citizen can now ignore or 
pretend to ignore; the fate of Europe is at the 
mercy of the two world superpowers and 
depends on the outcome of their negotiations. 
Furthermore, it must be realised that the terms 
and aims of such negotiations have changed as 
compared with the regular summits to which we 
had become accustomed. The basic objective is 
in fact no longer the balance of s~rategic nuclear 
weapons and intermediate-range: weapons. SDI 
has suddenly been added to the regular issues 
and has profoundly altered the basic facts of the 
negotiations. 
Anyone can see and must admit that this space 
defence policy is a terrible challenge by America 
to the Soviet Union which in spite of vast expen-
diture on space research, ine'f'itably at the 
expense of other civilian uses, is in danger of 
being quickly left behind by the United States in 
a sector which may have some civilian spin-off 
but is first and foremost of military impor-
tance. 
Because of the domestic situation also, it is 
inevitable therefore that the USSR should seek 
to halt or at least slow down the SDI programme 
as much as possible while conversely the United 
States is doing everything to speed it up. 
From now on, this is the new basic factor in 
East-West relations and all disarmament negotia-
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tions, which makes us realise the terrible trap -
more terrible for Europe than for the United 
States - which the western world was in danger 
of falling into at Reykjavik; by giving the 
impression of being willing to yield some ground 
on the SDI programme, the Soviets continued 
their bid to persuade their American opposite 
numbers to agree to the withdrawal of all 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons from the 
European theatre. 
The negotiations failed to produce results but 
the fact remains that on that famous day in 
Reykjavik Europe was in danger of becoming 
totally exposed militarily and above all psycho-
logically to Soviet power. 
Indeed, if all intermediate-range weapons, 
INF, were withdrawn from the European theatre 
all the short-range weapons would still be 
deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; 
some of these are capable of hitting with ten-
metre accuracy all western targets south of the 
Loire. 
And even if the Warsaw Pact agreed to no first 
use of short-range nuclear weapons there would 
still be the threat from conventional and 
chemical weapons and forces in the East 
European countries which the Western European 
states would certainly not be able to meet with 
their conventional forces. 
Addressing Sir Frederic Bennett, I am cer-
tainly not unaware of the actual and not merely 
potential aggression- by the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, I am not unaware of the tragedy of 
that country with whose partisans the Secretary-
General of my party - the Italian Liberal Party -
Mr. Altissimo even spent a short time in secret at 
the end of last summer. 
Reykjavik cannot therefore be regarded as a 
great opportunity for peace offered to the whole 
world by the Soviet Union and lost through 
American obstinacy over space defence. At 
Reykjavik, Western Europe was at terrible risk; if 
the American and Soviet positions could have 
been reconciled, in their exclusive mutual 
interests, the result would have been a com-
pletely new world picture with the United States 
moving towards new isolationism behind the 
space shield and the USSR moving towards total 
dominance in Europe. 
As Cinderella between the two great powers, 
Europe would have been at least Finlandised. A 
sigh of relief therefore for Europeans and in par-
ticular for the members ofWEU? No more than 
that? If that were the only conclusion it would 
certainly be unilateral and limiting. 
The truth probably is that while European 
security would certainly have been at great risk if 
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the Iceland summit had produced a positive but 
hasty solution, it is now difficult to imagine that 
any subsequent negotiations can ignore the posi-
tions stated on that occasion. 
The Soviet Union will not be able to go back 
on its willingness to agree to a gradual reduction 
- down to the zero option - of nuclear weapons 
in Europe while the United States will not be 
able to continue promoting solely and exclu-
sively their research into space defence, it being 
clear that even if such research - which seems to 
me to be allowed by the ABM treaty up to the 
building of a prototype - were capable of pro-
ducing optimum results for the protection of the 
American continent - and this has still to be 
proved - it would certainly not apply in the same 
way to Western Europe. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
will have to accept, each for its own part, that the 
negotiations cannot be limited to nuclear 
weapons and the space shield and that they will 
at the same time have to cover conventional and 
chemical weapons and forces in particular. 
Europe, and more particularly WEU - and I 
am hoping for a WEU enlarged to include all the 
European members of NATO with the prospect 
of our organisation becoming the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance - will have to draw the 
lesson of Reykjavik and take action on its own to 
safeguard its future against the deplorable even-
tuality of the United States taking up an isola-
tionist stance as the Iceland summit in some 
ways appeared to suggest might happen. 
It is precisely for this reason that I am con-
vinced that Reykjavik can act as a powerful 
stimulus for the construction of a new European 
defence community which I continue to believe 
is essential for the security of western 
civilisation, provided we Europeans learn all the 
possible lessons and fully accept that our own 
freedom begins to be lost when it is allowed to 
depend on others. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bogaerts. 
Mr. BOGAERTS (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Burger 
talks about Russian football and it is certainly 
the best in Europe, but I would like to remind 
him that last June little Belgium beat Russia 4-2 
and succeeded in scoring the two decisive goals 
between the ninetieth and one hundred and 
twentieth minutes of the game! 
I note with satisfaction that Mr. Close has now 
abandoned the somewhat ideologically biased 
and simplistic arguments which he used to 
advance when depicting the Soviet menace. But, 
since all partings are such sweet sorrow, we can 
still from time to time note a resurgence, for 
example in his description of the internal situ-
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ation in the USSR, of a naively conservative 
outlook which differs little from the simplistic 
arguments advanced by some elements of the far 
left: the USSR is a totalitarian dictatorship, and 
it is only by virtue of that fact that it has been 
able to contain the ardent desire of millions of 
Soviet citizens to escape to the freedom of the 
West. 
We in the West too often lose sight of the deep 
social consensus which exists between the Soviet 
nation and the state, i.e. between the Soviet 
people and its leaders - a consensus born of, 
amongst other things, their history, past expe-
rience and the steady rise in living standards. 
To judge from his report, the Rapporteur does 
not seem to realise that the divergences between 
the reformers and the conservatives with regard 
to future policy cannot fail to have parallel reper-
cussions on the conduct of foreign policy. In a 
profoundly conservative society, such as has 
always existed in the Soviet Union and in 
mother Russia before it, reformers are always in 
the minority. 
To implement their policy they will always 
need to enter into a " historical compromise " 
with their conservative opponents. At this point, 
two courses are open to them: either they can 
exaggerate the threat from outside, a familiar 
stratagem for anyone wishing to create a con-
sensus in support of his policy, although liable to 
intensify a centralist attitude; or they can 
maintain the status quo, i.e. a spirit of distrust 
and a siege mentality - all attitudes of mind 
tending to strengthen the conservative 
position. 
If the society which it envisages is to come 
about, the reformist team now in power needs a 
degree of detente and expectation in interna-
tional relations. But the lesson drawn from the 
breakdown of detente in the seventies - a 
breakdown as frustrating to the USSR as to the 
United States and Europe- is that detente based 
solely on the two superpowers offers no lasting 
guarantee. It is only one step from this 
realisation to the advocacy of a more diversified, 
and more European, foreign policy, and it is a 
step which the Soviets are in the process of 
taking. 
The only outcome of the Rapporteur's recom-
mendation will be that this step towards Europe, 
which the Soviet reformers wish to take, will 
prove to be a step in the wrong direction 
inasmuch as it will fail to produce concrete 
results. It does not take much imagination to see 
that, as soon as this first step goes wrong, the 
conservatives in the Kremlin, and in the party 
and state machine will exploit the fact to reduce 
the room for political manceuvre and impair the 
standing of the reformers and Mr: Gorbachev. 
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Notwithstanding the almost dialectical tone of 
the report, let us now look at its recommenda-
tions: an agreement on Euromissiles must not be 
signed without a reduction in the Warsaw Pact's 
superiority in conventional forces; we should not 
distance ourselves from the Americans with 
regard to the SDI programme; banning nuclear 
tests does not serve European interests, trade 
with the East serves only to back up its arms 
policy. In a word: " the question of European 
security is not a regional matter, but is linked to 
the establishment of a world balance". 
Since this world balance - a hypothetical and 
debatable concept if ever there was one - will in 
practice never be attained, we are forced to the 
conclusion that throughout the whole inter-
vening period it will be impossible to reach an 
agreement leading to an improvement in interna-
tional relations at European level. By way of 
example I cite here the proposals which my col-
leagues in the SPD in the Federal Republic of 
Germany have worked out jointly with the SED 
in the German Democratic Republic with the 
aim of establishing zones free from nuclear and 
chemical weapons in Europe. 
It is the fear of myself and my party that 
European inertia of this kind, this failure to face 
up to our responsibilities, may result in a return 
to the intractability practised by the Soviet con-
servatives in power in the Kremlin. Is this the 
unwitting foundation on which the Rapporteur's 
recommendations are based? Is this the true 
nature of the de facto alliance between conserva-
tives in the East and the West? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we were 
already familiar with the verve, enthusiasm and 
talent of the author of that well-known book 
"L'Europe sans defense ". As Wti today read the 
report presented by Mr. Close, we can only con-
gratulate ourselves that we ha~ in our midst 
such an expert on East-West relations and 
security at European and world level. 
This document has the great merit of an 
approach which is at once realistic, as far as our 
relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, 
and courageous, because Mr. Close does not hes-
itate, in particular, to broach the delicate 
question of chemical weapons. 
He also suggests that we should exercise great 
caution in our dealings with the USSR, a recom-
mendation which is all the more apposite since 
General Secretary Gorbachev's mastery of the 
skills of communication certainly facilitates an 
objective approach to the problem of difficult 
and delicate relations with the USSR. 
As you very rightly say, Mr. Close, the Soviet 
Union faces a choice: either it c~n increase the 
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prosperity of its people or it can pursue its mil-
itary efforts. In the past the totalitarian Soviet 
regime has taken a fundamental option, but I 
share your hope that it will be obliged by circum-
stances to rethink its position. 
We must look very carefully at all the pro-
posals made by the USSR, but we must never 
lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a 
totalitarian regime which is not called upon to 
explain the rationale of its policy to public 
opinion at home. 
You are right, Mr. Close, to draw our attention 
to the Soviet presence in all parts of the world. 
This is no doubt the critical as well as the latest 
factor affecting our relations with the USSR in 
the security field. The way the USSR has built up 
its military presence throughout the various con-
tinents over the last ten years has altered the stra-
tegic map of the world. The USSR has already 
had a presence in Africa for some years, and a 
number of members have already referred to 
Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. I would now 
like to draw your attention to the appearance of 
the USSR in South-East Asia and the Pacific. 
Clearly, world strategy has been completely 
transformed since 1975, that is, since the "liber-
ation " of Saigon by Russian tanks manned by 
the North Vietnamese. The fact is that the Soviet 
Union, by virtue of a considerable military 
presence at both ends of its continent, has suc-
ceeded in splitting the military effort that the 
West, and the United States, in particular, has 
had to make to contain this threat. 
Sir Frederic Bennett has referred to the 
balance of forces in Europe as between the 
Warsaw Pact and ourselves, but we must also 
bear in mind that the USSR has completely 
redeployed its naval forces since 1980. At least 
half of the total naval strength available to 
Admiral Gorshkov is now deployed in the 
Pacific. This new threat naturally forces the 
United States to make a much bigger effort in the 
Pacific and Asia. 
I also wish to draw your attention to the addi-
tional threat which the USSR could pose by its 
pressure, geographical expansion and encroach-
ments on the third, i.e. the southern, front. 
Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 
December 1979. Should it occur to the Soviet 
Union to continue its excursion beyond Afghan-
istan and the Pakistan frontier into Baluchistan, 
it would reach warm waters. For the first time in 
its history, it would then be able to split the 
Eurasian continent into two, and could control it 
from the North Pole to the Indian Ocean. Oper-
ating from the Indian Ocean it would also be 
able to cut all routes of communication and 
supply, especially those carrying the free world's 
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raw materials and oil supplies both to the West 
towards Europe and to Asia, to Japan and the 
countries of ASEAN. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we must recognise 
therefore that the moment has come, if only in 
response to the needs of global strategy, to see 
that Europe plays a much larger and more 
decisive role in the free world's overall defence 
capability. So, in conclusion, I wish to draw your 
attention to the paragraph I consider to be the 
most important in the draft recommendation in 
Mr. Close's report. 
I refer here to paragraph 5, which states the 
need for a further effort in terms of conventional 
forces prior to, or in parallel with, the com-
mencement of negotiations on nuclear weapons, 
and more especially on intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons. I am thinking here in particular 
of the SS-20s, which pose a threat not only to us 
Europeans, but to all the Soviet Union's neigh-
bours including ourselves to the west, India and 
its neighbours to the south and Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Indochina to the east. This is further 
substantiation of the fact that Europe's security 
and that of the Pacific world are completely 
interdependent. 
Returning to paragraph 5, it is essential that 
the balance of conventional forces be restored at 
the earliest possible moment. This should be one 
of the priority tasks of WEU, which must also 
concern itself with any disarmament negotia-
tions following in the wake of the Reykjavik 
meeting, in which the West might support, or 
continue to advocate, the idea of the zero option. 
It is specially necessary to ensure - and it is vital 
that our Assembly should stress this point and 
bring it home to our governments - that this 
zero option should include the shorter-range 
nuclear weapons on the Soviet side. I am 
thinking here of the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s 
apart from the SS-20s. From our Western 
European point of view it makes little difference 
whether we are killed by an SS-20 with a range of 
5 000 kilometres, or by an SS-21 or an SS-23 with 
a range of a mere 800 to 1 500 kilometres. 
The great danger stems from the fact that, in 
Reykjavik, President Reagan, probably urged on 
by his wish to obtain concrete results on disar-
mament in order to rally public opinion on the 
eve of the legislative elections, made some very 
specific concessions on intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons, that is on the weapons of 
concern to us as Europeans, but not on strategic 
weapons which are specially relevant to the 
security of the United States. 
This is renewed proof that we cannot always 
expect to safeguard our security by counting 
exclusively on a third party, even when that third 
party is a friend and an ally. It demonstrates our 
need to encourage that ally to pursue his efforts 
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on our behalf by setting an example ourselves, 
and by making a much bigger defence effort in 
our own interests. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I hope that this 
excellent report will be adopted with a very large 
majority. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I wish to make a few random remarks about 
Senator Close's excellent report. It read 
extremely well and held together as an 
expression of the hope that the change of man-
agement in the Kremlin might lead to better 
times and the warning that we must not be taken 
in by the window dressing which may yet prove 
to be the only thing that has changed. 
The first speech in the debate took me straight 
back to the era of Gromyko and Molotov. It 
could have been made by either of those gen-
tlemen, because it reflected the 1948 view and 
suggested that there was nothing wrong with 
what was going on in Soviet Russia. I found that 
disturbing, particularly as I thought that the 
speaker represented a country that wished to 
defend freedom in the West. However, perhaps 
the fact that he was able to make that speech 
here, whereas, I would not be able to make a 
speech in Soviet Russia, demonstrates the 
importance of WEU and other such forums. 
Colleague Close - I am not sure whether he is 
a senator, a general or a civilian; each hat fits 
him well- covers a wide range and rightly talks 
about the dangers of Soviet penetration in 
Africa. I am worried about the way in which the 
West has allowed the Russians to get away with 
the fact that they have made virtually no contri-
bution to the dying and starving people in Africa. 
The West has made immense humanitarian 
efforts, but the Russians have done virtually 
nothing. It might be worth our while examining 
what is wrong with our basis of producing infor-
mation for the world. 
Let us try to analyse what Mr. Gorbachev is 
trying to do. In political life in the East and West, 
a new prime minister or ruler is usually five or 
ten years younger than his predecessor. In Mr. 
Gorbachev's case, there has been an enormous 
jump in age and one wonders why it was per-
mitted. Many of Mr. Brezhnev's colleagues had 
held office in the Soviet Union for a long time. 
They could have taken power, but for some 
reason it was decided that they should not do so. 
Was that because Mr. Gorbachev was seen as a 
man who could outwardly portray a change of 
attitude in the Soviet Union? Was it because he 
could demonstrate a willingness to sit down and 
negotiate without saying: "Not everything is up 
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for negotiation. We shall merely sit down"? He 
seems to have been told that he may negotiate. 
It is interesting to consiqer where Mr. 
Gorbachev goes. If he tries to carry out negotia-
tions that go too far, there is no doubt that the 
military, who still control Soviet Russia, would 
rapidly haul him back and say: " That is not per-
missible. " On the other hand, if he achieves 
nothing, the military may say that it was 
pointless putting him there and that they had 
better have a change. Mr. Gorbachev is walking a 
tight-rope. He must make some progress because 
the military realise that Russia's economy must 
have some relief and must be able to deliver 
something to the civilian population. There must 
be some reduction in military expenditure, but 
not too much. 
Mr. Gorbachev nearly achieved far more than 
he ever dreamt of at Reykjavik. We shall never 
know whether that was by accident or design -
unless someone who was there leaks the infor-
mation in the modem way of officials who sell 
information and break their oaths. But perhaps 
that will not happen in this case. I warn my col-
leagues that we must realise that Mr. Gorbachev 
is walking a tight-rope. 
Senator Close was criticised by two or three 
members who said that he was merely displaying 
his well-known distrust and disl*e of the Soviet 
Union. I did not think that anyone here trusted 
the Soviet Union, but some speeches suggest that 
there are members who trust the Russians 
beyond belief. I would be encouraged to trust the 
Russians ifthey made it permissible once again -
not merely under the constitution, but in fact -
for people to go into a Russian church and listen 
to a priest talking as openly as some Polish 
priests talked before one of them was murdered. 
I would be encouraged to trust the Russians if 
they permitted unhindered services in Jewish 
synagogues or allowed those imprisoned in 
Soviet labour camps to come out and go abroad 
if they wished. At that stage, I might believe that 
the Soviet Union could be trusted in some of the 
negotiations. 
There is some agitation in parts of Europe 
because of a foolish statement by a British poli-
tician. I do not normally talk about British pol-
itics in a European assembly, but because the 
basis of this Assembly has been put at risk by a 
foolish statement by the leader of the British 
Labour Party it is necessary for me to read a two 
paragraph extract from a speech made yesterday 
in the British Parliament by Lord Stewart of 
Fulham. He is a former Labour Foreign Sec-
retary, who was held in high regard in Europe 
and the rest of the world for his calm and sen-
sible attitude. He said: " The one thing which 
will put the Russians off negotiation is the belief 
that if they hang on long enough the West will go 
in for unilateral disarmament on a large scale ... If 
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they believe that they are not likely to be very 
helpful at the negotiating table. "' 
The headline of the article is: " Our arms 
policy suicidal, says Labour peer". That is Lord 
Stewart, the former distinguished British Foreign 
Secretary. 
Mr. Kinnock will not win the election, but that 
is unimportant. What is important is the fact 
that he is worrying those responsible for the 
security of the West. I believe that what I have 
said is the view held by the vast majority ofthose 
who may support his party but will not support it 
at the polls. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hill. 
Mr. HILL (United Kingdom). - It is not always 
fortunate for someone to be a tail-ender in a 
long, involved debate such as this morning's 
debate. Many interesting facts were given by Sir 
Frederic Bennett on the composition of the 
forces opposed to us on the other side of the iron 
curtain. We have also heard about the difficulties 
oftrusting the USSR. Most of us in the Assembly 
will remember Khrushchev in the United 
Nations taking off his shoe to slam his table, to 
convey his point. The fear of the Russians has 
been with us for the past forty years. 
Mr. Close was right to say in the first of his 
draft recommendations: 
.. Considering that for forty years the Soviet 
Union has constantly pursued a degree of mil-
itary deployment not justified by the require-
ments of its security". 
The tension has always been there. There was the 
episode of nuclear weapons being shipped to 
Cuba. We have heard about the traumatic events 
in Afghanistan, and still we in the West allow it 
to continue. 
We have heard many facts about the increase 
in the number of chemical weapons held by the 
USSR. We know that Reykjavik was nearly a 
complete failure for the West in as much as we 
would have been left completely defenceless in 
Europe if the negotiations had gone forward to a 
successful conclusion. Mr. Gorbachev and his 
colleagues have real problems building up for 
them. Let me give one simple fact. Communica-
tions between the East and the West are 
improving. People in Eastern Germany and 
further East can watch television proving that 
the standard of living enjoyed in the West is 
much superior to that in the Soviet Union. That 
is one way in which pressure will be put on the 
Politburo to cut down on spending on what the 
Soviets would term their defensive weapons. 
Programmes on television will highlight the 
falsehood of many of the myths that the Pol-
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itburo wants to sustain. In paragraph (vii) of the 
preamble to his draft recommendation, Mr. 
Close says: 
"Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 
the highest Soviet authorities have presented 
many proposals ". 
There is an old English expression for that, 
which is probably impossible to translate: these 
have been sprats to catch mackerels. 
I admire the skill and ability of the Soviet lead-
ership to put on a public relations image that is 
almost impossible to fault. We have a smiling, 
well intentioned, well turned out and correctly 
dressed image, accompanied by a most charming 
wife, probably in a sable fur coat. The whole 
package is good to Western European eyes, but I 
am inclined to think, as Senator Close obviously 
does, that it is something to fear. 
One of the main planks of the report is the fact 
that the USSR obtains help from the West. The 
EEC even contributes to its war effort by pro-
viding it with cheap cereals and butter, but the 
help goes beyond that. The USSR purchases sur-
pluses throughout the West, and those surpluses 
keep at bay what could be famine in some years. 
The money that is saved by bulk purchasing 
must inevitably be turned into arms. 
The report is excellent. It is time that we said 
what it says. It is time that we were more forceful 
and discussed defence policy in depth. Too many 
of us come here to make political points- that is 
understandable: one cannot be a politician one 
week and a neutralist the next ; but defence 
policy is all important. That is what WEU is all 
about, and it is why Spain and Portugal will wish 
to join us in the not-too-distant future. 
This is an excellent report. It is firm, strong 
and clear and I for one will certainly vote for it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone else wish to speak? ... 
The debate is closed. 
I call Mr. Close, Rapporteur of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I have listened 
with sustained interest to the various speakers. 
As was to be expected, they split along the cus-
tomary divide separating what my fellow del-
egate, Mr. Tummers, refers to as the hawks from 
the doves. Personally, I would say that the 
dividing line is one separating the realists, who 
know that international politics are governed by 
self-interest and not by philanthropy, from the 
idealists, whose convictions are highly hon-
ourable but whose dreams, hopes and sometimes 
credulity led us, as we know all too well, from the 
Anschluss via the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia 
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and the Danzig corridor to the final catastrophe 
which claimed fifty million victims. 
I will try to reply as briefly as possible as time 
is passing and flight times are unforgiving ... 
I shall address myself first of all to the realists, 
that is to those who have spoken in support of 
the report, namely Mr. Martino, Sir Frederic 
Bennett, Mr. Burger, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. De 
Decker, Mr. Hill and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. I 
shall then address myself to Her Majesty's oppo-
sition and the rest... 
Mr. PECRIAUX (Belgium) (Translation). -
They have read the report too! 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - I was 
aware of the fact; thank you for this sign of confi-
dence. 
I thank all members who have been kind 
enough to approve the report and who consider 
that it does perhaps contain a positive element. I 
am also grateful for their observations during the 
debate, which were most interesting. 
When Mr. Martino, notwithstanding a certain 
bitterness in the wake of the Reykjavik summit, 
stresses that we should on no account allow our 
solidarity with the United States as partners in 
the alliance to be shaken, he is perfectly right. 
For his part, Sir Frederic Bennett underlined 
what is happening in Afghanistan - a situation 
which many tend to forget in favour, say, of Nic-
aragua, or apartheid in South Africa. He also 
quoted some irrefutable figures for the relative 
strength of forces, figures which I was very disap-
pointed not to find in Mr. Stokes's report. My 
thanks also go to my Luxembourg colleague, Mr. 
Burger, for his eminently sensible remarks. I also 
listened very closely to the arguments advanced 
by Mr. Palumbo, which are in line with the state-
ments made in this forum by our President as 
well as by Lord Carrington, Mr. Chirac and Mr. 
Spadolini. When my colleague, Armand De 
Decker, draws attention to the worldwide 
dimension of the threat, he brings to the fore an 
issue which now appears to be one of concern to 
the Council and which we refer to as " perils 
outside the NATO area". This is a problem to 
which, I trust, not only our Assembly but the 
Council, too, will give all the attention it 
deserves. Lastly, I thank Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
and Mr. Hill for their observations corroborating 
certain points made in the report and under-
lining the internal difficulties which Mr. 
Gorbachev might encounter if he trampled too 
radically on the privileges of the hierarchy or 
upset established situations and vested 
interests. 
I shall reply at somewhat greater length to the 
arguments put forward by Mr. Pecriaux, Mr. 
195 
FOURTEENTH SITTING 
Bogaerts and Mr. Tummers. I was awaiting with 
benevolent curiosity the sugar-coated criticisms 
of my esteemed socialist colleague, and I was not 
disappointed. He called to my mind the words of 
a British minister: " I have sometimes listened to 
convincing speeches backed up by irrefutable 
arguments and the most substantial proofs. They 
have on occasion changed my mind but never 
my vote. " I do not expect Mr. Pecriaux to give 
his unqualified approval to the report, as he 
stated with characteristic frankness that he 
rejects its substance even though appreciating its 
form. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, 
I have said repeatedly that they were not used 
during the second world war, because they were 
neutralised by the fact that both sides had them. 
It is a fact that in this field the Soviet camp has 
superiority due to its crushing preponderance, 
American chemical weapons, considered 
obsolete, having been withdrawn and the 
decision to brandish binary weapons having only 
recently been taken by Congress. In other words, 
we find ourselves in complete imbalance and 
faced with a danger which I personally consider 
to be more real than that presented by nuclear 
weapons. I would remind my honourable col-
league that if we do not have chemical weapons 
while others do, we shall be obliged to wear pro-
tective clothing which will reduce our opera-
tional efficiency by 50% - a disadvantage which 
will not of course affect the other side. 
In relation to current strategy, Mr. Pecriaux 
also raised the questions " Where, when, how 
and decided by whom". I am surprised that he 
occupies a seat in this Assembly' whose purpose, 
to the best of my belief, is to address itself to 
problems of defence and strategy, without 
knowing that the strategy of massive reprisals 
was replaced by the strategy of flexible response 
after France withdrew from the integrated mil-
itary organisation in late 1966, early 196 7. I am 
all the more surprised since, unless I am mis-
taken, a strategy is always approved unani-
mously by all NATO members, and I seem to 
remember that at the time in question his party 
was in power. If he now wants explanations, he 
knows who to ask! He criticises me for talking 
about Africa. Before dealing with Soviet foreign 
policy, it did seem that a few words of the report 
should be devoted to this problem. I have never 
voiced either support for or opposition to 
apartheid, and so I have not, as he alleges, inter-
fered in other people's business. I must say 
however that I find his selective indignation very 
strange, as in my view the greatest political 
apartheid is that practised by the Soviet Union 
with its one-party system, witness the fact that 
the Soviet empire contains seventy million 
Moslems, none of whom share in the exercise of 
power. 
I now come to what Mr. Bogaerts had to say. 
His intervention is confirmation of his party's 
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attitude. which is against nuclear weapons, 
against conventional weapons and against every-
thing else. If his only response to the threat of 
conflict is " let's surrender at once " I am pleased 
to allow him the honour and, of course, the 
responsibility. 
Mr. Tummers, on the other hand, considers 
that my report is very restricted. However, I con-
sider that Mr. Tummers's points are curiously 
alien to the topic under discussion as he refers to 
culture. We shall never be intimidated by any 
threat posed by the Bolshoi ballet or the Red 
Army band. I might add that, before 1940, I 
knew who Goethe was and had read Leibnitz and 
the rest. I also admired German music. 
However, I quite failed to integrate all this with 
the concentration camps where I spent three 
years in that cultural milieu. Similarly, I can 
appreciate Chekov, Tolstoi and Dostoyevsky, 
but I shall never add to the inventory of my 
appreciation the gulags so marvellously 
described by Solzhenitsyn. 
I ask Mr. Tummers to reconsider and to 
remember what happened in the late thirties, 
when a policy of abandonment and backsliding -
the Munich spirit - symbolised a degree of 
naivety which even prevented us noticing the 
reversal of alliances and the implications of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, mentioned a moment 
ago. 
As I often say, we have to be realists if we are 
to preserve the European security we have been 
discussing throughout this session. Reykjavik 
should have made it clear that, if we lay claim to 
European sovereignty, we must have the means 
of defending it. 
(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - I just 
want to make a simple point, Mr. President, 
about two matters at the close of this debate. 
In committee, the report was approved by 10 
ayes, 1 no and 3 abstentions. The intention in the 
harsh tone of the report - harsh because it tells 
the plain truth - was to avoid the ambiguity of 
diplomatic phraseology. For me this is praise. I 
welcome it. 
The second point to note is the absence of any 
amendments. Clearly, there was no practical pos-
sibility of changing anything in such a well-
documented text. I shall therefore vote for it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1079. 
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Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
five representatives or substitutes present in the 
chamber ask for a vote by roll-call. 
I call Mr. Stoffe1en. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - After the 
answer of the Rapporteur it has become even 
more clear that this report and draft recommen-
dation are extremely controversial. For that 
reason it should be made absolutely clear how 
the Assembly wants to vote on this controversial 
report. I ask for a roll-call in conformity with 
Rule 33 (2). 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Are there 
five members of the Assembly who support Mr. 
Stoffelen's proposal? ... 
(More than five members rose) 
We shall therefore vote by roll-call on the draft 
recommendation in Document 1079. 
Before doing so, I shall check that we have a 
quorum. The attendance register shows 48 signa-
tures out of a total of 89 representatives. We 
therefore have a quorum. 
The roll-call will start with the name of Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows 1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Ayes............................... 24 
Noes .............................. 14 
Abstentions ....................... . 
The draft recommendation is adopted 2• 
4. Statement by the President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, before bringing the session to a close 
I should like to say something about the extra-
ordinary session. 
In accordance with Article Ill (b) of the 
Charter of the Assembly, I have decided to 
convene an extraordinary session of the 
Assembly. The Presidential Committee met this 
morning and agreed the following arrangements 
for that session. 
I. See page 39. 
2. See page 40. 
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Thanks to the kindness of the Luxembourg 
Government, to which I express my thanks 
through Mr. Goebbels, the session will be held in 
Luxembourg on 28th and 29th April next, that is 
on the occasion of the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers scheduled for 29th and 30th April. 
I would remind the Assembly that the Presi-
dential Committee will meet with the Council at 
a date to be fixed. The Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and the General 
Affairs Committee will meet the Council after its 
meeting ends. 
The work of the committees must be com-
pleted in good time but each of you will have 
made the necessary arrangements, as we had 
decided that the Assembly committees should 
meet in Luxembourg at the same time as the 
Council. 
The Presidential Committee considers 
therefore that the agenda should cover three 
main subjects, which the committees concerned 
will work out in detail. 
First, the reactivation ofWEU. In essence, this 
will primarily be the follow-up to the report pre-
sented by Mr. Poos, with special reference to the 
Political Committee for European Security. The 
second matter is the proposal by the Prime Min-
ister of the French Republic for a charter of 
European security. This question will be studied 
by the General Affairs Committee. 
Second, there is the disarmament issue dealt 
with in the report by our colleague, Mr. Amadei, 
which has been referred back to the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Third, there are the budgetary and adminis-
trative questions, which will be the responsibility 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration. 
At the end of the three-month period which we 
voted for this week it will be necessary to render 
an account to the Assembly and, of course, to 
have an opportunity of discussing it with the 
Council. 
The salient points included in this issue are: 
the position of pensions in the Assembly's 
budget; the Assembly's operating budget; the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk and, 
lastly, the growth rate to be applied to the 
Assembly with a view to examining and, if pos-
sible, implementing the proposals made by the 
Chairman of the Council in his address on 
Tuesday. 
In view of our extremely tight budget, this 
extraordinary session will be organised with the 
strictest economy. We cannot yet furnish full 
details, but we anticipate having a very small 
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administrative team so as not to prejudice our 
negotiations with the Council. 
I must add that this extraordinary session I 
have decided to convene - without any political 
pressure, it must be said - is the logical outcome 
of what I might term" the positive growth crisis 
of our Assembly " due both to the interest on the 
part of governments and to the amount of work 
we have to do. As it has not been possible to 
dispose of all this work, this special session is 
needed to clear the backlog and, as we shall have 
an opportunity of meeting the Council on that 
occasion, it is clear that the tap priority for the 
Assembly, and more especially for its President, 
must be to ensure that these t~o days are wholly 
devoted to deliberations relevant to our 
Assembly. 
I think I have made myself clear. 
I call Mr. Cox on a point of order. 
Mr. COX (United Kingdom). - May I first pay 
tribute to you, Mr. President. We would all 
accept that you have not had an easy week, 
through no fault of your own. 
I listened with interest to the announcement 
you made about the special session. I am sure 
that members will welcome the opportunity to 
discuss the subjects that you have outlined. 
Numbers one and three are closely linked. If we 
are to seek to reactivate WEU there has to be 
much more generous funding from the govern-
ments we represent. Perhaps before the April 
session our delegations will be able to gain some 
insight into the thinking of governments about 
reactivation. It cannot be done without money. 
The selection of the second subject, disar-
mament, will please many members. Since you 
have said that we are to meet for only two days, 
may I ask that you ensure that it will be a 
meeting of this Assembly, with members dis-
cussing these items? Will you ensure that 
whatever pressures are put upon you, no matter 
where they may come from, you will reject any 
suggestion that other speakers should attend the 
Assembly, telling us how much they admire us 
and support what we are doing but, nevertheless, 
taking up the time that we should be giving to 
debate? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, we have noted your message. You 
said you had decided to hold an extraordinary 
session in Luxembourg, but I recall having 
myself signed a request to this effect. Allow me 
to point out, therefore, that a number of us did, 
in fact, help you to reach this decision. 
I have a number of other comments. In your 
opening address you stated that the Assembly's 
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budget was such that it did not even run to an 
evening sitting you had planned. In that case, I 
wonder how it is possible to organise a two-day 
session in Luxembourg. The cost to our 
respective parliaments will certainly be greater. 
Our sessions seem to me to be curiously 
organised. We complain that our governments 
show no interest or are not pressing ahead with 
the reactivation of WEU. We also complain that 
our financial resources are insufficient to run the 
machine, but, when it comes to considering a 
report as important as the one we have just 
adopted, I note that the attendance register was 
signed by forty-eight out of eighty-nine members, 
which means that a fifth were absent and that the 
report was adopted by only 26% of Assembly 
members. 
I am therefore rather worried about the good 
name of our parliamentary Assembly. I could 
have raised this matter privately, but I preferred 
to air it in public as we are not entitled to level 
criticisms at ministers, even if they are in 
political and parliamentary phraseology, unless 
we are ourselves prepared to shoulder our 
responsibilities and fulfil the mandate entrusted 
to us by the electorate. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. 
Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - May I also 
congratulate you, Mr. President, on the way in 
which you have handled this difficult week and 
on the fact that you have adhered closely to the 
democratic process by arranging the meeting in 
Luxembourg. 
My answer to Mr. Dejardin is that the expense 
involved in arranging the Luxembourg meeting 
is part of the price that we have to pay for 
democracy, but I note that" our Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and Parliamentary and 
Public Relations Committees are meeting in 
Luxembourg at the same time. That suggests that 
you wish to save money and not to be profligate 
with the funds of WEU. We can take that 
message to our governments, because it will 
strengthen our hand in our efforts to be taken 
seriously and may encourage our governments to 
ensure that we are given proper funding for the 
future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
welcome your decision to hold an extraordinary 
session in April. On behalf of my group, I gave 
unqualified support to your proposal. The 
presence here of a large number of ministers was 
an event in itself - a very welcome one, and 
proof of the revitalisation of WEU. 
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I should like to thank the Minister and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council for being with 
us throughout our session. We owe him a par-
ticular debt of gratitude. 
If a large number of ministers came here, it is 
because they considered that it served a good 
purpose to do so, for themselves, their countries, 
the concept of Europe and the construction of 
European defence. I am thinking here especially 
of the highly important address given by Mr. 
Chirac. 
I am glad therefore that this session is to be 
held so that discussion of Mr. Chirac's proposal 
can start and our work on the various reports 
which we have to consider can be continued. I 
hope also that the ministers meeting in 
Luxembourg at the same time will be fully con-
scious of the fact that revitalisation has actually 
taken place and that constant co-operation 
between the Assembly and the Council on 
current defence issues is, as I see it, possibly far 
more important than consideration of parlia-
mentary reports. I trust they will also understand 
that they must reconsider their position on the 
budget for the whole WEU organisation, 
including the Assembly and the Secretariat-
General. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
for your remarks, Mr. De Decker, I am also 
grateful to all the other speakers. 
Before giving the floor to Mr. Goebbels, there 
is a point I would like to mention. 
Reference has been made to the cost to 
national parliaments, but unless there is some 
element of which I am not aware, national par-
liaments will not be called on to disburse an 
extra penny or sou, as we had already decided to 
hold committee meetings in Luxembourg on the 
two days in question. The travelling and living 
costs met by national parliaments will therefore 
be unchanged. 
As to the savings we are going to make in order 
not to overstrain our budget and facilitate our 
negotiations with the Council, I must tell you 
now that only a summary of debates will be pro-
vided immediately, with a consequent reduction 
in costs. The reports of debates you are used to 
having during sessions will be prepared later. 
I must point out here that the decision to 
organise an extraordinary session is a political 
one. Our arrangements must be guided by 
political considerations, and I am sure, given the 
identity of purpose of ourselves and the Council, 
that we both - Council and Assembly alike -
take an identical political view. 
Do you consider, ladies and gentlemen, that, 
with the means at its disposal, WEU is truly in a 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
position to cope with a problem as weighty as the 
one posed for western nations, and for the 
members of Western European Union in par-
ticular? in the aftermath of the Reykjavik 
summit? 
We are the only European assembly where it 
has been possible to discuss these issues and to 
take the relevant decisions. Nevertheless, we 
have the smallest budget, the most modest 
resources and the fewest administrative services. 
We also meet least often. In spite of all this we 
still do our job! 
By attending our Assembly in such numbers, 
members of governments have underlined the 
identity of view shared by the Council and the 
Assembly. That means that our present crisis is 
one of growth. The presence of government 
members in the Assembly is to the good. I recall 
the criticisms voiced by Assembly members 
when government representatives stayed away. 
Our resources are still inadequate, and this 
problem requires attention - but in complete 
political accord with the Council. 
I am therefore not curious to know whether 
one or other of us had in his pocket twenty, 
thirty or forty signatures in support of such or 
such an additional procedure. I only know there 
is one amongst us who, thanks to you and the 
confidence you place in him, is in a position to 
speak on behalf of all Assembly members in the 
interests of the Assembly as a whole. 
I thought it my duty to say this to you. With 
the backing of the Presidential Committee and 
the Assembly, we have to ensure the 
revitalisation of WEU at a particularly signif-
icant time in the history of our countries. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to bring 
this debate to a close by asking you to see to it 
that our Assembly has the working conditions 
vital to its operation. 
I call Mr. Goebbels, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg. 
Mr. GOEBBELS (Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). 
- The Council presidency does not wish to 
comment on your debates, but I must tell you 
that I have taken note of what you have said, 
particularly concerning the budget. In my 
opinion it is clear that the governments of the 
member states must join in an effort to provide 
you with a budget to match your legitimate aspi-
rations. 
As I have already had occasion to say per-
sonally to your energetic President, Mr. Caro, I 
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believe in the reactivation of WEU. Such 
revitalisation is a reality. That fact has been 
brought home to me by your lively Assembly, 
which, to borrow the image used by Mr. Bianco 
on Tuesday, is assuming an increasingly high 
profile. 
That is the reason why so many ministers and 
people in high authority have come to Paris to 
attend this session. These visits have underlined 
the new importance of WEU in European pol-
itics, although I understand, of course, that a 
number of parliamentarians have been inclined 
to look askance at the resulting disruption of 
your work. However, let me put a question to 
you: would your Assembly be in better shape if it 
were not addressed by ministers? Mr. De Decker 
and your President, Mr. Caro, have already 
answered that question. 
In response to what my friend Mr. Ahrens said 
last Tuesday, it is not my impression that min-
isters come here to use your Assembly as a 
sounding board - quite the contrary. In the view 
of the Luxembourg presidency at least, your 
Assembly is a meeting place, a debating forum 
and, above all Mr. President, a source of inspi-
ration. 
That is why the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, 
my colleague, Mr. Fischbach, and I have taken it 
in turn to be here throughout this session so that 
we could listen to what you had to say and pass 
on your views and messages to the Council of 
Ministers. I, therefore, welcome your decision to 
convene an extraordinary session of your 
Assembly in Luxembourg. I can assure you that 
the Luxembourg Government will do its utmost 
to see that the infrastructures necessary for your 
work are made available to you at lowest pos-
sible cost, and will in this way contribute to the 
success of the meeting and to the necessary dia-
logue between your Assembly and the Council of 
Ministers. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Secretary of 
State, the applause which you have just heard 
shows how grateful the Assembly is for your 
intervention and for your renewed assurance of 
support. I would also like to express my own 
gratitude, which I ask you to convey to your col-
leagues in the Luxembourg Government, Mr. 
Poos and Mr. Fischbach. 
5. Close of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, we have now come to the end of the 
session. 
Before closing the session, I wish to thank 
Assembly members for their attendance, the 
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Council members who have been present, the 
Secretariat-General, the successive ministers 
who have addressed us, the press which has fol-
lowed our deliberations and given them consid-
erable coverage this week and all the staff, per-
manent and temporary, including especially our 
friends the interpreters, who have faithfully 
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transmitted our words in spite of the difficulties 
of this session. 
We will next meet in Luxembourg, and I now 
declare closed the thirty-second ordinary session 
of Western European Union. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.) 
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